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Abstract 
 
American suburban fiction is often viewed as satirical social commentary, critiquing its 
affluent, dull, and conformist cultural environment. In this thesis, however, I argue that 
a significant strand of such fiction, published between the early 1960s and the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, was concerned with broader existential themes, 
and was strongly influenced by European existentialism, particularly by Sartre’s 
philosophy. While this influence is apparent in American urban fiction of the 1950s, for 
example in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952) and Richard Wright’s The Outsider 
(1953), it is far more fully developed, and ‘Americanized’, in the suburban fiction of the 
1960s – in John Updike’s Rabbit, Run (1960), Richard Yates’ Revolutionary Road 
(1961), and Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer (1962), all of which, I argue, are 
fundamentally concerned with the notion of existential authenticity. I suggest that 
existentialist, and specifically Sartrean, themes are developed in subsequent fiction – 
from a concern with existential contingency in an increasingly threatening and violent 
suburban environment, apparent in such novels as Joyce Carol Oates’ Expensive 
People (1968), John Cheever’s Bullet Park (1969), Updike’s Rabbit Redux (1971), and 
Ann Beattie’s Falling in Place (1980), to an obsession with entropy, emblematic of the 
desire to escape existential freedom through stasis, in Joseph Heller’s Something 
Happened (1974), Updike’s Rabbit is Rich (1981), and the stories of Raymond Carver; 
and a retreat into solipsism portrayed in later twentieth-century fiction, in Heller’s novel, 
but also Richard Ford’s Frank Bascombe novels, published between 1986 and 2014 
(The Sportswriter, Independence Day, The Lay of the Land, and Let Me Be Frank with 
You), and Chang-rae Lee’s A Gesture Life (1999) and Aloft (2004). I argue that the 
spatial and conceptual indeterminacy of the suburbs, their liminality, engenders 
existential anguish and unease, thus making them an especially conducive cultural 
environment for these authors’ thematic concerns, one in which they are able to 
explore the ideas central to Sartre’s existentialism. Existential Suburbia traces the 
influence of Sartre’s philosophy, developed primarily in Being and Nothingness (1943), 
on the authors of suburban fiction in this period, both directly and indirectly, and 
provides a thematic (rather than chronologically based) analysis of the novels and 
stories based on key Sartrean concepts. Finally, the thesis discusses the revisionist 
TV series Mad Men (2007-2015), set in the 1960s and heavily influenced by the stories 
of John Cheever, considering its concern with existential authenticity and gender 
relations.  
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Introduction: Existential Suburbia 
 
    When the French philosopher and playwright Gabriel Marcel described Jean-Paul 
Sartre as an existentialist in 1945, Sartre replied curtly, “My philosophy is a philosophy 
of existence; existentialism – I don’t know what it is,” despite having written an article 
entitled  'A More Precise Definition of Existentialism’  several months earlier for Action 
magazine.1 The following year, in response to criticism of his play The Respectful 
Prostitute, depicting racism in the American south, he stated, “I am not anti-American. 
I don’t even know what the word means.”2 Yet in the same year, despite his disavowals 
and professed incomprehension, Sartre propounded a philosophy he called 
existentialism, with which his name would become virtually synonymous, and was 
often (and increasingly in the late 1940s) vociferously anti-American in his views.3 The 
conception of existentialism as somehow antithetical to American culture became 
established during this period, and then became entrenched – so much so that 
‘American existentialism’ is sometimes considered an oxymoron: Americans, 
supposedly, lack the European sensibilities that have produced great existentialist 
writers. Sartre famously commented that “there is no pessimism in America regarding 
human nature and social organisation.”4 Camus commented that America was a 
“country where everything is done to prove that life isn’t tragic,” and was disparaging 
of American materialism and its superficiality.5 Simone de Beauvoir, meanwhile, wrote 
that “most Americans are afraid of themselves…afraid of that cold isolation, that 
dereliction into which man falls when he splits off from what is given,” rendering them 
psychologically and culturally unreceptive (if not impervious) to existentialism, since 
“from this kind of separation the drama of human existence is born; without the pang 
of separation the drama is not authentically human, lacking consciousness and 
                                               
1 Ronald Hayman, Writing Against: A Biography of Sartre (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), 
p. 224; 'A More Precise Definition of Existentialism’ (‘A propos de l'existentialisme:  Mise au point’), 
Action, December 29, 1944, cited in Hayman, p.224. 
2 New York Herald Tribune (European Edition), 20 November, 1946, cited in Michel Contat and 
Michel Rybalka, eds. The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre, Volume 1: A Bibliographical Life (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 199. 
3 Sartre gave a lecture in 1946, the purpose of which, he claimed, was “to offer a defence of 
existentialism.” This was subsequently published as ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, and was included 
in Walter Kaufman’s anthology Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre, published in 1956 (New 
York: Plume, 2004, p.345). 
4 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘A European Declaration of Independence’, Commentary, January 1950, cited in George 
Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), p.411. 
5 Rob Kroes, If You’ve Seen One, You’ve Seen The Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996), p. 22; Herbert R. Lottman, Albert Camus: A Biography 
(1979), p.378. 
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freedom.”6 Understood to include both the fervent anti-theological Christianity of 
Kierkegaard and the strident atheism of Sartre, existentialism, however, defies easy 
definition. Alienation, anguish, and authenticity are thematic preoccupations of 
existentialist writing. In addition to the ‘three As’, however, Walter Kaufman identifies 
an awareness of the ‘four Ds’ common to such writing: “dread, despair, death and 
dauntlessness.”7 Sartre, like Beauvoir, considered this awareness to be fundamentally 
non-American, since US culture was pervaded by “great myths, the myths of 
happiness, of progress, of liberty,” its people encouraged to pursue “a life of rosy ease” 
by the media and entertainment industry, to be “conventionally happy,” and to view 
their society as “the least ‘historical’ in the world… never complicating its problems 
with inherited customs and acquired rights.”8 These beliefs were by no means confined 
to Europeans (existentialist or otherwise) and US literary criticism has itself tended to 
view existentialism as ‘un-American’. American critic Frederick R. Karl, for example, 
declared in 1983 that: 
 
Existentialism is meaningful literarily only where death (time, mortality, 
inescapability) is an ever-present reality, not in a society where it can be 
disguised with all the pleasures of wealth and ingenuity….In the end, the 
American believes he can conquer death, just as in coming to the new world as 
a settler, pioneer, or immigrant he placated the devil.9 
 
    This view is based on a fundamental assumption that there is a narrative 
expansiveness and disregard of history and time inherent in American culture, and by 
extension American fiction, and that the inwardness, the austerity and starkness of 
European existential writing is antithetical to such fiction. The influence in the 1940s 
and 1950s of existentialism on American fiction is, nonetheless, recognised by Karl, 
albeit “reduced and modified for American taste.”10 American novels of the 1950s, he 
suggests, addressed existential anguish, but sought transcendence of the absurd and 
so created a kind of ‘failed existentialism’. Walter Kaufman’s anthology Existentialism: 
From Dostoevsky to Sartre, published in 1956, was hugely influential and provided 
                                               
6 Simone de Beauvoir, ‘An Existentialist Look at Americans’, New York Times Magazine, 25th May 1947, cited 
in Margaret A. Simons, ed.  Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
2004), p. 313. 
7 Walter Kaufman, Critique of Religion and Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 26. 
8 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Americans and Their Myths’, The Nation, October 18, 1947 (accessed 08/01/15 
from: http://www.thenation.com/article/americans-and-their-myths). 
9 F.R. Karl, American Fictions, 1940-1980: A Comprehensive History and Critical Evaluation (Cambridge: 
Harper and Row, 1983), p. 3. 
10 Ibid. p. 8. 
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American readers with an accessible overview of existentialism at a time when Sartre 
in particular was literarily fashionable.11 The literary vogue enjoyed by Sartre and 
Camus in the U.S., and the influence of their fiction in particular, had an impact on 
novels of this period, generally urban fiction, featuring disaffected and alienated 
protagonists, searching for selfhood and self-knowledge. Perhaps most notable 
among these were Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952), and Richard Wright’s The 
Outsider (1953), the latter written in exile in Paris, saturated with Sartre and 
Kierkegaard, its title a critical homage to Camus’ The Outsider (1942). Such novels, 
however, tended to be seen as a kind of deracinated existentialism, a poor imitation 
of the original novels. Others, such as Saul Bellow’s The Victim (1947) and Seize the 
Day (1956), and J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye (1951), would presumably be 
considered by Karl as emblematic of the American ‘failed existentialism’ of this period.  
 
    However, it was in the suburban rather than urban fiction of the 1960s and later 
decades of the twentieth century that the influence of Sartrean existentialism was most 
profound: Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer (1961), Richard Yates’ Revolutionary Road 
(1961), Joyce Carol Oates’ Expensive People (1968), John Cheever’s Bullet Park 
(1969), John Updike’s ‘Rabbit’ tetralogy, Joseph Heller’s Something Happened (1974), 
Richard Ford’s ‘Bascombe’ novels, Raymond Carver’s short stories, Ann Beattie’s 
Falling in Place (1980), and Chang-rae Lee’s A Gesture Life (1999) and Aloft (2004), 
are all examples of a kind of ‘American existentialism’, one that could hardly be 
dismissed as simply an adulterated and imitative failure. All were influenced by 
European existentialism (many by Sartre), whether directly or indirectly, and all 
explored existentialist themes in the context of American suburbia, its liminality and 
indeterminacy providing the requisite cultural and existential disequilibrium (yet also, 
paradoxically, an ostensible orderliness and uniformity) to explore such themes.   
 
    In the chapters that follow I will discuss these themes and argue that they can be 
understood using a Sartrean analysis, based on the ontological system Sartre 
developed in Being and Nothingness, published in 1943 (and in several other mostly 
incomplete texts). Key Sartrean concepts will be explained and explored in the 
discussion of these suburban novels and short stories, most importantly perhaps the 
notion of bad faith, “a lie to oneself within the unity of a single consciousness,” a 
response to the anguish of ontological freedom. Sartre explains this anguish – and the 
                                               
11 George Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), Chapters 5, 6 and 
7. 
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freedom that engenders it – as arising from the existence of ‘being-for-itself’, as distinct 
from ‘being-in-itself’. Being-in-itself is complete and without possibilities, and 
characterises inanimate objects (but also non-human beings), which are in a fixed and 
permanent state, whereas being-for-itself, by virtue of consciousness (and specifically 
self-reflective consciousness) is in a perpetual state of existential flux, of change and 
instability. Consciousness, the defining characteristic of being-for-itself, embodies a 
lack, since it is necessarily separate from the being it is conscious of; put another way, 
“if being is present to itself it is because it is not wholly itself,” so that “consciousness 
is not what it is,” a state which engenders existential anguish. What Sartre calls the 
‘project’ of bad faith originates in the desire for an impossible ontological unity, for 
“being-in-itself-for-itself.”12 For Sartre contingency, “the brute fact of being this for-itself 
in the world,” without causal necessity, only possibility, is an inescapable cause of 
anguish, one that the for-itself will (seemingly inevitably) seek to assuage through bad 
faith, to provide some kind of (bogus) causal foundation in itself.13 There is a tension 
in being caused by the coexistence of its facticity, “the for-itself’s necessary connection 
with the in-itself, hence with the world and its own past,” and its inevitable 
transcendence, “the process whereby the for-itself goes beyond the given in a further 
project of itself.”14 The two aspects of being are ontologically intertwined, as Jonathan 
Webber explains, since facticity can be understood to include “one’s character as well 
as one’s past and material body and surroundings, where this character consists in 
the set of projects that one is pursuing and that one can alter,” while transcendence is 
“the ability to move beyond one’s current situation into a new one.” Although “one’s 
facticity includes one’s essence,” this should not be understood as a ‘nature’, since it 
is freely chosen; consequently, “because this essence is not a nature…one can 
transcend one’s facticity freely.”15 Also key to Sartre’s ontology as discussed in this 
study is the notion of ‘the look’, others’ objectifying conception of us, through which we 
become ‘being-for-others’, our subjectivity inevitably denied as we are reified, ascribed 
immutable natures or characters, again exemplifying bad faith. The only means of 
avoiding bad faith for Sartre is the continuous acceptance and valorisation of our 
inevitable ontological freedom, in our unstable equilibrium of freely chosen selfhood, 
which is a means of achieving authenticity, though this must be ‘reacquired’ in each 
new situation precisely because of the disequilibrium of being. The protagonists of the 
                                               
12 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p.629, p.77, p. 62, p.552. 
13 Ibid. p. 630. 
14 Ibid. p. 631, p. 635. 
15 Jonathan Webber, The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 76. 
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texts I discuss all exemplify bad faith, though in markedly different ways, and all seek 
to bolster that bad faith in the false refuge of suburbia. 
 
    The authors of the suburban novels and short stories discussed in this study were 
particularly influenced by ‘literary existentialism’ – by Beckett, Kafka, Camus, and by 
Sartre himself, though they were also influenced by ‘non-literary’ existentialist 
philosophy. Kafka was probably the most influential of the ‘literary existentialists’ for 
many of the writers I discuss, and certainly for Joseph Heller and John Updike. This 
may be attributable in part to what Morris Dickstein calls “the Kafka vogue” after the 
war amongst American writers, in some of whose novels “the public world disappears 
completely and we are plunged into a vortex, a metaphysical abyss.”16 The reason for 
this vogue, though, as George Cotkin notes, was that Kafka’s writing expressed “the 
anguish of modernity, the alienation of modern men and women” and “addressed 
anxiety and alienation in a spare language while confronting the faceless bureaucratic 
horror of modern existence.”17 There was a cultural receptivity to Sartre’s ideas in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s because “at the moment when French existentialism 
arrived in New York, American intellectuals were confronting existential themes 
through the work of novelists Franz Kafka and Fyodor Dostoevsky.”18 The result was 
that, as Frederick R. Karl argues, “Kafka’s presence” was “reinforced…by French 
existentialism, the general ideas rather than precisely the fiction of Sartre, de Beauvoir 
or Camus.”19 In the 1950s and subsequent decades, however, Sartre’s non-literary 
writing did not simply ‘reinforce’ Kafka’s literary influence – it provided a kind of 
philosophical framework in its own right, quite distinct from the influence of Kafka, 
particularly for many suburban novelists of the 1960s and later. These American 
writers often came to Sartre by way of Kafka, who, as Walter Kaufman points out, 
“stands between Nietzsche and the existentialists,” depicting in his fiction “the godless 
world of Sartre, the ‘absurd’ world or Camus.”20  
 
    Camus’ notion of the absurd is described by Frederick R. Karl and Leo Hamalian as 
“a condition that results when man, seeking happiness and reason, confronts a 
                                               
16 Morris Dickstein, ‘The New Fiction: From the Home Front to the 1950s’in Sacvan Bercovitch, ed. 
The Cambridge History of American Literature Volume 7: Prose Writing, 1940-1990 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 145, p. 147. 
17 George Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 108. 
18 Ibid. p. 108. 
19 F.R. Karl, American Fictions, 1940-1980: A Comprehensive History and Critical Evaluation 
(Cambridge: Harper and Row, 1983), p.8. 
20 Walter Kaufman, Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre, 1956 (New York: Plume, 2004), p. 
143. 
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meaningless universe,” the result of “the implicit antagonism between the individual 
world and the collective world in which both strain against each other without the 
possibility of either satisfactory embracement or resolution.”21 This notion, expressed 
a little more succinctly (and poetically) by Camus himself in The Myth of Sisyphus 
(1942) as the consequence of “the confrontation between the human need and the 
unreasonable silence of the world,” between “the irrational and the wild longing for 
clarity whose call echoes in the human heart,” is entirely consonant with Kafka’s 
existential vision, as depicted in such works as Metamorphosis (1915) and The Trial 
(1925).22 What appealed to American authors in particular, though, as Cotkin 
suggests, was “existentialism’s preference for the concrete over the abstract, the 
contingent over the absolute.”23 This description could apply equally well to Sartre’s 
existentialism and to Camus’ absurdism, but it was Sartre’s more fully developed, 
systematic, philosophy, and the primacy of authenticity and freedom within it, that 
proved especially influential. In an article for The Nation in February 1946 entitled 
‘French Existentialism’, Hannah Arendt contrasted the philosophies of Camus and 
Sartre for an American readership, noting that Camus expounds “a philosophy of 
absurdity, whereas Sartre seems to be working toward some new positive philosophy 
and even a new humanism.” Camus rejects the label ‘existentialist’ “because for him 
the absurdity does not lie in man as such or in the world as such but only in their being 
thrown together,” so that life “must be lived as absurdity – lived, that is, in a kind of 
proud defiance…constantly rebelling against all its conditions” and “constantly refusing 
consolations.” For Camus, Arendt argues, “all that remains, all that one can say yes 
to, is chance itself, the hazard roi which has apparently played at putting man and 
world together.”24 Camus thus stresses contingency, but does not explore (or possibly 
disavows) its implications for existential freedom, of crucial importance in Sartre’s 
ontological system. As Arendt notes, for Sartre, what separates things in the world 
from the human being (even though absurdity constitutes “the essence of things as 
well as of man”) is that “things are unequivocally identical with themselves, whereas 
man – because he sees and knows that he sees, believes and knows that he believes 
– bears within his consciousness a negation which makes it impossible for him ever 
to become one with himself.” The primacy of consciousness, which has “the germ of 
negation in it,” means “man is a creator,” since “if man becomes aware of his own 
consciousness and its tremendous creative possibilities, and renounces the longing to 
                                               
21 Frederick R. Karl and Leo Hamalian, eds. The Existential Imagination, 1963 (London: Picador, 
1973), p. 14, pp. 14-15. 
22 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, 1942 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 32, p. 26. 
23 George Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 110. 
24 Hannah Arendt, ‘French Existentialism’, The Nation, February 23, 1946, p. 27. 
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be identical with himself as a thing is, he realizes that he depends upon nothing and 
nobody outside himself and that he can be free, the master of his own destiny.”25 This 
is arguably the crucial distinction between Sartre and Camus (certainly in their early 
writing), and, as John Foley observes, “Camus seems to have had serious 
reservations about the implications of Sartre’s depiction of solipsistic, absurd 
freedom.”26 Sartre, though, did not think that solipsism was inevitable within his 
philosophy, and in fact thought it could be countered through that philosophy.27 He 
also suggested, Foley notes, that Camus had misinterpreted his “conception of, 
absolute freedom…as an assertion of absolute political freedom, rather than absolute 
ontological freedom.”28 While the notion of contingency, central to both Camus’ and 
Sartre’s philosophy, became influential in American literature, it was Sartre’s concern 
with the problem of solipsism and its relation to authenticity and freedom that engaged 
American writers more fully. 
 
    Joseph Heller, whose novel Something Happened (1974) is discussed in Chapters 
One and Two, acknowledged that he was strongly influenced by Kafka, Beckett, and 
Camus (though he also has the protagonist of Something Happened cite 
Kierkegaard).29 He told Richard B. Sale in an interview in 1970 (by which time he had 
been working on Something Happened for nearly eight years) that  
 
I read Beckett and Dostoevsky because I want to absorb their language. I want 
to be immersed in that type of expression… I read The Fall again; the third 
person narration there is similar to what I’m doing. I read The Stranger [The 
Outsider] when I was working on the first part of the book.30 
 
                                               
25 Ibid. p. 27. 
26 John Foley, Albert Camus: From the Absurd to Revolt (Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing Limited, 
2008), p. 109. 
27 This is discussed in Chapter Two. 
28 John Foley, Albert Camus: From the Absurd to Revolt (Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing Limited, 
2008), p. 122. The distinction between ontological freedom and political freedom would become of 
crucial importance in Sartre’s later writing, in which he attempted to reconcile his existentialism with 
his Marxism. In this thesis, however, I am concerned with his early philosophy, developed principally 
in Being and Nothingness (1943). 
29 Bob Slocum says of a former girlfriend that “she had never heard of Camus, Copernicus, or Søren 
Kierkegaard (the three big K’s, ha,ha)” (p.443) and of his wife that “she has never heard of Copernicus 
or Kierkegaard either, although she may have heard of Camus because he was killed in an expensive 
sports car.” (p.449). 
30 Richard B. Sale, ‘An Interview in New York with Joseph Heller’, 1970, in Adam J. Sorkin, ed. 
Conversations with Joseph Heller: Literary Conversations Series (Jackson, Mississippi: University 
Press of Mississippi, 1993), p. 88. 
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In an interview with Per Winther in 1976, two years after the novel’s publication, he 
suggested in reference to Something Happened that  
 
The bleakness of Beckett exceeds even mine. The difference is of course that 
I’m trying to make this horrible grotesque life and deal with it in thoroughly 
familiar terms, whereas Beckett doesn’t and Kafka doesn’t…So I try to deal with 
a world as horrifying as it is to Kafka’s characters but to keep that world familiar.31  
 
    John Updike, whose fiction is discussed in three of the chapters in this study, also 
cited the influence of existentialist writers on his work. He told Jeff Campbell in 1976 
that in their philosophising “Kierkegaard and I might be tedious in the same way...[in] 
this constant turning it over and seeing the opposite side and expounding it,”  and 
when then asked by Campbell if he shared Sartre’s “affirmation of man’s radical 
discontinuity with nature and his radical aloneness,” Updike replied that he agreed that  
“there is a  radical jump between one’s individual sense of me – I – and any other kind 
of  reality.” He stated, in relation to Kierkegaard, that “what the existentialists picked 
up was his insistence on the importance of the individual.”32 In an earlier interview in 
1973 Updike told Frank Gado that from Kierkegaard “it’s not much of a jump to Camus 
and Sartre in whom I find the same gravity of moral concern persisting even though 
they had done away with the theism.”33 Another important influence, as for Heller, was 
Kafka, who for Updike “seemed to strike an essential chord,” when he read him at the 
age of eighteen, because “Kafka suddenly opens up the desolation, the spiritual unrest 
which we all feel somehow and are unable to express.”34 Consequently, in “trying to 
present human experience,” and specifically in Rabbit Redux (1971), Harry 
Angstrom’s “anarchistic…search for infinite freedom” (a search in which violence is 
“organically evolved” from the “distinct reality” of his “individual sense of me”), Updike 
considered “existential philosophy more useful…than the more social views of 
humanity.”35   
                                               
31 Per Winther, ‘Joseph Heller on Something Happened: An Interview’, American Studies in 
Scandinavia, 8 (No.1, 1976), pp.17-31, p.30. 
32 Jeff Campbell, ‘Interview with John Updike’ in James Plath, ed. Conversations with John Updike: 
Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1994), p. 97, p. 98. 
33 Frank Gado (ed) First Person: Conversations on Writers and Writing (Schenectady: Union College 
Press, 1973), pp. 88-89. 
34 Willi Winkler, ‘A Conversation with John Updike’, 1985, in James Plath, ed. Conversations with 
John Updike: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1994), p. 
172. 
35 Michael Sragow, ‘Updike Redux’, 1971, all in James Plath, ed. Conversations with John Updike: 
Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1994), p. 62; 
Jeff Campbell, ‘Interview with John Updike’ in James Plath, ed. Conversations with John Updike: 
Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1994), p. 98. 
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     Joyce Carol Oates has described her writing as being in part “workings out of 
remarks of Pascal, and also Kafka, and Kierkegaard,” but also commented that she 
didn’t know what free will meant, suggesting little familiarity with Sartre’s arguments 
concerning ontology in Being and Nothingness.36  Yet her concerns are Sartrean (there 
are four references to Sartre in her 1968 novel Expensive People, examined in 
Chapter Three); when asked about “existential matters…doubting one’s existence” by 
an interviewer in 1982, she replied, “We believe we exist in terms of other people, our 
surroundings, our activities, or our environment. If these are altered or denied us – 
what then…Is personality nearly all cultural – external trappings?”37 Ann Beattie cites 
Beckett as a major influence, the “whole Beckettian thing” of characters floundering 
and unable to act (which she described as a predicament in which each one thinks “I 
can’t stay and I can’t go”)38 so that, as Christina Murphy suggests, Beattie’s characters, 
like Beckett’s “seem to wait, to long; ironically, [and] even in the process of waiting, 
they do not know what to seek or what can save them.”39 Beattie views her writing as 
making “some attempt to grapple with that alienation...while at the same time not giving 
answers, because I don’t think there are answers to give.”40 In Falling in Place (1980) 
there are repeated references to Camus’ The Outsider (rather than to Beckett), which 
prefigure a violence comparable to that in Camus’ novel. John Cheever’s Bullet Park 
(1969) also has references to Camus, though Cheever did not explicitly acknowledge 
the influence of existentialism on his writing (critics generally assumed such an 
influence, however, viewing the novel as a literary representation of Sartrean 
existentialism).41 Beattie’s and Cheever’s novels are considered in Chapter Three of 
this study.  
 
    Of all the writers whose work is discussed in this thesis, however, Walker Percy was 
probably the most extensively and profoundly influenced by existentialism, both 
                                               
36 Linda Kuehl, ‘An Interview with Joyce Carol Oates’, 1969, in Lee Milazzo, ed. Conversations with 
Joyce Carol Oates: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1989), 
p. 8, p.11. 
37 Leif Sjoberg, ‘An Interview with Joyce Carol Oates’, 1982, in Lee Milazzo, ed. Conversations with 
Joyce carol Oates: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1989), 
p.102. 
38 Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory, ‘A Conversation with Ann Beattie’, 1982, in Dawn Trouard, 
ed. Conversations with Ann Beattie: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of 
Mississippi Press, 2007), p. 43. 
39Christina Murphy, Ann Beattie: Twayne’s United States Authors Series (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Twayne Publishers, 1986), p. 103. 
40 Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory, ‘A Conversation with Ann Beattie’, 1982, in Dawn Trouard, 
ed. Conversations with Ann Beattie: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of 
Mississippi Press, 2007), p. 35. 
41 Reviews of Bullet Park are discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Kierkegaardian and Sartrean. Explaining his inspiration for The Moviegoer (1960), 
discussed in Chapter Four, Percy told Zoltan Abadi-Nagy in an interview in 1987 for 
The Paris Review, that  
                                                                                                                                                                       
The spark might have come from Sartre’s Roquentin in Nausea sitting in that 
library watching the self-taught man or sitting in that café watching the waiter. 
Why not have a younger, less perverse Roquentin, a Southerner of a certain 
sort, and put him down in a movie house in Gentilly, a middle-class district of 
New Orleans, not unlike Sartre’s Bouville.42 
 
In the same interview he spoke of “frantic selves” who “grope for any mask at hand to 
disguise their nakedness,” and suggested that “Sartre’s various descriptions of bad 
faith in role-playing are marvellous phenomenological renderings of this quest of the 
self for some, any, kind of habiliment.”43 In an earlier interview in 1974 Percy told 
Bradley R. Dewey that his “main debt to Kierkegaard is the use of his tremendous 
philosophical and theological insight as a basis to build on.”44 He acknowledged this 
debt with a quote from The Sickness Unto Death (1849) as the epigraph for The 
Moviegoer ('...the specific character of despair is precisely this: it is unaware of being 
despair.') Richard Ford, whose Bascombe novels I discuss in Chapter Two, has 
acknowledged the influence of Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer and Joseph Heller’s 
Something Happened in various interviews, most recently in 2007 in an interview with 
Brian Duffy. Discussing his reasons for choosing the particular narrative style and 
focus of The Sportswriter (1986) Ford claimed he was 
 
In the grip of…several books that I had read that I really liked: The Moviegoer 
by Walker Percy, Something Happened by Joseph Heller, and A Fan’s Notes by 
Frederick Exley. Those books were told in the first person…and they just hugely 
affected me. So I was just in the grip of those books that I liked very much, and 
what I did with my own once I made that narrative decision just came quite 
fortuitously.45  
 
                                               
42 Zoltan Abadi-Nagy, ‘The Art of Fiction No. 97: Walker Percy’, The Paris Review, No. 103, Summer 
1987. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Bradley R. Dewey, ‘Walker Percy Talks about Kierkegaard: An Annotated Interview’, Journal of 
Religion 54 (July 1974): 288, cited in Jac Tharpe, Walker Percy: Twayne’s United States Authors 
Series (Boston, Massachusetts: Twayne Publishers, 1983), p. 5. 
45 Brain Duffy, Morality, Identity and Narrative in the Fiction of Richard Ford (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2008), p. 347. 
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In addition to this indirect influence, Ford has also repeatedly acknowledged the direct 
influence of existentialism on his writing. In the same interview he stated that “all of us 
American novelists are required to read Kierkegaard,” his own reading most apparent 
in Frank Bascombe’s references to Kierkegaard in The Lay of the Land (2006), the 
third of Ford’s Bascombe novels.46 Frank suggests that an acquaintance knows “better 
than Kierkegaard” that “the human species isn’t supposed to go down willingly,” and 
he describes the suburban “Haddam gang element” as communicating through 
“smirky graffiti from Sartre, Kierkegaard and martyred Russian poets,” while early on 
in the novel he recognises the risk of succumbing to “despair that knows it’s despair,” 
an oblique reference to Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death.47 In the interview with 
Duffy Ford also spoke of “fulfilling Sartre’s requirement… to take something that was 
part of life but not noticed, give it a name, [which] elevates important bits of our 
existence to the level where we can think about them. That’s what I did, or had Frank 
do…I’m just fulfilling Sartre’s requirement.”48 Ford also suggested in an earlier 
interview with Elinor Ann Walker that his writing could be considered optimistic in the 
“Sartrean sense that to write about the darkest human possibility is itself an act of 
optimism because it proves that those things can be thought about.”49  
 
    Three of the writers I discuss have not directly acknowledged the influence of 
existentialism, though their work does contain starkly existentialist themes, and often 
includes (whether implicit or explicit) recognition of the historical and cultural influence 
of Sartrean existentialism. In Richard Yates’ Revolutionary Road (1961) a suburbanite 
protagonist has a delusional sense of himself as “as an intense, nicotine-stained Jean-
Paul-Sartre sort of man.”50 In Chang-rae Lee’s Aloft (2004) the narrator recalls his 
father “recklessly quoting Sartre and Camus” and goading his Catholic mother into fury 
by referring to “the then recently announced death of God.”51 Raymond Carver was 
ambivalent about existentialism and its influence on his writing; in an interview in 1986 
he told John Alton, “I don’t feel I’m emphasizing the dark side of things. I don’t call 
myself an existentialist and I don’t feel like an existentialist – whatever that feels like.” 
Carver described the conflicts in his stories as “domestic” but acknowledged that 
                                               
46 Ibid. p. 341. 
47 Richard Ford, The Lay of the Land, 2006 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007), p. 89, p. 238, p. 
76. 
48 Brain Duffy, Morality, Identity and Narrative in the Fiction of Richard Ford (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2008), p. 346. 
49 Elinor Ann Walker, ‘An Interview with Richard Ford’ in Huey Guagliardo, ed. Conversations with 
Richard Ford (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 2001), p. 144. 
50 Richard Yates, Revolutionary Road, 1961 (London: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 23. 
51 Chang-rae Lee, Aloft, 2004 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005), p. 44. 
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“domestic conflicts can quickly escalate into existential conflicts,” and that the tone of 
his stories was “grave…and sometimes dark.”52    
 
    The influence of existentialism on US culture (from the 1940s to the 1960s) has 
been explored in only two studies, Ann Fulton’s Apostles of Sartre: Existentialism in 
America, 1945 – 1963 (1999), and George Cotkin’s Existential America (2003). 
Apostles of Sartre focuses on the reception of Sartre’s ideas amongst American 
philosophers rather than their impact on literature or US culture more generally. Within 
this fairly disparate group of scholars, Fulton includes Walter Kaufman, and also Hazel 
Barnes, who authored the first translation into English of Being and Nothingness 
(1943) in 1956. While Fulton does not discuss in any great depth how Sartrean 
existentialism related to what might be termed ‘American philosophy’ (within which the 
Transcendentalism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, in particular, but also of Henry David 
Thoreau and Margaret Fuller, would be particularly relevant), she does acknowledge 
that among philosophers there was an awareness of the similarities between 
‘Sartreanism’ and William James’ form of pragmatism which, she suggests, was 
regarded as “somehow quintessentially American.”53 Reaction to Sartre’s 
existentialism, though, with its emphasis on individual freedom and the contingency of 
human existence, was generally negative in the 1940s. Fulton points out that Sartre’s 
plays and novels, such as Nausea (1938), The Flies (1947), No Exit (1947), The Age 
of Reason (1947), and The Reprieve (1947), were translated into English, but not his 
philosophical works (until 1956), with the result that his ideas were seen as 
representing a ‘literary school’ rather than a philosophy. By the beginning of the 1950s 
however, Sartre’s ideas had gained more credence; Roy Sellars, a key figure in 
American critical realism, noted in his review of ‘Existentialism’, the similarity in 
Emerson’s and Sartre’s notions of the self,  while Marjorie Grene’s Dreadful Freedom: 
A Critique of Existentialism (1948), was the first American scholarly book devoted 
solely to Sartre’s philosophy. The two most significant factors, though, in the 
popularisation of Sartre’s ideas were the publication of Walter Kaufman’s anthology, 
Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre, in 1956, and Hazel Barnes’ translation of 
Being and Nothingness, published in the same year. Sartre’s theories were also 
contextualised more clearly within the history of phenomenology and of existentialism 
itself, with a keener understanding of how his ideas differed from those of Kierkegaard 
                                               
52 John Alton, ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Literature: An Interview with Raymond 
Carver’, in Marshall Bruce Gentry and William L. Stull, eds. Conversations with Raymond Carver 
(Jackson, Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1990), p. 159, p. 154, p. 156. 
53Ann Fulton, Apostles of Sartre: Existentialism in America, 1945 – 1963 (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1999), p. 3. 
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and Nietzsche in particular, though also from those of Heidegger, informed additionally 
by William Barrett’s Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (1958). In a less 
rarefied environment, the university campus, Sartre gained popularity with students 
coming of age in the early 1960s because of the primacy in his thinking of individual 
freedom, responsibility and authenticity, though the full ontological significance of 
these concepts may not have been appreciated (or even considered). Fulton suggests 
that Sartre’s appeal in America was limited to academics and to the period from the 
1940s to the late 1960s. While she acknowledges that Sartre’s existentialism was 
initially viewed as a literary phenomenon, and she notes his admiration for 
Hemingway, Faulkner and Dos Passos, this is the only reference to US fiction in her 
study. Yet the influence of Sartre’s ideas on American novels and short stories was 
pronounced and profound, from the 1960s to the end of the twentieth century. Fulton’s 
research focus is on the reception of Sartre’s ideas within American academia, and 
she is not concerned with their literary impact, though it is precisely this impact that 
was the more significant, and lasting, as this thesis will seek to demonstrate.  
 
    George Cotkin’s study presents a broader historical overview of existential 
philosophy in the US than Apostles of Sartre, tracing precursors to European 
existentialism, which, Cotkin argues, rendered US culture especially receptive to 
Kierkegaardian, and later Sartrean and Camusian ideas. Cotkin sees clergyman 
Walter Lowrie’s interest in, and translation of, Kierkegaard’s writing as the most 
significant event in the introduction of European existentialism to America. His 
principal contributions to the popularisation of Kierkegaard were his biography in 1938 
and later his A Short Life of Kierkegaard (1942), both intended to be accessible to a 
wide audience with no former knowledge of the subject matter. This popularisation 
occurred extremely rapidly and with the end of World War Two, the beginning of the 
Cold War, and the development of atomic weapons, “a discourse of anxiety exploded 
into the vocabulary of everyday life,” at a time when Reinhold Niebuhr’s moral and 
political ideas were highly influential, published in The Nature and Destiny of Man 
(1941), and presenting a worldview paralleling that of Kierkegaard, and founded on “a 
recognition of the infinite distance between man and God, and an acute sense of 
anxiety.” Rollo May’s The Meaning of Anxiety (1950) acknowledged the importance of 
this particular historical and political period in fostering a generalised anxiety, but 
regarded it as a fundamental ontological state and believed its debilitating effects could 
be overcome through “self-realization and personal transformation,” marking the 
beginning of what would become existential psychotherapy. Kierkegaard was also co-
opted for anti-Soviet political ends, with Whittaker Chambers’ Witness (1952), 
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exhorting its readers to make the “either/or choice between faith in communism versus 
faith in God.”54 It was, though, against the cultural backdrop of the burgeoning 
consumerism and affluence of the mid to late 1950s, Cotkin argues, that existentialism 
gained its greatest sway over American intellectual life, but now more through the 
popularisation of Sartre than of Kierkegaard. Like Fulton, Cotkin identifies Hazel 
Barnes’ translation of Being and Nothingness as crucial in this, but he also stresses 
the impact of her later work An Existentialist Ethics (1967), which attempted to illustrate 
the relevance and consequences of such ethics for contemporary societal problems. 
Cotkin claims that it took scarcely more than a decade for existentialism to be 
transformed from “vogue to canon,” its influence on fiction of this period most notable 
in the work of Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison and Norman Mailer.55 By the mid to late 
1960s however, Albert Camus’ popularity was growing with young Americans, for 
whom Camus’ existential (if not ‘existentialist’, as he claimed) philosophy developed 
in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) and The Rebel (1951), resonated strongly. For this 
generation of college students, Camus’ insistence on the need to confront the human 
condition as inherently alienated and absurd, and, perhaps more importantly, on the 
concomitant necessity of undaunted rebellion (both existentially and politically) was 
inspiring. While Cotkin’s study is broader in scope than Fulton’s, it similarly concludes 
that the influence of existentialism on American culture diminished rapidly in the late 
1960s. Cotkin views the American existentialist novel as a phenomenon of the 1950s 
and 60s, and as inherently urban, with the frenetic, harsh and dangerous environment 
of the city highlighting alienation and precipitating existential crises. Yet, as I will argue, 
the influence of Sartrean existentialism was most marked in US novels of the suburbs, 
and it became more, not less, significant as the 1960s ended, as suburban fiction 
adopted and adapted Sartre’s ideas to create a peculiarly American existential vision.  
 
    There has, though, been little, if any, critical consideration of the influence of Sartre’s 
philosophy on American suburban fiction. Catherine Jurca’s White Diaspora: The 
Suburbs and the Twentieth-Century Novel (2001), Robert Beuka’s SuburbiaNation 
(2004) and Bernice M. Murphy’s The Suburban Gothic in American Popular Culture 
(2009) discuss the symbolic significance of the suburbs, though each focuses on 
                                               
54 George Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 55, p. 
61, p. 65, p. 75. 
55 Ibid. p. 135. Mailer’s romanticised notion of societal transgression in ‘The White Negro: Superficial 
Reflections on the Hipster’, published in Dissent in 1957, in which he writes of “the American 
existentialist – the hipster, the man who knows that…our collective condition is to live with instant 
death by atomic war, relatively quick death by the State…or with a slow death by conformity,” has 
little foundation in existentialist philosophy, Sartrean or otherwise. 
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suburbia primarily as emblematic of the American Dream, or its evisceration. Jurca’s 
study is concerned principally with US fiction of the suburbs from the early twentieth 
century to the 1950s, and she traces a thematic pattern in this literature, namely the 
(disingenuous) reconfiguring of “the rights and privileges” of living in suburbia as 
“spiritual, cultural, and political problems of displacement, in which the middle class is 
imagined to have as much or more to do with subjugation as with social dominance.” 
Jurca suggests that Sinclair Lewis’ Babbitt (1922) marks the beginning of the change 
in the literary conception of the suburban house as being synonymous with a 
comfortable, emotionally and spiritually restorative home, to its portrayal as an 
alienating and disempowering site of disenfranchisement; suburbanites, she 
contends, are now shown to be dispossessed, rendered spiritually homeless in novels 
with “ubiquitous complaints about mass production, standardization, dullness, and 
conformity,” and which disavow “the very real privileges that the suburb has offered” 
and “generate a twentieth-century model of white middle-classness based 
counterintuitively, and, indeed, incredibly, on the experience of victimization.” Jurca 
locates this sense of homelessness in what she sees as an “irresolvable psychic split” 
for fictional suburbanites between their enjoyment of the increasingly affluent 
materialism of their environment, and their anxiety about the spiritually deleterious and 
increasingly debilitating consequences of the standardization and conformity that 
accompany it. By way of contrast, and to point up what she considers to be the 
mendacity of privileged white middle-class suburbanites’ arrogant, self-pitying claim to 
dispossession, Jurca discusses Richard Wright’s urban novel Native Son (1940) and 
the black protagonist Bigger Thomas’ thwarted desire for self-determination and the 
freedom to live where and in the way he wants. Native Son, she argues, highlights the 
fact that white people’s residential freedom, whether they choose to live in a city or in 
a suburb, is “enabled and underwritten by the constraint of others.”56 In her brief 
discussion of the post-war novel of the suburbs, featuring “sanctimonious 
suburbanites,” Jurca suggests there is little change in their portrayal in novels of the 
1950s and 1960s, other than in the reflection of their authors’ anxiety over the loss of 
an elevated social position, exemplified by Sloan Wilson’s The Man in the Gray Flannel 
Suit (1955) and Richard Yates’ Revolutionary Road (1960).57 Jurca regards suburban 
                                               
56 Catherine Jurca, White Diaspora: The Suburb and the Twentieth-Century American Novel (New 
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fiction of later decades of the twentieth century as merely continuations of the tradition 
of “undercut conceit, beleaguerment, and self-pity that has characterised the white 
diaspora in the suburban novel,” the familiar disingenuous self-indulgence and 
comfortable bourgeois alienation of privileged white (mostly) male writers.58 
 
    Jurca’s assertion that suburbia is generally a privileged space, affording its 
comparatively affluent inhabitants a material comfort and well-being not enjoyed by 
those outside such an environment, is surely irrefutable. It is not clear, however, why 
the relative economic prosperity and security of the protagonists of the suburban fiction 
Jurca so thoroughly disparages should preclude spiritual and existential anguish – 
indeed, these could be seen as providing the psychic space for such anguish to 
manifest itself, in an environment that is, contradictorily, culturally and physically 
amorphous and changeable, yet also rigidly normative. Implicit in her analysis is the 
assumption that alienation is a social, political and economic phenomenon, not an 
existential one, and that the anguish of suburbanites can only be an affectation. For 
Jurca Bigger Thomas’ alienation is real, verifiable by his societal status as outsider, 
marginalised and oppressed, and it can only be overcome socially, in the ‘community’ 
of the similarly disenfranchised in prison. The implication of much of the suburban 
literature of alienation, however, is that it cannot be fully overcome socially and 
economically, since it is not solely social or economic; it cannot be explained in terms 
purely of anxieties over economic and social status and their perceived 
precariousness, a notion Jurca would surely dismiss as risible. Yet, in downplaying the 
thematic diversity and nuanced narratives of mid to late twentieth-century novels of 
the suburbs, her analysis elides significant developments in a body of fiction that 
necessarily charted a social, cultural and environmental phenomenon that was in a 
state of flux and indeterminacy. It is perhaps not surprising then that such fiction, as I 
will argue, evinced a consistent fixation with existential – and existentialist – concerns, 
displaying a heightening of existential anguish.  
 
    While Robert Beuka’s SuburbiaNation does discuss mid to late twentieth-century 
suburban fiction (and films) in some depth, his analytical focus is on portrayals of 
suburbia as “the material counterpart” to a drive toward “cultural homogenization.” 
Beuka argues that John Updike’s Rabbit tetralogy traces “the collapse of the pastoral 
                                               
collar workplace.” (The Twilight of the Middle Class: Post-World War II American Fiction and White-
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dream of the suburbs into an unsettling space of homogenous facelessness.”59 Like 
Jurca, he views “the failure of the suburban dream” depicted in fiction of the 1950 and 
1960s as indicative of social and economic anxieties, and imperilled suburban 
masculinity in particular. Beuka’s chronological analysis begins with a comparison of 
F. Scott Fitzgerald’s depiction of Long Island exurbia in The Great Gatsby (1925) and 
Frank Capra’s It’s a Wonderful Life, released in 1946. While the former concerns 
wealthy exurbanites of 1920s New York and the latter portrays middle class life in a 
small town during the Great Depression and World War Two, “each text is set in an 
environment in transition, and each positions a nostalgia for landscapes of the past in 
the face of the onrush of modernity, figured in the form of suburbanization.”60 Beuka 
views John Cheever’s stories published between the late 1940s and the late 1960s as 
primarily reflecting “larger societal concerns over the relationship between economic 
position and social ‘place’” in a period of middle class expansion. In the course of these 
two decades Cheever’s characters change from city dwellers living economically 
precarious lives to wealthy but anxious exurbanites, yet both are plagued by 
insecurities concerning social position and status. As Beuka suggests, in the 1970s 
the oppression experienced by women in the suburbs was documented more than in 
previous decades, as exemplified by Ann Beattie’s novel Falling in Place (1980) and 
Bryan Forbes’ 1975 film adaptation of Ira Levin’s The Stepford Wives (1972). By the 
1990s the suburbs had ceased to be the exclusive preserve of the white middle class, 
as reflected in Gloria Naylor’s novel Linden Hills (1985) and Reginald Hudlin’s film 
House Party (1990), both about African American suburbanites. They offer contrasting 
views of this experience, the former presenting a dystopian landscape in which the 
extreme materialism of the residents results in the dissolution not only of a sense of 
community, but also of a sense of racial identity itself (and even of self), while in the 
latter “the suburban terrain is valorized as representing the very promise of African 
American achievement.” 61 
 
    Although Beuka implicitly acknowledges that the crises faced by these suburbanites 
are existential in nature, since they concern a malleable sense of self and of identity, 
he considers such identities to be culturally determined, suggesting there is no self 
that is separate from its cultural construction – a view seemingly in accordance with 
postmodern theories of identity. He is right to stress, however, the importance of 
                                               
59 Robert Beuka, SuburbiaNation: Reading Suburban Landscapes in Twentieth-Century American 
Fiction and Film (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 2, p. 119. 
60 Ibid. p 136, p. 26. 
61 Ibid. p. 69, p. 197. 
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landscape in this construction, as a physical and conceptual phenomenon, and 
specifically the significance of the suburb as “both an idealized and insular landscape,” 
in contrast to the common “perception of suburbia as a culturally flat, static space,” a 
perception shown to be false in the texts he discusses. It is clear, as he suggests, that 
the interpretive power of this concept of the suburban landscape has not been fully 
explored, and in analysing it as a marker and indication of socio-economic and cultural 
changes he provides a valid, if partial, account of its significance.62 The importance of 
the suburb as fraught and mutable existential space is not clearly acknowledged in his 
analysis, yet in many of the texts he discusses it is foregrounded – for example in 
Updike’s Rabbit Redux and Beattie’s Falling in Place, and in Cheever’s exurbia of 
Bullet Park – as an environment exemplifying existential contingency. As I will argue 
in this thesis, fictive suburbia is often for American writers the liminal environment in 
which existential themes can be most effectively addressed and developed.  
     
    Bernice M. Murphy shares Jurca’s and Beuka’s view that post-war US fiction of the 
suburbs reflected white middle class anxieties over rapid lifestyle changes. She 
identifies the Suburban Gothic as “a sub-genre of the wider American gothic tradition 
that often dramatises anxieties arising from the mass suburbanisation of the United 
States.” Murphy analyses novelistic and cinematic depictions of suburbia as a 
dystopian landscape besieged by aliens, androids, zombies, witches and vampires, 
haunted by ghosts, and stalked by serial killers. In the various novels and films she 
discusses, the suburban dream of a “utopian setting…insulated from the dangers of 
the outside world” has become “a place of entrapment and unhappiness…in which the 
most dangerous threats come from within, not from without.” In the post-war culture of 
the 1950s mass suburbia was an ideal environment for fictional depictions of anxieties 
about depersonalisation because of its uncertain geographical status, “falling between 
two geographical stools,” and being “an in-between space by definition: located 
beyond the heart of a town or city, yet still existing within its urban orbit.”63 This 
indeterminacy is of pivotal importance in her analysis, and equally so in the chapters 
that follow in this study, since anguish arises in “the gaps between what something is 
and what it is not,” foregrounding questions about identity and selfhood. Like Beuka 
and Jurca, Murphy groups the texts she discusses both chronologically and 
thematically, beginning with Shirley Jackson’s and Richard Matheson’s fiction, which 
shares the same concerns with “paranoia, entrapment, domesticity, neurosis, 
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isolation, the redefinition of the meaning of the terms ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ and the 
exploration of the dark side of American society during the 1950s.” Murphy also traces 
the development in fiction, film and television of the ‘suburban witch’, as exemplified 
in Fritz Leiber’s Conjure Wife (1943), published as a full-length novel in 1952 and 
George A Romero’s film Jack’s Wife (1972), which present suburban domesticity as a 
form of entrapment and submission within an oppressive environment and culture. The 
sense of suburban menace and otherness is even more marked, Murphy argues, with 
depictions of (literal) dehumanisation in Jack Finney’s Invasion of the Body Snatchers 
(1956), George A. Romero’s Night of the Living Dead (1968), and Ira Levin’s novel 
The Stepford Wives (1972). In the suburban haunted house, environment and 
inhabitant are also inextricably linked, as in The Amityville Horror (1977), Anne Rivers 
Siddons’ novel The House Next Door (1978), and Poltergeist (1982), while in horror 
films featuring serial killers, such as Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960), Peter 
Bogdanovich’s 1968 film Targets, and John Carpenter’s Halloween (1978), suburbia 
becomes “a valid site for narratives in which apparently inexplicable and random acts 
of violence take place,” with the family itself now “a powerful locus of horror.”64 
 
    Murphy’s study highlights a facet of suburbia that is of central importance – its 
indeterminate, liminal status as a fictional landscape, which is acknowledged but not 
explored in Beuka’s SuburbiaNation, and not addressed at all in Jurca’s White 
Diaspora. She rightly emphasises the unsettling effect this has on suburbanites, the 
sense of nebulousness and inchoateness that they feel, and the attendant unease, 
and often dread, precipitating crises of personal identity. She also recognises the 
seemingly contradictory tendency of suburban culture to restrict, delimit, isolate and 
homogenise, though this can perhaps best be understood as, at least in part, a 
reaction to the anguish provoked by this environment’s liminality, its indeterminacy. 
Crucially, she identifies the sense of the Other, and of otherness, as a constant theme, 
with ever growing alienation as the suburb becomes increasingly interiorised, and the 
threat is not just from within suburbia, but from within the self, oneself become the 
Other, in inversions and reversals of identity. Since Murphy’s study is concerned with 
representations of the suburban gothic and their socio-cultural significance she does 
not explore the existential themes of the novels and films she discusses (the word 
‘existential’ appears only once, and only in the index in reference to ‘existential crisis’). 
Yet this subgenre, like the urban gothic subgenre at the end of the nineteenth century 
– exemplified by R.L. Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886), 
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Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) and Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897) – 
while generally interpreted as a barometer of societal anxiety in a period of 
unprecedented change, also addresses existential themes and problematizes the 
notion of selfhood. This is key in much fiction of the suburbs in the second half of the 
twentieth century, not just in gothicised fiction, and it is this ramified theme that the 
current study will explore.  
 
    While existing studies, then, do acknowledge the dystopian bleakness of many 
novels of the US suburbs, they focus on their social, economic and cultural 
significance, rather than explicitly on their existential themes. Seemingly lacking the 
intensity and starkness of the urban novels by writers such as Bellow, Wright and 
Ellison cited earlier, suburban fiction is considered to be primarily social commentary 
and satire, if in the case of suburban gothicism, violent satire. These studies seem at 
times, though, to conflate the 1950s sociological critiques of the newly burgeoning 
mass suburbia with the novels depicting the lives and preoccupations of its inhabitants. 
William H. Whyte was one of the most influential social critics of this period, as Jurca, 
Beuka and Murphy all acknowledge, and his belief that the suburbs encouraged an 
oppressive banality, a fearful conformity, was echoed in much of the social 
commentary of the time. His study of Park Forrest, Illinois, published as The 
Organization Man (1956) found the inhabitants of this suburb to be inordinately 
conservative and conformist, their characters shaped and altered by corporate 
bureaucracy, the new consumer economy, and the homogeneity of suburbia itself, 
both architecturally (identical ‘cookie-cutter’ homes with picture windows in an 
otherwise largely empty landscape) and culturally. The new suburbs were of course 
also racially homogenous (though this was not a focus of Whyte’s study) since the 
building company Levitts refused to sell their houses to black people for twenty years 
after the war, a policy that was not unusually racist for building firms at the time. Whyte 
was critical of the loss of individualism in the supposedly classless suburbs, and of 
their residents, who were in thrall to the organization (i.e. the increasingly powerful 
bureaucracies of post-war life), who were on “a vain quest for a utopian equilibrium” 
and who were suffering from “the soft-minded denial that there is a conflict between 
the individual and society.”65 Other critics voiced similar concerns, perhaps most 
notably C. Wright Mills in White Collar (1951) and David Riesman in The Lonely Crowd 
(1950), both identifying a loss of autonomy and freedom with the bureaucratisation of 
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middle class suburban life. The increase in leisure available to organization men, to 
the new suburbanites, did little if anything to offset this diminishing of individuation 
because, as Elizabeth Long points out, work had become “the only foundation of 
individual identity” and consequently “increased leisure offered no real possibility for 
freedom, but only the shallow joys of the consumer.”66  
 
    The historical evolution of the ‘suburban existential novel’ can be traced from the 
disaffection of post-war fiction of the 1950s (partly a response to the anonymising and 
disempowering forces identified by Whyte, Mills and Riesman), which led to a 
peculiarly American ‘suburban existentialism’ in the 1960s and in later decades. Sloan 
Wilson’s protagonist in The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (1955), Tom Rath – who 
David Castronovo aptly describes as a “well-educated man with no special abilities or 
destiny” - is dissatisfied with his drab and dismal suburban life and his job with a 
charitable foundation, a life Wilson implicitly critiques as being somehow 
‘inauthentic’.67 This is contrasted with his former experience as a soldier in the war, 
which is shown as authentic (awareness of death revivifying life), although nightmarish 
and traumatising. Wilson also contrasts the quotidian predictability of Rath’s marriage 
and his wartime affair with an Italian woman, an affair of heightened emotional and 
physical intensity, with a constant consciousness of death and loss. This binary 
opposition between inauthentic, somnambulant suburban life and authentic wartime 
experiences, also characterises Wilson’s third novel, A Sense of Values (1960). The 
first person narrator, Nathan Bond, describes his service in the navy and the 
camaraderie amongst his fellow officers and seamen, who “joked constantly about 
death,” and the incommunicability of these experiences in the material comfort and 
safety of the suburbs. In suburban fiction of this time there was also often a nuanced 
analysis of character and selfhood, and of the complex effects on inhabitants’ sense 
of self of living in this new environment – explorations of what Chang-rae Lee calls the 
“drama between the self and his or her context.”68 In Philip Roth’s Goodbye Columbus 
(1959), twenty-three-year-old Neil Klugman, a poorly paid library clerk living in a 
working class neighbourhood of Newark, has an affair with precocious and wealthy 
suburbanite Brenda Patimkin, an affair that highlights their insuperable cultural 
differences and values (Brenda represents Americanised Jewish upper middle-class 
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consumerist conformity) leading him to question his identity, undermining his sense of 
self. The novella ends with Klugman staring at his reflection in a library window, 
thinking that “I was only that substance…those limbs, that face that I saw in front of 
me…I wished I could…get behind that image and catch whatever it was that looked 
through those eyes.”69  
 
    Much of this fiction though, despite its critique of suburban uniformity and conformity 
as alien to American individualism and to a nebulous conception of existential 
freedom, also implicitly valorised ordinariness in the form of family life and ‘family 
values’ – the end of The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit sees Tom Rath reconciled with 
his wife and newly committed to family life, and A Sense of Values (1960) also ends 
with a kind of familial resolution, husband and wife finally united and happy in their 
recognition of “responsibility, the danger of unrealistic dreams.”70 Similarly, Arthur 
Douglas, in David Karp’s Leave Me Alone (1957), complains of “being locked up, 
wrapped up, snuggled down, tucked in” after moving from New York to the suburbs, 
but eventually accepts life in suburbia as “part of the adjustment you have to make” 
for the sake of family life. He still believes, however, that he and his wife can keep their 
individuality and identity as a couple separate from their environment, declaring, “We 
won’t adjust it to suit the suburban ideal.”71 There are, nonetheless, existential 
dilemmas faced by the protagonists of these novels before the resolution of their 
domestic and familial conflicts. Indeed, it is precisely the homogenisation, conformity 
and apparent placidity of suburbia that highlights the alienation and isolation of the 
characters – something that would become far more marked in later fiction of the 
1960s and of future decades. 
 
    The fictional representation of the suburbs began to change at the beginning of the 
1960s, signalling the emergence of a thematic shift, as a new kind of American 
existentialist novel developed, one that could not be accused of simply expressing 
what David Castronovo calls the “locutions – used and misused – of Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, and Jean-Paul Sartre himself,” of being merely a distorted and diluted form 
of European existentialism.72 In John Updike’s Rabbit Run (1960) the internal 
monologues of Rabbit, Ruth and Janice show each character’s existential crisis and 
sense of entrapment, with Rabbit experiencing “his inside as…a pure blank space…a 
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kind of sweet panic” at the end of the novel, what Kierkegaard calls “possibility’s 
despair.”73 Richard Yates’ Revolutionary Road portrays Frank and April Wheeler’s 
delusions of specialness as exacerbated by their suburban environment, since, as 
David Castronovo notes, “the place itself makes them more inert and garrulous, 
lonelier and more self-deluding than they might be if they were challenged and 
disciplined by a big city.”74 The suburbs allow Frank to indulge his sense of himself as 
somehow gifted and destined for some kind of artistic success, and April to nurture 
her pretensions to being a talented actress. Once the flight from suburban drabness 
is a potential reality, however, the couple can no longer sustain their illusions, resulting 
eventually in April’s death and Frank’s virtual loss of (the remnants of) self. The 
suburbs’ putative safety and placidity were fictively threatened in this period by forces 
that could not be fully understood or combated. Murderous intruders figure in both 
Bruce Jay Friedman’s Stern (1962) and John Cheever’s Bullet Park (1969). Suburbia 
is now, as Bernice M. Murphy suggests, an environment in which “inexplicable and 
random acts of violence take place.”75 On moving to the suburbs Stern, the eponymous 
antihero of Friedman’s novel, initially feels “as though a great eraser had swept 
across…[his] mind, and he was ready to start fresh again, enjoying finally this strange 
house so far from the safety of his city.”76 The suburbs, then, are no longer presented 
as a safe (if boring) refuge from the dangerous city – it is the city that affords protection 
and security, and the suburbs (increasingly, as the novel progresses) that are 
threatening and alienating for a Jewish middle-aged man. Stern is beset by various 
threats – menacing dogs, hostile suburbanites, but most frighteningly the “kike man”, 
a neighbour who is abusive and intimidating, knocking Stern’s wife over, and calling 
her a “kike.” In Bullet Park, meanwhile, a suburbanite’s property has become a 
dumping ground for city dwellers, who regularly leave “broken refrigerators, television 
sets, maimed and unidentifiable automobiles and always a few mattresses, rent, 
stained, human and obscene.”77 The suburbanite’s son is suddenly struck down by an 
immobilizing depression, taking to bed for a month, and after ‘recovering’ is kidnapped 
and nearly murdered by a neighbour, a seemingly random act of violence in an 
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increasingly besieged fictional landscape. In Joyce Carol Oates’ Expensive People 
(1968), the narrator, Richard Everett, decries suburban dullness and complacency, 
and the smothering of existential disquiet. In a reiterative and obsessive narrative, he 
berates his parents and other suburbanites for “dreaming the dream; all in conjunction, 
happy, so long as no one woke up,” eventually seeking a release for his anguish and 
rage in violence, firstly in vandalistic destruction of property, and then in two shooting 
sprees, and finally in the shooting to death of his mother.78 The suburb of Updike’s 
Rabbit Redux (1971) is also a beleaguered and frightening environment, and Harry 
Angstrom’s house is “a strange dry place…emptily spinning in the void of Penn 
Villas.”79 The house becomes a scene of violence, perpetrated by the impassive 
Angstrom and by a black self-proclaimed revolutionary who moves in with him, against 
a runaway teenage girl, and it is eventually set on fire by suburban vigilantes, killing 
the girl.  
 
    The precariousness and sense of existential contingency that characterises the 
suburbs in these novels can be seen, in part, as a reflection of the events and social 
and political turmoil of the 1960s, particularly the Kennedy and King assassinations, 
the continuing, and strongly opposed, war in Vietnam, and the civil rights movement 
(discussed in Chapter Three). However, many suburban novels of the 1970s 
continued to portray the suburb as embodying existential unease, but also, 
significantly, as an increasingly interiorised space. Joseph Heller’s Something 
Happened was perhaps the most important of these, and is of pivotal importance in 
this thesis. The novel was published in 1974, the year often regarded as marking the 
onset of a new cultural and political period in America. Philip Jenkins, for example, 
argues that the 1960s began with the assassination of John Kennedy in 1963 and 
ended with the resignation of Richard Nixon in 1974.80 The Watergate crisis was one 
of several factors contributing to a loss of national self-confidence, as Edward D. 
Berkowitz points out, citing the end of US involvement in Vietnam in 1973, and the oil 
crisis that precipitated an economic recession (and a stock market in free fall) as the 
most significant of these.81 1974 was also the year Prozac was patented, introducing 
what would become a pharmaceutical solution, or palliative, for the national existential 
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anguish and crisis that began in the 1970s. Something Happened may have reflected 
this crisis, but it was far more than simply a gauge of the cultural malaise of the period. 
Heller’s novel characterised the suburbs not simply as places of dulling conformity and 
material comfort, but as the locus of existential dread. The first person narration of Bob 
Slocum, a compulsive, relentless chronicler of his fragmented and incoherent 
suburban situation, shifts repeatedly between his three preoccupations – his suburban 
family life, his anguished company relations, and his (de)formative adolescent years. 
Curiously, however, this seminal and influential novel is not discussed in the studies 
by either Jurca or Beuka, in part, perhaps, because it contains few explicit references 
to the suburbs (there are only six in the entire novel), but also because family and 
suburban life are conflated with the narrator’s working life, no longer providing a refuge 
from corporate, bureaucratic forces of control and manipulation.82  
 
    The novel’s social and historical significance has been recognised, however, by 
sociologist Elizabeth Long who observes that in Something Happened “the suburban 
haven of the 1950s has turned into a shambles, a quagmire” in which “interpersonal 
life is a desert. Isolation and despair are its prevailing emotional weather, and in time, 
they will erode personal relationships, personal integrity, and even personality.” Long 
identifies this bleak portrayal of suburban life, viewed as no less (possibly more) 
alienating than work and corporate life, as indicating an important departure from 
previous literature of the suburbs. She argues that “the dramatic nature of this thematic 
shift cannot be overemphasized” since it addresses the “failure of success” and the 
beginnings of the dissolution (or degeneration) of the American Dream.83 Long does 
not fully acknowledge that the American Dream had been in an ongoing process of 
degeneration since well before the 1970s, though the thematic shift she identifies was 
indeed highly significant. The importance of Something Happened lies in the way the 
degeneration of the American Dream is portrayed, in how it is characterised, in the 
novel’s exclusive interiority; in an interview with George Plimpton for The Paris Review 
in 1974 Heller described the novel as being about “interior, psychological survival.”84   
 
    In the 1970s and 1980s the suburbs themselves were becoming more complex and 
varied environments, with increasing numbers of Americans living in some type of 
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suburb – not just the corporate suburb of Something Happened, but the lower middle 
class and working class suburbs depicted in Raymond Carver’s stories, in Will You 
Please Be Quiet, Please? (1976), What We Talk About When We Talk About Love 
(1981) and Cathedral (1983). The suburbs in Carver’s stories are spaces 
characterised by an implacable sense of menace and unknowableness, a muted 
interiority that contrasts with the hyper-analytical but incoherent effusiveness of 
Heller’s Slocum. The interiority and existential anguish of Something Happened is 
developed in other fiction of the suburbs in this period. It is central to the stories in Ann 
Beattie’s Distortions (1976) and The Burning House (1982), and especially to her novel 
Falling in Place (1980), with its eschewal of plot for muted descriptions of suburban 
affective numbness and somnambulant fatalism, which even the near-fatal shooting 
of a girl by her pre-teenage brother, in a tranquil suburban garden, cannot breach. 
John Updike’s Rabbit is Rich (1981) is dominated, unlike the two earlier Rabbit novels, 
by Harry Angstrom’s internal monologue, his obsession with entropic decay and 
dissolution. In the ironized dread of Don DeLillo’s absurdist White Noise (1984), 
meanwhile, a couple fixate on their own mortality, in a suburban environment filled 
with the static of relentless media information overload, entropic communication that 
pervades the protagonist’s consciousness, nullifying interiority.  
 
    In Richard Ford’s The Sportswriter (1986), the first of the ‘Bascombe novels’, 
narrator Frank Bascombe believes the suburbs highlight contingency in their very 
denial of it, engender existential anguish in their very attempt to assuage it through 
their façade of tranquillity and calm. Frank uses an evolving existential terminology, 
initially contrasting ‘factualism’ with ‘literalism’, modes of being and experiencing 
denoting existential insight in the latter term, and lack of it in the former. In the second 
novel in the trilogy, Independence Day (1995), Frank has immersed himself in what 
he calls the ‘Existence Period’, characterised by a muted sense of self and the limited 
impingement of others on that self, and in The Lay of The Land (2006) he has entered 
what he calls the ‘Permanent Period’, this existential state being superseded in turn 
by what he considers a more open and transcendent existential awareness, the ‘Next 
Level’. In Let Me Be Frank With You (2014), Frank enters his final existential state, the 
‘Default Period’, with a ‘Default Self’, in which he believes “character…is one more lie 
of history and the dramatic arts,” and that “we have only what we did yesterday, what 
we do today, and what we might still do.”85 
 
                                               
85 Richard Ford, Let Me Be Frank With You (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), p. 145. 
 32 
 
    In the 1990s and early 2000s Chang-rae Lee developed similarly expansive 
suburban landscape narratives. Like Ford’s Frank Bascombe, Lee’s narrators see the 
suburbs they live in as allowing an existential ambivalence, between isolation and a 
sense of belonging or community. In A Gesture Life (1999) Doc Hata, now retired, 
reflects on his traumatic wartime experiences, his former relationship with a suburban 
widow, and on his troubled relationship with his adoptive daughter, each filtered 
through an emotional detachment that he has cultivated over the course of his life, 
which is finally challenged by an existential crisis that it cannot withstand. The Irish-
American narrator of Lee’s Aloft (2004), Jerry Battle, also retired, similarly has little 
contact with either his family or his neighbours, in his wealthy Long Island suburb. His 
narrative is permeated by existential anguish, in spite of his attempts to allay this by 
taking his Cessna Skyhawk on regular flights above the Long Island suburbs, allowing 
him physical as well as emotional detachment and distance, and he is forced to 
recognise that “self-definition…is now…a source of anxiety and dread,” and questions 
“if you can speak of someone’s nature.”86 As in Ford’s Bascombe novels, others 
repeatedly threaten the narrator’s precarious equilibrium, eventually forcing him to 
face what he calls “The Real”.  For Doc Hata and Jerry Battle, as for Frank Bascombe 
and Bob Slocum, the suburbs provide a landscape in which what Frederick R. Karl 
terms “consciousness of immensity” is “transformed into the consciousness of 
emptiness, so that escape into vastness – whether of self or of geographic space – 
does not fill, but empties one out.”87  
 
    The chapters that follow are organised thematically, rather than chronologically, to 
illustrate most effectively the shared existentialist themes of the novels and stories 
discussed, and to allow a Sartrean analysis of those themes as they are developed in 
the texts. In Chapter One I discuss the portrayal of suburbia as an entropic 
environment, hermetically insular, in Joseph Heller’s Something Happened (1974), 
John Updike’s Rabbit is Rich (1981), and in stories by Raymond Carver, from Furious 
Seasons (1977), Would You Please Be Quiet, Please? (1976), What We Talk About 
When We Talk About Love (1981), Cathedral (1983) and Beginners (2009). In these 
texts, the suburbs function as closed systems, entropic environments, their social 
homogenisation and uniformity hastening the process of entropy, their isolation and 
interiority mirrored in the suburbanite protagonists, who, in bad faith, seek a kind of 
‘entropic selfhood’ to assuage their existential anguish. These suburbanites display 
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what Tony Tanner calls the “widespread fear of the tendency of all things towards 
eventual homogeneity,” their “gradual collapsing towards inertia and death,” which can 
be understood as a “manifestation of the ubiquitous dread of ‘entropy’.”88 Yet, despite 
their dread of the entropic decline manifested in and through their suburban 
environment, the protagonists attempt to escape their intimations of ontological 
freedom, of the inevitable disequilibrium of consciousness (which is both facticity and 
transcendence), through a hermetic withdrawal, a kind of metaphysical shutting down. 
As Tanner observes, “as long as an individual is not a closed system he…cannot be 
in a state of equilibrium.”89 For the suburbanites discussed in this chapter, then, the 
dread of entropy, yet paradoxical drive towards a metaphysical entropic stasis, creates 
an irresolvable conflict, heightening their anguish. In Heller’s novel, Bob Slocum’s 
iterative narrative is both obsessed with, and itself embodies, physical, metaphysical 
and informational entropy; in Updike’s third Rabbit novel Harry Angstrom is aware only 
of  decline and dissolution, of his body, relationships, and even his nation; Carver’s 
claustrophobic working class suburbs are isolated, from the world outside the 
suburban interior settings, but also each house from the others, and each oppressed 
suburbanite from the others – a series of closed systems that deplete and undermine 
the characters’ sense of self, and from which protagonists sometimes attempt a form 
of escape through futile acts of violence.  
 
    Chapter Two focuses on solipsism as it is embodied in fictive suburbia, beginning 
with Heller’s Something Happened, in which the protagonist’s hermetic narrative 
charts his withdrawal into unreachable inner space within the indeterminate, detached 
environment of his Connecticut suburb. I then discuss Richard Ford’s Bascombe 
novels, characterised by Frank Bascombe’s solipsistic narrative in which others are 
understood according to the existential states that Frank believes himself to be in, 
often serving to illustrate the validity of these self-designated states, but denied full 
subjectivity by Frank in his jobs as sportswriter and then realtor; in both jobs he spends 
much time driving through the isolating New Jersey suburbs of Haddam and Sea-Clift, 
detached from but observant of others. The third part of this chapter considers the 
ways in which Chang-rae Lee’s novels A Gesture Life (1999) and Aloft (2004) develop 
the theme of suburban solipsism that is so central to Ford’s Bascombe novels. In the 
former, Doc Hata’s solipsism leads to his estrangement from his daughter, but also 
from the suburban widow with whom he has a faltering intimacy and a relationship that 
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finally founders because of his emotional and psychic detachment, carefully cultivated 
in Long Island, since for Hata in the suburbs “the most available freedom is to live 
alone.”90 Jerry Battle, the narrator of Aloft, also attempts to maintain a precarious 
existential balance through a controlled and controlling distance from others in the few 
relationships he has, though as with Frank Bascombe and Doc Hata, it becomes clear 
that this is precipitated by a life-defining loss. His detachment, like theirs, becomes 
entrenched in the liminal space of suburbia, an environment in which, in Frederick R. 
Karl’s terms, “space is evasion.”91 Solipsism, or rather its avoidance, is a key problem 
in Sartrean existentialism, and the three protagonists’ refusal to clearly recognise 
others’ consciousness and selfhood (their subjectivity) is interpreted here in Sartrean 
terms as an evasion of what Sartre calls “a primary relation between my 
consciousness and the Other’s.”92 
 
    In Chapter Three existential contingency, and suburban violence as an extreme 
reaction to it (or denial of it), is examined in four novels, Joyce Carol Oates’ Expensive 
People (1968), John Cheever’s Bullet Park (1969), John Updike’s Rabbit Redux 
(1971), and Ann Beattie’s Falling in Place (1980). In these texts the contradictory 
nature of the suburbs – their stolid uniformity, fixity, yet indeterminacy – creates 
increasing tension, leading the characters to deny their awareness of themselves as 
contingent, and indeterminate beings, lacking any existential necessity, a denial that 
only heightens their anguish and leads to explosive acts of violence. All of the novels 
were published in periods of social and political turbulence, and can be understood as 
exemplifying a kind of ‘vulgar existentialism’, reflecting, at least in part, the perceived 
existential crises of those periods. All include (explicit and implicit) references to 
European existentialism and each presents an adulterated (and distorted) version of 
it. Within Sartrean existentialism violence can be understood as a refusal or rejection 
of existential contingency, a disavowal of its implication that “existence precedes 
essence.”93 It is also futile and self-defeating, as is illustrated by the suburban violence 
in each of the four novels, which necessarily fails to provide any kind of resolution or 
greater existential awareness for the protagonists, since their acts of violence destroy 
the semblance of order and balance in their lives, heightening their awareness of the 
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very contingency that incited them. In Oates’ Expensive People the narrator decries 
suburban denial of contingency, the repression of existential unease, while also 
shamefully craving it, while in Cheever’s Bullet Park two characters, one seemingly 
unaware and one near-hysterically aware of contingency, eventually confront each 
other. The suburbia of Updike’s Rabbit Redux is similarly portrayed as the locus of 
violence in response to the existential anguish of indeterminate selfhood, and Beattie’s 
Falling in Place depicts suburbanites who are neurotic and dysfunctional, and one who 
is pathologically violent in his existential denial.  
 
    Chapter Four addresses the contested concept of authenticity, examining the 
contributory factors and influences on the post-war concern with individualism, 
conformity and authenticity. Social critiques and commentaries, perhaps most 
significantly David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (1950) and William H. Whyte’s The 
Organization Man (1956), both cited earlier, identified a loss of individuality in the 
characters of Americans with the advent of mass suburbia in the late 1940s and 1950s, 
though as Abigail Cheever notes, their concern was more with a perceived uniformity 
than conformity, with the possibility that suburbanites weren’t simply acting the same 
way, but that they really were the same, so that “the problem as these writers 
understood it was less one of behaving than of being.”94 At this period then the notion 
of authentic selfhood was primarily an existential one, and was a key theme in many 
suburban novels published at the beginning of the 1960s, as illustrated by John 
Updike’s Rabbit, Run (1960), Richard Yates’ Revolutionary Road (1961), and Walker 
Percy’s The Moviegoer (1961), all of which are discussed in this chapter. The 
conflicted predicament of the protagonists of these novels causes existential anguish, 
in Sartrean terms, the result of what Jacob Golomb calls “treating oneself as an other 
instead of treating oneself as one’s self,” the sociological counterpart of which would 
be David Riesman’s “other-directedness.” The notion of a contrastingly authentic 
selfhood, with an awareness that the self is always in “the process of becoming, never 
of being,” is explored in relation to the characters in search of a self in these suburban 
novels.95 These themes and concerns are also central to the revisionist depiction of 
1960s suburban culture presented in Mad Men, discussed in the second part of the 
chapter, and particularly in the first three seasons during which Don Draper and his 
family live in a New York suburb. Strongly influenced by John Cheever’s stories, which 
                                               
94Abigail Cheever, Real Phonies: Cultures of Authenticity in Post-World War II America (Athens, 
Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2010), p. 5. 
95 Jacob Golomb, In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus (New York: Routledge, 
1995), p. 153, p. 154. 
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writer, executive producer and occasional director Mathew Weiner has described as 
being “in every aspect of Mad Men, starting with the fact that Don lives in Ossining on 
Bullet Park Road,” the series documents the seismic societal changes of the 1960s, 
and the relation between such changes and the ongoing evolution of the main 
characters’ sense of identity.96 The problematic nature of authenticity, of authentic 
being, self or action, as depicted in Mad Men – and in the Cheever short stories that 
seem most clearly to have inspired Weiner – is explored with reference to Sartre’s 
notion of authentic choice. Whilst Mad Men, as a television series, is clearly from a 
different genre, it is heavily influenced by Weiner’s reading of US literature of the 
suburbs (in addition to Cheever, Weiner has acknowledged the influence of Richard 
Yates and J.D. Salinger amongst other writers), which is referenced both implicitly and 
explicitly in the writing for the show. Since authenticity is the only means, in Sartrean 
terms, of avoiding bad faith – of transcending entropic selfhood, countering solipsism, 
and accepting existential contingency – it is discussed in this chapter, even though the 
texts analysed were published before those considered in previous chapters. The 
significance of gender in relation to authenticity, and the related Sartrean concept of 
good faith, is also addressed in this chapter, since it is only female characters (in The 
Moviegoer and in Mad Men) who evince or approximate existential authenticity.97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
96 Semi Chellas, ‘The Art of Screenwriting No. 4: Matthew Weiner’, The Paris Review, No. 208, 
Spring 2014. 
97 Mad Men, of course, was written after all of the texts discussed in this thesis were published, with 
the exception of Richard Ford’s Let Me Be Frank With You (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014). 
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Chapter One: Entropic Suburbia 
 
 
The concept of entropy 
 
    Entropy has been defined in various ways, and with varying degrees of precision, 
but the term originates in theoretical physics and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, 
according to which, “the material world moves from orderly states to an ever-
increasing disorder and…the final situation of the universe will be one of maximal 
disorder.”1 Rudolph Arnheim defines entropy as the “measure of the degree of disorder 
in a system” but as he points out, such a definition is necessarily open to interpretation. 
The terms order and disorder themselves require clarification. The “entropy principle” 
characterises order as “an improbable arrangement of elements, regardless of 
whether the macro-shape of this arrangement is beautifully structured or most 
arbitrarily deformed; and it calls disorder the dissolution of such an improbable 
arrangement.”2 Tony Tanner, discussing the appropriation and metaphorical use of the 
concept in post-war US literature, defines entropy more broadly as “the increasing 
disorder of energy moving at random within a closed system, finally arriving at total 
inertia.” Significantly though, and crucial for the discussion that follows, order “if it is 
dedicated to the procuring of ‘uniform motion’, may in fact accelerate entropy and not 
counter it,” if, that is, it is “that sort of mechanical ‘order’ which induces anaesthesia 
and ultimately irreversible torpor,” and is thus symptomatic of “the tendency of all 
things towards eventual homogeneity.”3 In Arnheim’s terms this would represent the 
dissolution of an “improbable arrangement.”  
 
    The notion of suburbia as emblematic of ‘cultural entropy’ is addressed by Drew 
Austin, who argues that “the real threat of twentieth-century suburbanization was not 
its inefficiency or even the social limitations it imposed, but that it indicated a societal 
failure to resist entropy.” This societal failure was marked by “the hollowing out of 
urban centers and the rebirth of those places as blandly repetitive bedroom 
communities,” which “threatened more than just cities themselves as it suggested an 
                                               
1 Rudolph Arnheim, Entropy and Art. An Essay on Disorder and Order (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1971), p. 7. The First Law of Thermodynamics states that although energy can 
change its form, it cannot be created or destroyed (Arnheim, p. 9). 
2 Ibid. p.13. These definitions are central to the notion of suburbia as inherently entropic in the 
discussion that follows. 
3 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950 – 1970, 1971 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976), 
p. 142, p.p. 143-144, p. 144. 
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acceleration of civilizational heat death.”4 This view is echoed by James Howard 
Kunstler, who has described the suburbanization of the US as “a vast entropic 
enterprise.” This enterprise, he claims, was made possible by “the economy of 
suburban sprawl…a systemic self-organizing response to the availability of 
inordinately cheap oil with ever-increasing entropy.” This entropy has been “expressed 
in an ever-increasing variety of manifestations from the destruction of farmland to the 
decay of the cities, to widespread psychological depression, to the rash of school 
shooting sprees, to epidemic obesity.”5 Kunstler also suggests, however, that “it will 
be the failure of this entropic project that may rescue us,” but in order for this to happen, 
“we will have to rescale and reorganize everything we do…We will have to rebuild 
local networks of economic interdependence and we will have to reconstruct real 
communities.”6 The prospect, however, of such ‘real communities’ replacing the 
entropic landscapes of suburbia seems less than likely. 
 
    In the texts I will discuss in this chapter the suburbs represent a tendency towards 
(cultural) homogenization and order, and it is precisely these tendencies – towards 
mechanical order and movement, uniformity of motion – that can be understood as 
hastening the process of entropic decline rather than arresting it. Indeed, suburbanites 
in these novels and stories are themselves becoming closed, or isolated, systems, 
within the closed system of suburbia, seeking a kind of entropic equilibrium. 
 
Entropy as an existentialist concept and the Sartrean concept of bad faith 
 
    Sartre does not discuss the concept of entropy in any of his philosophical writing or 
literary texts, yet the process of entropic dissolution can be expressed, and 
understood, in existentialist, and specifically Sartrean terms. It is Sartre’s view, as 
Walter Kaufman notes, that “man’s basic wish is to fuse his openness and freedom 
with the impermeability of things, to achieve a state of being in which the en-soi [in-
itself] and pour-soi [for-itself] are synthesized,” in a process leading to a state of 
equilibrious yet conscious inertia, or ‘thingness’.7 Being-in-itself is complete and 
                                               
4 Drew Austin, ‘Civilization and the War on Entropy’, Ribbonfarm, May 23rd, 2013, accessed 16/07/16 
from: http://www.ribbonfarm.com/2013/05/23/civilization-and-the-war-on-entropy. 
5 James Howard Kunstler, The Long Emergency: Surviving the Converging Catastrophes of the 
Twenty-First Century (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005), p. 222, p. 223. 
6 James Howard Kunstler, ‘Virtual is No Refuge from Reality’, Michigan Land Institute News, 
September 26th, 2003, accessed 16/07/16 from: http://www.mlui.org/mlui/news-views/articles-from-
1995-to-2012.html?archive_id=274#.V4ufy-Akrcu. 
7 Walter Kaufman, ed. Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre, 1956 (New York: Plume, 2004), 
p. 47. 
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without possibilities, and characterises an object such as a table or door, which cannot 
change its own state, whereas being-for-itself is in a perpetual state of existential flux, 
of change and therefore instability and inchoateness. Consciousness, the for-itself, 
experiences anguish because of the freedom its openness, its lack of fixity, implies, 
and its drive towards a degradation of its being, its desire to flee from its freedom, is, 
I argue, analogous to the process of entropy, of entropic decline ending in that final 
state of “mechanical order“ discussed by Tanner. The anguish caused by 
indeterminacy of being, and the freedom that is its corollary (since human beings don’t 
have fixed, unchangeable natures) is also recognised by Camus, who identifies 
“perpetual conflict, continually created and mastered by the intelligence” and the need 
to accept that “life…is only an impulse which endlessly pursues its form without ever 
finding it,” and hence it cannot be experienced (or represented) solely as a process of 
entropy, of entropic diminishment.8 For Camus, absurdity arises from this; it is a state 
in which there is a knowledge of the impossibility of permanence and order (an entropic 
fusing of the en-soi and pour-soi in Sartrean terms) but still, also, an irrational desire 
to attain that permanence and order, one which endures despite its irrationality. The 
absurd, then, is a state of consciousness, which necessarily causes existential 
anguish.9 This anguish, however, cannot be experienced by being-in-itself because, 
Sartre claims, “there is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack 
through which nothingness might creep in.” For being-for-itself, however, the self 
represents “a way of not being [its] own coincidence…of being in a perpetually 
unstable equilibrium,” so that “an impalpable fissure has slipped into being…it is not 
wholly itself” and “there is never an instant at which we can assert that the for-itself is, 
precisely because the for-itself never is.” Consciousness, the defining characteristic of 
being-for-itself, implies, and in fact constitutes, a lack, since “consciousness is not 
what it is,” a state which gives rise to existential anguish.10 
 
    In the texts I discuss here the suburbs can be characterised as closed systems, 
subject to entropy, thus becoming the locus of existential anguish for the suburban 
protagonists, and representing the tension between being-in-itself (their desired 
entropic stasis which can provide a false identity and sense of self) and being-for-itself 
(the impossibility of this stasis). The protagonists of the novels and stories seek an 
impossible resolution of the conflict, the tension inherent in the indeterminate state of 
                                               
8 Albert Camus, The Rebel, 1951 (London: Penguin Books, 1971), p.265, p. 228. 
9 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, 1942 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 32. 
10 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 74, p. 77, p. 149, p. 62. 
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being-for-itself, by attempting to gain a stable equilibrium of selfhood, one that is 
conscious yet also has the quality of fixed being i.e. the impossible state of what Sartre 
calls “being-in-itself-for-itself.”11 The entropy that pervades these texts is, then, 
primarily existential and, I will argue, can be understood within what Jonathan Webber 
interprets as Sartre’s theory of character, developed in Being and Nothingness (1943). 
The dread that characterises Heller’s, Updike’s and Carver’s texts originates in what 
Sartre calls ‘bad faith’ (‘mauvaise foi’), a complex and ramified concept, exemplifying 
what he terms ‘projects’ – undertakings that motivate people’s actions and determine 
their world views, and indeed their characters. Bad faith is a kind of ontological 
disavowal – the attempt to maintain a view of oneself and others as having fixed 
natures. Key to understanding these terms is the Sartrean notion of essence 
(something freely chosen) as opposed to nature (a fictive deterministic concept). Thus, 
Sartre’s statement that “existence precedes essence” implies, Webber argues, that 
we chose our characters (not that we don’t have characters), and that these characters 
are mutable essences not natures, and are a function of our projects – the most 
important of which, and the one underlying all others, is the desire to attain something 
ontologically impossible: being in-itself-for-itself.12 Narrative fixation on a spurious 
sense of past stability (in Heller’s novel especially), can be understood by what Sartre 
calls ‘facticity’, which, Webber suggests, includes “one’s character as well as one’s 
past and material body and surroundings, where this character consists in the set of 
projects that one is pursuing and that one can alter.”13 It should perhaps be stressed 
though, that facticity per se is not in any way indicative of bad faith (since it is an 
ontological inevitability), but rather it is the futile attempt at entrenchment in facticity, 
and denial of transcendence, that is illustrative of (one form of) bad faith. Heller’s Bob 
Slocum, Updike’s Rabbit Angstrom, and Carver’s characters have unwanted 
intimations that, in Sartre’s terms, “what the for-itself lacks is the self – or itself as in-
itself,” that this lack is what it is.14  
 
    If, as Webber suggests, bad faith is “self-distraction rather than self-deception”, the 
narrators of the texts to be discussed can be viewed as distracting themselves from 
their own existential freedom.15 The narrators and protagonists experience a 
                                               
11 Ibid. p. 552. 
12 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ in Walter Kaufman, ed. Existentialism: From 
Dostoevsky to Sartre, 1956 (New York: Plume, 2004), p. 353. 
13 Jonathan Webber, The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 76. 
14 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 89. 
15 Jonathan Webber, The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 91. 
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dissolution of selfhood because they cannot accept the unstable, transitional nature of 
that self, or character, that it is, in Sartre’s formulation, “a being which is what it is not 
and which is not what it is.”16 Bad faith, in its denial of the mercurial nature of self, of 
the possibility (in fact, the inevitability) of one’s transcendence of one’s facticity, 
compounds their anguish (despite its aim of escaping that anguish), and underpins a 
desire for, but also a fear of, entropic stasis.17 This entropic drive would seem to be 
inherent in consciousness because of its disintegrative, yet transcendent, nature, 
which, as Mark Meyers claims, is “perhaps best understood as a dualism in constant 
dissolution, as a dualism that is always in the process of slipping into a monism, yet 
which never fully slips. Indeed, such a full slippage would foreclose the process of 
becoming and result in totality (death).”18 The paradoxical drive towards and away 
from entropy can be understood as the desire for an equilibrious state of stasis 
(towards), but one that is conscious (away from), in the impossible state of being-in-
itself-for-itself, to avoid that totality and (heat/consciousness) death. This desire for 
stasis, by fusing the in-itself and the for-itself, has a corollary in an existential 
conception of suburbia. In its apparent (but false) placidity and unchangeability, its 
orderliness and insularity, suburbia arouses the very anguish it is intended to stem, its 
denial of contingency and existential flux heightening suburbanites’ awareness of 
them: suburbia is itself a manifestation of bad faith.   
 
The literary treatment of entropy  
 
    Although Tanner suggests there are “entropic hints” in early twentieth-century 
American fiction – notably the “valley of ashes” in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great 
Gatsby (1925) and the “painters of Decay and Mystery” which preoccupy Tod Hackett 
in Nathanael West’s The Day of the Locust (1939) – he sees a concern with “the 
initiations and cessations of movement, the fate of all energy” as characteristic of post-
war fiction, and novels of the 1960s in particular, since “ the advanced stages of an 
industrial, even a post-industrial, society necessarily proliferate processes and actions 
based on mechanised movement.”19 Thomas Pynchon exemplifies this trend amongst 
                                               
16 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 63. 
17 Jonathan Webber suggests that “we should understand transcendence as the ability to move beyond 
one’s current situation into a new one…one’s facticity includes one’s essence and it is because this 
essence is not a nature that one can transcend one’s facticity freely.” (Jonathan Webber, The 
Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 76). 
18 Mark Meyers, ‘Liminality and the Problem of Being-in-the-world: Reflections on Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty’, Sartre Studies International, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2008), pp. 87-88. 
19 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950 – 1970, 1971 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976), 
p. 143, p. 150. 
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US writers most clearly, and Tanner sees the short story ‘Entropy’, originally published 
in the Kenyon Review in 1960, as establishing the dominant theme of Pynchon’s later 
work. The story is set in two city apartments, one upstairs and one downstairs, and is 
concerned, like many other post-war stories and novels, with “the chaos of waste…in 
contemporary urban landscapes.”20 The notion of entropy as an urban phenomenon 
is reflected in much of the fiction of the 1960s, though as the later discussion will show 
the fiction of the suburbs of this period demonstrates a deeper concern with the theme 
of entropy. In Pynchon’s story there is a chaotic party in the downstairs apartment of 
a character called Meatball Mulligan, the party being “a relatively closed system of 
people,” and one that is subject to exhaustion and dissipation of energy, eventually 
leading to inertia.21 Two of the partygoers discuss communication theory and signal-
to-noise-ratio in the process of informational entropy, one commenting that 
“leakage…noise screws up your signal, makes for disorganization in the circuit.”22 
Upstairs, meanwhile, the middle aged intellectual Callisto attempts to restore life to a 
freezing bird, in a “hermetically sealed…tiny enclave of regularity in the city’s chaos,” 
from where he can observe 
 
The younger generation responding to Madison Avenue with the same spleen 
his own had once reserved for Wall Street: and in American ‘consumerism’ 
discovered a similar tendency from the least to the most probable, from 
differentiation to sameness, from ordered individuality to a kind of chaos.23  
 
Meatball struggles to contain and diminish the party chaos, but finally acquiesces and 
waits for the inertia that will come with the passing out of the drunken guests. Upstairs, 
Callisto is unable to transfer heat energy to the bird and it dies, while the temperature 
outside the apartment remains at 37 degrees Fahrenheit. Like Meatball, Callisto and 
his girlfriend also succumb to entropy, as she symbolically smashes the windows and 
they wait for “the moment of equilibrium…when 27 degrees Fahrenheit should prevail 
both inside and outside” and “their separate lives should resolve into a tonic of 
darkness and the final absence of all motion.”24 The two forms of entropy in the story, 
the chaotic disorder of Meatball’s party and the ordered hermetic “enclave of 
                                               
20 Ibid, p. 151. The urban novels cited in the introduction – Saul Bellow’s The Victim (1947) and Seize 
the Day (1956), J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye (1951), Ralph Ellison’s The Invisible Man 
(1952), and Richard Wright’s The Outsider (1953) – all portray cities as chaotic and dissolute 
environments.  
21 Ibid. p. 153. 
22 Thomas Pynchon, Slow Learner, 1984 (London: Picador, 1985), p. 87. 
23 Ibid, p. 79, p. 84. 
24 Ibid. p. 94. 
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regularity” of Callisto’s apartment, correspond to the forms of entropy considered at 
the beginning of this chapter – Tanner’s “increasing disorder of energy moving at 
random within a closed system” (the party) and “that sort of mechanical ‘order’ which 
induces anaesthesia and ultimately irreversible torpor” (Callisto’s apartment). 
Significantly, the characters in Pynchon’s story seem resigned to the inevitability of 
entropy, and perhaps even desire a kind of existential stasis. In keeping with a 
Sartrean understanding of the ‘entropic drive’ in terms of a conflict, or tension, between 
‘being-in-itself’ and ‘being-for-itself’, Tanner sees Pynchon’s characters as sharing “an 
aspiration to eradicate consciousness and revert to thing-status,” that is, to being-in-
itself, and to fuse this with being-for-itself into the ontologically unachievable state of 
being-in-itself-for-itself.25 
 
    There has been almost no literary or critical consideration of the notion of (fictive) 
suburbia as a closed system, an environment subject to entropy. It is, though, implicit 
in Pamela Zoline’s story ‘The Heat Death of The Universe’, in which suburbanite 
housewife protagonist Sarah Boyle is “proud of her growing family which keeps her 
happy and busy around the house, involved in many hobbies and community activities, 
and only occasionally given to obsessions concerning Time/Entropy/Chaos and 
Death.”26 As Mark Bould and Sherryl Vint suggest, Sarah is “condemned to the closed 
system of suburbia,” in which Zoline has her unceasingly “filling the great spaces of 
Space with a marvellous sweet smelling, deep cleansing foam.”27 The connection 
between the suburbs and entropy was also made by Paul Rambali, in an interview 
with J.G. Ballard for The Face magazine in April 1988. Discussing the theme of entropy 
in the author’s work, he noted that Ballard had himself chosen to live in “the entropic 
cocoon of suburbia” in “a sort of self-imposed alienation,” and suggested that “in this, 
he is like a character from one of his novels, accepting the entropy that surrounds 
him.”28 The insularity of suburbia is addressed by Lorraine Delia Kenny, in the 
introduction to her partly autobiographical study, Daughters of Suburbia: Growing Up 
White, Middle Class, and Female. Kenny describes the suburb she grew up in as “a 
closed system, one that feeds off itself feeding off itself, an insular community that 
                                               
25 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950 – 1970, 1971 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976),  
p. 159. 
26 Pamela Zoline, The Heat Death of the Universe and Other Stories (New York: McPherson, 1988), 
pp. 137-138. 
27 Mark Bould and Cheryl Vint, The Routledge Concise History of Science Fiction (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), p. 114; Pamela Zoline, The Heat Death of the Universe and Other Stories (New 
York: McPherson, 1988), p. 142. 
28 Paul Rambali, ‘Visions of Dystopia’, The Face, No.6, April 1988, accessed 15/07/16 from: 
http://jgballard.ca/media/1988_april_the_face_magazine.html. 
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doesn’t see too far off its present condition and boundaries.” In this ‘community’ 
“equilibrium depends on a closed rather than a permeable system and the known is 
always more manageable than the unknown.”29 Suburbia is clearly an exclusionary, 
homogenising environment (especially the suburban ‘gated communities’ of recent 
decades), one in which, as Robert Beuka observes, “architectural and landscape 
styles” demonstrate “a desire to elide the very notion of difference among suburban 
residents.”30 In this way it exemplifies the tendency “toward…eventual homogeneity” 
identified by Tanner, towards entropic equilibrium.31  
 
Suburbia as entropic  
 
“More and more things seem to be slipping into a state of dissolution”:  
Informational, physical and existential entropy in Something Happened 
 
     In Joseph Heller’s Something Happened, Bob Slocum’s narrative is an entropic 
monologue obsessed with entropy – physical, metaphysical (existential) and 
informational. In information theory, as Patrick O’Neill observes, entropy can be 
understood as “a measure of disorganization, of randomness” but also as “a measure 
of lack of information…a measure of the disruption of information.”32 Lindsey Tucker 
discusses Heller’s novel using concepts from information theory, and characterises 
Slocum’s monologue as a kind of ‘closed system’, a term that could also be applied to 
his Connecticut suburb, and to suburbia more generally. Tucker’s description of the 
language of Catch-22 as “an artificial construct, divorced from any reality beyond its 
own self-reflective existence” describes equally well Bob Slocum’s monologue, in 
which he seeks to stem the entropy that that monologue embodies. Tucker views 
Slocum as being “intent on establishing his own version of a closed system…working 
against what he sees as entropic signals coming from both his own consciousness 
and the outside world.”33 Those entropic signals reflect the narrator’s society and 
culture, as various commentators have observed. Susan Strehle suggests that Slocum 
presents “a vision of America as both corollary and source for his own loss of energy 
                                               
29 Lorraine Delia Kenny, Daughters of Suburbia: Growing Up White, Middle Class, and Female (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000), p. 5, p. 168. 
30 Robert Beuka, SuburbiaNation: Reading Suburban Landscapes in Twentieth-Century American 
Fiction and Film (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.5. 
31 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950 – 1970, 1971 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976), 
p.142. 
32 Patrick O’Neill, The Comedy of Entropy: Humour, Narrative, Reading (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1990), p. 9. 
33 Lindsey Tucker ‘Entropy and Information Theory in Heller’s Something Happened’, Contemporary 
Literature, Vol. 25, No.3 (Autumn, 1984), p.326, p. 328. 
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and dissipation of ideals” and David Seed argues that “the polluted and junk-ridden 
landscape becomes a collective metaphor of his current state of mind.”34  
 
     Slocum's job itself (it is not specified but it includes copywriting and promotional 
work) embodies informational redundancy, since he spends his working life 
“converting whole truths into half truths and half truths into whole ones.” His first job, 
a recurring theme (as all the themes necessarily are within the reiterative structure of 
the narrative), was also emblematic of informational entropy. As a filing clerk in an 
accident insurance company, he was required to work in a “gloomy, silent, dingy 
mausoleum for dead and decaying records,” while in his current job he sees “skeletons 
in decaying winding sheets as I study company reports.”35 Like Callisto in Pynchon’s 
Entropy, he tries to create a closed system that is impervious to the disorder and chaos 
he dreads, and the language of enclosure pervades his narrative. He describes himself 
as “safely encapsulated” in corporate suburbia; when someone dies “her case is 
closed.” The opening sentence of the novel – “I get the willies when I see closed doors” 
– establishes Slocum’s obsession, and although he tells us that “the sight of a closed 
door is sometimes enough to make me dread that something horrible is happening 
behind it,” what he dreads most is the opening of the door, the exposure to external 
information, thoughts, that threaten to undermine his entropic narrative.36 “There are 
so many things I don’t want to find out,” he tells us, and he has “retreated into the 
suburbs” to avoid finding them out. In Something Happened suburbia as a closed 
system symbolises the desire for existential stasis, the fusion of being-in-itself and 
being-for-itself. The street Slocum lives on is called “Peapod Lane,” suggesting both 
conformity and enclosure.37 Whenever he is at home he stays in his study and keeps 
the door closed, avoiding contact with his family. He claims to be saddened by his 
son’s “shutting me out,” but being shut in is exactly what he desires, since 
 
I see the doors closed to his and my daughter’s rooms and think of the closed 
doors at the company and am reminded squeamishly of all those closed 
cupboard and closet doors I had to open each morning and evening back in the 
                                               
34 Susan Strehle, ‘“A Permanent Game of Excuses”: Determinism in Heller’s Something Happened’ in 
James Nagel, ed. Critical Essays on Joseph Heller: Critical Essays on American Literature (Boston, 
Massachusetts: G.K. Hall and Co., 1984) p. 109; David Seed, The Fiction of Joseph Heller: Against 
the Grain (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), pp. 103-105. 
35 Joseph Heller, Something Happened, 1974 (London: Vintage Books, 1995), p.29, p. 94, p. 241. 
36 Ibid. p. 240, p. 88, p. 3. 
37 Ibid. p. 6, p.249, p. 359. 
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apartment in the city with those baited traps concealed behind them when we 
were trying to catch or kill those mice.38 
 
    What Slocum fears is the inevitability of decay and death symbolised by the dead 
mice, and in his narrative he associates the suburbs with that process of dissolution, 
of physical entropy. On his “choice country acre in Connecticut…grass grows under 
my feet…spring in our countryside smells of insect spray and horseshit.” Slocum 
dreads spending holidays with his family in their suburban home, and Christmas 
festivities only heighten his alienation. Christmas dinner with them is transformed into 
a stark image of entropy, as  
 
They sit like ruins in a coffin in their high backed chairs. The turkey’s carved; 
white meat, dark meat, second joints, wings, and legs lie laid out neatly like tools 
on a dentist’s tray or surgical instruments of an ear-nose-and-throat man about 
to remove tonsils…There are spiced apples, chilled cranberry molds, and 
imported currant jams. It’s a gelid feast, a scene of domesticity chiseled on cold 
and rotting stone.39 
 
    Slocum’s desperate, farcical, attempts to avoid intimations of physical entropy only 
increase his obsession. “I never make hospital visits if I can avoid them,” he confesses 
“because there’s always the risk I might open the door of the private or semi-private 
room and come upon some awful sight for which I could not have prepared myself.” 
When his mother becomes terminally ill he is appalled by her impending physical 
dissolution and refuses to acknowledge it – or her: 
 
I was silent…with my mother when she had the first of her brain strokes, and am 
silent also with everyone else I know in whom I begin to perceive the first signs 
of irreversible physical decay and approaching infirmity and death. (I write these 
people off rapidly. They become dead records in my filing system long before 
they are even gone, at the first indications that they have begun to go).40  
 
Slocum is appalled that his mother eventually became a “bloodless pulp,” is repelled 
by his son Derek’s carer, who has “gnarled fingers on bloated hands and…a musty 
collapsing bodice… [a] thrusting front with no suggestion of anything else in back but 
                                               
38 Ibid. p. 550. 
39 Ibid. p. 359, pp. 402-403. 
40 Ibid. p.6, p. 104. 
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stale and folding space” and his own inevitable physical demise fills him with 
unassuageable dread, as he imagines being “battered by continuing hurricane 
warnings of bursitis, arthritis, rheumatism, diabetes, varicose veins, dizziness, nausea, 
tumors, cysts, angina, polyps, the whole fucking shebang of physical dissolution,” 
which will finally leave him “deaf, dumb, blind, paralyzed, and dead.”41 
 
    Slocum, however, cannot avoid intimations of physical entropy because of the 
constant presence of a powerful symbolic reminder: his mentally handicapped son 
Derek. As Slocum’s mother “faded away, speechless, in one direction, Derek 
emerged, speechless, from the other.” For Slocum, Derek’s muteness renders him 
atavistic, a primitive being, but also emblematic of the physical dissolution, incapacity 
and speechlessness that he will eventually have to face in old age. When Slocum 
imagines himself in a nursing home he also imagines “Derek out 
front…slobbering…with an incriminating resemblance to a secret me I know I have 
inside me…an inner visage” and later says, “he’s a simulacrum” but one in which “the 
architecture’s finished. The circuits can’t be changed.” In a foretelling of his killing of 
his other son Slocum’s imagined murder of Derek is also an image of self-extinction: 
 
Derek I smother with a huge hand over his mouth to stifle his inarticulate noises 
and hide his drivelling eyes, nose, and mouth. (It is not to put him out of his 
misery that I do it; it is to put me out of mine).42 
 
    Slocum’s primary narrative obsession however, is not informational entropy or even 
physical entropy, but metaphysical, or existential, entropy. For Slocum, as John 
Aldridge suggests, “we decline from our beginnings…they are only left behind in the 
meaningless drift of history in which at an indefinable moment something happened 
to make them unrecapturable.”43 The unrecapturable moment that Aldridge refers to 
is, of course, illusory, as is the entropic diminishment of self, since the self is in a 
constant process of change, of transition, with no conceivable end – except in death, 
which is why Slocum is death-obsessed. His thoughts reflect and embody a kind of 
amorphous dissolution, since for him they are “circular, spherical, orbicular, a wheel 
turning like the world in a basin of sediment into which so much of what I forget to think 
about separates and drops away into the bottom layers of murk and sludge.”44 Slocum 
                                               
41 Ibid. p. 268, pp. 451-452, p. 406. 
42 Ibid. p.209, p.391, p. 533, p. 392. 
43 John W. Aldridge, The American Novel and the Way We Live Now (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983), p. 41. 
44 Joseph Heller, Something Happened, 1974 (London: Vintage Books, 1995), p.407. 
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experiences his consciousness as a bodily phenomenon, and in his dreams, he seems 
to “dissolve while dreaming them,” being left afterwards with “nothing but my eyes and 
a puddle of tears.” The mental and the physical are conflated as his narration unravels, 
itself subject to the entropy it seeks to forestall: 
 
Fungus, erosion, disease. The taste of flannel in your mouth. The smell of 
asbestos in your brain. A rock. A sinking heart, silence, taut limbs, a festering 
invasion from within, seeping subversion, and a dull pressure on the brow, and 
in the back regions of the skull. It starts like a fleeting whim, an airy, frivolous 
notion…it enlarges in space and force like a somber, inhuman form from 
whatever lightless pit inside you it abides in; it fills you up, spreading steadily 
throughout you like lava or a persistent miasmic cloud, an obscure, untouchable, 
implacable, domineering, vile presence.45 
 
Bob Slocum’s is a “horrible grotesque life,” as Heller suggested in an interview with 
Per Winther in 1976; his self-contradictory language, as his consciousness begins 
breaking down, is markedly similar to the unravelling consciousness in Beckett’s The 
Unnamable (1952), the last novel in the Trilogy, following Molloy (1950) and Malone 
Dies (1951), an influence Heller acknowledged in the same interview.46 Beckett’s 
narrating consciousness intones, “I think I must have blackouts, whole sentences lost, 
no, not whole. Perhaps I’ve missed the keyword to the whole business,” while Slocum 
drones, “The cable of continuity is not unbroken; it is not thick and strong; it wavers 
and fades, wears away in places to slender, frayed strands, breaks. Much of what I 
remember about me does not seem to be mine…I do not always know where I am at 
present.” Beckett’s narrative consciousness jabbers, “I shall not be alone…I am of 
course alone…And how can one be sure, in such darkness? I shall have company”, 
while Slocum babbles, “I have so many people to cope with at night. Many are made 
of varnished glass wax. There’s no such thing.”47 As in what Thomas LeClair calls “the 
fused vitality and futility of Beckett’s fiction,” in Slocum’s monologue “silence [is] feared 
and filled at any cost.”48 David Seed, however, notes an important difference in 
                                               
45 Ibid. pp. 379-380, p. 493. 
46 Per Winther, ‘Joseph Heller on Something Happened: An Interview’, American Studies in 
Scandinavia, 8 (No.1, 1976), pp.17-31, p.30. 
47 Samuel Beckett, Trilogy, 1959 (London: Calder Publications, 2003), p. 372, p. 294; Joseph Heller, 
Something Happened, 1974 (London: Vintage Books, 1995), pp. 400-401. 
48 Thomas LeClair, ‘Joseph Heller, Something Happened and the Art of Excess’ in James Nagel, ed. 
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G.K. Hall and Co., 1984), p. 125.  
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Slocum’s narrative, its momentum and final dissolution, and a resultant lessening of 
the monotony that characterises Beckett’s Trilogy: 
 
Where Beckett presents a dwindling self whose physical exhaustion 
corresponds to the futility of narrating…Heller shows how Slocum’s gradual 
admission of illicit thoughts increases his ambivalence to crisis point so that he 
begins to break down physically (headache, hallucinations, nightmares) and 
syntactically (ambiguous pronouns, shifting parentheses, inordinate 
digressions).49 
 
    The process Seed describes could be viewed as the ever-increasing drive towards 
entropy of Slocum’s consciousness, which actually generates physical and 
informational entropy. Heller’s narrator also differs from Beckett’s narrator in his 
obsession with the ‘something’ he believes ‘happened’ in his life and in his refusal to 
face the something that is happening (and his responsibility for it). In this fixation 
Slocum exemplifies Sartre’s “nostalgia of impermeability,” fostered, or maintained by 
the apparent stasis of the suburbs; his response to his “being-in-the-world” is to affirm 
only the first of the two aspects of its “nihilating ambiguity…I am what I have been (the 
man who deliberately arrests himself at one period in his life and refuses to take into 
consideration the later changes).” In ‘arresting himself’ in his past and succumbing to 
nostalgia for impermeability, Slocum seeks a kind of entropic existential stasis, 
impermeability clearly being suggestive of a closed system. He can only endlessly 
repeat his bewildered disavowal of the second aspect of the “nihilating ambiguity”, that 
“I am not what I have been (the man who in the face of reproaches or rancour 
dissociates himself from his past by insisting on his freedom and on his perpetual 
recreation).”50 Bad faith (understood in Sartrean terms) cannot provide the solace 
Slocum is so desperate to find; rather in its denial of the mercurial nature of self, of the 
possibility (in fact, the inevitability) of one’s transcendence of one’s facticity, it 
compounds his anguish. Yet, paradoxically, because pain is the one constant in his 
sense of self, because it is not entropic, he cannot relinquish it. “There is so much 
liquid pain,” Slocum intones, “It never grows less. It stores itself up. Unlike heat or 
energy, it does not dissipate. It all always remains.”51 This highlights Slocum’s 
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 50 
 
contradictory state, since the reassuring constancy that he experiences solely through 
pain is of course generated by the inconstancy, the disequilibrium of his 
consciousness, a consciousness that, in seeking to escape its own state, is finally 
unable, in bad faith, to avoid anguish. 
 
“Running out of gas”: environmental, physical and metaphysical entropy in 
Rabbit is Rich  
 
    Harry ‘Rabbit’ Angstrom, the twenty-six-year-old protagonist of Rabbit, Run (1960), 
is constantly on the move, seemingly afraid of succumbing to suburban normalcy and 
stasis, since he is afraid, as Zbigniew Lewicki suggests, that “immobility facilitates 
entropy and thus helps destroy human beings,” yet his motion is without direction 
(alternately away from and towards both his wife Janice and his lover, Ruth).52 In the 
first novel in Updike’s Rabbit tetralogy, Harry could be seen as an example of the 
“increasing disorder of energy moving at random within a closed system” (the 
suburbs). His movements are impulsive, undertaken with no thought for his 
destination, and as the novel progresses, as Gerry Brenner suggests, “Rabbit’s 
escapes become increasingly aimless, panicky, valueless,” prompted by “instinctual 
fear.”53 In Rabbit Redux (1971), the second novel, Harry has ostensibly acquiesced at 
the age of thirty-six to suburban homogeneity (if not normalcy), and in his passivity 
appears to surrender to “that sort of mechanical ‘order’ which induces anaesthesia and 
ultimately irreversible torpor.”54 While the concept of entropy is an underlying concern 
of the first two novels, in Rabbit is Rich (1981) it is arguably the dominant theme from 
the opening sentence, as Harry, now forty-six, muses on decline and dissolution – of 
his body, his environment, and his country: 
 
Running out of gas, Rabbit Angstrom thinks as he stands behind the summer-
dusty windows of the Springer Motors display room watching the traffic go by on 
Route 111, traffic somehow thin and scared compared to what it used to 
be…dollars are going rotten.55 
 
                                               
52 Zbigniew Lewicki, The Bang and the Whimper: Apocalypse and Entropy in American Literature 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 110. 
53 Gerry Brenner,‘Rabbit, Run: John Updike’s Criticism of the ‘Return to Nature’ in Twentieth Century 
Literature, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Apr. 1966) p. 7. 
54 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950 – 1970, 1971 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976), 
p. 142, pp. 143-144. I argue in Chapter Three that Harry’s apparent passivity in Rabbit Redux can be 
better understood as a kind of narcissistic impassivity. 
55 John Updike, A Rabbit Omnibus: Rabbit, Run; Rabbit Redux; Rabbit is Rich, 1990 (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1991), p. 417. 
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     Rabbit is Rich is set in 1979, and is pervaded by a sense of cultural malaise and 
perilousness in the wake of events in the late 1970s in the US (and elsewhere), 
discussed in the introduction. Perhaps most notable among these were the hostage 
crisis in the US embassy in Tehran, which started in November 1979, and the ongoing 
oil crisis that precipitated an economic recession. In Rabbit’s internal monologue these 
events compound his sense of existential dread and his fear of environmental, physical 
and metaphysical, or existential, entropy, which intermingle in his consciousness, and 
are often conflated. After noticing that traffic has become “thin and scared,” Rabbit 
returns to the office of Springer Motors, where he is now the senior salesman, following 
the death of his wife’s father, Fred Springer, and sees that the photographs and 
clippings on the office wall, reminders of his former glory as a high school basketball 
player, are themselves thinning and dissolving. The glass under which they are kept 
is no protection, since “the clippings keep yellowing…resurrected from the attic where 
his dead parents had long kept them, in scrapbooks whose mucilage had dried so they 
came loose like snakeskins.”56 The clippings then are reminders of physical decay and 
dissolution, of the loosening and weakening of flesh that Rabbit sees in his own body 
and the bodies of those around him.  
 
    The bleak tone of much of Rabbit is Rich seems at odds with the ostensible 
happiness Harry Angstrom has found in the material comfort and comparative security 
of middle age. Updike himself commented to Melvyn Bragg that this novel is “a happy 
book. I was happy, I was feeling rich. My own exuberance spilled over” but he also 
acknowledged in The New York Times that the novel was set against the backdrop of 
a “flimsy America” experiencing “a sort of deflation of expectations…[and] malaise,” 
and pervaded by a “general sense of exhaustion.”57 It is of course precisely Harry’s 
stolid contentment that gives him the time and space for reflection, inevitably leading 
to angst (‘anguish’ in Sartre’s terminology), as his name suggests. Updike allows 
Rabbit’s consciousness to dominate this novel far more than in Rabbit, Run or Rabbit 
Redux, a consequence in part of his affluent suburban slothfulness, as Peter J. Bailey 
observes: 
 
Rabbit is the author’s preferred medium for the registering of sensations and 
perceptions, and the insularity of his prosperous middle-class existence 
                                               
56 Ibid. pp. 417-418. 
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combined with his improved attitude toward the world allows Rabbit is Rich, to a 
greater extent than the previous novels do, to foreground rendering – the 
evocation of Harry’s subjective impressions – by minimizing plot.58 
 
    The problem with this “improved attitude toward the world” though, is that it conflicts 
with the (spurious) identity Rabbit has cultivated as outsider in the first two novels, now 
that, in middle age, “his diminished energies threaten his idea of himself.”59 “Your 
selves die too,” he reflects, thinking back to the turbulent events of his life ten years 
earlier, remembering the self of that time which “had shriveled and been overlaid.” For 
Harry, this sense of depletion undermines all relationships and diminishes their reality, 
but especially that with his son Nelson, now aged twenty. In the overgrown vegetable 
plot in his garden, with Nelson just returned from college, Rabbit is forced to admit to 
himself that “he and Nelson have been through enough years together to turn a cedar 
post to rot and yet his son is less real to Harry than these crinkled leaves of lettuce he 
touches and plucks.” The plot in the suburban garden, a symbol of tranquil retreat, 
only heightens Harry’s dread of entropic dissolution, the nullifying effects of growth 
and decay: 
 
Grass that won’t grow in the lawn where you plant it comes in here wild to 
multiply. Seed, so disgustingly much of it, Nature such a cruel smotherer. He 
thinks again of the dead he has known, the growingly many.60 
 
Suburbia itself, closed and entropic, reminds Harry of the homogenising process of 
entropy and of death itself: 
 
Town after town numbingly demonstrated to him that his life was a paltry thing, 
roughly duplicated by the millions in settings where houses and porches and 
trees mocking those in Mt. Judge fed the illusion of other[s]…that their souls 
were central and dramatic and invisibly cherished.61 
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Any solace or comfort that Harry’s newfound suburban wealth might bring to console 
him in this knowledge that life is “a paltry thing” is, as Marshall Boswell suggests, 
undercut by his imagining of “the inflationary cycle in entropic terms, with money as a 
closed system from which its buying power leaks,” so that even “the dollar is bound to 
keep leaking.”62 When he buys thirty krugerrands and shows them to his wife Janice 
they make love amongst the coins on the bed, but Updike has them lose one, so that 
“the missing coin suggests a depletion of energy,” another unwanted intimation for the 
narcissistic Harry that his fate and the planet’s are intertwined, as “the world is running 
down fast” and “mother Earth is drying up.”63  
 
    Rabbit Angstrom, like Bob Slocum in Something Happened, is virtually unable to 
see his environment, the people he knows, or himself except in entropic terms. As 
Harry drives through his suburban hometown of Mt. Judge and the city of Brewer he 
looks around and “everywhere…structures speak of expended energy.” In closed 
gasoline stations there are “shrouded pumps…a new industry” and “the acres of dead 
railroad track and car stops and stockpiled wheels and empty boxcars stick in the heart 
of the city like a great rusting dagger.” Even the car that Harry drives is an emblem of 
entropy, with its “tin getting dusty and rusty, the chrome developing pimples. Metal 
corrodes.”64 He thinks of his body, his physicality, in the same way, of “the face far 
behind him, crew-cut and thin-jawed…[which] exists in his present face like the chrome 
bones of a grille within the full front view of a car and its fenders.” Now “a chaos of 
wattles and slack chords blooms beneath his chin,” and in the morning he sometimes 
notices “an old man’s sad sour body smell…[a] faraway odor like a corpse just 
beginning to sweeten.” In bed with Janice, his wife, he hears “her voice sinking into 
the pillow like the dust of a mummy’s face, so weak,” and even the prospect of a new 
human life cannot divert Rabbit from his obsession, as he watches the heavily 
pregnant Pru, his future daughter in law, sleeping, “her belly shiny like one of those 
puffballs you find in the woods attached to a rotten stump.”65 
 
                                               
62 Marshall Boswell, John Updike’s Rabbit Tetralogy: Mastered Irony in Motion (Columbia, Missouri: 
University of Missouri Press, 2001), p. 137; John Updike, A Rabbit Omnibus: Rabbit, Run; Rabbit 
Redux; Rabbit is Rich, 1990 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1991), p. 523. 
63 Marshall Boswell, John Updike’s Rabbit Tetralogy: Mastered Irony in Motion (Columbia, Missouri: 
University of Missouri Press, 2001), p. 143; John Updike, A Rabbit Omnibus: Rabbit, Run; Rabbit 
Redux; Rabbit is Rich, 1990 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1991), p. 578, p. 420. 
64 John Updike, A Rabbit Omnibus: Rabbit, Run; Rabbit Redux; Rabbit is Rich, 1990 (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1991), p. 435, p. 427, p. 435, p. 645. 
65 Ibid. p. 419, p. 556, p. 63, p. 610. 
 54 
 
    Harry’s reaction to his intimations of mortality, to the images of the entropy he sees 
everywhere, is to withdraw and isolate himself still further, having already alienated 
those close to him in the earlier two novels. Driving, he “sits snug in his sealed and 
well-assembled car” and in bed with Janice asleep “he is not displeased to be thus 
stranded, another consciousness…is a responsibility, a snag in the flow of his 
thoughts.”66 Another consciousness, and specifically that of his wife, is more than a 
responsibility – it is an existential threat for Harry. His bad faith, like that of the other 
suburban male protagonists discussed here, their desire for the impossible state of 
being-in-itself-for-itself, requires an ontological negation of women; the potential threat 
they pose as separate consciousnesses with agency, with the potential for self-
determination, is impermissible in the false idyll and refuge of normative patriarchal 
suburbia, where they are expected to be dutiful, self-abnegating wives, facilitating their 
husbands’ retreat into feigned existential stasis, into entrenchment in facticity. For the 
suburban wife, as I will argue in Chapter Four, not only transcendence, but facticity 
too must be disavowed, since both signify consciousness, selfhood, and so the Other, 
a threat obviated and neutralised by her acceptance of what Sartre calls ‘being-for-
others’, an inescapable and alienating aspect of being for both men and women. For 
women in suburbia of the 1950s and subsequent decades, however, being-for-others 
is not only disempowering, it is destructive of selfhood, a nullification of identity. 
 
    Seemingly paradoxically (and like Bob Slocum), Harry Angstrom tries to turn himself 
into a closed system, resisting entropic thoughts and images from his environment, 
yet seeking a kind of entropic stasis of self, an “inner dwindling” to assuage his 
anguish. Unlike Slocum, however, he falters in his bad faith, has momentary insights, 
recognising that “from a certain angle the most terrifying thing in the world is your own 
life, the fact that it’s yours and nobody else’s,” and that his freedom, amorphous and 
transitional, cannot be nullified by an entropic equilibrium.67 Despite the entropic drive 
of his consciousness, then, he has a nascent awareness that he is “a being which is 
what it is not and which is not what it is.”68 Such insights are soon displaced by the 
relentless onslaught of imagery, sensations and thoughts that Rabbit seems to register 
impassively, unable though finally to “refute the world’s rumors of universal death.” He 
is obsessed with the past, with his former selves (his facticity in Sartrean terms) and 
the people he has known who are now dead: his mother and father, Becky, his baby 
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daughter who drowned, Jill, his former lover, Skeeter, the black militant he briefly lived 
with, Janice’s father Fred Springer, and Tothero, his former basketball coach – all 
become conflated with his self at different times of his life. His facticity becomes a 
source of frustration in its limitations on his selfhood, but one he cannot relinquish 
because to do so he would have to face constantly his fleeting recognition that “you 
have a life and there are these volumes on either side that go unvisited.”69 
    
    The movement of the novel is towards immobility and stasis, and when Harry tells 
Nelson, “you’ve got to keep moving. That’s the thing about you. You’re not moving” 
his tone is almost plaintive, his son a mystery to him, so different from Harry at his 
age, “attempting to rediscover himself by running.”70 In Rabbit is Rich, his attempts at 
running are only a bleak reminder of his dwindling energy, and lead to thoughts of the 
ever-growing number of the dead, who “reach up…catch at his heels.” Rabbit and 
Janice move at the end of the novel to an upper middle class, “overgrown, mature 
suburb” where “his life stretches emptily on all sides, and it seems that moving in any 
direction he’s bound to take a fall.” Harry has become stationary, still, and in the scene 
that ends the novel he is watching television and holding his granddaughter in his 
arms, “another nail in his coffin.”71 Frederick R. Karl describes the primacy of Rabbit’s 
consciousness in Rabbit is Rich as “intense, almost claustrophobic” since “his inner 
life…is a wasteland” and he views this as a limitation, if not an actual failing of Updike’s 
novel.72 It is true that Harry’s reflections never lead to greater understanding, or afford 
sustained insights into his own consciousness or his environment; subject to the 
entropic drive of that consciousness, they simply fade, dissipate, dissolve. This, 
though, is surely the point of foregrounding Harry’s consciousness: the highlighting – 
and heightening – of his sense of entropic decline and nullity, his conviction throughout 
the novel that “there is nothing to know. We are each of us filled with a perfect 
blackness.”73 
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“Everything Goes”: Entropy and death in the stories of Raymond Carver 
 
    The suburbanites of Raymond Carver’s stories have little in common with Updike’s 
Rabbit or Heller’s Slocum; Carver’s lower-middle and working class characters mostly 
strive only for psychic and emotional survival, for a semblance of self-strong enough 
to withstand existential crises and, often, unrelenting material hardship. Carver’s 
stories are almost always set indoors; his people exist in stark physical and emotional 
interiors, characterised by domestic drudgery and dread.74 Flashes of insight, muted 
epiphanies, cause their lives to abruptly unravel, or bring an implacable but 
indeterminate sense of menace and uncertainty. In an interview with John Alton in 
1986 Carver described the conflicts in his stories as “domestic” but acknowledged that 
“domestic conflicts can quickly escalate into existential conflicts.” Although he claimed 
that in his writing he wasn’t “emphasizing the dark side of things” he said in the same 
interview that the tone of his stories was “grave…and sometimes dark.”75 The suburbs 
of Carver’s earlier fiction in particular, are usually quiet, almost silent environments, 
their inhabitants sometimes prone to angry or frightened outbursts, but more often to 
emotional implosions, though in either case life continues and little, if anything, 
changes. The setting of the stories is crucial in this, as Graham Clarke argues: 
 
The suburbs in which they [Carver’s characters] seek resolution (or simply a way 
to get through their day) consist of vacant habitats where death exists as a kind 
of continuing reminder of personal limits. Death frames Carver’s world and 
suggests an underlying nothingness: the existential terms of an America sans 
its transcendent possibilities.76 
 
     If Carver’s suburban interiors suggest domestic confinement, transcending this 
confinement is both potentially liberating and frightening, though for most of his 
characters, finally impossible, since, as Clarke suggests, “in Carver’s America there is 
nowhere to go. The culture has reached the limits of its own exhaustion. The entropic 
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state…has been locked into the everyday atmosphere of suburban America.”77 There 
is undoubtedly a muted and stark interiority in Carver’s suburbs. They are isolated, cut 
off not just from the outside world, but each house and its occupants from neighbouring 
houses and occupants, and each house’s occupants from each other – closed 
systems within closed systems. Houses define and circumscribe characters’ sense of 
self, household items comfort and oppress, suddenly become malign presences 
instead of being neutrally utilitarian.  
 
     Carver’s concern with entropy, and in particular with what Margaret J. Downes calls 
“the inevitability of entropy and failure in love relationships between men and women” 
is apparent in many of his stories, and can be seen in his very early fiction, in the story 
‘Furious Seasons’.78 The story concerns an incestuous relationship between a brother 
and sister, in which the brother murders his sister by slashing her throat after 
discovering she is pregnant, and is set against a backdrop of torrential rain, in a cold 
and dark winter landscape. The imagery is of watery dissolution and death, and airless 
claustrophobia. The brother watches his breath disappear “until only a tiny circle, a dot 
remained, then nothing,” while the breakfast coffee he made “slopped over the cup 
and the brown drops ran slowly down the side onto the table.” His memory of his father 
slaughtering a sheep – “the blood gushes out…the gray guts slide out of the steaming 
belly” – foreshadow the killing of his sister, and the story ends with the brother standing 
motionless in the rain, as “the gutter water rushed over his feet, swirled frothing into a 
great whirlpool at the drain on the corner and rushed down to the center of the earth.”79 
Such stark imagery is strongly suggestive of entropy, matter being reduced to its 
original undifferentiated state through liquefaction. In a later story, ‘Collectors’, from 
the 1976 collection Will You Please Be Quiet, Please? an out of work divorced man 
living alone receives a visit from a vacuum cleaner salesman, who tells the man that 
people are surrounded by their own decay in their homes, that “every day, every night 
of our lives, we’re leaving little bits of ourselves, flakes of this and that, behind…you 
would be surprised how much of us gets lost,” deposited into mattresses and onto car 
seats. The salesman demonstrates the effectiveness of the vacuum cleaner, 
afterwards showing the man the filter, now “alive with dust, hair, small grainy things,” 
but the man tells the salesman he can’t afford the machine, and he should write him 
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off as a “dead loss.”80 When the salesman leaves he picks up a letter addressed to Mr 
Slater, and puts it in his pocket, removing the man’s decaying self along with his dust 
and hair.   
 
    The theme of entropy is developed more fully in Carver’s 1981 collection, What We 
Talk About When We Talk About Love. In ‘Why Don’t You Dance?’ a husband has 
transcended the limits of his suburban domesticity, but in the only way possible for 
most of Carver’s characters – through its complete dissolution. He is finally outside, 
but the outside has become the inside in an ironic inversion, his yard full of the entire 
contents of his house, now for sale, and most significantly, the bed, or at least 
mattress, he shared with his wife. The man has recreated the interior faithfully, so that 
“things looked much the way they had in the bedroom – nightstand and reading lamp 
on his side of the bed, nightstand and reading lamp on her side.”81 He has even run 
an extension cord into the yard so that the lamps, the blender, the TV and stereo all 
work, and the young couple who stop and browse can enact their own future domestic 
life, which, Carver, suggests, is no more likely to withstand entropic dissolution than 
the man’s: the first thing the boy does after getting out of their car is to plug in the 
blender and turn the dial to “MINCE”; the girl tries out the mattress and asks the boy 
to join her, but he just sits and stares at the TV, a preview of the future breakdown of 
communication between them.82 The couple ask the man how much he wants for the 
bed and the TV, try to haggle, failing to understand his need simply to be rid of 
everything, and when the boy asks him how much he wants for the desk, the man 
waves his hand “at this preposterous question.”83 “Everything goes,” he tells the 
couple, but they only see the items for sale in the yard.84 The parodic staging of a 
mock-idyllic suburban domesticity (the neighbours are watching the spectacle) 
highlights its illusoriness and powerlessness to protect, or to endure, as Daniel 
Lehman notes: 
 
                                               
80 Raymond Carver, The Stories of Raymond Carver (London: Picador, 1985), p. 83, p. 85. 
81 Ibid, p. 187, p. 183. 
82 In the version of the story published in Beginners the man is named Max, and the boy is named Jack, 
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83 Raymond Carver, The Stories of Raymond Carver (London: Picador, 1985), p. 190. 
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Everything Goes. However, Dan Rush’s 2010 full length film adaptation, Everything Must Go, 
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Without a meaningful home to surround them, the domestic items arranged in 
the driveway lose their significance and disintegrate…Artificial light (the lamps) 
or pictures (television) or sound (the record-player) or intimacy (the bed and 
couch), Carver seems to be saying, can’t hold back the darkness, even as the 
objects of a relationship can’t create or sustain the relationship or stave off the 
despair of its dissolution.85 
 
As the girl and the man dance drunkenly to music on the stereo (the man seems to be 
permanently drunk) she says he “must be desperate or something” but doesn’t realise 
the significance of her question. She seems to have intimations of a possible 
understanding, perhaps experiences incipient dread and empathy, but telling her 
friends about the incident later, finds she cannot explain its significance, and “after a 
time, she quit trying.”86 As is so often the case in Carver’s stories, there is a shift in 
perception, but the girl is denied an epiphany, or rather she has what Gunter Leypoldt 
calls an “arrested epiphany” characterised by 
 
A distinct disparity between the character’s feeling of revelation and his or her 
lack of understanding of what sort of insight the revelation is supposed to 
provide. That is to say, the centers of consciousness realize, with an often 
disquieting sense of menace, that there is something out of joint in their world, 
that at some level they are on the brink of making a tremendous discovery, but 
they remain far from grasping what exactly it could be.87 
 
     Carver’s preoccupation with entropy is even clearer in ‘Preservation’ from 
Cathedral (1983). The imagery and symbolism in this story are entirely concerned with 
decay and dissolution. Sandy’s husband (unnamed) has hardly moved from the sofa 
since being “terminated” three months ago, and now, far from “putting roofs on new 
houses,” cannot prevent the unravelling of his own domestic life.  He has been reading 
the same book for three months, ‘Mysteries of the Past’, but Sandy sees that he isn’t 
“making any progress”; he is still on the same page, with a story about a petrified man 
who was discovered after being buried in a peat bog for two thousand years, and in 
the accompanying photograph “the man’s brow was furrowed, but there was a serene 
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expression to his face.” Sandy comes home from work one day to find that their fridge 
freezer has broken down, its contents already thawing and liquefying, producing a 
stench that makes her “want to gag.” One of the key symbols of suburban domesticity, 
of consumerist affluence and plenty, has become a harbinger of entropy, of irreversible 
decay. Her husband meanwhile, assumes a corpse-like form on the sofa: “he lay 
still…his arms down...[at] his sides”, resembling the man buried in the peat bog for two 
thousand years.88 The husband seems to be in a state of neither sleep nor 
wakefulness, but in a somnambulant trance, passively receding into near non-
existence, attempting in Sartrean terms “to fuse his openness and freedom with the 
impermeability of things, to achieve a state of being in which the en-soi [in-itself] and 
pour-soi [for-itself] are synthesized,” to become being in-itself-for-itself.89 Sandy sees 
in a newspaper that there is an auction for fridges and other household appliances that 
evening and remembers going to auctions with her father, but these too are now 
associated with decay and death since at the last auction her father went to he bought 
a car that “leaked carbon monoxide up through the floorboards and caused him to 
pass out behind the wheel…The motor went on running until there was no more gas 
in the tank. He stayed in the car until somebody found him a few days later.” The car, 
another emblem of suburban convenience and affluence (and without which there 
would be no suburbs) has also become a symbol of death, a force of entropy, which 
“went on running” but finally ran down, ran out of gas, as the man’s body decomposed. 
Before going to the auction Sandy (sand being the chemically inert matter left after the 
slow decay and erosion of rocks) cooks all the rapidly perishing food but the meat no 
longer resembles food; like the fridge freezer and car it has also mutated symbolically 
into an image of death (her husband’s), and “looked like part of an old shoulder blade.” 
The final image of the story is of puddles of water from the thawed food collecting on 
the table and dripping onto the floor of the kitchen, matter returning to its original form. 
Sandy is transfixed by the sight of her husband’s feet next to the water, but “she didn’t 
know what to make of it yet,” another of Carver’s arrested (or at least delayed) 
epiphanies.90 In Sartrean existentialism this can be understood in terms of bad faith, 
which prevents Sandy’s full recognition of the ‘entropic drive’ of consciousness, its 
desire to flee from its freedom and achieve the permanence and stasis of being-in-
itself-for-itself. Bad faith motivates ‘self-distraction’, as Jonathon Webber describes it, 
from the implications of that recognition: 
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Bad faith…is motivated by the dim awareness that we do not possess our 
qualities in the way that mere objects possess their properties, so it occurs only 
because we are aware of not having fixed natures.91  
 
The images of dead meat, of foodstuffs become inanimate things, that is, (ontologically 
fixed) being-in-itself, contrasts with the image of her husband’s feet, and his presence 
in the kitchen, as (ontologically unfixed) being-for-itself drained of volition, resembling 
being-in-itself in his immobility. 
 
     In the story ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Love’, the imagery is less 
stark, but Carver again shows a movement towards dissolution and finally stasis; from 
light to darkness and from conversation to silence (and from sobriety to drunkenness). 
The interior is, as in ‘Preservation’, a suburban kitchen, and the conversation at the 
beginning of the story is animated, lively, as two couples discuss their experiences of 
love and find themselves incapable of communicating its essence, and eventually of 
communicating at all. At the beginning of the story Nick, the narrator, tells us that 
“sunlight filled the kitchen from the big window behind the sink.” In trying to agree on 
what “real love” is, the couples discuss domestic violence, suicide, a car crash, 
physical disfigurement, suffocation, as “the afternoon sun…the spacious light of ease 
and generosity” begins slowly “changing, getting thinner.” The tone of the conversation 
grows menacing as Mel, the narrator’s friend, becomes increasingly aggressive, telling 
his girlfriend Terri to “just shut up for once in your life”.92 Significantly, Mel says this 
very quietly; he is extremely controlled, but Carver shows his capacity for violence, like 
Terri’s former partner, who abused her and eventually killed himself when she left. 
Nick tells us that Mel’s movements when sober “were precise, very careful” but as he 
starts to get drunk his control lessens. His self-absorption and aggressive 
defensiveness exclude those around him and at one point he looks at Nick’s partner 
Laura “as if he could not place her, as if she was not the woman she was.”93 As the 
light starts “draining out of the room, going back through the window to where it had 
come from” the conversation dwindles to silence and the characters, like Sandy’s 
husband in ‘Preservation’, become inert, stuck in place at the kitchen table as the 
darkness envelops them. Earlier in the story Mel says that if he could come back in a 
different life he would be a knight, protected by armour (and so, of course, invulnerable 
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and detached) but then realizes that knights, as well as serfs, were “vessels to 
someone…But then everyone is always a vessel to someone.” Terri tells him the 
correct word is ‘vassal’, but the image is clear – the examples of love discussed by the 
couples involve some kind of subjugation and control, but also an attempt to fill an 
existential emptiness. At the end of the story the talking has stopped completely, and 
in the silence and emptiness the narrator “could hear everyone’s heart. I could hear 
the human noise we sat there making.”94 As Margaret J. Downes observes, the story 
is “a narrative about unsuccessful narratives – about the uselessness of striving to 
know ourselves better through talking about love or through telling stories about 
love.”95 
 
    Love leads to self-estrangement for Carver’s characters, since they are ‘subliminally 
aware’ (the contradiction of bad faith) that the surety of that love is as illusory as their 
own fixed characters and the characters of those they love, and “being loved is 
therefore alienating.” Yet for Mel especially, who can’t understand how he could have 
loved his wife and now hate her, and for Terri’s ex-husband Ed, as for the girl in ‘Why 
Don’t You Dance?’, who cannot acknowledge that “everything goes,” the denial of the 
entropic nature of love requires the objectifying of the loved one in what Sartre calls 
‘the look’ (le regard). This, as Jonathan Webber observes, involves the attempt  
 
To get the other person to affirm that I do indeed have a fixed nature, which 
Sartre describes as an attempt to ‘assimilate’ the other to my project of seeing 
myself in a certain way’ and…[to] focus attention on the other person and see 
them as having a fixed nature. Within the project of bad faith, my relationship 
with another person, according to Sartre, will continually oscillate between these 
two basic attitudes, looking at them and allowing myself to be looked at by them, 
each attitude being ‘enriched by the failure of the other.’96 
 
There is a kind of violence in this project of bad faith concerning love, a subjugation of 
selfhood, one’s own and the Other’s (turning ourselves into ‘vessels’ as well as 
‘vassels’, as Carver’s story expresses it). If, as Webber suggests, “the desire to be 
loved…is one way in which we try to pursue the project of bad faith, as it is one way 
in which we try to reassure ourselves of our fixed natures,” this inevitably leads to inner 
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conflict because “the feeling of being loved…like the feeling of pride, contains within it 
the suggestion that people do not, or might not, really have fixed natures.” This is 
because if we had fixed natures being ‘loveable’ or ‘unloveable’ would be neutral 
descriptions, and loving, or being loved, would be simply states of being dependent 
on the unchanging natures of the loved and the loving, having no value. Bad faith is 
therefore “stultifying” because “it conflicts with the value of being loved.”97 In Carver’s 
story, Nick, the narrator, tells Mel “I think what you're saying is that love is an absolute" 
and Mel replies “The kind of love I'm talking about is…. physical love, that impulse that 
drives you to someone special, as well as love of the other person's being, his or her 
essence, as it were.”98 If existence precedes essence, as Sartre claims, characters 
(essences) are mutable, and Mel’s anger at not being able to define love can be seen 
as being motivated by bad faith, since he believes love must be an absolute; the 
ontologically impossible fusing of being-in-itself and being-for-itself: being in-itself-for-
itself. Mel can’t accept that self, or character, is “a being which is what it is not and 
which is not what it is.”99  The answer to his bellicose, hectoring question about his 
love for his former wife (“What happened to that love? What happened to it, is what I'd 
like to know”) is: entropy.100 
 
    If imagery of physical and metaphysical entropy pervades many of Carver’s stories, 
death and entropic decay, and the existential crises they precipitate, are the main 
narrative focus of others. Death is generally the result of dramatic acts of violence, and 
such acts, as Kirk Nesset suggests, “attest to the inevitable course of buried violence 
in Carver’s stories – to the return of the repressed, and to the extremity at the heart of 
all conflicts, and of all stories.”101 Two stories that exemplify this are ‘So Much Water 
So Close to Home’ and ‘Tell the Women We’re Going’. Interestingly, it is the earlier, 
longer versions published posthumously in Beginners (2009) (the former story also in 
the 1977 Furious Seasons collection) rather than those in What We Talk About When 
We Talk About Love (1981) that demonstrate clearly this pattern of repression leading 
to explosions of violence. The later versions edited by Gordon Lish rely on implied 
connections, and in avoiding the more explicit depictions of violence (whether verbal 
or physical) and entropic decay and disfiguration of the Beginners versions, they 
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underplay their inevitability, suggesting an underlying randomness. In both stories 
characters actually leave oppressive suburban interiors, but Carver’s narrative focuses 
on the characters’ interiority – that of the first person narrator in ‘So Much Water So 
Close to Home’ and that of Jerry, the violent protagonist of ‘Tell the Women We’re 
Going’. For them, as for most characters, as Graham Clarke notes, “Carver’s world 
never offers an escape route…no matter how or where his characters travel, the 
primary movement is inwards, towards a found emptiness: an interior condition beyond 
the words of its own naming.”102 
 
    This “interior condition” described by Clarke can be understood as the entropic drive 
of consciousness towards the dissolution of selfhood, “beyond the words of its own 
naming” as Beckett’s The Unnamable is, and as Bob Slocum’s monologue is. In ‘So 
Much Water So Close to Home’ a group of male suburbanites go on a weekend fishing 
trip in a familiar suburban ritual, attempting to “play out the myth of a rugged America” 
but death intrudes shockingly when they discover the body of girl in a river in the 
woods.103 Rather than abandoning their fishing trip and reporting their discovery to the 
police, the men decide to wait until after the weekend to inform the sheriff’s office.  
Claire, the narrator, tells us that one of the men,  
 
It might have been Stuart [her husband], he could have done it, waded into the 
water, and then took the girl by the fingers and pulled her, still face down, closer 
to shore, into shallow water, and then took a piece of nylon cord and tied it 
around her wrist and then secured the cord to tree roots, all the while the 
flashlights of the other men played over the body.104 
 
The man’s touching and binding of the woman, and the other men’s voyeuristic gazing 
at the body suggest prurience and physical threat, if not actual violence. His morbid 
fascination with the girl’s body (he periodically returns to look at it, supposedly to check 
that it is still there) prefigures the entropic dissolution of his relationship with Claire. 
When Claire says her husband “could have done it,” the implication seems to be that 
he might have been capable not just of binding the girl, but of killing her; earlier in their 
relationship Stuart had told Claire that “someday this affair…will end in violence”, and 
when she rejects his sexual advances for the second time after the finding of the girl’s 
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body, he throws her on the floor and tells her “I hope your cunt drops off before I touch 
it again.” Like Mel in ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Love’, Stuart is unable 
to conceal his anger and there is a constant threat of its erupting into psychological or 
physical violence, or both. Here, the ontological negation of women in bad faith 
(rendering them objects, being-in-itself) is even starker than in Rabbit is Rich, with an 
ever present risk of actual injury or even death. The threat of male sexual violence is 
also clear when Claire drives to the murdered girl’s funeral; she pulls over to let a pick-
up truck overtake, but the driver stops too, walks over to the car and asks Claire to 
open the window so they can talk.  He looks at her breasts, stares at her legs, and 
tells her she’s “going to smother in there.” “I want to smother,” Claire replies, “I am 
smothering, can’t you see?” She increasingly comes to identify with the murdered girl, 
in an alienated and passive self-objectification: “I float toward the pond, eyes open, 
face down…I am carried into the lake where I am pushed by the breeze.”105 The girl’s 
death has precipitated an existential crisis and in her anguish Claire experiences a 
heightened drive, in bad faith, towards denial of self and towards ontological depletion 
and stasis. In an impassive abrogation of selfhood, she experiences her life 
unravelling, with no sense of control or agency. Like Heller’s Bob Slocum, who feels 
that “much of what I remember about me does not seem to be mine,” Claire cannot 
make sense of her past and tells us “I cannot be sure that the things I remember 
happening really happened to me.”106  
 
    In this story, as in Something Happened and Rabbit is Rich, the suburbs foster, or 
engender, a kind of somnambulant fatalism, and passivity; in Heller’s novel (with 
Slocum’s mother’s demise and a girl’s suicide) and Carver’s story, death shatters the 
tenuous equilibrium, the precarious emotional balance, that the characters strive to 
maintain, forcing them to experience (though not always acknowledge) the forces of 
entropy to which their bodies and relationships (but not their consciousness) are 
subject. The violence in Something Happened (Slocum’s killing of his son) and in 
Carver’s story, does not (cannot) provide catharsis, cannot stem the inexorable 
progress of those forces. Claire comes to realise this in her identification with the dead 
girl, who she imagines drifting and directionless in the water, carried along by the 
river’s current, and she reflects that “nothing will be any different. We will go on and 
on and on and on. We will go on even now, as if nothing had happened.”107 Stuart’s 
                                               
105 Ibid. p. 122, p. 132, p. 129, p. 120. 
106 Joseph Heller, Something Happened, 1974 (London: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 505; Raymond 
Carver, Beginners, 2009 (London: Vintage Books, 2010), p. 122. 
107 Raymond Carver, Beginners, 2009 (London: Vintage Books, 2010), p. 120. 
 66 
 
denial of this – and his resultant affective (and perhaps moral) numbness and 
obliviousness – is shown by his reaction to finding the girl, his fixation on her 
unchangeable facticity in the stasis of death, no longer subject to the process of 
entropy. It is Claire who, despite her bad faith, begins to understand the extent of her 
husband’s alienation and self-estrangement, and the implications for their relationship.  
 
    In ‘Tell the Women We’re Going’, as in ‘So Much Water So Close to Home’, the 
tranquil façade of suburban domesticity is shattered by physical and emotional 
violence, and a girl’s murder is central to both. In ‘Tell the Women We’re Going’ Bill 
and Jerry have been friends since junior high school, Jerry being the more dominant, 
since he “didn’t like being told what to do,” while “Bill didn’t mind; he liked it that Jerry 
was the sort of take-charge guy he was.” After Jerry got married, had two kids and 
dropped out of high school to work in the local shopping mall, the friends became more 
distant. When Bill got married Jerry was his best man, but he seemed to Bill 
prematurely old at twenty-two. Already Jerry’s capacity for violence was clear at Bill’s 
wedding when he got drunk and picked a fight with one of the ushers. The friends now 
are fellow suburbanites, Bill going regularly to Jerry’s house for the suburban ritual of 
the barbeque. Jerry has grown increasingly withdrawn and “Bill had to do most of the 
talking…Jerry nodded now and then, but most of the time just stared at the clothesline 
or the garage.”108 These emblems of domesticity have become mutely oppressive for 
Jerry, who crushes his beer cans but says little to Bill, punching him lightly in the 
stomach in a strained display of male camaraderie. Jerry suggests the two friends go 
for a drive, and, as in ‘So Much Water So Close to Home’, the attempt to transcend 
domestic confinement only highlights inner emptiness, reveals a “central disfiguring 
blankness” in Jerry.109 He tells Bill a “guy’s got to get out now and then or he gets 
stale,” but Jerry can’t get out, his withdrawal is so absolute, his sense of self so 
diminished that he is as depersonalised as the clothesline he stares at absently.110 He 
has become, like many of Carver’s characters, a closed system, energies depleted as 
he seeks stasis, in Jerry’s case the stasis of the facticity of his past. 
 
    For Jerry, others, but particularly women, are also utterly depersonalised, and when 
the friends drive past two girls cycling he tells Bill he wants “some of that…old enough 
to bleed, old enough to…You know that saying.” He slows the car and asks Bill to 
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“hustle ‘em in for us,” though Bill is uneasy and reluctantly engages the girls in 
conversation, as Jerry follows the girls to Painted Rock, a range of hills in an outcrop 
of rocks, where “the highway forked,” though Jerry’s decision is in no doubt. On the 
cliff side of the rock there are “announcements and warnings” but Jerry is oblivious as 
he waits for the girls to appear. The friends follow the girls into the hills at Painted 
Rock, Bill noticing “with a little shock his trembling fingers,” and when the girls split up 
Jerry follows the older girl. She hides and tries to escape when he finds her, but he 
grabs her and rapes her, and when the girl starts to cry he hits her. Carver’s description 
of Jerry’s killing of the girl is almost clinical – Jerry hears “her teeth and bones crack” 
and when he drops a rock on her head it sounds “like a slap” – highlighting Jerry’s 
utterly dissociative state. His violent act of self-definition in bad faith is in fact an act of 
absolute self-annihilation, his humanity lost in his dehumanisation of another.111  
 
    If Jerry’s actions can be viewed (like Bob Slocum’s) as a consequence of what 
Sartre calls the “nostalgia of impermeability,” fostered in the stasis of the suburbs 
(represented here by Jerry’s blank staring at the clothesline and the garage – being-
in-itself) then they are the deadly result of his bad faith, his objectification of women 
pathologized in obliterative violence. Like Slocum in Something Happened, his 
response to his “being-in-the-world” is to violently reject its “nihilating ambiguity.” He 
can only accept that “I am what I have been (the man who deliberately arrests himself 
at one period in his life and refuses to take into consideration the later changes),” and 
cannot allow himself to recognise that “I am not what I have been (the man who in the 
face of reproaches or rancour dissociates himself from his past by insisting on his 
freedom and on his perpetual recreation).”112 Jerry identifies solely with his former self, 
unmarried and childless, and his objectifying of others reduces them to the semblance 
of being-in-itself, empty of volition, or of selfhood, while his own self-objectification 
provides, temporarily, an illusory state of being-in-itself-for-itself. When Bill finds him 
he feels “the awfulness closeness of their two bodies” and raises his hand “as if the 
distance now separating them deserved at least this.” Like Claire in ‘So Much Water 
So Close to Home’ Bill has intimations of a terrible insight. Claire, though, articulates 
her intimations of the radical discontinuity of consciousness, as her bad faith falters. 
She is aware of the futility of seeking stasis, permanence of self, mirrored in the illusion 
of suburban tranquillity and permanence. Like her fellow suburbanites, though, she 
                                               
111 Ibid. p. 85, p.87, p. 89, p. 92. 
112 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 58. 
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feels the need to “continue to talk and act as if you were the same person as yesterday, 
or last night, or five minutes before.”113 
 
   Winifried Fluck argues that “experience has no redeeming force of initiation or 
transformative potential for the weak identities of Carver’s characters.”114 This 
assessment, though, discounts the often subtle shifts in perception those characters 
experience. In a 1983 interview Carver said of his characters that “It’s their lives 
they’ve become uncomfortable with, lives they see breaking down” and in a later 
interview said that in his stories “things perish. Ideas and ideals and people’s goals 
and visions – they perish.” The characters may not understand the full significance of 
the forces of entropy, of things perishing and their lives breaking down, but they don’t 
always reject or deny their muted existential insights, despite their striving in bad faith 
for fixity of self, for a kind of entropic stasis of consciousness. Whilst they may 
experience muted epiphanies though, they do not gain a sense of full agency and 
control over their lives, but instead feel that they have no choice but to “go on and on 
and on and on.”115 
 
   The notion of entrapment is a familiar one in fiction about the suburbs and it is 
precisely the sense of being shut in – in the closed system of the suburb – that allows 
the development of the theme of entropy in the texts discussed here. The suburbs 
heighten and catalyse their inhabitants’ drive towards ontological stasis, their desire 
to flee from ontological freedom through a kind of entropic diminishment. The 
protagonists of these novels and stories all experience a sense of existential depletion 
– Slocum’s “festering invasion from within”, and “lightless pit inside,” Rabbit’s “inner 
dwindling,” Carver’s characters’ oppressive suburban interiors in which finally 
“everything goes” – and entropy is of course a kind of depletion, a dispersal and 
diminishment of energy within a closed system.116 In each case suburbia provides an 
environment in which characters can isolate themselves, shut out others, and close 
                                               
113 Raymond Carver, Beginners, 2009 (London: Vintage Books, 2010), p. 93, p. 94, p. 122. 
114 Winifried Fluck, ‘Surface Knowledge and ‘Deep’ Knowledge: The New Realism in American 
Fiction’, Neo-Realism in Contemporary American Fiction, ed. Kristiaan Versluys (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 1992), pp. 65-85, p. 72. 
115 Mona Simpson and Lewis Buzbee, ‘Raymond Carver’ in Marshall Bruce Gentry and William L. 
Stull, eds. Conversations with Raymond Carver (Jackson, Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 
1990), p. 42; John Alton, ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Literature: An Interview with 
Raymond Carver’ in Marshall Bruce Gentry and William L. Stull, eds. Conversations with Raymond 
Carver (Jackson, Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1990), p. 161. 
116 Joseph Heller, Something Happened, 1974 (London: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 493; John Updike, A 
Rabbit Omnibus: Rabbit, Run; Rabbit Redux; Rabbit is Rich, 1990 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1991), p. 
475; The Stories of Raymond Carver (London: Picador, 1985), p. 190. 
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down. There is, though, an overwhelming irony here, since, whilst the body, the 
environment, relationships are all subject to entropy, consciousness is not, yet in the 
anguish experienced because of its mercurial, transitional, unstable quality, it seeks 
stasis, degradation of being analogous to the entropy it dreads in the world. Urban 
fiction, by contrast, is often characterised by explosive and cathartic actions of the 
protagonists in the midst of an energising excess of stimulation. In US urban literature 
considered existentialist, perhaps most notably in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man  
(1952), Richard Wright’s The Outsider (1953), Saul Bellow’s Seize the Day (1956), 
and Norman Mailer’s An American Dream (1965), protagonists’ acts of (often violent) 
self-definition galvanise them, and allow some kind of epiphany or significant 
realization, an enrichment of self not a depletion. Ellison’s nameless protagonist, 
narrating from his brightly-lit underground basement, has learned through his ordeals 
that " to be unaware of one’s form is to live a death…the truth is the light and light is 
the truth"; Wright’s Cross Damon comes “to a consciousness of having somehow 
fallen into a vast web of pledges and promises which he had not intended to make and 
whose implied obligations had been slowly smothering his spirit”; Mailer’s Stephen 
Rojack has “a quick grasp of the secret to sanity…the ability to hold the maximum of 
possible combinations in one's mind”; and Bellow’s Tommy Wilhelm attends a 
stranger’s funeral and is convulsed by a purgative grief that allows him finally to move 
towards “the consummation of his heart’s ultimate need.”117 For the suburbanite 
protagonists of the texts discussed here, however, each obsessed with entropy, no 
access of energy and insight is possible. For Heller’s Bob Slocum there is only “stale 
and folding space” and “seepage …destroying my loved ones”; for Updike’s Harry 
Angstrom there are increasingly “patches of burnt-out gray cells where there used to 
be lust and keen dreaming and wide-eyed dread…the self…all scattered and 
distributed”; and the lives of Carver’s characters “have been set in motion, and they 
will go on and on until they stop.”118
                                               
117 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, 1952 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 10; Richard Wright, The 
Outsider, 1953 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008), p. 503; Norman Mailer, An American Dream, 
1965 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979), p. 162; Saul Bellow, Seize the Day, 1956 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1996), p. 118. 
118 Joseph Heller, Something Happened, 1974 (London: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 268, p. 393; John 
Updike, A Rabbit Omnibus: Rabbit, Run; Rabbit Redux; Rabbit is Rich, 1990 (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1991), pp. 422-423, p.531; Raymond Carver, Beginners, 2009 (London: Vintage Books, 
2010), p. 122. 
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Chapter Two: Suburban Solipsism 
 
 
Solipsism and existentialism  
 
    For existentialism the problem of solipsism – the view that (or state in which) only 
one’s own self, one’s own mind and existence can be verified or known – is rooted in 
the primacy of subjectivity, its phenomenological foregrounding of subjective 
experience, and the impossibility of our experiencing the subjectivity of another. In 
Sartrean terms, as Joseph S. Catalano notes, this means that 
 
The for-itself cannot conceptualise its primary being-for-others, and it cannot 
conceptualise the other person as a for-itself…To ‘know’ how the other sees me 
would be to ‘know’ him as a free subject. But I ‘know’ the other only in the light 
of my own free subjectivity.1 
 
This would appear to render the ontological problem of solipsism an insoluble one, 
since for Sartre “my original relation to the Other” is “a negation which posits the 
original distinction between the Other and myself as being such that it determines me 
by means of the Other and determines the Other by means of me.”2 The Other’s 
subjectivity is inaccessible, if not actually unimaginable, because “consciousness is 
always intentionally directed towards an object,” and so “anything that we are 
conscious of will seem to be an object,” including the consciousness of another 
person.3 It is perhaps ironic, then, that subjective experience, fundamental to 
existentialism and phenomenology more generally, both provides an intimation of the 
consciousness of others and precludes any knowledge of it. However, as Jonathon 
Webber argues 
 
This is a central aspect of [Sartre’s] response to solipsism: our experience 
makes us aware that there are other conscious subjects, but we cannot 
formulate any explicit thought about or direct conscious attention to the 
subjectivity of other people.4 
 
                                               
1 Joseph S. Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre’s ‘Being and Nothingness’, 1974 (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 157. 
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 232. 
3 Jonathan Webber, The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 126, 
4 Ibid. p. 127. 
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     Sartre sees the means by which solipsism can be avoided as being based in 
recognising “a primary relation between my consciousness and the Other’s” rather 
than through recourse to philosophical realism or idealism, neither of which he regards 
as adequate in avoiding solipsism.5 Knowledge, then, as something objectively 
verifiable, is of little or no use here, and Sartre’s ‘solution’ depends on a kind of 
inference that allows us to posit the subjectivity of another person – or rather, since 
inference is a cognitive operation, and Sartre’s solution is ontological rather than 
cognitional, it might be more accurate to say that we are exposed to the Other. Sartre 
sees this as arising from what he calls ‘the look’ (le regard), discussed in Chapter One 
in reference to Raymond Carver’s stories. If we have an existence as object as well 
as subject, this depends on the consciousness, and so subjectivity, of others, since 
we cannot be objects to ourselves; we cannot externalise our relation to ourselves. 
Sartre uses the concept of shame to illustrate this; in the situation in which I am 
absorbed in spying through a keyhole, as Catalano observes, “I am my possibility as 
one who is jealous,” but the presence of another, or just the intimation of this through 
audible footsteps, creates an awareness formerly absent, since I am now “aware of 
myself because I am aware of being seen by another,” thus “revealing my 
consciousness to myself as an object for the Other,” and causing me to feel shame.6 
I cannot deny, or negate, the existence of the Other as subject since, Sartre states, “I 
cannot be object for an object.”7 As Kathleen V. Wider suggests, “the Other cannot be 
an object in this context. If she were, she could not make me into an object. Only a 
subject can do that.” Whilst “the look of the Other creates for me a consciousness of 
myself as an object in the world,” it is precisely this “dimension of self-consciousness 
that makes certain for me the existence of the Other as another consciousness.”8 
Solipsism - as denial of others’ consciousness – is thereby avoided because, Sartre 
claims, “it is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that I 
must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject.” This knowledge (or 
intimation) then is phenomenological, is subjectively experienced rather than 
                                               
5 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 253. Both the idealist and the realist “consider the relation of the self 
to others as an external relation. The realist considers consciousness within a body and sees the bodies 
of the self and the other as separated by the external relation of space. The idealist considers each mind 
locked in on itself and thus views the distance between minds as the external relation between two 
fixed or given nothings.” (Joseph S. Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre’s ‘Being and 
Nothingness’, 1974, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985, pp. 154-155). 
6 Joseph S. Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre’s ‘Being and Nothingness’, 1974 (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 161. 
7 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 257. 
8 Kathleen V. Wider, The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of 
Mind (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 61, p.62. 
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empirically ‘known’ since “I experience the inapprehensible subjectivity of the Other 
directly and with my being.” This awareness though is bound to cause anguish for the 
very reason that my rendering as object for the other nullifies my freedom, though this 
is through my own consciousness of this, and hence “the Other’s look [is] at the very 
center of my act as the solidification and alienation of my own possibilities.”9 Through 
‘the look’ we apprehend the inapprehensible, we experience rather than know the 
Other’s consciousness. 
 
    Significantly for the discussion that follows, Sartre conceptualises the relation 
between our subjectivity and our apprehension of others’ subjectivity in terms of space, 
and specifically in terms of a kind of nullifying invasion of each person’s ‘ontological 
space’. He views “the appearance of a man in my universe” as “the appearance among 
the objects of my universe of an element of disintegration in that universe,” and a 
corresponding “alienation of the world which I organise.”10 He explains this further with 
reference to an oddly almost suburban sounding scenario: 
 
The Other is first the permanent flight of things toward a goal which I apprehend 
as an object at a certain distance from me but which escapes me inasmuch as 
it unfolds about itself its own distances. Moreover this disintegration grows by 
degrees; if there exists between the lawn and the Other a relation which is 
without distance and which creates distance, then there exists necessarily a 
relation between the Other and the statue which stands on a pedestal in the 
middle of the lawn, and a relation between the Other and the big chestnut trees 
which border the walk; there is a total space which is grouped around the Other, 
and this space is made with my space; there is a regrouping in which I take part 
but which escapes me, a regrouping of all the objects that people my universe.11 
 
This regrouping (and the attempt to forestall it) is one of the key themes of the novels 
to be discussed in this chapter. 
 
 
 
                                               
9 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 256, p. 270, p. 263. 
10 Ibid. p. 263.  
11 Ibid. p. 255. 
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Solipsism and literature  
 
    Literary criticism has at times used solipsism as a vague but pejorative term, 
meaning little more than wilful self-absorption or insularity, or to suggest a debilitating 
tortuous condition, a form of “metaphysical autism.”12 Tony Tanner, however, provides 
a cultural contextualization that views solipsism in US literature as a tendency borne 
of a need for “interior spaciousness.” The significance of this interior spaciousness is 
often not, though, its provision of freedom, “that familiar American delight at feeling 
free from external control and shaping,” as he suggests, but a fear of being free, a 
disavowal of existential freedom. For Tanner the “instinct to cultivate and protect an 
area of inner space” is exemplified by Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar (1963) in which the 
protagonist, Esther Greenwood, has the “inclination to escape into some private space 
away from the pressure of the moment,” to become a “sealed-off spectator.”13 Tanner 
also sees this reflected in the novels of Susan Sontag, in which there is “a dread of 
environment, a suspicion of material impingements,” but also a concern with “what 
happens if you do possess the dome for yourself and keep all others out,” the risk of 
“a sharp diminishment in the dimensions of the architecture of consciousness,” and of 
discovering that “the dome…is ultimately full of death.”14 Whilst the protagonists of the 
novels to be discussed do have a “dread of environment,” and do experience a “sharp 
diminishment” of self, this can hardly be seen as “providing the space in which to be 
free.” On the contrary, it is a means of withdrawal – from inwardness, from existential 
freedom, as well as from their environment and the people in it, since the interior 
spaciousness is a vacuum.  
 
    What distinguishes solipsistic fiction (or fiction concerned with solipsism as a 
problem) is its lack of action, or lack of concern with action, since it is the narrative 
consciousness that is foregrounded rather than action, plot, or dramatic development, 
which impinge minimally on that consciousness. Harold Kaplan views this as leading 
to an inevitable passivity for the solipsistic protagonist since  
 
                                               
12 Mauric Natanson makes the comparison with autism to illustrate the notion of solipsism as a literary 
‘affliction’. (Maurice Natanson, ‘Solipsism and Sociality’, New Literary History, Vol. 5, No. 2, 
‘Changing Views of Character’, Winter, 1974, pp. 237-244, p. 241); Reino Virtanen quotes J.P. Stern’s 
description of the genre of Bildungsroman as “fundamentally solipsistic” in that it “leads the young 
hero from self-absorption into society, as though social life were a problematic task rather than a 
natural condition.” (Reino Virtanen, ‘The Spectre of Solipsism in Western Literature’, The Journal of 
the Midwest Modern Language Association, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring, 1986, pp. 59-76, pp. 59-60). 
13 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950 – 1970, 1971 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976), 
p. 262, p. 263. 
14 Ibid. p. 267, p. 268, p.267. 
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Action can be distinguished from movement only when choice, responsibility, or 
causation is clearly featured, and the further these are placed from the 
protagonist himself on the scene of action, the less he has to offer as a dramatic 
agent.15 
 
Kaplan is obviously right to identify the significance of volition in turning movement into 
action, but his suggestion that a lack of volition diminishes a protagonist as a “dramatic 
agent” ignores the drama of solipsistic withdrawal, of a consciousness in active refusal 
to engage in the existentially threatening drama of the protagonist’s own life. This can 
be understood as a form of denial in Sartrean terms, a resistance to the “regrouping 
of all the objects that people…[the protagonist’s] universe” that Sartre identifies. This 
is particularly true of Bob Slocum in Joseph Heller’s Something Happened, whose 
monologue confounds Frederick R. Karl’s claim that “the American writer cannot posit 
an entire universe on withdrawal.” Karl is surely right though to argue that there is a 
“Kafkan drift” in much post-war US fiction, at odds with a traditional narrative 
expansiveness, and that “even as Kafkan enclosure seems so seductive, most of our 
novelists slide away into space.”16 This is certainly an accurate description of the 
narrative voices in the novels to be discussed here (with the exception of Something 
Happened), though more importantly it is in “space they find…despair,” the inner 
space of unreachable, and unbreachable, solipsism. Suburbia, an indeterminate, 
detached environmental space, promotes solipsism for the narrators/protagonists 
since it is “a spatial idea…it is order beyond chaos, and its quality is frequently 
measured…by its distance from real turmoil, the city. Space is evasion.”17 
 
    It is useful for analytical clarity to distinguish three ‘types’ of solipsist in fiction, as 
identified by Rae Langton. She suggests there is the metaphysical solipsist “who 
believes he is the only person,” the epistemic solipsist “who believes he is the only 
knowable person,” and the moral solipsist, “who believes he is the only person who 
matters.”18 The second of these is the most important for my analysis of the novels in 
this chapter, though it should be stressed that within a Sartrean analysis epistemic 
solipsism is the refusal of the existential intimation of others’ consciousness and 
                                               
15 Harold Kaplan, The Passive Voice: An Approach to Modern Fiction, 1966 (Ohio: Ohio University 
Press, 1979), p. 11. 
16 Frederick R. Karl, American fictions, 1940-1980: A Comprehensive History and Critical Evaluation 
(Cambridge: Harper and Row, 1983), p. 21, p. 31, p. 37. 
17 Ibid. p. 31, p. 41. 
18 Rae Langton, ‘Love and Solipsism’, in Roger Lamb, ed. Love Analyzed (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1997), p. 124. 
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selfhood, rather than any kind of objective ‘knowledge’ of these. The third type is 
arguably a possible consequence of epistemic solipsism, and it is this notion that is 
central to both Richard Ford’s Bascombe novels and Chang-rae Lee’s A Gesture Life 
and Aloft.   
 
    However, it is the underlying reasons for the adoption of epistemic solipsism (and 
its moral implications) that is significant for an existentialist analysis. I will argue that 
the suburbs, understood as what Karl calls a “spatial idea,” one in which “space is an 
evasion,” are integral to the solipsistic (lack of) vision evinced by the narrators and 
protagonists of the novels of Heller, Ford and Lee. Suburbia promotes, or encourages, 
an evasion of the “primary relation between my consciousness and the Other’s”, and 
a resistance to the apprehension of others’ subjectivity, understood as space (in 
Sartrean terms). Christopher Lasch, in his 1979 sociological treatise The Culture of 
Narcissism, viewed this resistance as an inevitable consequence of 1970s American 
corporate suburban culture in which people “hunger not for personal salvation, let 
alone the restoration of an earlier golden age, but for the feeling, the momentary 
illusion, of personal well-being, health, and psychic security.”19 In such a culture others 
are a threat, but one that could increasingly be avoided in the suburbs of the late 
twentieth century. By the 1970s, changes in family life and socialization were occurring 
which involved the development of what Kenneth T. Jackson calls the “drive-in culture 
of contemporary America” in which “the automobile and the suburb have combined to 
create a drive-in culture that is part of the experience of most Americans.”20 Away from 
the densely populated cities, increasingly separated physically as well as 
psychologically from others, suburbanites could practice the evasion identified by Karl, 
their experiences of their environment and of others mediated through their 
windscreens or their picture windows. However, while the suburbs provide the 
environment in which solipsism can become entrenched – where protagonists can find 
Tanner’s “interior spaciousness” and avoid others – its primary cause for Heller’s, 
Ford’s and Lee’s narrators is the trauma of grief, as will be seen in the discussion that 
follows.  
 
 
 
                                               
19 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in An Age of Diminishing 
Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Ltd, 1979), p. 7. 
20 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 246, p. 247. 
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Solipsistic suburbia  
 
Something Happened: “The consolations of unreachable inwardness” 
 
    Joseph Heller’s Something Happened is one of the most extreme examples of a 
solipsistic narrative in post-war US fiction, embodying the desire for what Tanner calls 
“the consolations of unreachable inwardness.”21 Bob Slocum’s entropic narrative, 
discussed in Chapter One, is necessarily solipsistic, since it functions as a kind of 
closed system, seeking to forestall existential anguish caused by external sources (by 
the Other and ‘the look’ in Sartrean terms). Slocum works for a corporation, though 
the nature of his work as executive, or of the company and its products, is never 
specified. His narrative revolves around three aspects of his life, compulsively and 
repetitively – his suburban family life (with his wife, fifteen-year-old daughter, nine-
year-old son and his youngest brain-damaged son), his company relations and his 
hopes and fears for his job, and his early and adolescent past.  
 
    In Slocum’s obsessive revisiting of his past he fixates on Virginia Markowitz, a girl 
he worked with in his first job as filing clerk in an accident insurance company, and 
with whom he had his first fumbling, unfulfilled, sexual encounters. Virginia functions 
as a symbol of loss for Slocum, and in his misery he returns again and again to his 
flirtations with her, and to a time when, if he was not happy, there was at least the 
possibility of future imaginable happiness. Virginia represents a figure untarnished by 
adult life and its compromises, exigencies and disappointments.22 She is also 
untouched by the slow, inevitable process of physical decay Slocum dreads, since she 
committed suicide. Slocum confesses, “I think I am still in love with her (and glad she’s 
dead, because otherwise I might not be, and then I would have no one).” In Slocum’s 
grief over Virginia he withdraws into an unreachable interiority, attempting to nullify 
that grief, but in his solipsism he refuses to grieve and so cannot overcome his grief. 
If, as Sartre seems to claim, solipsism can be a means of denying ‘the look’ - which 
forces us to recognise other’s subjectivity and acknowledge its nullifying power since 
it renders us objects ontologically – then solipsism affords a kind of ‘ontological 
protection’ in its denial of ‘the look’. However, it also necessarily renders others objects 
ontologically, and it is only through acknowledgement of others’ subjectivity, their 
                                               
21 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950 – 1970, 1971 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976), 
p. 262. 
22 Much like Allie in Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye (1951), which arguably anticipated (and 
influenced) the thematic concerns of the literature of the suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s – and indeed 
later fiction, for example David Gates’ Jernigan (1991). 
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consciousness and self, that they can affect us, emotionally or psychologically. Since 
solipsism denies that subjectivity it forestalls emotions aroused by others, including 
grief, and so functions as a kind of psychological and emotional refuge or protection. 
Slocum, then, seeks solace in solipsism, but it paralyses him mentally and emotionally, 
resulting in a circular, iterative narrative.  
 
    Suburban life for Slocum has assumed the same character as corporate working 
life, in which others are a threat and must be subordinated, which he achieves through 
solipsism, denying their subjectivity, their consciousness and selfhood. In this way he 
seeks to nullify their power over him. His need to subordinate others at work is mirrored 
by this same need in his relations with his wife and his daughter, with both of whom 
he seeks to maintain power relations in which he is always dominant. He is utterly 
estranged from his wife, unloving sex functioning as the only contact between them 
that is not combative, manipulative or deceitful. The eliding of this distinction between 
corporate working life and corporate suburban home life is perhaps inevitable in the 
‘corporatization’ of suburbia in the 1970s, with companies relocating from the cities to 
suburbs, as Jackson observes, pointing out that “corporate relocation in the post-war 
period” was “overwhelmingly a city-to-suburb phenomenon” so that by 1970 “about 78 
per cent of the residents in the New York suburbs also worked in the suburbs.”23 
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, Slocum describes work and home relations in the same 
way. At the beginning of the novel he tells us, “in the office in which I work there are 
five people of whom I am afraid,” and “there are six people who are afraid of me,” and 
later states, “in the family in which I live there are four people of whom I am afraid. 
Three of these four people are afraid of me.”24  “My wife,” he says, “is afraid of me; I 
don’t particularly want her that way, but it makes things easier.” Others necessarily 
have a one-dimensional quality, they exist and have reality only insofar as they 
impinge on his own fragile sense of self. He claims that “I have never been sure I ever 
really cared for anyone in this whole world but myself and my little boy” and yet projects 
his fear and longings onto the child, believing that “our minds are very much alike, his 
and mine, in our humor and our foreboding.”25 Slocum’s son represents a terrible 
vulnerability for him, one that he wishes to protect, but which ultimately enrages him 
because it reminds him of the residual (non-solipsistic) self he has, a self desperate 
                                               
23 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 269, p. 267.  
24 Joseph Heller, Something Happened, 1974 (London: Vintage Books, 1995), p.13, p.17, p.355. 
25 Ibid. p. 102, p. 206, p. 163. 
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for a breach in his self-imposed isolation, and one that cannot survive or even function 
in corporate suburbia.  
 
    Slocum inevitably refuses to recognise his wife’s despair or that of Martha, the 
secretary in his office who finally has a breakdown, which Slocum is able to “handle 
suavely.” If his solipsistic bad faith renders others ontological objects, women are more 
fully objectified than men, since his fear of male colleagues in the corporate world 
dominates his relations with them; Martha and his wife, however, do not impinge on 
his consciousness sufficiently to engender such a heightened sense of dread, and 
instead cause an intermittent but manageable unease, since their powerlessness in 
his corporatized world is disenfranchising if not entirely anonymising. The narcissistic 
Slocum cannot perceive any alternative to his hermetic corporate self and (fully) 
detached suburban situation, as he asks himself “is this all there is for me to do? Is 
this really the most I can get from the few years left in this one life of mine? And the 
answer I get, of course, is always…Yes!”26 What threatens his continued corporate 
suburban existence is the persistent consciousness of unease, nameless dread, and 
shame, which, he externalises, attributing it to his own disembodied consciousness (of 
multiple selves) in and of the past: 
 
Where are those scattered, ripped pieces of that fragmented little boy and 
bewildered young man who turned out to be me? There are times now when it 
seems to me that I may not have been any place at all for long periods of time… 
There must have been a second person who grew up alongside me (or inside 
me) and filled in for me on occasions to experience things of which I did not wish 
to become a part.27 
 
    Slocum views his son as the manifestation of “that fragmented little boy,” and in 
making him part of his myth of himself Slocum takes his solipsism to a new level of 
pathology that ultimately results in his killing the boy, ostensibly by accident. Slocum’s 
often repeated fear in his narrative that his son will die before he does (that he is too 
vulnerable to live), finally comes true as he hugs and asphyxiates the boy following a 
traffic accident in which Slocum thinks he is fatally injured, though he is actually only 
slightly hurt. As Heller prepares us for the inevitable tragedy, Slocum’s narrative grows 
increasingly disjointed, the parenthetical asides ever longer and unrelated. Slocum 
                                               
26 Ibid. p. 569, p. 31. 
27 Ibid. pp. 134-135. 
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confesses that “real and imagined events overrun each other in my mind in hazy 
indistinction” and that “I’m not always sure I remember what I’ve imagined.”28 Since 
Slocum’s mind is increasingly the only reality he recognises, the distinction between 
what he imagines and what actually occurs is no longer possible to distinguish clearly. 
With his son’s death, which necessarily has limited reality for him, Slocum eradicates 
the final remnants of his vestigial self that do not fit into his corporate suburban life, 
and the final chapter sees him fully integrated in his new job, promoted to a position 
of higher authority within the corporation. Slocum has found a new equilibrium in 
identifying himself wholly with the company, closure of a kind, and with it the final 
cessation of his torrent of words. 
 
    Slocum’s killing of his son then, can be understood as an attempt to extinguish 
external sources of existential disquiet, vulnerability, and despair, to bolster the 
spurious equilibrium he maintains through solipsism. Yet, as stated earlier, this false 
equilibrium, this sense of self, is necessarily fragile and has to be validated by the very 
existences external to Slocum that his solipsism denies. His narcissism, understood 
as the virtual absence of a sense of self, leaves him with an ontological void, since the 
absence of even the possibility of self-knowledge seems to nullify the possibility of 
even epistemic solipsism. “The problem,” Slocum says, “is that I don’t know who or 
what I really am” and that “there is now no one else I would rather be than me – even 
though I don’t really like me and am not even sure who it is I am.” Slocum takes on the 
attributes of others he encounters; when he meets a superior at work “his nature will 
be my nature until I come up against the next person who has more powerful 
personality traits than any of my own….I often wonder what my true nature is. Do I 
have one?” Unsurprisingly, Slocum is obsessed with speech, with voice, and inability 
to speak. He thinks he has always “been sandwiched between people who will not 
speak” and is subject to dreams in which “I often have trouble speaking. My tongue 
feels dead and dry and swollen enough to choke my mouth.”29 Communication 
threatens his equilibrium; he communicates little to others, yet seeks to ameliorate his 
alienation and isolation through his narrative. Slocum’s solipsism then, creates an 
oppressive, claustrophobic narrative, stuck in a relentlessly and compulsively iterative 
locked groove. 
 
                                               
28 Ibid.  p. 429, p.486. 
29 Ibid. p. 74, p. 176, pp. 72-73, p. 354. 
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    Slocum’s isolation and solipsistic alienation are inevitable in the corporate suburban 
culture of the 1970s identified by Lasch, one in which the undermining of the American 
dream of success, its evisceration, necessarily leads to the erosion of self, since the 
dream of success has no meaning outside its own terms – success for success’ sake, 
not for any other end or purpose. One could therefore argue, extending Lasch’s 
analysis, that the self is eroded to the extent that it is invested solely in the pursuit of 
material success, since achievement can only be measured in relation to that of others. 
Lasch considers narcissism a near-pathological state, closer to self-hate than self-
love, though since there is little if any sense of self for the narcissist to hate, the state 
of narcissism is perhaps more one of great anxiety or dread than self-hate. Lasch sees 
the prevalence of narcissism in the 1970s as the commonest form of psychiatric 
pathology as being the result of “quite specific changes in our society and culture – 
from bureaucracy, the proliferation of images, therapeutic ideologies, the 
rationalization of the inner life, the cult of consumption, and in the last analysis from 
changes in family life and from changing patterns of socialization.”30 These 
developments (including the drive-in culture identified by Jackson), inevitably leading 
to greater suburban isolation, were underway by the time Something Happened was 
published in 1974, and corporate relocation to the suburbs from the cities was also 
occurring, a probable influence on the corporatization of the suburbs implicitly depicted 
in the novel. Fiction clearly reflected such changes, and though Lasch’s description 
below of postmodernist writers conflates narrator and author, it accurately describes 
Slocum’s solipsism. Confessional writing, he claims, no longer has anything 
meaningful to confess, since  
 
The voyage to the interior discloses nothing but a blank. The writer no longer 
sees life reflected in his own mind. Just the opposite: he sees the world, even in 
its emptiness, as a mirror of himself. In recording his ‘inner’ experiences, he 
seeks not to provide an objective account of a representative piece of reality but 
to seduce others into giving him attention, acclaim, or sympathy and thus to 
shore up a faltering sense of self.31 
    
If Lasch’s explanation of narcissism as a cultural phenomenon of the 1970s and after 
is credible, then it is likely that narcissists would also be solipsists in their attempt to 
establish the “psychic security” he claims they crave. The historical changes he 
                                               
30 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in An Age of Diminishing 
Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Ltd, 1979), p. 7, p. 32. 
31 Ibid. p. 21. 
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identifies affected the middle class primarily, who, of course, lived in the suburbs, and 
clearly Slocum exemplifies Lasch’s narcissist, for whom the world is a mirror of himself. 
The ongoing changes in the culture of the suburbs in the late twentieth century, leading 
to greater isolation and remoteness from others, make them increasingly significant in 
the depiction of solipsism, as the discussion of Richard Ford’s Bascombe novels and 
Chang-rae Lee’s A Gesture Life (1999) and Aloft (2004) will illustrate. 
 
The Bascombe novels: “Disappearing into your own life” 
 
    The first of Richard Ford’s Bascombe novels, The Sportswriter, published in 1986, 
has little obvious resemblance to Heller’s novel, other than its first person narration. 
Frank Bascombe, approaching early middle age (he’s thirty-eight), is an avowed 
optimist, claims to have little interest in his past and to be focused on the present, 
enjoys his job as a sportswriter and expresses contentment with his suburban 
environment (claims which are all undermined in the course of the novel). Ford, 
however, acknowledged the influence of Something Happened on The Sportswriter in 
an interview with Brian Duffy in 2008, and there are indeed similarities between the 
novels in both the narrative form and the dominant themes.32 Like Bob Slocum, Frank 
Bascombe is an unreliable narrator, who manipulates people (including, of course, the 
reader) through language, and dissembles in his relations with others, even as he 
indulges in a kind of ‘confessional’ monologue, privileging his relationship with the 
reader. Like Slocum he is isolated and needs his isolation to maintain a delicate 
equilibrium and prevent his despair becoming manifest (to himself), and he similarly 
exemplifies Lasch’s Culture of Narcissism in that, as W.G. Chernecky argues, 
 
People and events become less events experienced and more objects of 
speculation. But Frank’s ability to abstract patterns from people and events only 
adds to his solipsistic worldview and alienates him from the world around him. 
Frank Bascombe’s limited points of view emphasize the isolation of his individual 
consciousness.33 
 
 For Frank then, living in the fictional New Jersey suburb of Haddam, others have a 
limited reality, existing to validate or diminish him in his mercurial psychological states 
                                               
32 Brain Duffy, Morality, Identity and Narrative in the Fiction of Richard Ford (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
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33 W.G. Chernecky, ‘“Nostalgia Ain’t What It Used To Be”: Isolation and Alienation in the Frank 
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and sense of self. Frank is divorced, and has a fractious relationship with his ex-wife, 
referred to as ‘X’ throughout the novel, signifying negation, a nullifying crossing out, 
as well, of course, as simply ‘ex’, though Ford maintains that he simply could not think 
of a name for her, and the initial provisional ‘X’ in place of a name remained in the final 
text.34 Frank deflects his grief following the death of his first son at the age of nine from 
an untreatable illness, through withdrawal into solipsism, which he calls “a terrible 
dreaminess and the worst kind of abstraction and unreachableness.” His grieving 
process has been arrested, following the moment of Ralph’s death, when, he says, “I 
remember my mind stopping. No other thought occurred to me immediately. No 
association or memory latched onto the event, or to the next one.” Frank has declared 
a moratorium on grieving, for fear that he will again be “unprotected from the emotions 
– vivid ones – of true death” and “suddenly feel…exactly as I did that morning [when 
Ralph died]: bereaved and in jeopardy of greater bereavement sweeping me up.”35 He 
is afraid, in other words, that he will succumb to despair in the face of his son’s “absurd” 
death. Like Bob Slocum, Frank Bascombe reacts to grief by withdrawing into 
“unreachableness”; both seek refuge in solipsism, but discover the inevitable despair 
of being Tanner’s “sealed-off spectator.”  
 
    Bascombe’s relations with his other two young children, Paul and Clarissa, are 
somewhat strained, his engagement with them limited, as is the case in all his 
relations. His detachment makes him well suited to his job as a sportswriter, however, 
since “to be a sportswriter…is to live your life mostly with your thoughts, and only the 
edge of others’.” In fact, Frank mostly avoids even the edge of the thoughts (or selves) 
of others, and implicitly valorises solipsism. At the very beginning of The Sportswriter 
he states that “very early you come to the realization that nothing will ever take you 
away from yourself” and later says that “you don’t have any business knowing what 
other people think.”36 After recounting an affair he had some years earlier he tells us 
that in the course of the relationship he “simply found out that you couldn’t know 
another person’s life and might as well not even try.” He takes the same approach to 
‘friends’ and claims that “the only badge of true friendship” is “not to be curious.”37 
 
                                               
34 Kay Bonetti, ‘An Interview with Richard Ford’ in Huey Guagliardo, ed. Conversations with Richard 
Ford (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 2001), p. 31. 
35 Richard Ford, The Sportswriter, 1986 (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 130, p. 259, p.61. 
36 Ibid. p. 318, p. 348, p. 7, p. 77. 
37 Ibid. p. 229, p. 183. 
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    Significantly, though, the isolation that Frank experiences as a sportswriter, is little 
different from that experienced by the subjects of his writing, in the corporate and 
bureaucratic world of sports in the early 1980s, the unregulated free market of 
‘Reaganomics’. As Lasch noted in 1979, 
 
The prevalent mode of social interaction today is antagonistic cooperation…in 
which a cult of teamwork conceals the struggle for survival within bureaucratic 
organizations. In sport, the rivalry among teams…reduces itself (like the rivalry 
among business corporations) to a struggle for shares of the market. The 
professional athlete does not care whether his team wins or loses (since losers 
share in the pot), as long as it stays in business.38 
 
The monolithic corporate bureaucracy that dominates Slocum’s world impinges too on 
Frank’s life, though in his solipsism he does not recognise the inevitable despair such 
alienation creates, preferring to idealise athletes and believe they are “as literal and 
within themselves as the ancient Greeks…never likely to feel the least bit divided, or 
alienated, or one ounce of existential dread.”39 Frank aspires to this state, yet fails to 
recognise its Kierkegaardian implications, since as Ann Walker points out,  
 
According to at least one philosopher, the worst kind of despair occurs when a 
person does not recognise that he or she is in despair. Despair, in other words, 
is the catalyst for some higher state of mind because it makes its host seek 
something beyond the self. These athletes would then be in the worst kind of 
despair, if Frank’s perception of them is accurate.40 
 
    Frank, then, fails to recognise his own despair in projecting his aspirant state onto 
athletes, but also, in the course of the novel, he projects his own despair onto others 
he meets, such as his girlfriend’s father and an injured ex-athlete he describes as 
being “as alienated as Camus.” Ironically though, he fails to recognise his friend Walter 
Luckett’s despair, precisely because it threatens to make his own despair clear to him. 
Walter, also divorced, feels he is “impoverished just suddenly…and everything seems 
very bad to me. I’ve quit becoming, is what it feels like.”41 This mirrors Frank’s own 
                                               
38 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in An Age of Diminishing 
Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Ltd, 1979), p. 118. 
39 Richard Ford, The Sportswriter, 1986 (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 63. 
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41 Richard Ford, The Sportswriter, 1986 (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 208, p. 183. 
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emotional and psychological state, but his solipsism does not allow him to empathise 
with luckless Luckett; instead, after Walter’s late night confessional visit, Frank 
unplugs his phone to avoid having to speak to him again, “Don’t call, my silent 
message says, I’ll be sleeping. Dreaming sweet dreams. Don’t call. Friendship is a lie 
of life. Don’t call.” Walter commits suicide the following day, and leaves a suicide note 
addressed to Frank. As he finishes reading the note on a train to New York, the train 
enters a tunnel, “the lights go out and you can’t see beyond your reflected self in gritty 
window glass and I have the sudden feeling of falling out of space and into a perilous 
dream.” Walter’s suicide undermines Frank’s sense of self, sends it momentarily into 
freefall, his narcissism and solipsism revealed as frightening emptiness, the very thing 
he consistently seeks to avoid: “the essence of a small empty moment.”42 In Sartrean 
terms, Frank resists the “regrouping of all the objects that people…[his] universe” 
caused by Walter’s attempt at intimacy, which Frank experiences as violation, the 
impingement of ‘the look’ of the Other: Ironically, this is exactly what Walter had tried 
to discuss with Frank, his anguish in recognising (paraphrasing Sartre’s notion of the 
nullifying effect of ‘the look’) that “we all of a sudden become the thing viewed, not the 
viewer.” Walter’s intrusion into Frank’s solitary life has the effect of nullifying Frank’s 
hermetic sense of independence, his sense of his own character as stable in its 
imperviousness – and most fundamentally, nullifying his subjectivity (Walter wishes he 
could be more like Frank, though of course knows almost nothing about him).43 Walter, 
though, does more than violate Frank’s ‘ontological space’ – he violates his suburban 
space, calling late at night, being let in by Frank’s lodger, and waiting for Frank in his 
study (the epicentre of his suburban solipsism to which no-one is allowed access). 
Frank’s alienation, then, can hardly be overstated and the threat posed by others (‘the 
look’ of the Other) becomes clear when he tells us that he avoids his fellow 
sportswriters “like piranhas,” since  
 
More than one drink with the boys from the office…and the dreads come right 
down out of the fake tin ceiling and the Tiffany hanging lamps like cyanide. My 
knees start to hop under the table, and in three minutes I’m emptied of all 
conviction and struck dumb as a shoe and want nothing but to sit and stare away 
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at the pictures on the wall, or at how the moldings fit the ceiling or how the mirrors 
in the back bar reflect a different room from the one I’m in.44 
 
    At the end of The Sportswriter, however, Frank’s solipsism is challenged and Ford 
implies that he may yet transcend it; while Frank considers Walter’s death to be, like 
Ralph’s death, absurd, it has on him “the effect…that death means to have” – it forces 
him to recognise (too late) the reality of Walter’s despair. The suburbs both contributed 
to and denied Walter’s despair, the inadmissibility of that despair in solipsistic suburbia 
isolating him further, and heightening his alienation. Frank recognises this when he 
comments that the suburbs of New Jersey are “the perfect landscape for…loneliness,” 
places where you can be “derailed by the spiky fact of being alone.”45 At the end of the 
novel Frank feels himself briefly out from under the “thin…residue or skin of all the 
things you’ve done and been and said and erred at” and, paraphrasing Kierkegaard, 
asks “Is life itself an illness or a syndrome? Who knows? We’ve all felt that way, I’m 
confident, since there’s no way that I could feel what hundreds of millions of other 
citizens haven’t.”46 
 
    At the beginning of Independence Day, published in 1995, Frank (now forty-four) 
seems to have strived to overcome his debilitating solipsism and to have become more 
involved with others, both with his family, and with his fellow suburbanites in Haddam, 
in his new job as a realtor. A few pages into his narrative, however, we learn that Frank 
is now in what he calls the ‘Existence Period’, an indeterminate and mutable state in 
which he can “ignore much…that seems worrisome and embroiling,” a period in which 
we (Frank extrapolates) can be content “spending quality time simply with ourselves.” 
Dreaminess has been replaced by the Existence Period, anguished solipsism by torpid 
solipsism in the indolent indeterminacy of suburbia (and Frank’s invention of a 
personal and private existential terminology could itself be seen as solipsistic). Frank 
implicitly acknowledges his sense of detachment and self-estrangement in confessing 
that “I try…to keep something finite and acceptably doable on my mind and not 
disappear. Though it’s true that sometimes in the glide…I sense I am afloat and cannot 
always feel the sides of where I am.”47 The Existence Period stresses a form of 
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independence from others and emotional cautiousness (perhaps more nuanced and 
seemingly less solipsistic than dreaminess) – a delicate balance in which “interest can 
mingle successfully with uninterest…intimacy with transience, caring with obdurate 
uncaring…maturity’s balance.” Frank’s girlfriend, Sally Caldwell, is disbelieving of his 
protestations of strong feelings for her, knowing the tenets of the Existence Period by 
which he lives, particularly since Frank himself admits that “sometimes I feel beyond 
affection’s grasp” but he thinks “that’s just being human.”48 Sally though, is cautious 
herself, having been alone for much of her life since her war-traumatised husband 
Wally inexplicably abandoned her and her two very young children. Frank believes 
their relationship is “the Existence Period shared” since  
 
Sally superintends nothing, presupposes nothing and in essence promises to do 
nothing…except like me…And whereas in marriage there’s the gnashing, cold 
but cozy fear that after a while there’ll be no me left, only me chemically 
amalgamated with another, the proposition with Sally is that there’s just me. 
Forever.49 
 
    The significance of the suburbs in fostering and maintaining solipsism is made clear 
in Frank’s conceptualisation of his job as a realtor. Frank believes that he sells people 
a representation, or symbol, of independence, through home ownership and financial 
self-reliance – but he also sells them freedom to live unconnected to others, the 
dangers of which he comes to realise. For much of Independence Day Frank is in the 
detached and distancing comfort of his car, avoiding involvement and the need to 
make choices in his relationships, and in particular in his relationship with Sally. In this 
way his car provides a form of independence that is an analogue of exclusionary 
suburban independence.  Ford discussed the risks of this in an interview in 1997 with 
Elinor Ann Walker, and specifically “the eventual sterility of cutting yourself off from 
liaisons with other people, from attachments, affinities, affiliations… finally the end of 
the line for independence is sterility.” He seems though to view this as virtually 
inevitable in the suburbs, since “the American practice of independence is premised 
on the notion of ‘get away from me, because I’m better off when I’m here by 
myself…when I’m not somehow diluted by you’.”50 Far from overcoming his solipsism 
then, Frank has immersed himself further in it, through his virtual living in his car, 
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through his isolated and isolating suburban environment, and through his existential 
conceptualisation of his life. He claims to be “dismally aware how impossible it is ever 
to be ‘with’ another human being” and believes that “moving closer, even slightly, even 
for a heartbeat, is just another form of storytelling.”51 The Existence Period effectively 
justifies epistemic solipsism, as its recognition of others’ unknowability leads to an 
emotional and psychological distancing, foreclosing the possibility of intimacy, or 
meaningful relationships with others – as Ford says, “the Existence Period is 
purchased at the price of isolation.”52 It therefore inevitably leads to a form of what Rae 
Langton calls moral solipsism. For Frank though there is no possibility of meaningful 
intimacy, since  
 
The truth is…we know little and can find out precious little more about others, 
even though we stand in their presence, hear their complaints, ride the roller 
coaster with them, sell them houses, consider the happiness of their children – 
only in a flash or a gasp or the slam of a car door to see them disappear and be 
gone forever. Perfect Strangers.53 
 
    Frank’s epistemic solipsism can be seen in his relationship with his fifteen-year-old 
son, Paul. Frank discovers that Paul too is stuck in his own kind of hermetic solipsism; 
most of the time he finds himself “thinking he’s thinking” and ceaselessly monitors his 
thoughts as a means of trying to understand himself, but has little conception of other 
people’s emotions or thoughts, of the subjectivity of others.54 Frank claims to want to 
build a closer relationship with Paul, and to this end the two go on a trip over 
Independence Day weekend from New River, Connecticut, to the Basketball Hall of 
Fame in Springfield, Massachusetts and the National Baseball Hall of Fame in 
Cooperstown, New York (a trip which ends disastrously when Paul is hit full in the face 
by a baseball). Before the trip Frank gives Paul a copy of Emerson’s ‘Self-Reliance’ 
(in which Emerson writes that “nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own 
mind”) hoping that they will be able to discuss it on the trip.55 However, Frank’s 
repeated attempts to engage Paul end in failure (Paul of course has not read ‘Self-
Reliance’) and the Existence Period renders Frank virtually unable to engage 
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emotionally. Father and son cannot establish or maintain intimacy, and each remains 
entrenched in his isolation and alienation. The joking, pun-based exchanges the two 
have traditionally relied on as “a way of conducting father-son business” now fail them, 
and their words “get carried off in the breeze, with no one to care if we speak the 
intricate language of love or don’t” (including, quite possibly, Frank). Frank’s isolation 
is underscored by an arbitrary and absurd act of violence in a motel where he stays 
on his way to collect Paul for their trip. Frank watches as the police attend the scene 
of a fatal shooting of a man after a robbery in one of the motel rooms, and the escorting 
of the man’s wife, with her daughter, from the room in which her husband has been 
murdered. Later, when Frank is in bed he has intimations of all that the Existence 
Period has allowed him to repress. Contingency and death force Frank to recognise 
that solipsism cannot finally assuage existential anguish, but can only intensify it: 
 
Suddenly my heart goes bangety-bang, bangety-bangety bang, as if I myself 
were about to exit life in a hurry. And if I could, I would spring up, switch on the 
light, dial someone and shout right down into the hard little receiver, ‘It’s okay. I 
got away. It was goddamned close, I’ll tell ya. It didn’t get me, though. I smelled 
its breath, saw its red eyes in the dark, shining. A clammy hand touched my 
mine. But I made it. I survived. Wait for me. Wait for me. Not that much is left to 
do.’ Only there’s no one. No one here or anywhere near to say any of this to. 
And I’m sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry.56 
 
    Frank does seem to have changed by the end of Independence Day. Whereas in 
The Sportswriter he disconnects his phone after Walter’s despairing visit, at the end 
of the second novel he is woken by the phone in the middle of the night and answers 
it, telling the silent caller “Now’s not a bad time at all…Let me hear your thinking. I’ll 
try to add a part to the puzzle.” He now recognises that in the Existence Period there 
is a risk of simply “disappearing into your own life” and that “the physical isolation and 
emotional disengagement…cause trouble equal to or greater than the problems they 
ostensibly solve.” In relinquishing the false refuge of the Existence Period Frank 
experiences “the re-emergence of some small hope (which is merely human),” and 
contemplates marriage to Sally Caldwell. The ending sees Frank out of his car, and in 
the crowd during the Fourth of July celebrations, energised and excited as he feels 
“the push, the pull, the weave and sway of others.”57 
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    The third of the Bascombe novels, The Lay of The Land, published in 2006, is set 
at the start of the new millennium, just before Thanksgiving, with Frank (now fifty-five, 
living by the ocean in Sea-Clift, and recently abandoned by his second wife, Sally) 
musing over a shocking news report he recently read. The report is about a disgruntled 
student nurse and father of two in south Texas, who walked into an examination room 
and, aiming a gun between his teacher’s eyes, asked her if she was ready to meet her 
maker, to which she replied: “Yes. Yes, I think I am.” The man shot her and then 
himself. This sets the tone of the novel, with several other (seemingly random) acts of 
fatal violence underscoring contingency, heightening Frank’s dread in facing his own 
mortality, since he now has prostate cancer and has endured treatment in the form of 
radioactive iodine-seed implants. Initially it seems that Frank’s solipsism has been 
replaced with a greater openness to new experiences and a concern with others, 
despite their nullifying existential threat to his sense of self, his subjectivity in Sartrean 
terms; he seems ‘grounded’ in immanence but not debilitated by it. He is now in the 
Permanent Period, which is “specifically commissioned to make you quit worrying 
about your own existence and how everything devolves on your self (most things aren’t 
about ‘you’ anyway, but about other people).” He is still a realtor, though now with his 
own business (‘Realty-Wise’) in Sea-Clift, having left the suburb of Haddam when “it 
stopped being subordinate to any other place and became a place to itself…a town of 
others, for others,” in other words when it lost its indeterminacy and the existential 
threat of the Other became greater.58 Space in Haddam was no longer, in Karl’s terms, 
an evasion, for Frank, since it had lost that indeterminateness and mutability, the very 
qualities that enabled him to maintain his evasive solipsism, his distancing from others 
(and from ‘the look’ of the Other).  Sea-Clift however, is a far more remote suburb and 
has far fewer inhabitants. Frank’s solipsism is now so entrenched that his attempts at 
(nominally) overcoming it by reconceptualising his life (the Permanent Period) can only 
fail. Ironically, Frank has joined an organization called ‘Sponsors’, a “network of mostly 
central New Jersey citizens…whose goal is nothing more than to help people…[who] 
need nothing more than a little sound advice.” Visits to such people last no more than 
an hour, with no follow-up visits or communication, and Frank of course meets the 
requirement that sponsors have “a capacity to be disengaged while staying sincerely 
focused.” This is also the requirement for being a suburban realtor, and sponsoring 
cannot diminish his sense of alienation and isolation any more than his job can. Frank 
                                               
58 Richard Ford, The Lay of the Land, 2006 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007), p. 2, p. 106, p. 
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has a sensation of “constantly feeling offshore, a low-level, slightly removed-from-
events, wooing-wind agitation that doing for others, in the frank, plain-talk way I was 
able to as a house seller, generally assuaged but never completely stilled.” It is hardly 
surprising then that for Frank “sponsoring has never actually produced a greater sense 
of connectedness…a little connectedness, in fact, goes a long way…we might all do 
with a little less of it.59 
 
    Frank’s pronouncements on relationships and the impossibility of intimacy suggest 
that in late middle-age his solipsism is more desolate than ever, as he now claims to 
believe that “life only happens to you and to you alone, and…any concept of 
togetherness, intimacy, union, abiding this and abiding that is a hoot and a holler into 
darkness.” He describes his relationship with Sally as an example of “loving someone, 
but knowing with certainty you’ll never, never, never (because neither of you remotely 
wants it) have that person except in…[a] sorry ersatz way,” and wonders if his ten 
years with Sally were just “a matter of clammy reasons and practicalities, as though a 
life lived with another was just a matter of twin isolation booths in an old fifties quiz 
show.” He avoids face-to-face conversations with Ann, his former wife, and thinks 
Alexander Graham Bell was a “great American” because he “foresaw how human we 
are and how much protection we need from others.”60 The suburbs though provide the 
ideal place to cultivate the kind of relations Frank believes possible, such as his 
‘friendship’ with Carter Knott from Haddam, which is based on an “unspoken rule never 
to exchange dinner invitations or to meet for drinks or lunch, since neither of us would 
have the least interest in what the other was up to and would both get bored and 
depressed.”61 
 
    Ironically, it is the cause of Frank’s solipsism – his grief over his son Ralph’s death 
– that is the means of his (possibly) overcoming it. Frank’s “dreaminess” in his 
sportswriter days, his shutting down and shutting out in his moratorium on grief, 
evolves into the Existence Period and the Permanent Period, and with each stage 
Frank claims to have acquired a new existential insight and to have gained a 
heightened awareness – yet his moratorium continues through his increasingly 
entrenched detachment.  At the end of The Sportswriter Frank claims that both his 
grief (relatively short) and mourning (much longer) for Ralph are over, yet all he has 
done is attempt to nullify their debilitating power. He cannot, however, maintain this 
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solipsistic refuge indefinitely, and the grief he has tried to suppress erupts 
unexpectedly when he reads about the death of a fellow realtor’s son in a magazine. 
Frank breaks down, is suddenly in tears, feeling “rage, frustration, sorrow, remorse, 
fatigue, self-reproach” and “a pain right where my heart ought to be…as if I’d done 
death already” – which of course he has figuratively through his benumbing isolation.62 
He wonders if it is possible to accept that “your life is founded on a lie, and you know 
what the lie is.” Frank does finally accept the irrevocability of Ralph’s death, but in 
doing so feels vulnerable, robbed of his “old, safe context.”  At the end of the novel 
Frank reflects on his relationship with his family and speculates that he might “come 
to know them better than I do,” a possibility he would not have conceded previously. It 
seems that his acceptance of Ralph’s death, which he now realises he “will never truly 
get over if I live to be a hundred” may have released him from his Other-denying 
solipsism.63 
 
    In the last of the Bascombe books, Let Me Be Frank With You (2014), a collection 
of four interrelated stories, it is clear that Frank, now sixty-eight, has not come to know 
his family better (his contact with his two children consists mostly of occasional 
bemused phone calls), though his grief and mourning for Ralph seem even greater – 
he mentions him seven times, telling us that he imagines him alive (he would be forty-
three), working as a stockbroker and advising Frank on investments, that he tried and 
failed to write “something memoiristic” about Ralph’s death many years before, and 
that although he hardly remembers him he “can hear his voice” still, twenty-five years 
after his death. Frank has not fully relinquished the false solace and refuge of 
solipsism, but it can no longer protect him from experiencing the constant presence of 
grief. He alternately seeks in detachment to nullify the lives, and subjectivity, of others, 
and through involvement to experience intimations of that subjectivity, of the immanent 
presence of others. As in the previous three Bascombe books Frank’s engrained 
solipsism is repeatedly challenged, and he is forced to choose between avowal and 
avoidance in his encounters with others. The stories are all set just before Christmas 
2012, in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, which devastated parts of the New Jersey 
shoreline, including Sea-Clift, and Frank’s old house there, which he sold in 2004, 
moving back to Haddam with Sally, to whom he is still married. In the first story, ‘I’m 
Here’, Frank reflects (as he did in The Lay of the Land) that “Emerson was right – as 
he was about everything: an infinite remoteness underlies us all,” which is “truly 
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mysterious, yet completely adequate for the life ongoing.”64 Such infinite remoteness, 
however, is shown not to be adequate in the second story, ‘Everything Could be 
Worse’, in which Frank receives a visit from a middle-aged black woman, Charlotte 
Pines, who grew up in his house in the 1960s when it was an exclusively white 
neighbourhood. The trauma she experienced there unfolds slowly, as she begins 
falteringly to tell her life-disfiguring story, and he listens expectantly, recognising that 
“it’s little enough to do for other humans – help them get their narrative straight.” The 
violence of the trauma Charlotte recounts, however, leaves Frank without recourse to 
commiserative platitudes, as his visitor explains that her (black) father shot and killed 
her (Italian) mother, and her brother, and then shot himself, after his marriage 
disintegrated amidst intractable cultural and temperamental conflicts, and his wife 
began an affair. Before this disclosure Frank muses that “it would do any of us good 
to contemplate the house we live in being peopled by imperfect predecessors. It would 
encourage empathy and offer – when there’s nothing left to want in life – 
perspective.”65Afterwards, despite his lifelong belief that it’s “better not to know many 
things,” Frank comments that “it’s a solid gain to experience significant life events for 
which no words or obvious gestures apply,” and as Charlotte leaves he smiles what 
he hopes is a smile of mutual understanding, to express what he hadn’t been able to 
express before in words but believes they shared. Grief again breaches Frank’s 
solipsism, and in a kind of reverse flow of empathy, he acknowledges what Sartre calls 
being-for-others, wondering if our “complex mental picture of ourselves” should include 
“not just the image that smiles wryly back from the shaving mirror; but the solitary 
trudger glimpsed in the shop window, shoulders slumped, hairline backing away, neck 
flesh lapping, bent as if by winds” – ourselves as the unknowable and beleaguered 
Other.66 
 
    ‘The New Normal’ recounts Frank’s visit to his first wife, Ann Dykstra, who now has 
Parkinson’s, at “a state-of-the-art, staged-care facility,” uncomfortably close to where 
he lives in what was, when they first met, “the verdant Haddam hinterlands.” Frank’s 
intention is to “come before her portraying as close to human mass as I’m able – my 
Default Self.” Since their marriage unravelled, as Frank retreated into his Other-
denying solipsism, his period of what in The Sportswriter he called “dreaminess” – and 
now acknowledges was “near-institutional-grade distraction” – Ann cannot accept his 
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Default Self, or the intention it signifies of trying to “seem a better, solider person.”67 
Ann talks of her wish to be buried next to Ralph and Frank is relieved that she wants 
to talk about this rather than their failed marriage and his role (withdrawn, distancing, 
detached) in its failure, but the tone of neutral civility is ruptured when Ann tells him 
“I’ve had two. Two second marriages. Both better than when I married you.” The 
statement is not, though, accusatory, as Frank initially thinks, but bewildered and 
mournful, as he realises when she calls him “sweetheart…her old pet name,” and as, 
Frank observes poignantly, “her pale eyes stare at me as if she’s lost the thread.” Ann 
is quickly restored to her bristling, efficient and organised self (though there is now 
nothing to be efficient or organised for) and, when she asks Frank to leave he knows 
that her isolation is absolute, unbreachable, and, unlike his own, not chosen.68 Frank’s 
reluctance to let others impinge on his consciousness is most apparent though in 
‘Deaths of Others’, the last story, in which he visits an acquaintance from early 1980s 
Haddam, who has now returned and is in the last stages of metastasised pancreatic 
cancer. Frank comments that “lived life, especially once you hit adulthood, is always a 
matter of superfluity leading on to less-ness,” and believes both he and Eddie 
understand that “life is a matter of subtractions.” He is consequently taken aback by 
Eddie’s confession that he slept with Ann soon after Ralph’s death and fell in love with 
her – unwelcome additional knowledge that can’t be subtracted – though Frank tells 
Eddie it changes nothing for him because “a wound you don’t feel is not a wound.”69 
This sounds like the Frank of earlier years, seeking the nullifying comfort of solipsism, 
neutralizing the threat of others’ subjectivity destabilising him (avoiding the “the 
essence of a small empty moment.”70) In this story, as in each of the others, Frank’s 
lifelong impulse to deny intimations of others’ subjectivity, and the threat this poses to 
his emotional equilibrium, is in conflict with his need to experience grief and mourning, 
for Ralph, but also for all he and those he loves have lost – for Sally, her first husband, 
for Ann, her second and third husbands, and now her very self, for Paul and Clarissa, 
their brother Ralph. Significantly, the story – and Bascombe’s narrative – ends with 
Frank meeting a former classmate of Paul’s he both respects and likes, outside Eddie’s 
house, who asks how Ralph is. Frank says, “He means my son Paul. They knew each 
other long ago in school. It is a sweetness that brings tears to my eyes.” The trustful, 
open benevolence of the man, breaches Frank’s guard, and “it becomes for us a 
moment to know the expanding largeness of it all,” not less-ness, not subtraction, but 
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a continuous expansion until death – of loss, of grief, but also, perhaps, of compassion 
and empathy.71 
 
A Gesture Life and Aloft: “Modes of consciousness” 
 
    Chang-rae Lee’s novels A Gesture Life (1999) and Aloft (2004) share some of the 
key themes of Ford’s Bascombe novels, and perhaps most importantly, the dangers 
and consequences of suburban solipsism. Lee’s narrators see the suburbs they live in 
as allowing an existential ambivalence, a tension between commitment and 
independence, between isolation and a sense of belonging or community. As in Ford’s 
novels, “space is an evasion” in the suburbs, and they have a liminal, indeterminate 
essence, yet for Lee’s protagonists there is no clear transition to a better 
understanding, a more insightful state, but rather a kind of suspension of volition, a 
passivity and near-paralysis of will that should in Kaplan’s terms render them 
implausible as “dramatic agents.” Yet it does not because their monologues, like Frank 
Bascombe’s, create tension in their attempt to sustain solipsism through narrative. 
Since narration is obviously a form of communication (however unreliable the 
narrator), it necessarily undermines that attempt at solipsistic withdrawal. If monologue 
is, as John W. Aldridge suggests, “the natural solipsistic form,” the suburbs are the 
natural solipsistic environment, one in which there is, as one of Lee’s narrators 
eloquently describes it, “an unwritten covenant of conduct…a signet of cordiality and 
decorum, in whose ethic, if it can be called such a thing, the worst thing is to be drawn 
forth and disturbed” and “the most available freedom is to live alone.”72   
 
    In A Gesture Life Doc Hata, the narrator, has gained acceptance in the wealthy New 
York suburb where he is now settled, making painstaking efforts to fit in and employing 
a civil but distancing politeness in all his relations. Now retired from his medical supply 
business, he reflects on his life, and in particular his three cultures (he is Korean, was 
adopted and brought up in Japan, and emigrated in adulthood to the US), his service 
as a medic in World War Two (in the Imperial Army of Japan), on a failed relationship 
with a suburban widow, and on his fraught relationship with his adoptive daughter. Like 
Frank Bascombe, Franklin ‘Doc’ Hata tries to repress the trauma and grief of his past, 
to neutralise it, by fashioning a new identity for himself, a new sense of self. In Sartrean 
terms his response to “being-in-the-world”, like Bascombe’s, is to affirm only the 
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second of its two aspects of “nihilating ambiguity… that I am not what I have been (the 
man who in the face of reproaches or rancour dissociates himself from his past by 
insisting on his freedom and on his perpetual recreation).” He cannot recognise the 
first aspect, that “I am what I have been”, though this is all Bob Slocum in Something 
Happened can assert, since he exemplifies Sartre’s “man who deliberately arrests 
himself at one period in his life and refuses to take into consideration the later 
change.”73 Doc Hata has the feeling of 
 
Being in a place and not being there, which seems…a chronic condition of my 
life, but then too its everyday unction, the trouble finding a remedy but not quite 
a cure, so that the problem naturally proliferates until it has become you through 
and through. Such is the cast of my belonging, molding to whatever is at hand.74  
 
In this “being in a place and not being there…molding to whatever is at hand,” Doc 
Hata exemplifies what Lorrain Delia Kenny calls suburbia’s “insider-Other.” Insider-
Others “can appear fully ensconced on the inside, but upon closer examination there 
is something not quite normative enough about their identity or how they carry 
themselves in a normative world.”75 This ambivalent state and status, is what Hata 
calls “a chronic condition of my life,” his traumatised alienation and isolation, but also 
“its everyday unction,” affording a distancing self-protection in his adoptive suburban 
community. As an orphaned Korean boy immersed in Japanese culture, Hata would, 
perhaps, have been more Other than “insider-Other,” but his enculturation would have 
been essential in order to approximate such insider-Other status. In the fictional New 
York suburb of Bedley Run his adaptiveness allows Hata to be superficially 
assimilated, integrated, and to avoid drawing attention to his being “not quite normative 
enough,” what he calls “the cast of my belonging.” 
 
    Lee acknowledges the literary mythology of the suburbs, having Doc Hata muse 
early in the novel over a story he read in one of his daughter’s high-school books 
“about a man who decides one day to swim in other people’s pools.” He doesn’t, of 
course tell us that it is Cheever’s ‘The Swimmer’, but he says it makes him “think of 
many notions, the first being that the man has begun, whether knowing it or not, a sort 
of quest or journey, and ultimately finds himself, if in spiritual disillusion.”  Doc Hata of 
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course has a swimming pool and Lee uses this essential trope of fiction of the suburbs 
to illustrate his solipsistic state, as the water “appears nearly lightless, whether in bright 
sun or dusk, and the feeling sometimes is that you are not swimming in water at all, in 
something material and true, but rather pulling yourself blindly through a mysterious 
resistance,” and while swimming Hata feels that he is “gliding in the abyss.” Lee has 
Hata use water and swimming imagery to suggest ‘self-immersion’ and the struggle to 
maintain what for him is a kind of discipline, but also to show the inevitable – and 
redemptive – breach in his solipsism near the end of the novel, when he is immersed 
in “a nightly pool of deep worry and remorse and unexpected comfort that I could wade 
into and do my long-distance crawl, for once not forgetting who I was, for once not 
blacking myself out.” The final instance of such imagery serves as an admission by 
Hata that his attempts to forestall intimacy, to keep himself/ his self-immersed and 
unreachable, must finally fail, because “after you have pushed aside and pushed aside 
and pushed aside again, the old beacons will bob up once more, dotting the waters 
before you like a glowing ring of fire.”76  
 
    Hata’s description of Cheever’s story then – of a man who “has begun…a sort of 
quest or journey, and ultimately finds himself, if in spiritual disillusion” – describes 
precisely the journey that he will embark on in the novel, as he is forced to confront 
the horror of his experiences as a young medic during World War Two, when his falling 
in love with one of the Korean ‘comfort women’ in his charge precipitated a moral crisis 
– and for Hata now an existential one. In the brutal conditions these women endured, 
raped and sometimes murdered, Hata was forced to make choices that he now finds 
unjustifiable. In facing these atrocities and his own actions, he recognises their effect 
on his relations with his estranged daughter, Sunny, and eventually achieves a kind of 
reconciliation with her. Doc Hata’s solipsism is the cause of his estrangement not just 
from his daughter, who is exasperated by his self-estrangement and lack of 
engagement, his making “a whole life out of gestures and politeness,” but from Mary 
Burns, the widow with whom he has a relationship. She finally ends the relationship in 
frustration at his implacable distancing politeness and refusal to take “certain issues 
to the necessary lengths,” so that the couple “floated the deep waters, just barely 
treading.” Doc Hata cannot relinquish his solipsism and so cannot love; he wonders if 
“love is forever victorious, truly conquering all, or if there are those who, like me, 
remain somehow whole and sovereign, still live unvanquished,” a statement that would 
seem to contradict his claim that his life has consisted of “molding to whatever is at 
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hand,” though does not because this is precisely the means of his disengagement, his 
“being in a place and not being there” made possible by the suburbs in which “space 
is an evasion.” In Sartrean terms, Hata refuses to acknowledge ‘the look’, being-for-
others, and the associated intimation of others’ subjectivity – and for Hata especially, 
their pain. While Lee has us understand that this is at least in part caused by his guilt 
about his complicity in the war in the abuse of the ‘comfort women’, it can also be 
understood as the psychic disfigurement resulting from the trauma he experienced 
following the killing and mutilation of Kkutaeh, the girl he was in love with.  Doc Hata’s 
name – shortened from Kurohata – is itself emblematic of his self-imposed isolation, 
since “Hata is, literally, ‘flag’, and a ‘black flag’, or kurohata, is the banner a village 
would raise by its gate in olden times to warn of a contagion within. It is the signal of 
spreading death.” It is through trauma and grief- induced solipsism that Doc Hata 
attempts to stem the contagion of what he views as his dehumanised and morally 
corrupted self. Yet, as for Bob Slocum and Frank Bacombe, his solipsism can only 
further dehumanise him in its shutting out of others’ subjectivity, his imaginative and 
empathic paucity a protection that diminishes and bewilders him, as he tries to 
maintain an untenable equilibrium.77 
 
    In ‘The Swimmer’ Neddy Merill asks himself whether he has become “so disciplined 
in the repression of unpleasant facts that he had damaged his sense of the truth” and 
by the end of A Gesture Life Doc Hata has been forced to address this question too.78 
Near the beginning of the novel he states that “I’ve seen myself most clearly when I’m 
off on my own, without others in the mix” but by its close he has acknowledged that he 
has been “in the lonely dream of an oblivion, the nothing-of-nothing drift from one pulse 
beat to the next.” Having established a tentative and tenuous reconciliation with 
Sunny, and been introduced to her five-year-old son as a family friend, he finds that 
contact with the boy serves to “elevate” him and produces the “naturally attendant 
hope of a familial continuation, an unpredictable, richly evolving to be,” echoing Frank 
Bascombe’s desire at the end of The Lay of the Land for “the extra beat – to live, to 
live, to live it out.” Significantly, Doc Hata decides to leave the suburb where he lives, 
and to sell his house so he can help Sunny financially. He knows that when his former 
home is occupied, “when this house is full and alive,” he will be “outside looking in,” 
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but he has resolved not to shun involvement with others, however meagre, and instead 
to “fly a flag,” and no longer seek to contain the imagined contagion.79 
 
    The Italian-American narrator of Lee’s Aloft, Jerry Battle, also seeks to maintain a 
delicate existential equilibrium through a carefully calibrated detachment, though if, as 
Lee claims, Doc Hata is “both trying to tell you the story and trying not to tell you the 
story,” Battle has no such qualms. As a second-generation immigrant Battle 
(shortened from Battaglia) has, Lee says, “never questioned his context in the same 
way that Henry Park [in Native Speaker] and Doc Hata have questioned their context” 
and consequently feels able to “go on…these long rifts on himself.”80 Battle resembles 
Ford’s Frank Bascombe in The Sportswriter, since he has, as John Homans puts it, 
“temporarily forgotten how to want and so pretty much just watches.”81 He is retired 
from the family landscaping business, which his son Jack is in the process of 
bankrupting through ostentatious overspending, while his daughter Theresa, an 
academic, critiques the family, and Jerry in particular, from her post-
structuralist/Barthesian perspective. Battle’s isolation, in an unnamed Long Island 
suburb, like Bascombe’s in a New Jersey suburb, is self-imposed. His favourite ‘hobby’ 
is escaping emotional entanglements, familial or otherwise, by taking his Cessna 
Skyhawk on leisurely flights above the Long Island suburbs, an obvious (if perhaps 
over-emphasised) metaphor for his detachment. Lee describes the Long Island of Aloft 
as “the first suburbs that were built on one acre lots…you could live your entire life – 
have children, grow old and die – without having much to do with your neighbours.”82 
At fifty-nine, Jerry Battle has little to do not just with his neighbours, but with his family, 
or indeed with anyone else. He muses that  
 
In this new millennial life of instant and ubiquitous connection, you don’t in fact 
communicate so much as leave messages for one another…and then when you 
do finally reach someone, everyone’s so out of practice, or too hopeful, or else 
embittered, that you wonder if it would be better not to attempt contact at all.83  
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    Battle does not attempt much contact with others except on a superficial level, and, 
as with Frank Bascombe and Doc Hata, this can be understood as a psychological 
and emotional shutting down following a life-defining loss, in Battle’s case the 
drowning of his manic-depressive Korean wife in their swimming pool (and earlier, the 
death of his brother Bobby in Vietnam). Lee use the trope of the swimming pool to 
suggest Jerry’s failure to fully come to terms with or grieve over Daisy’s death – he 
has the pool filled and a lawn laid down almost immediately after she dies – but it is 
his reliance on flying his Cessna Skyhawk, his need to be aloft, that is clearly indicative 
of his solipsism. Unlike Doc Hata, Jerry waxes lyrical about this, portraying it as almost 
an elevated state of being (rather than the immersion/submersion that Doc Hata 
recognises it to be): 
 
When you’re up here and aloft…you don’t want to engage in the familiar lingering 
intimations, allusions, narratives, all that compacted striated terra-firma 
consideration, but instead simply stir with this special velocity that is in itself 
worth the whole of any voyage, this alternating tug and weightlessness of your 
constant departure.84  
 
It is precisely those “lingering intimations” that threaten to undermine Jerry’s sense of 
self and which he refuses to acknowledge, never having been able (or willing) to 
“develop the necessary armature for the fallout from oneself,” taking refuge instead in 
what he jokingly calls “self-absorption in the classical mode.” This cannot, however, 
be dismissed as mere egotistical or selfish self-absorption, but is rather a kind of ‘self-
entrenchment’, a near-hermetic state that seems virtually unbreachable. Daisy’s death 
may have been the most significant reason for, or cause of, this self-entrenchment, 
though Jerry’s solipsism and accompanying sense of unreality (perhaps comparable 
to Frank Bascombe’s ‘dreaminess’ in The Sportswriter) were apparent long before she 
died. This “condition of disbelieving the Real…and feeling distinctly outside of things” 
is most pronounced when conflict occurs – and so engagement is required – as Jerry 
acknowledges in describing an argument he had with Daisy that turned violent. Daisy, 
drunk and angry, lunged at him with a knife and he “froze, not so much with fear…as 
with a kind of abstention, for the horror of what was happening was too realistic to 
even begin to consider; it was actually enough to make me say, I must depart, I must 
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depart.”85 Departure, flight, is Jerry’s first impulse when conflict arises, and one that 
he follows after Daisy’s death, regularly taking trips to tourist destinations all over the 
world, enjoying “the constancy of serial arrivals and departures, and the comforting 
companion knowledge that you’ll never quite get intimate enough for any trouble to 
start brewing.” What makes his behaviour and attitude near-pathological though, is 
that Jerry never got intimate enough with his traumatised children, Jack and Theresa, 
either, following their mother’s death, though he couldn’t stop trouble brewing with 
them or their stepmother Rita, who tried to support them emotionally while he would 
indulge his “chronic habit of abstaining…sitting alone in my study poring over the travel 
guides to places I wanted to go.” Rita finally leaves Jerry, exasperated at his chronic 
habit of abstention, though not before Jack and Theresa have grown up and left home, 
forcing him to recognise that their “post-Daisy troika has really been the loose 
association of three very separate, unconnected beings.”86 
 
    Jerry then exemplifies Rae Langton’s epistemic solipsist “who believes he is the 
only knowable person,” and also (as a consequence) the moral solipsist, “who believes 
he is the only person who matters.”87 As for Frank Bascombe and Doc Hata, suburbia 
is an environment in which “space is an evasion” and “the worst thing is to be drawn 
forth and disturbed.” For Battle, as for Hata, and Bascombe especially, US culture of 
the 1970s and 1980s serves to reinforce solipsism. In the late 1970s Jerry set up home 
(though as it turned out didn’t ‘settle down’) with Daisy in the unnamed Long Island 
suburb where he still lives. This was the period in which US society was characterised 
by a culture of narcissism, as Christopher Lasch termed it, and if Heller’s Bob Slocum 
was its representative in fiction, Jerry Battle exemplifies what Lasch called “the 
minimal self.” As Philip Jenkins argues, the national sense of perilousness at this time 
– worsened by events such as the Jonestown massacre, the assassination of Harvey 
Milk, the murders and rapes committed by serial killer John Wayne Gacy, and in 
November 1979 the U.S. embassy hostage crisis in Tehran – created a national 
attitude of defensive insularity.88 The New Right was in the ascendant by 1980 and the 
culture was one of (perceived) besiegement, and as Lasch argued in The Minimal Self, 
                                               
85 Ibid. p. 26, p. 272, p. 173, p.122. 
86 Ibid. p. 202, p. 68, p. 131. 
87 Rae Langton, ‘Love and Solipsism’, in Roger Lamb, ed. Love Analyzed (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1997), p. 124. 
88 Philip Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 150, p. 153. Occurring within a few weeks of each 
other (apart from the US embassy hostage crisis) these events, according to Jenkins, showed a society 
with “the tendency to random and sadistic violence, the presence of dangerous psychopaths, the 
vulnerability to fanaticism, and the need to explain what appeared to be pure moral evil.” (p. 150). 
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“under siege, the self contracts to a defensive core, armed against adversity. 
Emotional equilibrium demands a minimal self, not the imperial self of yesteryear.”89 
Jerry Battle attempted to maintain such equilibrium through the late 1970s and 1980s, 
even following Daisy’s death, but seemingly at the cost of the contraction of self 
identified by Lasch. In one of his more candid moments he tells us “I am disappearing. 
But let me reveal a secret. I have been disappearing for years.”90 
       
    Lee has Battle’s Cessna Skyhawk, the primary symbol and instrument of his 
solipsism, become the means by which it is challenged, though not finally transcended.  
After his pregnant daughter is diagnosed with Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and decides 
against treatment, Jerry is distraught and, though she comes with her fiancé Paul to 
live with him, he is not included in, or even consulted about, her decisions regarding 
her health. He experiences the exclusion he has practised with others now directed at 
him, and, in the hope of being able to talk to her and persuade her to have treatment, 
takes her in his Cessna Skyhawk to Maine after she expresses “an intense hankering 
for lobster.” Jerry breaks two of his rules of flying – always fly alone (obviously) and 
never fly in anything but fine weather – and on the return journey they fly into a storm. 
Theresa goes into labour prematurely (at twenty-five weeks) and although Jerry is 
finally able to land near to the hospital in New Haven where her doctor is, Theresa 
dies in the ambulance from blood loss. At the end of the novel Jerry’s whole family are 
living with him – his father, son and daughter-in-law and their children (following 
bankruptcy) and Paul, who goes twice a day to the hospital in New Haven where his 
son is being kept alive in an incubator.  Jerry seems to have adapted to his new 
cramped and crowded family life and home, and claims to see the futility of his trying 
to stay aloft, musing that “no matter how much I wished to disappear sometimes, to fly 
far off and away, I really couldn’t, and maybe never did. Or will.”91 This echoes Doc 
Hata’s recognition that “after you have pushed aside and pushed aside and pushed 
aside again, the old beacons will bob up once more,” and like Doc Hata, who remains 
at the end of A Gesture Life “outside looking in,” Jerry is “in the world and completely 
outside of it too” at the end of Aloft.92 While the rest of his family are indoors he is in 
the swimming pool, or rather the preparatory pool trench that Jack has dug, where he 
comes “at least once or twice a day, standing and sitting and then leaning back against 
the steeply ramped dirt, gazing up at a perfect frame of firmament for flights endless, 
                                               
89 Christopher Lasch, The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times, 1984 (London: Picador, 
1985), p. 15. 
90 Chang-rae Lee, Aloft, 2004 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005), p. 22. 
91 Ibid. p. 310, p. 340. 
92 Chang-rae Lee, A Gesture Life, 1999 (London: Granta Books, 2001), p. 284. 
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unseen.”93 Whether Jerry has accepted a circumscribed horizon framed by familial 
relations, or will return to his exclusionary solace (submerged, immersed, where 
formerly he was aloft) is unclear, but as in A Gesture Life, Lee uses the swimming 
pool, emblematic of suburbia, to suggest solipsism, and, perhaps, its transcendence 
by his suburbanite protagonist. 
 
    For Frank Bascombe, Doc Hata and Jerry Battle, there is no clear resolution at the 
end of their narratives, as each experiences a kind of existential hiatus, with the 
suggestion of a reconfiguring of their lives. Ann’s affliction with Parkinson’s Disease 
and the ongoing uncertainty over Frank’s health heighten and sharpen his emotional 
responsiveness, and grief – his own and his children’s – may yet again challenge his 
solipsism; Doc Hata considers travelling and embarking on new experiences – and 
possibly relationships – having sold his house and decided to leave suburbia; and for 
Jerry Battle, freshly grieving for his daughter and now living with his entire extended 
family, the prospect of closeness, or even intimacy, no longer seems so threatening. 
Each one may be on the verge of recognising (or accepting their recognition of) the 
Other, and with it, all the emotion and pain that comes from acknowledging others’ 
selves, consciousness, their subjectivity – and unknowability. For Sartre, recognition 
of this unknowability is not solipsism; rather solipsism entails the refusal to recognise 
‘the look’ through which we become aware of others’ unknowability, but also their 
subjectivity. ‘The look’ renders us ontological objects for others (and so unknowable) 
just as it renders others objects for us (and so equally unknowable). Living with this 
intimation can only cause existential anguish, but it does not deny others’ subjectivity. 
For Bob Slocum, however, such denial is essential to maintain his existence in 
corporate suburbia, and the only resolution in Heller’s novel is the ending of Slocum’s 
existential unease through the killing of his boy, the Other thus nullified and solipsism 
the only possible existential state.  
 
    In the novels discussed in this chapter suburbia provides the “interior spaciousness” 
identified by Tanner as conducive to the retreat into solipsism. Suburban space 
engenders a narrative expansiveness, but also a diminishment of, and a retrenchment 
in, the self, and not just a distancing from, but a nullification of others. Space becomes 
evasion, as Karl suggests, and it is the pain of grief that the protagonists seek to evade 
in their denial of others’ subjectivity. Each one has become Tanner’s “sealed-off 
spectator,” experiencing “a sharp diminishment in the dimensions of the architecture 
                                               
93 Chang-rae Lee, Aloft, 2004 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005), p. 8, p. 343. 
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of consciousness,” in their denial of ‘the look’.94 This is ultimately futile, though, since 
such bad faith creates a kind of ‘ontological contradiction’: the pain that the characters 
wish to avoid is caused by others, and the need to deny others’ subjectivity, agency, 
their full existential reality, is a tacit acknowledgement of that reality. With the exception 
of Bob Slocum, who finally withdraws into a state of near-psychotic denial, the 
protagonists are unable to maintain their bad faith unfalteringly, their willed but 
numbing impassivity. Their solipsism is finally not unbreachable, and it is in the 
suburban spaces emblematic of their evasion that the breaches occur. Frank 
Bascombe is overwhelmed by grief for his son Ralph when sitting alone at night in his 
car, a ‘Suburban’, the very means by which he has consistently avoided engagement 
with others. Doc Hata imagines himself outside, but looking into, the house in the 
suburbs he has sold so he can help his formerly estranged daughter financially, the 
symbol of his self-protective withdrawal become the means of familial inclusiveness, 
with emotional and psychological exposure now inevitable for the bereft and 
traumatised Hata. Jerry Battle, having initially reacted to his wife’s death by filling in 
the swimming pool in which she died, is, at the end of Aloft, drawn to the freshly dug 
swimming pool trench in the grounds of his newly crowded family house, the void left 
by Daisy’s death and his repressed grief exposed. That each of these key symbols of 
suburbia can become inverted, signify a receptive openness rather than a hermetic 
imperviousness, suggests the bad faith the suburbs embody may be impossible to 
sustain. Suburbia’s contradictory nature – ordered, uniform and insular, yet 
indeterminate, liminal (and so potentially transitional) – may allow solipsistic 
withdrawal, but it can also undermine such a state, precipitate existential crises for the 
suburbanites who seek in bad faith to deny others’ subjectivity.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
94 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950 – 1970, 1971 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976), 
p.262, p. 263, p. 268. 
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Chapter Three: Existential Contingency and Suburban Violence 
 
    Violence occurs at some point in all of the texts discussed in the preceding chapters, 
and is a manifestation of their existential themes: Bob Slocum’s killing of his son in 
Something Happened is his final and definitive solipsistic act, marking the end of his 
narrative torrent, and his withdrawal into a hermetic consciousness; the various acts 
of violence in the Bascombe novels – the rape and murder of estate agent Clair 
Devane in Independence Day, the bombing of a hospital and Frank Bascombe’s 
shooting in The Lay of the Land – underscore the false placidity of the suburbs and 
threaten Frank’s solipsistic equilibrium;1 in A Gesture Life the disfiguring trauma 
caused by the rape and murder of Kkutaeh leads Doc Hata to withdraw emotionally, 
while for Jerry Battle in Aloft, his wife Daisy’s drowning in their swimming pool 
precipitates an emotional shutting down and exclusion of others; in Raymond Carver’s 
short stories nihilistic violence erupts in impotent response to entropy and dissolution. 
However, the violence in all of these texts is not (with the exception of some of Carver’s 
stories) central to the narrative themes, does not itself constitute a key theme, and 
does not appear principally as a response to the contingent nature of self and 
selfhood.2  
 
    The pivotal suburban violence in Joyce Carol Oates’ Expensive People (1968), John 
Cheever’s Bullet Park (1969), John Updike’s Rabbit Redux (1971), and Ann Beattie’s 
Falling in Place (1980), however, is an extreme reaction to existential contingency and 
indeterminacy, and so is integral to the development of this narrative theme. The 
protagonists see their own existential anxieties reflected in their environment, which 
is, as Robert Beuka suggests, “an enigma even to itself,” since it, like its inhabitants, 
exists in a contradictory state, as “a sort of plotted, ordered…calculated, precise 
parcelling of the natural landscape,” yet one that “lacks its own, self-contained sense 
of place identity…a ‘place’ and a ‘noplace’, a paradox.”3 In these texts the paradox of 
the suburbs – their orderliness and uniformity, fixity, yet indeterminacy – creates 
extreme tension. Characters repress their awareness of themselves as indeterminate 
                                               
1 Walter Luckett’s suicide in The Sportswriter is clearly different in existential terms from the other 
instances of violence in the trilogy, but its narrative importance lies in its challenge to Frank’s 
narcissism and solipsism. 
2 Slocum’s killing of his son in Something Happened occurs near the end of the novel, when his 
solipsism has become irreversible; it is not so much a response to existential contingency as the 
inevitable final act of a consciousness that has ceased to even recognise that contingency. 
3 Robert Beuka, SuburbiaNation: Reading Suburban Landscapes in Twentieth-Century American 
Fiction and Film (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.20. 
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and contingent beings, but this repression cannot be maintained – and violence is the 
eventual result.  
 
Decade of nightmares 4 
 
    Expensive People and Bullet Park seem only obliquely to register the seismic 
societal changes taking place in the 1960s, though Rabbit Redux was a reaction to, 
and reflection of, the upheaval at the end of that decade. George W. Hunt describes 
this as “one of the darkest and most bitter periods in American history” in the wake of 
the Kennedy and King assassinations, and the continuing war in Vietnam, 
increasingly, and vehemently, opposed by many. As he argues, these events – clearly 
a continuation of the social and political change that started earlier in the decade – 
were necessarily reflected in the novels written in this period, of which he lists fifteen, 
including both Expensive People and Bullet Park. While Hunt may overstate the 
significance of these novels as barometers of social change (they were published in 
the years he views as seminal, 1968 and 1969 respectively, but written prior to those 
years) they do reflect a society in cultural flux, one in which 
 
The center could not hold: America’s former, rather complacent image of itself 
was fragmented, and Americans of all ages were undergoing profound 
emotional and psychic displacement…the confluence of competing energetic 
angers and their unforeseen acceleration became allied with an intensive and 
highly publicized national self-analysis.5 
 
    The suburban culture portrayed in Bullet Park may be an attempt to deny these 
societal and existential forces, to provide a bulwark against them (a denial that actually 
leads to the disorder and violence it seeks to forestall), but Updike’s Rabbit Redux – 
set in 1969 –  addresses them directly. Updike commented in 1978 that the US was 
“a pleasanter country to live in now than it was 10 years ago...there’s much less stress. 
That was a very difficult time, the late sixties here, as in Rabbit Redux. Everybody had 
to rethink where they were and what things meant.”6 Updike clearly intended to 
                                               
4 The period of American history discussed in Philip Jenkins’ Decade of Nightmares: The End of the 
Sixties and the Making of Eighties America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) begins in the 
late 1960s, when Expensive People (1968) was published and ends in the early 1980s, shortly after the 
publication of Falling in Place (1980). 
5 George W. Hunt, John Cheever: The Hobgoblin Company of Love (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983), p. 150, p. 151. 
6 Iwao Iwamoto, ‘A Visit to Mr Updike’, 1978, in James Plath, ed. Conversations with John Updike: 
Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1994), p.119. 
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document these societal changes and their effect on his suburbanite protagonists, and 
Rabbit Redux is accordingly often discussed (far more than Rabbit, Run) as a socio-
cultural novel, exploring the profound cultural changes of the time. In the novel Harry 
Angstrom’s suburban house becomes a refuge for a young runaway hippie girl, and 
then a black militant Vietnam veteran, both of whom seem more representative than 
real, since, as George Hunt observes, “typology has replaced character here…as 
characters they are unrealized.”7 As the conflict in the house intensifies, leading to 
violence and eventually death, it becomes almost a microcosm of the US of the late 
1960s. As Howard Brick notes, the US was a more violent country at the end of the 
decade than at the beginning (or certainly appeared to be) and a proclivity for violence 
was coming to be viewed as a defining feature of American culture. Brick cites various 
events and occurrences that contributed to this impression of the culture, specifically, 
urban protests by African Americans, the tendency towards violence amongst some 
members of the anti-war movement, along with advocacy of the use of arms by both 
black and white militants on the left, and in an increase in violent crime and 
assassinations.8 These changes were not just the cultural backdrop to Updike’s novel, 
they were its subject matter and they account for its sense of existential and cultural 
perilousness.  
 
   Despite Updike’s comments about the US of the late 1970s being a pleasanter place 
than it had been a decade earlier, Ann Beattie’s Falling in Place (1980), depicts a 
period similarly characterised by a heightened sense of existential perilousness and 
violence, as Philip Jenkins notes: in November 1979 the US embassy in Tehran had 
been occupied by thousands of students, who took all fifty-two Americans hostage (for 
over fourteen months), demanding the return from the U.S of the Shah for trial, and 
the Soviet Union had occupied Afghanistan, heightening fears of a military 
confrontation. In November of the previous year over 900 people had died in 
Californian James Jones’ religious cult in Guyana, and in December of 1978 twenty-
nine bodies were discovered under the house in Chicago of serial killer and rapist John 
Wayne Gacy. These events seemed to show that in US society there was now, 
perhaps even more than in the late 1960s, as Philip Jenkins suggests, a “tendency to 
random and sadistic violence.”9 Beattie herself has stated that Falling in Place was 
                                               
7 George Hunt, John Updike and the Three Great Secret Things: Sex, Religion, and Art (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1980), p. 171. 
8 Howard Brick, Age of Contradiction: American Thought and Culture in the 1960s, 1998 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 158. 
9 Philip Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 150-15, p. 150. 
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intended to be “very much rooted in a place and time” and that it was “meant to be an 
‘historical’ novel.”10 She has also said that it was strongly influenced by her own 
experience of living in Redding, Connecticut, while writing the novel in the summer of 
1979 (motivated by an impending deadline to write “a chapter a day”). She described 
this period as one in which she felt a detached but extreme sense of existential 
disquiet, as “a year of very bad times and total isolation living in this wealthy commuter 
community” in which she “was watching the people at the market and it was like when 
you’re sick and have a fever and everything seems in sharper focus.”11  
 
The ‘vulgar existentialist’ suburban novel 
 
    All four novels discussed in this chapter, then, were published in periods of social 
and political turbulence, and all were also examples of what might be called ‘vulgar 
existentialism’, reflections in part of the existential uncertainty of those periods. Each 
one explicitly invokes European existentialism, and three cite European existentialist 
writers. This direct influence, however, results not in a faithful literary representation, 
but in a vulgarised form of existentialism – a reduction of its complexities, an apparent 
conflation of Camusian absurdism and Sartrean existentialism, and a focus on one 
notion common to both: contingency, shown in each novel to be closely connected to 
violence. 
 
    Expensive People, published less than a decade after the peak of the literary 
fashionableness of Sartrean existentialism in the US, has four references to Sartre. 
The first occurs early on, when Richard Everett, the narrator, disparages his 
argumentative parents for having yet “another fight – I believe it was over Jean-Paul 
Sartre.” In the second, Richard imagines a mocking review of his published memoir in 
Time Magazine, which suggests that “Everett sets out to prove that he can outsmartre 
Sartre but doesn’t quite make it.” In the third and fourth references Richard belittles 
his father for his literary and philosophical pretensions. He recalls Elwood asking his 
eleven-year-old self, “Have you done much reading in Sartre?” going on to tell him 
“Sartre is well worth reading” and “Sartre has something to say and I’m going to give 
him the benefit of the doubt. I’m going to give him the time to say it to me.”12 Richard 
                                               
10 Neila C. Seshachari, ‘Picturing Ann Beattie: A Dialogue’, 1989 p. 79; Larry McCaffery and Sinda 
Gregory, ‘A Conversation with Ann Beattie’, 1982, p. 44, both in Dawn Trouard, ed. Conversations 
with Ann Beattie: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 2007). 
11 Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory, ‘A Conversation with Ann Beattie’, 1982, in Dawn Trouard, 
ed. Conversations with Ann Beattie: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of 
Mississippi Press, 2007), p. 44, p. 49. 
12 Joyce Carol Oates, Expensive People, 1968 (New York: Modern Library, 2006), p. 69, p. 112, p.116. 
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later overhears a heated phone call in which his father is arguing with someone over 
the literary worth of Genet, who, he points out, “has been studied by Sartre and other 
intellectuals.” The narrator also tells us early on that he can “promise violence, yes. 
VIOLENCE, VIOLENCE…ANGST…KIERKEGAARD.”13 The narration itself 
exemplifies the vulgar existentialism that it satirises, as Oates, through Everett, 
continually makes pseudo-Sartrean observations in disparaging suburbia. In an 
interview in 1969 Oates told Linda Kuehl that Swan – in A Garden of Earthly Delights 
(1967) – and Everett are “rather autobiographical. I project my doubts, my 
metaphysical and philosophical doubts, into them.” These doubts are related to key 
Sartrean concepts: ‘being-for-others’, or ‘being-as-object’, and ‘being-as-subject’ 
(discussed in Chapter Two), and even more fundamentally, the anguish caused by 
being in the indeterminate, contingent state that is ‘being-for-itself’ rather than ‘being-
in-itself’. Indeed, these are the subject of Richard Everett’s narrative and, as Oates 
has suggested, the attendant heightened anguish is the reason Everett, and many of 
her other protagonists, “erupt into violence.”14 The suburban setting is also crucial in 
catalysing Everett’s violence, and provides the focus for his pseudo-Sartrean tirades.  
 
    John Cheever’s Bullet Park shares Expensive People’s concern with existential 
contingency, and its protagonists also erupt into violence, but it has only one reference 
to an existentialist writer; Cheever mocks a suburban wife who is “studying the works 
of Camus,” which she “pronounced…Camooooo.” Asked by a visitor which works she 
is studying she replies “Oh, I can’t remember all the titles…we’re studying all of 
Camus.”15 Camus was a more obvious reference for Cheever’s satire than Sartre in 
this period, since, as George Cotkin notes,  
 
For a generation coming of age in the 1960s, confronting the civil rights 
movement and the war in Vietnam, Albert Camus perhaps more than Jean-Paul 
Sartre offered intellectual inspiration and guidance…[and] Camus’s appeal 
extended beyond the cohort of young people on college campuses.16 
 
                                               
13 Ibid. p. 125, p.73. 
14 Linda Kuehl, ‘An Interview with Joyce Carol Oates’, 1969, in Lee Milazzo, ed. Conversations with 
Joyce carol Oates: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1989), 
p. 8. 
15 John Cheever, Bullet Park, 1969 (London: Vintage Books, 2010), p.33, p.112, p.96. 
16 George Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 238-
240. 
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Cheever’s mocking of suburban pretensions to Camusian existentialism 
notwithstanding, the novel caused some consternation amongst critics in the late 
1960s and early 1970s precisely because of its stark (and unequivocal) depiction of 
existential contingency. These critics interpreted the novel as very much an adaptation 
of Sartrean existentialism (rather than Camusian absurdism), rendered especially 
bleak by its suburban setting. Charles Nicol recognised that Cheever intended to 
“show that experiences today are fragmentary and that people no longer possess – if 
they ever did – a unified personality,” but considered the motivation of characters to 
be unclear, if not unfathomable; Joyce Carol Oates described the characters as 
“disintegrating” and unable to find “a retreat from chaos and insanity” because “they 
have no permanent identities,” and suggested that in the future the novel “will probably 
be incomprehensible” (though she presumably didn’t think Expensive People would 
share the same fate); Louis Grant criticised Cheever’s portrayal of “the temporariness, 
the provisionality…of the world,” and did not think that any novelist should be 
“condemned to write about the humanoids” who live in Bullet Park; John Gardner 
conceded that the book was superior to “the many recent novels that wail and feed on 
Sartre” but considered it to be “disturbing…full of danger and offense” in its insistence 
that “the universe is gloomy and frightening, random” and “brute existence precedes 
essence.” Only Samuel Coale seems to have praised Cheever’s novel unreservedly, 
arguing that its portrayal of “a world at war with itself…a prison of self-confinement” in 
which “confrontation and division mark the core of all essential things” made it his 
“most visionary and ambiguous book.”17  
 
    Though Cheever may have agreed with Coale’s assessment, he felt that such critics 
had mostly misunderstood the novel, in viewing his suburbanite protagonists as 
wretched, as diminished by being symbolic of contingency and as exemplifying two 
possible responses to it. In an interview with Annette Grant in 1976, Cheever said of 
his protagonists, “Neither Hammer nor Nailles were meant to be either psychiatric or 
social metaphors; they were meant to be two men with their own risks.”18 Suburbia 
                                               
17 Charles Nicol, ‘Salvation in the Suburbs’, Atlantic Monthly 223, May 1969, pp 96-98; Joyce Carol 
Oates, ‘Cheever’s People: The Retreat from Chaos’, Chicago Tribune Book World, 20 April, 1969, pp. 
1-3; Louis Grant, ‘America’s Nomads’, Ramparts 8, September 1969, pp. 62-66; John Gardner, 
‘Witchcraft in Bullet Park’, The New York Times Book Review, 24 October 1971, pp. 20-24; Samuel 
Coale, ‘The Resurrection of  Bullet Park: John Cheever’s Curative Spell’ pp. 113 – 121, all in Francis 
J. Bosha, ed. The Critical Response to John Cheever (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994), 
pp. 101-122 
18 Annette Grant, ‘John Cheever: The Art of Fiction LXII’, 1976, in Scott Donaldson, ed. 
Conversations with John Cheever: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of 
Mississippi Press, 1987), p.111. It seems likely that the protagonists’ names, Hammer and Nailles, are 
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provided a suitable setting to explore the two men’s risks (of denying or of fully 
admitting provisionality and contingency) and their consequences, because it is “an 
improvisation…an improvisational way of life…an invention.”19 As in Expensive 
People, the setting underscores the theme of contingency and provokes extreme 
reactions in the suburbanites who espouse and evince pseudo-Sartrean existential 
views, views that resemble Cheever’s own expressed in his Journals, where he wrote 
in 1966 of the anguish of confronting “the terrifying singularity of my own person” and 
in 1971 of “the terrifying insularity of a married man and woman,” for which, he wrote 
in 1977, “alienation seems to be the word.”20 
 
    Contingency and suburban violence are controlling themes in John Updike’s Rabbit 
Redux. Updike, though, to a greater extent than either Cheever or Oates, cited the 
influence of existentialist writers on his work, particularly Kierkegaard because of his 
“insistence on the importance of the individual” and a “building upon terror” in his 
writing in confronting existence and selfhood. He also said that one of his 
“philosophical obsessions” was the fact “that there is a certain gratuitousness in 
existence,” a particularly Sartrean obsession, gratuitousness being an unavoidable 
characteristic of contingent being, with no causal necessity or justification, only 
possibility.21 However, as in Oates’ and Cheever’s novels, the existential philosophy 
in Rabbit Redux is a patchwork of ideas and terms from various writers, and the 
pseudo-Sartrean passages are possibly more marked than in either of those works.22 
Beattie’s Falling in Place, like Cheever’s Bullet Park, has only one reference to a 
European existentialist writer, and as in Cheever’s novel it is to Camus; the violence 
in Beattie’s novel, a near fratricide, is prefigured by repeated references to Camus’ 
The Outsider (1942), which one of the characters read in college, as he tells both a 
friend and his son, the agent of violence in the novel. As in The Outsider, this violence 
is in the form of a shooting. Beattie, though, cites Beckett more than Camus as a major 
influence, reflected in her concern with characters who flounder, seem unable to act, 
                                               
slightly oblique references to Beckett’s characters Hamm and Nell (and Nellie is the name of Nailles’s 
wife) in Endgame (1957). 
19 John Callaway, ‘Interview with John Cheever’, 1985, in Scott Donaldson, ed. Conversations with 
John Cheever: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1987), p. 
245. 
20 John Cheever, The Journals (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), p. 222, p. 275, p. 329. 
21Jeff Campbell, ‘Interview with John Updike’ in James Plath, ed. Conversations with John Updike: 
Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 1994), p. 98, p. 100. 
22 Updike would later discuss and clarify his own existential and religious views in Self-Consciousness: 
Memoirs, published in 1989. 
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and seem to be in an unacknowledged state of waiting.23 Such influences in Falling in 
Place, however, sometimes result in a vague existential posturing, without the 
specificity that would convince the reader of the validity of her ideas and their 
grounding in existentialist writing.  
 
Violence and existentialism     
 
    The suburban violence in each of the four novels does not lead to any kind of 
resolution or understanding for the protagonists, since it locks them into a kind of 
vicious existential circle; their acts of violence are reactions to the perceived threat of 
existential contingency, but those acts precipitate crises since they irrevocably shatter 
the tenuous equilibrium of their lives, underscoring the very contingency that provoked 
them. It is the starkness and extremity of the violence in the novels – ostensibly so out 
of place in suburbia – that seems to cause the writers to invoke existentialism, and 
more specifically Sartre (directly or indirectly), for whom contingency is fundamental 
to ontology. The significance of violence, and its relation to contingency within his 
ontological system, is not discussed at any length in Being and Nothingness, but Sartre 
does address this issue in Notebooks for an Ethics, published posthumously in 1983.24 
 
    Within Sartrean existentialism violence can be understood as a refusal or rejection 
of existential contingency, a disavowal of its implication that “existence precedes 
essence.”25 It is therefore a form of bad faith (discussed in Chapter One in relation to 
entropy and in Chapter Two in relation to solipsism), and is a response to the 
arbitrariness of selfhood, to its nature as “a being which is what it is not and which is 
not what it is.”26 For Sartre “the violent man’s refusal to compose himself is equivalent 
to a refusal of being in the world” and reflects a desire for the impossible state of ‘being-
in-itself-for-itself’.27 As discussed in Chapter One, bad faith may be a denial of either 
aspect of the “nihilating ambiguity…[that] I am what I have been (the man who 
                                               
23 Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory, ‘A Conversation with Ann Beattie’, 1982, in Dawn Trouard, 
ed. Conversations with Ann Beattie: Literary Conversations Series (Mississippi: University of 
Mississippi Press, 2007), p. 43. 
24 Whilst the Notebooks were never finished, and so cannot be seen as representing definitive 
philosophical statements and positions, they do provide valuable insights into Sartre’s ideas on subjects 
not addressed, or only briefly discussed, in Being and Nothingness. This is especially true of Sartre’s 
notion of authenticity, and the related issue of ethics. These are discussed in Chapter Four. 
25 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ in Walter Kaufman, ed. Existentialism: From 
Dostoevsky to Sartre, 1956 (New York: Plume, 2004), p. 353. 
26 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 58. 
27 Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, 1983 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
p. 173. 
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deliberately arrests himself at one period in his life and refuses to take into 
consideration the later changes) and that I am not what I have been (the man who in 
the face of reproaches or rancour dissociates himself from his past by insisting on his 
freedom and on his perpetual recreation).”28 The first form of denial is an attempt to 
entrench oneself in one’s facticity, to seek to assuage the anguish caused by being in 
a contingent and indeterminate ontological state with no stability. Someone who 
resorts to violence to allay this anguish is “always in quest of the irremediable, the 
irretrievable…[and] wants to define himself exclusively by an irretrievable past, by a 
state of the past that he is unable to change.” The second form of denial asserts that 
one’s transcendence is complete and unfettered by facticity, and so denies the reality 
of one’s past self, since “what is negated is the fact of being in the world, of having a 
facticity.” This also implies a refusal of ‘the look’, discussed in previous chapters, in 
that “my refusal of being-in-the-world is, a fortiori, a refusal of being in the midst of the 
world, that is, of being looked at, of being something other than pure transcendence. 
Violence is a refusal of being looked at.”29 In both types of denial “the flight of the for-
itself is the refusal of contingency” which “cannot be annihilated since I am it,” that is, 
the self and existence are entirely contingent.30 Denial of either facticity or 
transcendence is bad faith since together and inseparably they constitute the 
contingent nature of freedom, our ontological unjustifiability. As Steven Hendley notes, 
it follows “that no conceptual intelligibility we find in the world is absolute,” 
indeterminacy of being (more than any other conceptual indeterminacy) frustrating the 
desire for what Sartre calls in Nausea “a necessary, causal being.”31 There is, then, 
no teleological explanation for existence or selfhood, since “existence precedes 
essence” and “the essential thing is contingency…existence is not necessity.” 
Recognition of this inevitably causes existential anguish, since the self is possibility 
rather than necessity, a being that is “amorphous and vague.”32 
 
                                               
28 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 58. Sartre’s term ‘nihilation’ refers to negation, but this negation is the 
‘negative creation’ of non-being.  
29 Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, 1983 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
p. 182, p. 175, p. 176. 
30 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 149. 
31 Steven Hendley, ‘Realism and Contingency: Elaborating a Viable Sartrean Response to Rorty’s 
Anti-Realism’, in Adrian van den Hoven and Adrian Mirvish, eds. New Perspectives on Sartre 
(Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), accessed 17/01/14 from: 
http://faculty.bsc.edu/shendley pp. 8-9; Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, 1938 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
1982) p. 188. 
32 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, 1938 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 188. 
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    The violent denial of either aspect of existential inchoateness represents a desire 
to destroy the “nihilating ambiguity” of selfhood, marked by perpetual division, and so 
seeks “the total unity of being through destruction.”33 It is, then, an extreme expression 
of bad faith. If the dissonance created by dissolute and divided selfhood is experienced 
as a form of violence, it would seem to increase the likelihood of this bad faith leading 
to violence as a response (violence begetting violence), suggesting the violent person 
is in a heightened state of existential anguish (and possibly of awareness).34 I will 
argue that the violence of the protagonists in the four novels discussed in this chapter 
can be understood in these terms – as examples of faltering bad faith, with the 
attendant anguish leading each one to acts of violence that only heighten their 
awareness of contingency. As for the suburbanites discussed in Chapter One, the 
attempt to fuse being-for-itself with being-in-itself, to create the ontological 
impossibility of ‘being-in-itself-for-itself’, is a doomed project, the very consciousness 
desirous of such fusion indicative of its inevitable failure, and of the inescapability of 
existential contingency.  
 
Violent suburbia  
 
Expensive People: “Dreaming the dream” 
 
    Analyses of Expensive People have tended to view the novel in one of two ways: 
firstly, as writing about writing, as Greg Johnson notes, describing it as “relentlessly 
self-referential, calling attention to its own artifice and doubting its own reality.” It has 
also been analysed as primarily a satire on post-war suburban uniformity and banality, 
on “America’s paradise of materialism and a clear statement of the moral and 
psychological consequences of the American Dream at a particular moment in 
history.”35 Although the novel could also be interpreted from a Freudian perspective 
as an Oedipal tale, the first person narrative of an orally fixated boy who is in a 
permanent state of arrested development, Oates herself is not very sympathetic to this 
view; she told Robert Phillips that she has “always found Freud rather limited” and that 
“it may be the Nietzschean influence (which is certainly more provocative than Freud’s) 
                                               
33 Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, 1983 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
p. 186. 
34 In the second part of Notebooks for an Ethics Sartre offers an historical and political analysis of 
violence as a function of class relations and power, but I am concerned here with the ontological status 
and significance of violence – how it can be understood within his ontological system. The violence in 
the texts to be discussed occurs in suburban families and is an expression of extreme existential states.  
35 Greg Johnson, Understanding Joyce Carol Oates (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1987), p. 49, p. 50. 
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that characterises some of my work.”36 As Harold Bloom suggests, “her subject is 
contingency,” and “her sense of facticity” is “as much hers as Freud’s.”37 The two types 
of critical interpretation of the novel – as contradictory postmodernist fiction realised 
through an unreliable narrator, and as suburban satire – are both valid, but only 
partially so, since they fail to address these aspects of the novel as essentially means 
to an end, that end being the depiction of existential contingency (albeit in a kind of 
‘vulgarized’ existentialism), as Bloom observes, and violence as a response to it. The 
digressive and self-doubting monologue of the narrator is not simply an ironic exercise 
in self-reflective literariness, since, as Gavin Cologne-Brookes argues, “its 
uncertainties stretch to the ontological. It draws specific attention to the problematic 
relationship between inner and outer worlds.”38 It can therefore be seen as a form of 
what Eileen Teper Bender calls “literary existentialism” since Richard Everett’s 
reiterative narrative is an attempt to derive “his existential reality, his very identity, from 
the act of writing.”39 The choice of a suburban setting is also critical – the ‘satire’ is 
actually the increasingly angry (and disingenuous) decrying of suburban denial of 
contingency, the smothering of existential disquiet, which the narrator despises, but 
also, desperately and self-loathingly craves. Through the depiction of his explosive 
acts, Oates provides what G.F. Waller calls “the delicate ingredient without which no 
suburb would be complete – violence.”40  
 
    The violence and societal upheaval in the US at this period are, however, curiously 
absent from Everett’s narrative, though this underscores the distanced and distancing 
culture of the suburbs. He tells us that for his mother, “what was ‘only real’ couldn’t be 
very important, and I have to confess to feeling this way myself. I have caught her 
solipsism from her.” The one oblique reference to the “only real” societal changes 
occurring is his recollection of being driven to his high school by a friend of his mother’s 
and on the way passing “a drive-in restaurant in front of which sullen Negro women, 
of middle age, were walking with picket signs.”41 Suburbia’s exclusionary intent, and 
its racial homogeneity is highlighted by Richard’s distance from the “sullen Negro 
                                               
36 Robert Phillips, ‘Joyce Carol Oates: The Art of Fiction’ (Paris Review, 1978) in Greg Johnson, ed. 
Joyce Carol Oates: Conversations 1970-2006 (Princeton, New Jersey: Ontario Review Press, 2006), p. 
76. 
37 Harold Bloom (ed), Joyce Carol Oates (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1987), p.2. 
38 Gavin Cologne-Brookes, Dark Eyes on America: The Novels of Joyce Carol Oates (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2005), p. 40. 
39 Eileen Teper Bender, Joyce Carol Oates, Artist in Residence (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1987), p. 31, p.38. 
40 G.F. Waller, Dreaming America: Obsession and Transcendence in the Fiction of Joyce Carol Oates 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), p. 117. 
41 Joyce Carol Oates, Expensive People, 1968 (New York: Modern Library, 2006), p. 70, p.179. 
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women” protesting about civil rights, seen only in passing, from his insular position in 
a car. This is, as Lorraine Delia Kenny argues, “the anti-Other America – a place 
intentionally built on imposing distance between white America and its Others… on 
the exclusion of the Other.” Kenny describes white suburbanites as having an “anti-
Other Self,” one founded on “a system of disavowals that shelters the anti-Other Self 
from effectively living with differences both within and without.”42 My concern here is 
primarily with Richard’s (and other characters’) attempt to disavow the differences 
within the “anti-Other Self,” though their need for a unified sense of self is mirrored in 
the need for a homogenous, undifferentiated and ostensibly unified suburban 
environment. This clearly precludes an acknowledgement of the racial Other, since, 
for Richard and other suburbanites, as Kenny observes, “knowing the Other means 
having to recognize the Self as part of a deliberate history of exclusions,” exclusions, 
moreover, that in Expensive People are ontological as well as racial, political and 
cultural.43 
 
    At the very beginning of the novel Everett confesses “I was a child murderer,” and 
goes on to explain “I don’t mean child-murderer…I mean child murderer, that is, a 
murderer who happens to be a child, or a child who happens to be a murderer.” He 
then immediately undermines his own clarification, by asking “Which am I? Child 
murderer? [or] child murderer?” As the narrative eventually makes clear, he is both, 
since he killed his mother at the age of eleven and in the process destroyed himself, 
or his sense of self (a self based on bad faith). His narrative, however, is a means of 
protracted denial of this loss of self (a loss he paradoxically freely admits).  Richard 
(now, he claims, eighteen years old) tells us that the first eleven years of his life were 
spent living in one cloistered suburb or another, moving regularly, and often backwards 
and forwards between suburbs (underscoring the essential sameness of these 
environments). His descriptions of his family, of the suburbs (and of virtually everything 
outside his own consciousness) highlight nullity and a kind of somnambulant 
existential numbness: Fernwood is 
 
 A dream, and everyone in it dreaming the dream; all in conjunction, happy, so 
long as no one woke up. If one sleeper wakened, everything would…[be] 
                                               
42 Lorraine Delia Kenny, Daughters of Suburbia: Growing Up White, Middle Class, and Female (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000), p. 6, p. 195. 
43 Ibid. p. 195 
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stretched and jerked out of focus and so…the end of Fernwood…All of 
Fernwood is kind, nice, generous, lovely, and it means nothing, nothing.44 
 
Richard’s father, Elwood, a successful businessman, “with nerves buried far beneath 
fat and muscle, safe…knew nothing, but where his imagination should have been, in 
that emptiness…there was a crude common sense.” It is Richard’s mother Natashya, 
however, who is most emblematic of suburban nullity, of denial of contingency, 
because, like Richard, she is only acting as if she is “dreaming the dream,” and 
conforms only to the image of banal uniformity, with all its blandishments, and for this 
he cannot forgive her (or himself for craving the same stilling of angst). He explains 
that when he was a small child she asked him to call her Nadia but “I must have been 
able to manage only the infantile ‘Nada’,” and, “hence Nada – strange name,” he 
disingenuously claims (her ‘name’ meaning ‘nothing’ in Spanish, of course), 
subsequently only referring to her as Nada.  Nada has a “suburban style” which is 
entirely fraudulent, rendering her almost inanimate, dehumanised, since it “dictated 
her hair, which was ‘done’ once or twice a week so that from behind or at a distance 
she looked like an ordinary resident of Fernwood…dictated her entire face, actually, 
because she wore nothing on her eyes.”45 Her appearance renders her as “American 
as the flag that rose above the frigid evergreens in the park,” and Richard watches her 
“run through her routine like a rag doll inspired by clockwork, ticking and clicking.” This 
routine is a passive pretence for his mother, a cultured intellectual and writer, though 
one she increasingly comes to identify herself with, so that “every word of hers, every 
gesture, was phony as hell, and as time passed in Fernwood this phoniness grew upon 
her steadily.” Richard is complicit in his mother’s deception, however, as he admits he 
“played healthy…played an eleven-year-old with some success.”46 Here, and later in 
his narrative, Richard’s existential musings are similar to Holden Caulfield’s angry 
adolescent disgust with phoniness and superficiality in J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in 
the Rye. Richard’s claims to existential insight are consequently somewhat 
undermined, since his teenage petulant critique is a social, and, at times, a pseudo-
psychological one, which he confuses with existential (and so ontological) awareness.  
 
    Richard’s narrative (his “memoir” as he calls it) charts what he describes as the 
process in which he “began to disintegrate” in Fernwood.47 What he experiences, or 
                                               
44 Joyce Carol Oates, Expensive People, 1968 (New York: Modern Library, 2006), p.119, p.101. 
45 Ibid. p.15, p.31, p.29, p.32. 
46 Ibid. p.12, p.55, pp.168-169. 
47 Ibid. p. 23. 
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has intimations of, in this process, is the contingent and indeterminate nature of self, 
the knowledge that he is not “a necessary, causal being” and that he is, in Sartrean 
terms, “a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.”48 Suburbia, ironically, 
both reflects this contingency and embodies its denial; suburbanites in the “tranquillity 
of Fernwood” make sure they “do not spill drinks, upset trays, burn holes in tables or 
rugs, because by doing such things they would come loose and these people never 
come loose.”49 Yet, as Bernice M. Murphy argues,  
 
The geography of the suburb has…tended to be intermediate between that of 
the town centre and of the countryside…the liminal status of this type of 
environment – neither one thing, nor another, but something in-between – is part 
of what helps make American suburbia the perfect breeding ground for fictional 
expressions of anguish and unease. Fear breeds in the cracks.50 
 
Fear certainly does breed in the ontological cracks – Sartre’s “nihilating ambiguity” – 
which Richard has a nascent awareness of, but falteringly attempts to deny, later 
confessing his fear of nothingness in near-hysterical anguish. Murphy contends that 
the gothic “often arises from the gaps between what something is and what it is not” 
and that consequently the suburban “milieu has proven a more than fitting venue for 
horror and gothic fictions.”51 The highlighting of the “gaps between what something is 
and what it is not” is also why suburbia has provided such a suitable environment for 
American existentialist fiction, why its liminality can provoke the anguish and unease 
Murphy identifies. It is precisely the ‘gap’, the nothingness at the core of being, but 
also in the space between being-for-itself and being-in-itself, that engenders anguish, 
and suburbia provides a kind of ‘geographical analogue’ to that nothingness. Mark 
Meyers suggests that for Sartre nothingness is “implicated in both consciousness 
(negativity) and its object (positivity)” and that it “operates as a figure of liminality.” This 
is because “it functions as a category which, in straddling being and non-being (it is 
both something and nothing), allows us to conceive of the for-itself and the in-itself as 
at once united and separated.”52 It would perhaps be more accurate to characterise 
                                               
48 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, 1938 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1982), p.188; Jean-Paul Sartre, Being 
and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: Methuen and Co. Ltd, 
1984), p. 58. 
49 Joyce Carol Oates, Expensive People, 1968 (New York: Modern Library, 2006), p. 99, pp. 45-46. 
50 Bernice M. Murphy, The Suburban Gothic in American Popular Culture (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), p. 20. 
51 Ibid. p. 4 
52 Mark Meyers, ‘Liminality and the Problem of Being-in-the-world: Reflections on Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty’, Sartre Studies International, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2008), pp. 78-105, p. 87. In Being and 
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the two types of being as coexistent and separated, since unity would imply the 
impossible ontological state of being-in-itself-for-itself – and facticity, which belongs to 
the ontological category of being-in-itself, cannot merge with transcendence, being-
for-itself, to form a stable unity of being. More central to Meyers’ argument, however, 
is his claim that being-for-itself’s awareness of the chasm between itself and the 
irreducibility of being-in-itself implies a nothingness that implicates the latter (since it 
has a contrastingly definitional relation to being-for-itself). In this way, “the liminality of 
nothingness…both reveals and maintains the paradoxical relationship between for-
itself and in-itself.”53 Crucially, this relationship is formulated in spatial terms. Meyers 
argues that “the central paradox underpinning Being and Nothingness” arises 
because: 
 
Human consciousness (being-for-itself) and the world as it appears to 
consciousness (the being of the phenomenon, or being-in-itself) are at once 
utterly separated from each other at the same time they are inextricably bound. 
In fact, they are bound precisely by virtue of their separation. This interplay 
between proximity and distance animates the whole of Sartre's 
phenomenological ontology.54 
 
It also engenders the tensions that animate Richard Everett (and the other suburbanite 
protagonists discussed in this chapter), since the existential nothingness they 
apprehend is partially mirrored in the nothingness of their suburban environment, 
defined negatively by its relation to an urban centre, often lacking clear proximity, so 
that suburbia is a non-place with ill-defined connectedness to a more determined and 
substantial, defined locational entity.55 The anguish this causes compounds, and is 
inextricably bound up with, that created by the (unacknowledged) coexistence of these 
characters’ facticity and transcendence, the latter constituting a nothingness in 
consciousness, being-for-itself, facticity constituting the only ontological stability, but 
                                               
Nothingness Sartre does not associate nothingness with liminality, and this is very much Meyer’s 
interpretation, but one that seem entirely credible.  Meyers suggests that nothingness “is never named 
as such [as liminal], mainly because of Sartre's desire to identify it wholly with the for-itself.” (p.87) In 
stressing the dichotomous duality of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, that is, Sartre necessarily 
identifies consciousness, the for-itself, as a nothingness, and does not address what might be called the 
‘negative ontological space’ between them, which Meyers describes as a liminal space. 
53 Ibid. p. 95. 
54 Ibid. p. 87. 
55 James Howard Kunstler states in his critique of suburbia, The Geography of Nowhere, that 
suburbanised Americans are now “living in places where nothing is connected.” (The Geography of 
Nowhere: The Rise and Decline of America’s Man-Made Landscape, 1993. New York: Touchstone, 
1994, p. 246). 
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one that is chimerical, since it is constantly transcended. Denial of this, and freedom 
as its corollary, in bad faith, results, for Richard, and for others, in fixation with being-
in-itself, with fixity and stasis. 
 
    Richard’s narrative itself – its rendering of events and occurrences, people’s actions 
and consciousness, as phenomena of the past, as unchangeable facticity – can be 
understood as a futile attempt at fusing the en-soi and pour-soi in Sartrean terms, to 
reconcile being-in-itself with being-for-itself, in order to achieve an impossible state, 
free from indeterminacy of being and the anguish it causes – that is, he seeks to deny 
the second aspect of Sartre’s “nihilating ambiguity,” transcendence, seeks to deny the 
consciousness that renders an ontological equilibrium founded on being impossible. 
This leads Richard to a fixation on stillness, the cessation of turbulent consciousness. 
His longing can be seen in a delusional claim to have achieved a state of ‘being-in-
itself-for-itself’ near the end of his narrative, after he has been on two ‘shooting sprees’ 
(quite literally causing cessation of movement – physically, if not, in these instances, 
ontologically, since no-one dies). He says he “was in a suspended state some call 
waiting…I was ‘waiting’ in the way the frog (a statue that was also a sprinkler) on the 
lawn across the street is ‘waiting’ – that is, I just was. I wasn’t existing in addition to 
anything else.”56  
 
    This not existing in addition to anything else is of course impossible because of 
consciousness: as discussed in Chapter One, whilst for being-in-itself “there is not the 
slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might 
creep in,” for being-for-itself the self represents “a way of not being [its] own 
coincidence…of being in a perpetually unstable equilibrium,” so that “an impalpable 
fissure has slipped into being…it is not wholly itself.” Richard tacitly recognises this 
and cannot maintain the pretence of ontological stillness, knows that “consciousness 
is not what it is,” that the very consciousness that composes his memoir constitutes, 
embodies, nothingness.57 This is apparent in his frequent asides on the nature of the 
memoir itself, which always stress nullity. At the beginning of the memoir he says it is 
“synonymous with my life, and no life begins anywhere,” and shortly after this opines 
“everything I type out turns into a lie simply because it is not the truth.” He also 
acknowledges his intimations of contingency and indeterminacy in tangential 
outbursts; he angrily berates his readers, using characteristically violent imagery, 
                                               
56 Joyce Carol Oates, Expensive People, 1968 (New York: Modern Library, 2006), p. 210. 
57 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 74, p. 77, p. 62. 
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because “you think children are whole…and if you split them in two with a handy axe 
there would be all one substance inside,” but instead, he says, there would be “a 
hopeless seething lava of all kinds of things, a turmoil, a mess.” Richard tells us that 
“once the child starts thinking about this mess he begins to disintegrate as a child and 
turns into something else – an adult.”58 Holding adults, and especially Nada, 
responsible for both this intimation, and for their attempts at denying it in their suburban 
insularity and somnambulism, Richard seeks to avenge himself on them. Again, the 
comparisons with Holden Caulfield are obvious, but if Holden has imposed a kind of 
moratorium on growing up and entering adulthood, Richard’s narrative is far more 
extreme, since it is an inverted, or arrested, bildungsroman, and embodies a kind of 
‘existential moratorium’, not just a desire to avoid growing up; he disavows intimations 
of ontological freedom and the anguish these cause, seeking a kind of existential 
stasis, a suspension of the disequilibrium of consciousness. This further detracts from 
his pseudo-existential speculation, which again sounds more like psychologically 
disturbed adolescent anguish than perspicacious ontological insight (though he does 
have nascent, unwanted - and rejected - intimations of his ontological state). 
 
     Richard claims not to know anything of Sartre’s work (presumably because Oates 
knew little of it), despite his pseudo-Sartrean descriptions of his existential state, of his 
acknowledgement that “you could inhabit the vacuum of your freedom,” and wondering 
of his ‘disintegration’ if there is “something…transcendent about it.” Richard 
experiences this ‘disintegration’ as a violent process, however, and his response to it 
is also violent.59After breaking into the student records office in his school and reading 
his file, which includes a “pathetic medical report, filled out by an indifferent quack,” he 
“picked up a stool and sent it crashing into the flickering fluorescent tubing overhead 
with a strength I didn’t know I had,” and later, walking home across a village green he 
admits “an overpowering fury rose in me, and I jumped into the flowerbed so neatly 
kept up…and began kicking at them. I kicked violently, madly…I kicked their tiny 
faces.” These violent acts have a soothing effect on him, and he falls into a 
“slumberous state.”60 In this way he exemplifies what Sartre calls “the violent man’s 
refusal to compose himself,” which is “equivalent to a refusal of being in the world.” 
This leads him to a futile attempt to substitute an “ontological irreducibility” for the 
indeterminate nature of self, of being – and the only way to do this is through violence 
                                               
58 Joyce Carol Oates, Expensive People, 1968 (New York: Modern Library, 2006), p. 5, p. 24, p.23. 
59 Ibid. p. 108.  
60 Ibid. p. 91, p. 187, p. 188. 
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in order to achieve “the total unity of being through destruction.”61 Richard’s kicking of 
the flowers’ “tiny faces” (highlighting his sense of enormity and power) creates such 
an illusory state of “ontological irreducibility”, since it renders the flowers 
(anthropomorphized with their “tiny faces”), being-in-itself, and so stills anguish, 
induces a somnolent calmness (the very state he claims to detest in suburbanites).  
 
    This state cannot last, however, and his intimations of contingency return, which he 
experiences as “a hard, sharp kernel of fire in my stomach that had to be kept from 
bursting into flame.” To prevent this existential conflagration – the ‘disintegration’ he is 
so afraid of – Richard decides to buy a gun. Having visited a sporting goods shop and 
“looked at some rifles, touched them, smelled them,” experiencing “a rocking, 
nauseated sensation,” he buys a deer rifle by mail order. The gun, “such a still, quiet 
object,” is emblematic for Richard of the quality of being-in-itself, which is of course 
the state into which it can transform any being.62 On the evening of his first ‘shooting 
spree’ he enters a pathologically dissociative state, which Oates highlights by having 
him wash himself in the bathroom, looking in the mirror and seeing a “strange child 
gazing at me, nearsighted without his glasses.” Richard washes “slowly and dreamily,” 
with “no thought of what was coming next.” He later finds himself walking the streets, 
carrying the rifle “like any hunter out for humble sport in any suburban darkness.” 
Eventually he reaches the house of his parents’ lawyer in the nearby exclusive suburb 
of “Pools Moran,” at which there is a party, with “energetic figures, three-dimensional 
shadows” in and around the vast swimming pool in the garden. The telescopic lens on 
the rifle intensifies his dissociative state, and others are rendered ontological objects 
by his (literally) nullifying ‘look’, which “brought them to me in a kind of haze.” He adds 
(using pseudo-Sartrean language) “it pleased me to think of how they existed both for 
themselves and for me, their spy.”63 Richard sees the lawyer, Mr. Body through the 
living room window and, he says, he could neither explain why he pulled the trigger 
nor his choice of victim. Richard shoots repeatedly, each time aiming to miss Mr. Body 
and then walks home at a leisurely pace, temporarily free from anguish, and, as after 
his kicking of the “tiny faces” of the flowers, enters a state of soporific tranquillity, and 
sleeps peacefully.  
 
                                               
61 Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, 1983 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
p. 173, p.182, p. 186. 
62 Joyce Carol Oates, Expensive People, 1968 (New York: Modern Library, 2006), p.84, p.154, p. 188. 
63 Ibid. p.196, p.197, p.189. 
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    The second shooting occurs a few days later, and this time Richard’s ‘victims’ are 
“two ordinary, attractive, anonymous people,” and again he shoots to miss, firing at a 
nearby wall. This does not have the temporarily pacifying effect on him that the first 
shooting had; his anguish remains unassuaged, and, he says, “Wherever I sat there 
was the drizzling vacuum.”64 Since neither the first nor the second shooting actually 
kills anyone, there is no lasting negation of ontological indeterminacy (and so also of 
Richard’s anguish), no transformation of the victims into being-in-itself, the means by 
which he seeks the stilling of his anguish. On the day Richard shoots his mother, 
however, he is in the “suspended state” referred to earlier, and claims that before he 
even raises the rifle to fire “she no longer existed for me.” Nada of course is the primary 
focus of Richard’s anguish, mirroring his own façade of contentment, her pretence of 
“dreaming the dream” of suburban somnambulism a charade he can neither forgive 
her for enacting, nor himself for being complicit in (in his craving for the same nullifying 
of contingency).  His shooting of her – this time aiming to kill – is his final futile attempt 
to deny that contingency, rendering her being-in-itself, nada, extinguishing her 
consciousness in his need for an “ontological irreducibility.” He tells us, ironically, “at 
such moments you think of nothing. Nothing.” Such moments are, of course, precisely 
that, momentary, and his anguish is, if anything heightened. Earlier in his narrative he 
talks of “the desire to get rid of…the desire for any kind of desire at all,” and this he 
achieves for Nada, but he is left with “this peculiar hollowness inside me that I had to 
fill,” an impossible desire as he now admits, finally pleading at the very end of his 
monologue, “all I ask is the strength to fill the emptiness inside me, to stuff it once and 
for all!”65  
 
    What is problematic, though, about this rather neat narrative dénouement and the 
violence that precedes it, is that Oates seems to suggest that Richard has entered a 
pathologically dissociative state, unhinged by the unremitting conflict between the 
desire to resist suburban existential denial, and the desire to succumb, to give in to its 
comforting delusional calm. This would be a misconstruing by Oates of the essential 
and fundamental feature of Sartrean existentialism, namely the inevitable ontologically 
dissociative state of being, which is not a type of mental pathology, as Richard’s 
narrative seems to exemplify. If his narrative can, as I believe, be understood as 
embodying bad faith, then the significance of the suburbs for him is, as I have 
suggested, precisely the opposite of what he claims – that is, their liminal state, as 
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Murphy suggests, that allows fear to “breed in the cracks,” rather than their dulling 
denial and conformity.66 The vulgarization of Sartrean existentialism in Oates’s novel 
results, at least in part, from its conflation of social, or sociological, critique, and 
existential exposition, combining polemical satire on the perils of suburban conformity 
and banality with anguished reflection on the isolated and divided self. Such reflection 
is engendered, ironically, by suburbia itself. 
 
    Given his unreliability as a narrator, and his apparently pathological state, Richard’s 
shootings and his killing of his mother could be seen as delusional fantasy, particularly 
since he is unable to find the rifle he subsequently buries, and nobody believes his 
confession, viewing it as guilt over her death. Such an interpretation, however, would 
miss an essential point. Suburbia embodies denial of the “nihilating ambiguity” of 
ontological duality and division (whilst paradoxically reflecting this ambiguity) and so 
Richard’s acts and the anguish that provoked them simply cannot be allowed to exist. 
There is a suggestion to this effect when Richard tells a detective about the rifle he 
used, hoping, again futilely, to allay his anguish through confession, the precursor to 
his narrative: he says that “for some reason I never heard from the detective again, 
and when I questioned Father desperately about him, Father cleared his throat and 
said it was ‘coming along, coming along’.” In suburbia “everyone is dreaming the 
dream, all in conjunction, happy, so long as no one woke up.”67 This cannot be 
permitted, and so, as G.F. Waller observes, “his confession is not believed, the 
surfaces of suburbia close over the deed.”68 However, it is Richard’s complicity that is 
crucial here (rather than his apparent pathology), since his bad faith is bolstered by 
the denial of his violence; the illusion of a calm, steady state in a calm, steady 
environment is strengthened – even if only, inevitably, temporarily. Richard’s 
vulgarized existentialism is, in its conflation of social critique and existential discourse, 
psychology with ontology, a form of befuddled distraction and so is the very means of 
maintaining bad faith, of avoiding ontological clarity. This is not the case with the main 
characters in John Cheever’s Bullet Park (published a year after Expensive People, in 
1969), one of whom is less aware than Richard Everett of existential contingency, 
while the other is fully aware of it. Yet in Cheever’s novel too suburbia is the means of 
(futilely) denying or deflecting the knowledge of that contingency – and again this 
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results in extreme violence at the end of a confused existential treatise, another type 
of vulgar existentialism that obscures more than it clarifies.   
 
Bullet Park: “A terrible kind of darkness” 
 
    On the first page of Cheever’s novel he tells us “the setting seems in some way to 
be at the heart of the matter.” Clearly the name of the suburb itself suggests violence, 
belying the putative safety of “this precinct of disinfected acoustics,” one in which “the 
stranger might observe that the place seems very quiet; they seem to have come 
inland from the sounds of wilderness – gulls, trains, cries of pain and love, creaking 
things, hammerings, gunfire.” Bullet Park however, only seems quiet, and the stranger 
only seems to have found a refuge from noise, discord and disharmony, and danger – 
both from within and without. In the first chapter a widow (using the services of a realtor 
named Hazzard) tells a prospective house buyer – Paul Hammer, the primary agent 
of existential violence in Bullet Park – that one day her husband said “I can’t stand it 
any longer” and “then he went out into the garden and shot himself.”69 In the second 
chapter the seemingly ingenuous Eliot Nailles has to contend with random detritus that 
undermines his sense of suburban safety, a regular and repeated affront to his 
sensibilities, as every few months he “would find on his property a collection of broken 
refrigerators, television sets, maimed and unidentifiable automobiles and always a few 
mattresses, rent, stained, human and obscene.” Nailles’s intimation of contingency 
and threat is heightened further when he reads in the newspaper that “a maniac with 
a carbine had massacred seventeen people in a park in Dallas…[and] a hairdresser 
in Linden, New Jersey, had shot his wife, his four children, his poodle and himself.” 
Nailles tries to assuage his anguish through denial, thinking of these atrocities as 
“news from another planet,” one that he need not concern himself with in his suburban 
sanctuary. As in Expensive People, there is no reference to the immense social 
changes of the period, other than through the recounting of the shock experienced by 
Nailles’s wife at seeing in New York “some students from the university…carrying 
picket signs on which were written Fuck, Prick and Cunt.”70 
 
    The first part of Bullet Park – almost two thirds of the novel – concerns the uxorious 
Nailles, his wife Nellie, and his sixteen-year-old son Tony. Cheever mocks (but also 
seems sympathetic to) Nailles’s love of suburban order and placidity. Nailles has an 
unexamined “belief in the fitness of things,” assuming there is “purpose and order” 
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underlying “the roofs, trees, river and streets that composed the landscape.” This belief 
is challenged three times in Cheever’s novel: firstly by his mother’s “inert, 
uncomprehending…emaciated” state following a stroke; secondly by his son Tony’s 
month-long depression during which he never leaves his bed, and thirdly by his 
neighbour Hammer’s attempted murder of Tony.  Since Nailles only sees his mother 
on his visits to the nursing home where she is slowly dying, he can mostly avoid facing 
the reality of her demise, though he cannot deny his own violent impulse to smother 
her, ostensibly to “end her pain in a few minutes,” though more importantly to suppress 
his own existential disquiet caused by her state.71 When Tony takes to bed, abruptly 
incapacitated because he feels “terribly sad…as if the house were made of cards,” 
Nailles is bewildered and confesses to his son, “If you don’t know anything about 
people it’s like a terrible kind of darkness.” Yet the darkness is within Nailles, his refusal 
to recognise that the trigger for Tony’s depression was his own violent action: the night 
before Tony takes to bed he disparages his father’s job marketing a brand of 
mouthwash and his equally sanitized suburban lifestyle, provoking Nailles to raise his 
golf club (a key symbol of suburbia) and try to “split his skull in two.” Although Tony 
runs away he is subsequently felled by immobilising depression. The disingenuous 
Nailles claims not to understand how Tony could “make me want to kill him” but it is 
clear that his son’s recognition of contingency (that the house is made of cards) and 
of the mutability of suburban identity challenges his father’s belief in his own identity.72 
In Sartrean terms, Tony challenges Nailles’s belief that he is “a necessary, causal 
being.”73 Significantly, it is after Tony says that he could be “a thief, or a saint or a 
drunkard or a garbage man or a gas pumper or a traffic cop or a hermit” that his father 
loses his temper and attempts to club him.74 Nailles (as his name suggests) seeks 
fixity, the consolation of being in “a state of the past that he is unable to change,” 
denies that “the essential thing is contingency,” that “existence is not necessity,” and 
so exemplifies Sartre’s man entrenched in his own facticity, in his own past as 
facticity.75 His bad faith is so entrenched that he seems almost comically unaware of 
his denial, in marked contrast to Richard Everett, whose nascent awareness 
constantly threatens his precarious and volatile state of mind. 
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    Nellie, Nailles’s wife, is complicit in her husband’s denial, though she seems to have 
more fully repressed any existential disquiet through “falsehood, confinement, 
exclusion and a kind of blindness…her only means of comprehension.” Cheever 
shows her sense of self – as the loving, contented, faithful housewife – to be entirely 
contingent, since her fidelity has been assured only through random occurrences 
preventing infidelity; a fire in a dancehall just as she is about to leave with a man, food 
poisoning when she is about to make love to a stranger in an apartment, and Nailles’s 
being ill at home with a cold when an intended lover comes to the house, so that “her 
chasteness, preserved by a fire, a runny nose and some spoiled sturgeon eggs was 
still intact, although she carried herself as if her virtue was a jewel – an emblem – of 
character, discipline and intelligence.”76 To underscore the ludicrousness of Nellie’s 
assumed character Cheever has her read Camus; Camus, as mentioned in Chapter 
One, viewed the self as being in “perpetual conflict, continually created…an impulse 
which endlessly pursues its form without ever finding it.”77  
 
    Paul Hammer embodies Camus’ notion of selfhood, and this creates a near-
psychotic conflict caused by what Camus calls “the metaphysical demand for unity 
[and] the impossibility of capturing it,” the “nihilating ambiguity” of selfhood in Sartrean 
terms. He longs for “the total unity of being through destruction,” for the state of ‘being-
in-itself-for-itself’– longs to be “individualized into facticity,” and have a stable 
character, denying his inevitable transcendence.78 The second part of Bullet Park 
consists of Hammer’s first person narrative, in which he explains the circuitous journey 
– more panicked fleeing from one place to another than picaresque adventure – that 
finally leads him to the suburb where Nailles lives. Hammer is acutely aware of the 
provisionality and contingency of identity, since his own personal history consists of 
random events, including the one that decided his name. Abandoned as a baby by his 
mother, whose lover left her once she became pregnant, he is adopted by his 
grandmother; unsure of what to write on her grandson’s birth certificate she consults 
a lawyer, and, Hammer explains, “While they were discussing what to call me a 
gardener passed the window, carrying a hammer, and so I was named.” His narrative 
reveals a self in irresolvable conflict, seeking stability but rejecting its semblance as 
untenable when he finds it. Hammer’s narcissism is threatened in each place he lives, 
in each situation where he is not in flight, when he cannot avoid facing his mercurial 
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nature. He suffers from a ‘cafard’ that drives him to move from one city to another, 
reaching a nadir in a hotel in Chicago, where he experiences “an intense emotional 
vertigo,” and a fear “not of falling but of vanishing.”79 Like Richard Everett in Expensive 
People, he is desperate for an “ontological irreducibility…that nothing can change,” 
but unlike Everett he is fully and constantly aware that this is an existential 
impossibility.80 Because of this, he is drawn in New York to the Museum of Natural 
History since it assuages his anguish in its display of continuity, of permanence (of 
being-in-itself). He feels a sense of security viewing  
 
Eskimo women in glass cases…performing the same humble tasks they had 
been performing when I was a child, clutching Gretchen Oxencroft’s [his 
mother’s] hand…Here in the stale and cavernous dark was a thrilling sense of 
permanence. Here were landscapes, seasons, moments in time that had not 
changed by a leaf or a flake of snow during my life.81 
 
    This sense of permanence, though, is of course illusory, as Hammer knows, and 
his anguish is only briefly assuaged, eventually being expressed, like Everett’s, 
through violence against a symbol of fixity and normalcy: suburbia. Hammer first 
learns of Nailles’s existence when reading a magazine in a dentists’ waiting room, 
which has an article on his “promotion to head of the Mouthwash Division” in his 
company. This chance event leads to his seemingly motiveless decision to kill Nailles. 
Hammer claims to be bemused by his decision himself, and suggests only “the 
coincidence of our names” by way of explanation. Soon after reading the article he 
decides “to crucify a man” and resolves to “settle in Bullet Park and murder Nailles.” 
In the final line of his narrative he tells us, “sometime later I changed my victim to 
Tony,” though does not suggest a possible motive for this seemingly arbitrary, random 
– and now clearly insane – thinking and action.82  
 
   The final, and brief, part of Bullet Park, documents the apparent friendship between 
Hammer and Nailles, as Hammer, now married, adopts with his wife the suburban 
rituals of his new neighbours. On a fishing trip with Nailles, Hammer, “looking at his 
victim…thought that he would like to leach from his indictment all the petulant clichés 
of complaint,” so that randomness is its only characteristic.  Hammer is determined to 
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show this exemplar of normative suburbia that the placidity and unchangeableness he 
craves is chimeric, that “the nature of man” is “terrifying and singular and man’s 
environment” is “chaos.” Hammer, though, is unable to resist telling ‘Swami’ Rutuola, 
the man who helped Tony through his depression, of his plans; while Hammer’s cafard 
is unrelenting, Tony has learned to cope, for the present, with existential contingency, 
and this is abhorrent to Hammer, surely motivating his decision to kill Tony rather than 
his father. While Nailles and his wife attend a dinner party Hammer kidnaps Tony, who 
is directing traffic there, and takes him to a church, intending to immolate (not crucify) 
him on the altar. Before he can soak Tony in gasoline his plans are thwarted by Nailles, 
who, warned by Rutuola, drives to the church and cuts through the church door with a 
chain saw, freeing Tony while Hammer collapses sobbing.  Hammer is committed to 
the State Hospital for the Criminally Insane, where he claims he intended to “awaken 
the world,” while life for Nailles, Nellie and Tony resumes its familiar suburban form, 
the placid façade in place once again and ostensible normalcy restored.  Cheever 
though, ironizes his novel’s ending, having Tony go back to school and Nailles go back 
to work so that “everything was as wonderful, wonderful, wonderful as it had been.”83 
 
    Cheever’s ending makes clear the precariousness of the suburban equilibrium the 
Nailles family have re-established, and by extension its ultimate untenability. The 
violence that characterises the novel in response to contingency is committed by both 
Hammer and Nailles, the latter’s apparent ingenuousness masking a murderous 
anguish, so that, as Samuel Coale observes, “what looks like a clearly demarcated 
confrontation turns out to be much more complex and complicitous.”84 Just as Hammer 
self-medicates with alcohol in an attempt to cope with his anguish, Nailles takes 
tranquillizers to staunch “a quaking feeling in his gut and the dark rain [that] seemed 
to beat upon his heart.” The apparent immutability of his suburban life and identity is 
challenged even by his daily commute, his journey to the city underscoring its illusory 
stability, the train rendered “a portable abyss.”85 This highlights for Nailles the “liminal 
status” of suburbia, the suburban indeterminacy identified by Murphy, since it is 
“neither one thing, nor another, but something in-between,” and so mirrors ontological 
indeterminacy (and possibility).86 Crucially, both Nailles and Hammer have violent 
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impulses, and commit acts of violence, as a result of their intimations of contingency 
– and both acts (one premeditated, one not) could have resulted in Tony’s death.  
 
    As in Expensive People though, there is a conflation of social critique and existential 
exposition, and the cause of the violence is not made explicit, and could even be 
construed as random – an interpretation some of the critics cited earlier seem to have 
chosen (and criticised). Unlike Oates’s novel however, Bullet Park is structured around 
these two aspects, with Cheever’s suburban satire in the third person in Part One, and 
Paul Hammer’s convoluted first person existential treatise in Part Two (and a brief 
dénouement in Part Three narrated in the third person).87 The existentialism of the 
novel that critics considered Sartrean lacks clarity, and it is this, rather than the 
bleakness that is problematic; Paul Hammer opines the contingent nature of being and 
cannot accept it, while Cheever seems to view suburbia as a refuge, even if finally a 
temporary one, from the danger and violence of Hammer’s vision. Hammer’s narrative, 
like Everett’s, is pathological, and this is inextricably linked to his reflections on 
contingency, not just his violent response to it. This is, though, a pathologizing of a 
kind of ‘ontological inevitability’ in Sartrean terms, that of contingent and divided 
selfhood, the discontinuity but coexistence of facticity and transcendence in being. 
Cheever, like the suburbanites he satirises, seems to almost disavow the inevitable 
indeterminacy and contingency of self and existence in his depiction of Hammer, yet 
he also seems to recognise that the liminal state of the suburban environment 
heightens the inevitable existential anguish of its inhabitants, even as they seek refuge 
from it in that environment. The suburbia of Rabbit Redux however, is shown quite 
explicitly to be both a source of existential anguish and anomie, and a site of violence 
in response to that anguish. Harry Angstrom’s violence, though, is different from the 
violence of Richard Everett and Paul Hammer, both in its form and its motivation. 
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Rabbit Redux: “Spinning in the void” 
 
     Whilst Rabbit Redux was a reflection of (and response to) the social and political 
upheaval of the late 1960s, its more fundamental themes, like those of Oates’s and 
Cheever’s novels, are existential. However, while the violence in Expensive People 
and Bullet Park is a denial of the second aspect of Sartre’s “nihilating ambiguity,” that 
is, of transcendence, the violence in Rabbit Redux, is more frequently a denial of the 
first aspect, facticity, and so is “a refusal of being in the midst of the world…of being 
something other than pure transcendence.”88 This violence arises in part because of 
the central tension between what George Hunt calls “the novel’s resolute facticity [that] 
almost resists transformation” (in the form of rigidly normative suburbia) and its 
portrayal of what Marshall Boswell terms (in Kierkegaardian language) “Rabbit’s quest 
for freedom’s possibility,” in Sartrean terms the anguish and conflict of being-for-itself, 
which is both transcendence and facticity.89  
 
    Harry is thirty-six years old, and seemingly reconciled with his wife Janice following 
his desertion after the death of their daughter ten years ago. They now live in Penn 
Villas, a suburban housing development outside the town of Brewer, and he works 
with his father as a linotyper at Verity Press. Harry’s distinguishing physical 
characteristics, his “small nose and slightly lifted upper lip,” which once gave him his 
nickname and identity as the quick-witted, light-footed and graceful athlete Rabbit, are 
now signs of a lack of self, are “clues to weakness, a weakness verging on anonymity” 
in the paunchy and pallid man approaching middle age.90 Peter J. Bailey describes the 
Harry of Rabbit Redux as “thoroughly passive” and “completely incapacitated” by his 
ten years of conformity as a printer and suburban husband and father.91  His defining 
characteristic, though – at least at the beginning of the novel – is more a kind of 
disengaged and narcissistic impassivity, a refusal to actively participate in his life 
situation and acknowledge his own facticity: Harry has become anonymized through 
this impassivity (narcissism being the near absence of self, as discussed in Chapter 
Two with reference to Christopher Lasch’s, The Culture of Narcissism). This is 
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apparent from his reaction on hearing from his father the rumours of Janice’s infidelity; 
rather than jealousy, anger, or fear, he feels “a hopeful coldness inside” which “grips 
his wrists inside his cuffs. The news isn’t all in, a new combination might break it open, 
this stale peace.”92 
 
    Harry’s mother is dying of Parkinson’s disease and Harry refuses to fully 
acknowledge this. When confronted with his mother’s inexorable decline in his visits 
to his childhood home, he feels, like Eliot Nailles when he sees his stroke paralysed 
mother in hospital, an existential dread that he cannot admit to himself. Instead, 
“Harry’s mind slides away from picturing her,” and, significantly, from visualising her 
eyes, their “unblinking ungathering gaze into space” which “frightens Rabbit with a 
sense of ultimate blindness, of a blackboard from which they will all be wiped clean.” 
Rabbit’s anguish, though, is not just a fear of death, it is a fear of his being-for-others, 
of ‘being in the world’, in Sartrean terms, a refusal of ‘the look’ and its nullifying of his 
freedom. This is why he feels a “hopeful coldness” about the prospect of his wife’s 
infidelity, why it “opens up possibilities” – without Janice’s presence, a reminder and 
symbol of his facticity, his belief in his transcendence of his past (and his present) is 
easier to maintain. It is also why he has no friends or close acquaintances, rarely visits 
his parents, and dissembles in the face of his father’s attempts at intimacy during their 
brief post-work drinks.93 Harry denies the irrefutable intimations provided by his own 
consciousness, denies that “the Other’s look [is] at the very center of my act as the 
solidification and alienation of my own possibilities.”94 This nullifying of self (and 
specifically of being-for-itself) was discussed in Chapter Two in relation to solipsism, 
but for Harry the futile denial of ‘the look’ is an inevitable result of his narcissism. The 
paradox is that while others threaten (by their very existence) his transcendent 
subjectivity, they are essential for Harry’s narcissistic equilibrium, for his belief in 
himself as a being beyond the constraints they represent. This paradox eventually 
leads to violence against others – both directly and indirectly, which Updike makes 
clear at the beginning of the novel by having Harry tell his father after work that he 
should get home to his house in Penn Villas “in case it’s burned down. In case a 
madman has moved in.”95 Both eventualities later occur and both are precipitated by 
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Harry’s insistence on his own transcendence (as a justified being, one that is not 
contingent) and refusal of his facticity, in the form of ostensible suburban normalcy 
and homogeneity.  
 
    Early on in the novel, after Janice confesses to an affair and (confounded by Harry’s 
insistence that she shouldn’t end it) leaves to live with her lover, Harry watches the 
news reports of the Apollo 11 Moon space expedition and lunar landing. The imagery 
suggests emptiness to Harry, the spacecraft seems forlorn and the astronauts seem 
to be drifting in space, mirroring his own sense of suburban drift and desolation, which 
is symbolised by his house itself, which “smells to Rabbit of preservative: of odors 
filming other odors, of layers of time, of wax and aerosol and death.” The house, then, 
becomes the locus of his dread, emblematic of the constraints of facticity, and like the 
spacecraft it is “a long empty box" but “in the blackness of Penn Villas, slowly spinning 
in the void.” Harry’s reaction to his dread is inevitably to try to escape the suburbs that 
focus and catalyse that dread. With a fellow worker he goes to Jimbo’s, a nightclub in 
Weiser, the poor, black district of Brewer, where, after a few drinks and a joint, his 
fantasy of unfettered existential transcendence becomes hallucinatory:96 
 
His inside space expands to include beyond Jimbo’s the whole world with its 
arrowing wars and polychrome races, its continents shaped like ceiling stains, 
its strings of gravitational attraction attaching it to every star, its glory in space 
as of a blue marble swirled with clouds; everything is warm, wet, still coming to 
birth.97 
 
Again, he thinks of his suburban home as “a strange dry place, dry and cold and 
emptily spinning in the void of Penn Villas like a cast-off space capsule.” Harry can’t 
leave his home, or Nelson, his twelve-year-old son, so instead he transforms it – and 
then destroys it. At Jimbo’s he meets a twenty-one-year-old runaway girl, Jill, and 
invites her to stay with him. For Harry Jill is part of the “coming to birth” that he imagines 
himself experiencing, a process of destruction since he believes that “freedom means 
                                               
96 Harry’s “anti-Other Self,” in Kenny’s terms, welcomes the racial other as a distraction from his own 
‘Other’ in the form of his facticity; his disavowal of that facticity is an attempt to shelter “the anti-
Other Self from effectively living with differences,” but these differences are very much within for 
Harry. This does not mean though that Harry acknowledges the racial – or gendered – Other’s 
subjectivity, since throughout the novel his behaviour is indicative of a kind of narcissistic 
instrumentalism towards others. (Lorraine Delia Kenny, Daughters of Suburbia: Growing Up White, 
Middle Class, and Female, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000, p. 195). 
97 John Updike, A Rabbit Omnibus: Rabbit, Run; Rabbit Redux; Rabbit is Rich, 1990 (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1991), p. 233, p. 236, p. 255. 
 133 
 
murder. Rebirth means death.” Harry and Jill become lovers and she tells him that she 
ran away from her wealthy Connecticut home to escape her junkie boyfriend, and that 
when you’re with a junkie and taking heroin “you realize you’re nothing.” Jill almost 
succumbs to that nothingness, but manages to escape – only to meet the equally 
destructive force of Harry Angstrom, which will eventually lead to her death. Harry tells 
Jill “you’re not scared of nothing” and the double negative seems deliberate and 
accurate; Jill almost died and her self-destructiveness is still apparent in her passivity 
and abrogation of selfhood and freedom, despite her specious talk of cosmic free love 
and tolerance.98Jill does not play the part assigned to her by Harry in his fantasy, does 
not aid him in his rebirth, but instead, because she is seemingly unafraid of 
nothingness (not the nothingness of consciousness but the nullity of death, which 
Sartre calls “a contingent fact which belongs to facticity”) she only worsens his dread 
of his own facticity and his sense of existential entrapment (his unwanted intimations 
of his unnecessary, contingent state) something he feels as a physical 
oppressiveness.99 At night he “lifts himself up the stairs, pushes himself through the 
underwater motions of undressing and dental care, sinks into bed…a weight crushes 
him.”100 His resentment of Jill quickly turns to anger and after she takes Nelson 
begging in the city centre for fun, he hits her, his anger ostensibly out of frustrated 
concern for his son. Even in his violence against her, however, he experiences a cold 
detachment as  
 
His slap feels like slapping plastic; stings his fingers, does no good. He slaps her 
again, gathers the dry flesh of her hair into his hand to hold her face steady, feels 
cold fury when she buckles and tries to slither away but, after a fist to the side of 
her neck, lets her drop onto the bed.101 
 
Jill knows his claim to be concerned is false and tells him “you don’t give a shit about 
me and Nelson hustling…you just wanted to hurt me.”102 Harry’s violence against Jill 
is an act of attempted nullification, his objectification of her in his disengaged state a 
negation of her subjectivity and identity. 
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    Harry’s destructiveness increases when Skeeter, a black self-proclaimed political 
revolutionary, who claims to be “the black Jesus,” moves into his house, uninvited by 
Harry, but known to him from Jimbo’s as a friend of Jill’s. Skeeter, arrested on a drugs 
charge, has jumped bail and so is a fugitive. Skeeter provokes Harry, telling him his 
“mamma’s a whore” and his “daddy’s a queer,” inciting him to violence. Skeeter’s 
insults continue and Harry finally loses his temper, “packed so solid with anger and 
fear…he wades towards the boy deliciously and feels his fists vanish, one in the region 
of the belly, the other below the throat.” The fight is broken up when Nelson comes 
home with a friend, thinking there is a burglar in the house. Harry though, does not 
kick Skeeter out, but tells his son he will be staying with them for a few days. Harry 
questions himself as to why he made such a decision, but soon realises that he was 
motivated “by his curiosity, by his hope for a break in the combination, for catastrophe 
and deliverance” – in other words, by his need for transcendence.103 
 
    Skeeter’s presence dominates Harry’s house; he indulges in lengthy monologues 
on the history of slavery, racial politics, crime, the war in Vietnam (he is a veteran), 
religion – and his existentialist views, which resonate with Harry, since he thinks they 
justify him in his belief in transcendence and denial of his facticity. Skeeter tells him, 
“What happens to you, is all that happens, right? You are it, right? You. Are. It.” and 
since “everybody [is] stuck inside his own skin, might as well make himself at home 
there, right?” Harry, though, fails to see the full significance of Skeeter’s (vulgar) 
existentialism, which he explains in pseudo-Sartrean terms: 
 
There is a steady state, and though it is true everything is expanding outwards, 
it does not thin out to next to nothingness on account of the reason that through 
strange holes in this nothingness new somethingness comes pouring in from 
exactly nowhere.104 
 
Harry acknowledges only the “new somethingness” (transcendence) and denies the 
“steady state” (facticity) because this would force him to recognise the restrictions 
imposed by his suburban situation and his past – both inimical to his delusional 
narcissism.  
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    With Jill and Skeeter in his house Harry believes he has freed himself from the 
“intensity of duplication” of households in Penn Villas, freed himself from the 
constraints of his suburban environment.105 As Robert Beuka notes, it is through 
“internalizing the otherness represented by Jill and Skeeter” that Harry seeks to 
become “the antithesis of the kind of staid conformity epitomised by his house and his 
bland suburban development.”106 It is only through this internalising of their otherness 
that Harry can refute ‘the look’ and seek transcendence, denying Jill’s and Skeeter’s 
subjectivity in his narcissism.  Ignoring threats from two racist neighbours about the 
damage he is doing to the “decent white neighbourhood,” ignoring Jill’s increasingly 
drug addled state, and clear evidence of her continued heavy heroin use, and ignoring 
Skeeter’s increasingly erratic and aggressive behaviour, Harry becomes sexually 
involved with the mother of one of Nelson’s friends.  On the night that he decides to 
stay at her house he receives a call from Skeeter telling him that something has 
happened at the house, but only that “it’s bad. Bad.” Harry drives home and finds the 
house already gutted by fire, an act of arson by his neighbours, yet he “feels peripheral, 
removed, nostalgic, numb.”107 Even when the firemen bring out Jill’s body his “inner 
admission that it did happen is muffled.” When Harry leaves the scene “his house slips 
from him. He is free,” a clear indication of his complicity in the destruction of the house, 
and by extension in Jill’s death. Harry’s sister Mim is the only person who sees the 
violence essential to Harry’s delusory sense of existential freedom (that for him 
“freedom means murder. Rebirth means death”). Harry evinces bad faith in refusing 
to recognise that freedom as being contingent and unjustified, since to acknowledge 
this would undermine his narcissistic sense of specialness, and so nullify his sense of 
self. Mim tells him, “You like any disaster that might spring you free. You liked it when 
Janice left, and you liked it when your house burned down.”108 Harry exemplifies the 
bad faith, in Sartrean terms, of the perpetrator of violence, in refusing ‘the look’, and 
“being in the world” because he fails to see  
 
The contradiction…that the world is perpetually necessary as an obstacle to be 
nihilated. The violent man is therefore a person of bad faith because, however 
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far he carries his destructions, he counts on the richness of the world to support 
them and perpetually provide new things to be destroyed.109 
 
Harry’s narcissistic belief in unfettered existential freedom relies on the suburban 
environment that he tries to escape from, the facticity it represents for him undermining 
his claims to that freedom since he cannot acknowledge the first aspect of Sartre’s 
“nihilating ambiguity…[that] I am what I have been.”110  
 
    Updike’s existential vision in Rabbit Redux is somewhat inchoate, and is so 
enmeshed with his socio-political commentary that it is difficult to extricate. Harry is 
presented as alternately receptive to the opposed existential states and ideas 
represented by Jill (her increasing passivity and eventual inertia suggesting 
oppressive facticity) and Skeeter (whose insistence on existential freedom to 
continually self-create suggests transcendence). The problem with this, however 
(aside from the use of characters to embody ideas) is that these are not alternative 
states that Harry can choose between, since they both constitute being, existence. 
Updike seems to confuse the notions of social and political individualism and freedom, 
with ontologically inevitable freedom (since existence is possibility not necessity, is 
contingent and indeterminate) and to conflate oppressive suburban conformity and 
ontological facticity, but the latter cannot be rebelled against because it is part of being. 
Rabbit’s violence is a response to, or rather a refusal to recognise, facticity, and so is 
directed at Jill, but (apart from his initial fight) he does not direct any of that violence 
at Skeeter, who seems to Harry to facilitate his own transcendence. Neither character, 
though, is more than this for Harry, a possible existential state, and the ending of the 
novel, with Harry and Janice tentatively reconciled, seems to suggest that the 
destructive ‘freedom’ Harry has experienced was aberrant, and that he will return to 
some kind of suburban normalcy, more passive and acquiescent. This is in fact what 
happens, and ten years later, in Rabbit is Rich (discussed in Chapter One), in his 
obsession with entropy, he denies transcendence and recognises only facticity, 
seeking an “inner dwindling.”111 The suburbia of Ann Beattie’s Falling in Place, 
however, is one in which such ostensible normalcy is highly tenuous, since her 
suburbanites are all neurotic and dysfunctional, and, as in Expensive People and 
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Bullet Park, one is sociopathic. The existential violence is also similar to that of Richard 
Everett and Paul Hammer, a response in part to the anguish created by the liminal, 
indeterminate suburban environment.  
 
Falling in Place: “You disappear but can still be seen” 
 
    Reviews in 1980 of Ann Beattie’s Falling in Place generally praised it as an insightful 
chronicle of its time, of the late 1970s culture of the self, the retreat into solipsism and 
passivity. Robert Towers considered the book to be “a fictional appendix to The Culture 
of Narcissism”, and Richard Locke described its subject matter as “that low-grade 
depression Christopher Lasch has called the characteristic malaise of our time…tepid 
nihilism or defeated shopping-mall consumerism.”112 More significantly, however, it 
reflected the sense of existential perilousness of the period, caused by, among other 
factors, the events cited earlier – the hostage crisis in Iran, the Soviet Union’s 
occupation of Afghanistan, the 900 deaths in Californian James Jones’ religious cult, 
and discovery of the bodies of twenty-eight victims of serial killer John Wayne Gacy: 
Beattie’s novel is permeated with menace and the threat of violence. One of the 
characters has recurring dreams of an atomic fireball threatening to engulf him, and 
his girlfriend fears shooting stars may actually be debris from NASA’s disintegrated 
space station, Skylab, falling to Earth. Another character reflects that in New York any 
one of its inhabitants “encountering some perverted mugger on the way back to his 
apartment, might later be found hanging on a meat hook in a deserted warehouse.”113  
 
    The actual violence in the novel, however, occurs in the suburbs, and the most 
serious and significant violent act is committed by a child in a suburban garden. The 
child is ten-year-old John Joel, son of John and Louise Knapp. John works for an 
advertising agency in New York where he spends his time thinking of “preposterous 
ways to sell preposterous products” to support his wife, his teenage daughter Mary, 
John Joel, and his five-year-old son Brandt, who lives with John’s mother. The Knapp 
family is riven by resentments and suspicion, communication reduced to barbed 
sarcasm and sardonic quips. John Knapp has a combative relationship with his wife 
and his teenage daughter; he tells his girlfriend Nina he is besieged in his own home 
and tells his wife and children, “I feel, when I am with my loving family, that everybody 
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is conspiring to beat me down.”114 Mary and John Joel have a fractious relationship, 
each openly mocking and contemptuous of the other, while John and his wife Louise 
tolerate each other but have little, if any, affection left in their relationship. John is a 
distant figure in his children’s lives, spending weekdays at his alcoholic mother’s house 
in Rye where his youngest son Brandt lives, while Louise is treated with hostility by 
her daughter and son. The dysfunctional Knapps then, are a far cry from the Nailles 
family, whose façade of tranquil suburban happiness is maintained through all the 
events of Bullet Park up until the end of the novel, or indeed from the Everett family in 
Expensive People, for whom decorum and appearances are paramount, though the 
Knapps have not quite imploded through conflict in the way the Angstrom family has 
in Rabbit Redux.  
 
    As in Expensive People, Bullet Park and Rabbit Redux, the acts of violence in 
Beattie’s novel are responses to existential contingency, to ontological disequilibrium, 
with the most dramatic act being John Joel’s shooting of his sister Mary. Like Richard 
Everett in Expensive People, and Paul Hammer in Bullet Park, John Joel is attracted 
to stasis, to being-in-itself, to places where there is a cessation of all movement, and 
he spends most of his time in the school holidays lying on a branch high up on a tree 
in the garden, inert and distanced from all movement below. He and his friend Parker 
(both obese and constantly eating in an attempt to assuage their anguish) spend time 
in the Whitney Museum in New York, repeatedly visiting one exhibition, entranced by 
the sculptures on display. Like Holden Caulfield in The Catcher in the Rye, who finds 
the reconstructed Pharaonic tomb at the Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art “nice 
and peaceful” because “everything stayed right where it was”, John Joel, remembering 
the white-plaster men and women in the Whitney Museum, thinks that “it would be 
wonderful to be so white and still.”115 However, while Richard Everett’s pseudo-critique 
of suburban phoniness and superficiality may at times resemble Holden’s, John Joel’s 
surly and bellicose disdain seems sociopathic, devoid of either sociological or 
existential insight.  
 
    Unlike Paul Hammer in Bullet Park, drawn knowingly in New York to the Museum 
of Natural History where there are “Eskimo women in glass cases…performing the 
same humble tasks…moments in time that had not changed,” John Joel is drawn 
almost somnambulistically to the plaster figures because their continuity and 
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permanence temporally allay his existential anguish.116 He is also fascinated when 
Parker, after touching poison ivy, becomes swollen and disfigured; seeing Parker 
covered in white ointment, John Joel thinks he is “some huge swollen mummy of 
Parker…the whiteness…was like those plaster people at the museum.”117 John Joel 
then, shares Paul Hammer’s and Richard Everett’s overriding impulse to find an 
“ontological irreducibility…that nothing can change” through a futile attempt to nullify 
contingency (though he is the least aware of this impulse and what motivates it), and 
so exemplifies the denial of the second aspect of Sartre’s “nihilating ambiguity,” 
transcendence.118 Like Everett, he makes this attempt with a gun (a powerful emblem 
of being-in-itself, a state it can render all being) shooting his sister from his vantage 
point in the tree.  
 
    Although the shooting occurs two thirds of the way through the novel, it is 
foreshadowed by John’s repeated references to Camus’ The Outsider, which he tells 
John Joel he read in college – a novel in which the protagonist feels little, if any, 
emotion after shooting someone dead. There is also a suggestion of John Joel’s 
fantasies of powerfulness and propensity for violence in his obsession with the 
collection of canes at his grandmother’s house, and in particular one with a lion’s head 
carved on the handle. John Joel “liked to touch the tip of his tongue to the wooden 
tongue, to hold the cane away from his face and glare at it, to imagine that he was as 
powerful as the squinting, roaring lion.” The carving of the lion is also, like the 
sculptures in the Whitney Museum in New York, a still image, a moment frozen in flux. 
John Joel’s sister, Mary, continuously disturbs his desire for stillness and his sloth-like 
existence and in doing so causes him great anguish. At fifteen, post-pubescent and 
emotionally volatile, she is emblematic of the state of existential flux which he tries to 
deny. His response is impassivity, though he has the violent impulse to “push her from 
behind so that she would go through a wall,” that is, to render her being-in-itself (a wall 
being inanimate and for John Joel a barrier, a means of mentally blocking out 
indeterminacy and contingency). Significantly, it is in the Whitney Museum that he 
expresses this impulse, amidst the stillness of the sculptures, embodying the 
“ontological irreducibility…that nothing can change.” When Parker gives him a pistol 
stolen from his father, John Joel finally acts on his violent impulse, and, as Mary is 
walking home and into their garden, he looks down from the branch where he is lying 
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and shoots her. Mary is taken to hospital and undergoes surgery, and though she 
doesn’t die, John Joel assumes she has, telling his father at the hospital, “She was a 
bitch.” John is appalled by his son’s apparent sociopathic state, but John Joel, now 
“all in white” like the sculptures in the museum, becomes almost catatonic, his 
“breathing…the calm breathing of near-sleep,” just as Richard Everett’s shootings 
initially enable him to enter a becalmed slumberous state.119  
 
    Beattie leaves John Joel in this state and the remainder of the novel is concerned 
with the effects of the shooting on Louise and John, whose relationship finally unravels. 
Mary’s shooting heightens John’s awareness of contingency, and, in an ironic 
inversion of the notion of suburbia as a haven from urban danger, he moves to the city 
for safety, finally seeking refuge in Nina’s tiny apartment, which is “small as a womb”, 
and in which he feels “comfortable with the small movements he could make.” There 
is an additional irony though, since John’s relationship with Louise parallels John 
Joel’s with Mary – he acts impassively towards her, but suppresses violent impulses; 
Louise tells him “you don’t talk straight” but knows “you hate me. Hate all of us,” and 
his final state mirrors his son’s.  He refuses to recognise this though, and believes that 
“it wasn’t John Joel he identified with, but Mary. He was the victim, not the one who 
pulled the trigger.”120 Yet throughout the novel he is drawn to stillness, lifelessness; 
just as the sick and bedridden Parker appears mummified to John Joel, the sight of 
his mother in her garden under mosquito netting looks to John like “a mummy…more 
silent than anything else in nature.” Entrenched in his own facticity, and resisting the 
inevitability of transcendence, the intimation that he is “a being which is what it is not 
and which is not what it is,” he experiences “a kind of anguish,” the sense that he is 
“rushing forward, but leaving something behind” and the unwanted realisation that “he 
wasn’t heavy, as he had thought, but light, speeding.” John is finally immobilised in 
Nina’s apartment, “hiding from himself,” though knowing “you disappear but can still 
be seen.”121  
 
    Beattie has commented that “the discord in that marriage and the kind of coercion 
that the characters exert on one another is...comparable to violence” and in Sartrean 
terms  lies and deception, both perpetrated by John Knapp in his unacknowledged 
coercion of his wife Louise, do have the same effect as violence (and both originate in 
                                               
119 Ann Beattie, Falling in Place (New York: Random House, 1980), p.53, p. 121, p.225. 
120 Ibid. p. 296, p. 89, p. 302. 
121 Ibid. pp. 41-42, p. 60, p. 262, p. 324. 
 141 
 
bad faith).122 For Sartre “the lie transforms man into a thing,” since it nullifies or 
invalidates the consciousness of the Other (the one lied to) – thus rendering that 
person an object. However, while in violence “one appropriates the freedom” of the 
Other “by crushing it with the world,” affirming “the superiority of the world over 
consciousness,” in lying “one appropriates this freedom…by destroying the world for-
the-consciousness-of-the-Other,” The destruction of the world for the Other is done 
“subtly” since it is accomplished by “hiding it by means of the imaginary.”123 This hiding 
of the world by the imaginary is what suburbia itself does, as Beattie suggests with an 
image of bland suburban conformity and placidity; John gazes at an old family 
photograph in which Mary is wearing a patterned bathing suit with  
 
Rows and rows of gingerbread men, arms outstretched, touching hands. A band 
of gingerbread men, and then another, and then another, as evenly spaced, as 
regular, as the gray bands of his mother’s television screen, but not rolling - no 
movement. Just the line of them…expressionless.124 
 
    In Falling in Place John Joel’s shooting of Mary does not undermine or even 
threaten the façade of the Connecticut suburb in which it happens; after Mary is taken 
to hospital the police wash away the blood, and clean up “as though somebody had 
made a faux pas…the polite host, passing no comment, silently mopping up spilled 
wine.”125 Beattie seems to suggest that there is a somnambulant despondency, 
passivity (or impassivity), a resigned fatalism (as the novel’s title suggests) in the 
Knapp family and amongst the inhabitants of their Connecticut suburb, each of whom, 
as Christina Murphy observes, “exists in an affectless and self-contained universe.”126 
Beattie has commented that in her writing “people often have more free will than they 
wish to exercise,” yet while she clearly acknowledges the enervating effect of suburbia 
on that free will, she does not, except through the references to Camus’ The Outsider, 
address the cause of the anguish and apparent paralysis underlying the existential 
conflicts she portrays.127 If her reference to Camus is a tacit acknowledgement of his 
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notion of the self as being in “perpetual conflict, continually created” and of “the 
metaphysical demand for unity [and] the impossibility of capturing it,” then she leaves 
this recognition entirely implicit.128 The anguish caused by the unrealisable desire for 
the state of ‘being-in-itself-for-itself’ is heightened in John Joel because of his 
suburban environment, yet Beattie’s depiction of that environment highlights only its 
pacifying and dulling denial, not its indeterminacy, its state of being in-between, so his 
violence seems almost random, symptomatic of some kind of breakdown in family life 
and social order. Beattie’s novel then, appears to present the existential alienation and 
anguish it portrays as arising from a detached and seemingly inviolable suburban 
isolation, and so offers a kind of social critique, suggesting a sociological explanation 
for an existential conflict. 
 
    Suburbia, of course, is a detached and potentially dulling environment, and it does 
nurture the development of bad faith through the illusion of regularity, uniformity and 
stasis, as the novels of Beattie, Updike, Cheever and Oates all show. Its denial of 
existential indeterminacy and contingency (a falsehood) can therefore be seen as 
having an effect comparable to violence, in Sartrean terms. It is also an environment 
in which violence in response to that contingency is likely to occur, when the bad faith 
suburbia engenders falters and suburbanites have intimations of the “nihilating 
ambiguity” of their being. The irony is that in all of the novels discussed in this chapter, 
the violent responses of the various protagonists are absorbed by the very suburban 
culture that promoted them, as if they had not occurred. In Expensive People 
suburbanites continue “dreaming the dream” even after Richard Everett kills his 
mother – “no one woke up” and, as G.F. Waller suggests, at the end of the novel “the 
surfaces of suburbia close over the deed.”129 At the end of Bullet Park “everything was 
as wonderful, wonderful, wonderful as it had been,” and Nailles’s bad faith is restored, 
bolstered by suburbia, his existential anguish unassuaged.130 Harry Angstrom is 
unable to deny his facticity, tentatively reconciled with Janice at the end of Rabbit 
Redux, but will go on to become an affluent suburbanite in Rabbit is Rich, his violence 
a dim memory, all but forgotten by his family and fellow suburbanites. In Falling in 
Place John Joel’s shooting of Mary is accommodated through a combination of 
suburban decorum and impassivity. Suburbia, then, denies the intimations 
experienced by the perpetrators of violence in these novels, that they are a “seething 
                                               
128Albert Camus, The Rebel, 1951 (London: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 265, p. 228. 
129 Joyce Carol Oates, Expensive People, 1968 (New York: Modern Library, 2006), p. 119; G.F. 
Waller, Dreaming America: Obsession and Transcendence in the Fiction of Joyce Carol Oates (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), p. 123. 
130 John Cheever, Bullet Park, 1969 (London: Vintage Books, 2010), p. 245. 
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lava,” not stable essences, that they are “spinning in the void,” because “if one sleeper 
wakened, everything would…[be] stretched and jerked out of focus.” This would mean 
the end of the illusion of fixity and permanence, and the recognition of “the drizzling 
vacuum” of suburbia.131 This denial itself though, like the violence it causes, is ironic, 
because the liminal, indeterminate nature of suburbia exacerbates the existential 
anguish of each of the protagonists. There is then a Sisyphean futility in their existential 
denial, since their anguish may be temporally allayed, but can only recur, again and 
again, mirrored and catalysed by their environment. This aspect of the suburban 
environment is underplayed in all four novels, perhaps in part because the notion of 
suburbs as culturally homogenous, as promoting a dulling denial and conformity, 
enables the authors to contrast these characteristics, or states, with the anguished 
states of the violent protagonists. However, the denunciations and violent reactions of 
those protagonists, depicted as being against suburbia, are ultimately against 
themselves, against the ontologically dissociative state of being.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
131 Joyce Carol Oates, Expensive People, 1968 (New York: Modern Library, 2006), p. 23; John 
Updike, A Rabbit Omnibus: Rabbit, Run; Rabbit Redux; Rabbit is Rich, 1990 (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1991), p. 236; Joyce Carol Oates, Expensive People, 1968 (New York: Modern Library, 
2006), p. 119, p. 210. 
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Chapter Four: Suburban Inauthenticity 
 
 
The concept of authenticity  
 
    Authenticity, as a post-war sociological concept, had a very particular and 
historically specific meaning. As Abigail Cheever observes, for sociologists and social 
commentators “authenticity in the post-war period is imagined as that which separates 
the individual from the social world,” the qualities that make him or her unique, qualities 
that are not the product of socialisation, but are inherently part of the individual. The 
term also has behavioural implications, since to be authentic, an individual would need 
to be “a self-cognizant agent who can differentiate quickly between his or her 
immediate inclinations and the behavioural expectations of a larger group.”1 Sartre’s 
notion of authenticity also stresses the individual’s self-awareness, and behaviour, but 
for Sartre it is, of course, an ontological rather than a sociological concept, and “that 
fear and that anguish at the heart of all authenticity…are apprehensions before life.”2 
Anguish arises with the recognition of ontological freedom, and if, as Thomas C. 
Anderson suggests, bad faith is primarily “a lie to oneself about the dual structure of 
his or her being,” and a denial that we are “unsubstantial, unnecessary, unjustified, 
and free,” then “authenticity, the escape from bad faith, will also primarily involve a 
relation to one’s self, not to others nor to the socio-political structures and institutions 
of society.”3 Both the sociological and the existentialist notions of authenticity, then, 
are based on the primacy of the individual, one’s relation to oneself, and each can 
provide significant insights into the concerns and preoccupations of the suburban 
novels of the early 1960s. 
 
The post-war concept of authenticity  
 
    Social critiques and commentaries in the post-war years, perhaps most significantly 
David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (1950) and William H. Whyte’s The Organization 
Man (1956), claimed that the advent of mass suburbia in the late 1940s and 1950s 
heralded (and partly caused) an erosion of individuality in American culture. This 
perceived loss of individualism, and a loss of individual ‘authenticity’ as a corollary, 
was attributed primarily to a culture of conformity fostered by the suburbs (though it 
                                               
1 Abigail Cheever, Real Phonies: Cultures of Authenticity in Post-World War II America (Athens, 
Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2010), p. 3. 
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phony War November 1939-March 1940, 1983 
(London: Verso Editions, 1984), p. 221. 
3 Thomas C. Anderson, Sartre’s Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1993), pp. 16-17, p. 55, p. 17. 
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could also be found in the burgeoning metropolitan areas). In order to understand the 
alarmist tone of such critiques it is important to stress the speed with which the new 
suburbia came into being, and spread, since this may partly explain such a heightened 
critical reaction. The ‘Levittowns’, built by real estate developers ‘Levitt and Sons’ 
quickly became synonymous with the suburbs, as Kenneth T. Jackson notes. 
Depression and war had led to stagnation in housing construction, and there was a 
dire housing shortage, with millions of soldiers returning from the war and a huge 
increase in the birth rate (22 per 1000 in 1943 – babies often conceived just prior to 
GIs being posted), with the result that by 1947 six million families were of necessity 
living with friends or relatives and an additional 500,000 were staying in temporary 
accommodation – and the less fortunate were forced to live in trolley cars and other 
scarcely habitable accommodation.4 Levitt and Sons, already established as army 
contractors, were quick to see the commercial opportunities in meeting this 
unparalleled demand for housing by providing comparatively cheap, mass-produced 
houses. The high demand was fuelled by the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, 
which provided a mortgage programme with considerable financial support for the 
sixteen million returning GIs. The Levitts produced a total of 17,400 assembly line 
houses, with thirty houses a day being put up at the height of production for the original 
Levittown on Long Island, after which additional ‘Levittowns’ were built in New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania.5 The rapid increase in home ownership rates led to the 
commodification of the home, as Lizabeth Cohen observes, with the creation of the 
suburban house as “mass consumer commodity.” Other contractors imitated the 
Levitt’s production techniques, and between 1947 and 1953 the suburban population 
of the US increased by 43 percent.6  
 
    With this scale and speed of demographic change, it is perhaps not surprising that 
social and cultural commentators voiced concerns, though the stridency and extent of 
the criticism by suburbia’s detractors suggests broader cultural anxieties. Before 
discussing Riesman’s and Whyte’s studies and the views they express, it is necessary 
to attempt to disentangle the post-war cultural notions of conformity, uniformity, 
autonomy and authenticity. As Abigail Cheever suggests, the concept of authenticity 
in this period “defined the self in opposition to, rather than as the product of, or even 
in symbiosis with, the cultural circumstances through which the self or subject came 
                                               
4 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 232. 
5 Ibid. p. 233, p. 234, p. 235. 
6 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America, 
2003 (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), p. 195. 
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into being.” The term was thus an oppositional one, and the more fully socialised and 
fully integrated an individual was, the greater the likelihood of his or her self being an 
‘inauthentic’ one. As Cheever notes, authenticity was something that “separated the 
self from a social realm, begrudged even a hint of cultural construction, and viewed 
individuals who appeared genuinely to be like their peers as inevitably mistaken about 
themselves and their wants – and as inevitably coerced.” It follows from this that 
conformity is not necessarily a sign of inauthenticity, as long, that is, as the ‘true’ self 
remains individual, separate and different from the one that is presented socially, 
camouflaged by that social self, but untainted by it, and therefore autonomous. 
Uniformity, however, is inevitably a sign of inauthenticity, since, as Cheever argues, 
this suggests not just that people act the same way, but that they fundamentally are 
the same, without the separateness from others that is necessary for authentic 
selfhood to exist; authenticity is “what might be uniquely one’s own rather than a 
consequence of social influence.”7  
 
    If an ever-increasing uniformity, rather than conformity, in the new mass suburbia 
was what both Riesman and Whyte detected and warned against, their views implicitly 
valorised the notion of an autonomous authentic self, opposed to the perceived 
oppressive banality of the cultural environment in which it existed. Riesman identified 
three character types, socio-cultural evolutions in character, rather than universal 
types. The first (near extinct) type discussed by Riesman is the ‘tradition-directed’ 
individual, who “learns to understand and appreciate patterns which have endured for 
centuries,” and for whom “important relationships of life may be controlled by careful 
and rigid etiquette, learned by the young during the years of intensive socialization that 
end with initiation into full adult membership.” As potentially oppressive as this sounds, 
note that Riesman refers to etiquette and so behaviour – to conformity in behaving not 
being. The tradition-directed type perceives dominant cultural forces as expecting “not 
so much that he be a certain type of person but that he behave in the approved way”; 
this type, then, believes that conformity, not uniformity is expected.8 The ‘inner-
directed’ type, by contrast, “can manage to live socially without strict and self-evident 
tradition-direction.” This is because “the source of direction for the individual is ‘inner’ 
in the sense that it is implanted early in life by the elders,” though this type “must also 
spend his entire life in the internal production of his own character.” Whilst not entirely 
                                               
7 Abigail Cheever, Real Phonies: Cultures of Authenticity in Post-World War II America (Athens, 
Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2010), p. 241, p. 3. 
8 David Riesman, Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing 
American Character, 1950 (London: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 11, p. 24. 
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autonomous or even independent, this type of person “has early incorporated a 
psychic gyroscope which is set going by his parents,” and is able to live by “obeying 
this internal piloting.”9 The third, increasingly dominant, ‘other-directed’ type, however, 
has no such internal piloting. This type feels the need to respond to societal and 
cultural signals from wherever they come, not just from parents and family, and 
consequently is “at home everywhere and nowhere, capable of a rapid if sometimes 
superficial intimacy with, and response to, everyone.” Such an individual lacks a sense 
of self as distinct from others, has effectively elided self and other, and “seeks to have 
the character he is supposed to have, and the inner experiences as well as outer 
appurtenances that are supposed to go with it.” Such a state is therefore one of 
uniformity, of being like others, rather than of conformity, of merely acting like others. 
The result is that the other-directed person has no sense of an inner existential core 
or being, but must always rely on others for a sense of self, causing anguish, or, as 
Riesman describes it, “a diffuse anxiety” since this type’s “control equipment, instead 
of being like a gyroscope, is like a radar.”10 Within this broader formulation of character 
types Riesman identifies the adjusted, the ‘anomic’, and the autonomous, though there 
is no direct or automatic mapping of these onto tradition, inner and other-directed types 
(in fact rapidly dwindling numbers of tradition-directed types seems to warrant their 
exclusion from further discussion in the study). The other-directed individual attempts 
to become adjusted by acquiring “the character he is supposed to have,” though if this 
attempt is perceived to have failed the individual becomes anomic (from Durkheim’s 
notion of ‘anomie’) – uncomfortable, ill-at-ease and unable to conform to the 
“characterological pattern of the adjusted,” effectively rendering them, Riesman 
suggests, maladjusted.11 The inner-directed person may also become adjusted, or, 
because of this type’s form of directedness, anomic. It is most likely though, that the 
most strongly inner-directed individuals will become autonomous, able to conform to 
societal and cultural conventions and expectations, but free to choose whether to do 
so or not. Such freedom and autonomy seems for Riesman to be synonymous with 
authenticity, precisely because, as noted earlier, in this period authenticity is that which 
“separates the individual from the social world.”12 While Riesman acknowledges that 
Sartre’s philosophy is concerned with “the problems of the autonomous individual” he 
does not agree with Sartre’s contention that “men – other than a few heroic individuals 
– can ‘choose themselves’ under conditions of extreme despotism,” presumably 
                                               
9 Ibid. p. 14, p. 15, p. 126, p. 24. 
10 Ibid. p. 25, p. 24, p. 25. 
11 Ibid. p. 240, p. 242. 
12 Abigail Cheever, Real Phonies: Cultures of Authenticity in Post-World War II America (Athens, 
Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2010), p. 3. 
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though, in post-war America (if not in totalitarian societies) choosing oneself was 
possible, if existentially challenging in an increasingly other-directed societal culture.13 
 
    The Lonely Crowd was a highly influential study, and the notion of inauthentic other-
directedness as primarily a suburban cultural phenomenon gained credence with the 
publication of William H. Whyte’s study of Park Forrest, Illinois, The Organization Man, 
in 1956. Whyte considered Park Forest to be emblematic of the contemporary 
corporate suburb, inhabited by ‘organization men’, in which the individualistic 
Protestant work ethic has been superseded by what he calls the ‘Social Ethic’, a 
“contemporary body of thought which makes morally legitimate the pressures of 
society against the individual,” creating a “tyranny of the majority.” In “intensifying the 
social virtues at the expense of others, by making the individual come to regard himself 
as a hostage to prevailing opinion,” suburban corporate culture had created a new kind 
of citizen in thrall to the purportedly benevolent patrician corporation (i.e. to the 
increasingly powerful bureaucracies of post-war life), one who “is not only other-
directed,” but also espouses “a philosophy which tells him it is right to be that way.”14 
What was so worrisome for Whyte about Park Forest and similar suburbs was not so 
much “the suburbanites' group-mindedness,” but rather their internalisation of this, the 
Social Ethic, as the highest value they could aspire to. In other-directedness Whyte 
identified a “vain quest for a utopian equilibrium,” resulting from “the soft-minded denial 
that there is a conflict between the individual and society.”15 Again, the notion of an 
autonomous, authentic selfhood is oppositional, and must be cultivated against 
societal influences and cultural forces, which can only serve to diminish and 
emasculate it. Other-directedness, then, is self-destructive because “the quest for 
normalcy, as we have seen in suburbia, is one of the great breeders of neuroses, and 
the Social Ethic only serves to exacerbate them.” For Whyte, as for Riesman, the 
autonomous individual is able to outwardly conform, to use “surface uniformities…as 
protective coloration.”16 By doing so he can retain control and freedom internally, and 
develop an authentic self, since authenticity is existential, rather than cultural.17 
                                               
13 David Riesman, Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing 
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15 Ibid. p. 393, p.13. 
16 Ibid. pp. 397-398, p. 11. 
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the aid of his own unique and inherent resources.” (R.W.B. Lewis, The American Adam: Innocence, 
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The Sartrean concept of authenticity  
 
    In order to understand Sartre’s notion of authenticity it is necessary to clarify the 
difference between bad faith and good faith, and their relation to that concept. Both 
good and bad faith are anterior to (the possibility of) authenticity because they are, 
initially, what Sartre calls ‘pre-reflective’ ontological states.18 While “consciousness is 
always consciousness of something,” at the pre-reflective ontological level there is “no 
knowledge but an implicit consciousness of being consciousness of an object.”19 
Consciousness has ‘intimations’ of its undeniable existential freedom (that it is a 
nothingness separated from what it is conscious of), and this, even at the pre-reflective 
level is experienced as anguish. Consciousness, being-for-itself, nothingness, Sartre 
claims, is “always an elsewhere,” is, as Ronald E. Santoni suggests, “always at a 
distance from itself; is metastable, mercurial, abruptly transitional…never one with 
itself.”20 As Joseph Catalano argues, “for Sartre, the attempts to flee freedom and to 
hide from anguish are pre-reflective projects of freedom.”21 This fleeing is bad faith, 
which, as Santoni notes, is faith insofar as it is “unwilling to be persuaded by critical 
evidence,” evidence of its “abruptly transitional” ontological state. Good faith, however, 
is willing to be persuaded by that evidence; where bad faith is “a closed, uncritical 
attitude towards available evidence, the fundamental attitude or original determination 
of being in good faith is an open, critical attitude toward evidence.”22 Good faith, then, 
recognises the freedom and autonomy of consciousness. This is important because 
at the reflective ontological level it may allow the ‘conversion’ that Sartre argues is 
necessary to achieve, always temporarily and always concretely in situations, 
authenticity: when consciousness becomes reflective, when it becomes, as Jacob 
Golomb states, “consciousness whose object is itself,” the ‘I’, the ego, the self is 
created (external to consciousness) and the reflection engaged in is what Sartre calls 
                                               
Tragedy, and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, p. 1, p. 
5). The nineteenth-century authentic self, however, would clearly not have been outwardly conformist 
in order to retain an internal existential autonomy. The historically influential Emersonian conception 
of selfhood, however, may well partly account for the cultural receptivity to Sartre’s ideas of freedom 
and authenticity in the US in the 1950s and 1960s. 
18 Critics do not agree on the definition and ontological characteristics of good faith, and some indeed 
see it as a form of bad faith – and Sartre himself is not always clear or consistent in his use of the term.  
I have tried to present an explanation that has, I believe, an explanatory validity and coherence. 
19 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 630. 
20 Ibid. p. 78; Ronald E. Santoni, Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre’s Early Philosophy 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), p. 72. 
21 Joseph S. Catalano, ‘On the Possibility of Good Faith, Man and World 13 (1980) 207-228, p. 218. 
22 Ronald E. Santoni, Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre’s Early Philosophy 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995) p. 71. 
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‘impure’ or ‘accessory’ reflection.23 Through such reflection, Sartre argues, the for-
itself attempts to disavow its constantly changing, inherently unstable ontological state 
and to ‘found’ itself in itself, as if it possessed the stability and permanence of being-
in-itself (its very desire for this underscoring its impossibility). Bad faith seeks to do 
this regardless of evidence; it is bad faith because it uses the impossibility of co-
incidence, of belief, faith, fully being what is believed – since “to believe is to know that 
one believes, and to know that one believes is no longer to believe” – as a reason to 
disregard all evidence regarding what is believed. However, whilst “the ideal of good 
faith (to believe what one believes) is…an ideal of being-in-itself,” good faith is open 
(where bad faith is closed) to the possibility – the evidence bad faith rejects – that such 
a state is impossible.24 That is, good faith contains the possibility of acceptance of 
ontological freedom and the anguish that it causes. This possibility in turn makes what 
Sartre calls ‘pure’ reflection achievable – and this may lead to a kind of transformation, 
what he calls a ‘conversion’, following which authenticity becomes (always, and only, 
situationally) possible. Bad faith then, exists at the pre-reflective ontological level, but 
contains within it the possibility of good faith; in ‘impure’ reflection, Santoni suggests, 
consciousness may, in good faith, resist its inclination to bad faith to assuage anguish, 
and may, through eventually engaging in ‘pure’ reflection, undergo the conversion to 
authenticity.25   
 
    Despite the importance of authenticity to Sartre’s ontological system, as the only 
means of transcending bad faith, it receives little attention in Sartre’s writing, and in 
Being and Nothingness it is relegated to a footnote. He states that to “radically escape 
bad faith,” there will need to be “a self-recovery of being which was previously 
corrupted and that “this self-recovery we shall call authenticity, the description of which 
has no place here.”26 Such a description did have a place though in a future related 
work Sartre intended to write on how bad faith might be avoided, and on ethics – 
generally assumed to be the posthumously published and unfinished Notebooks for 
an Ethics (1983). Quite why Sartre did not finish the Notebooks is unclear, but, along 
with his early War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phony War November 1939-March 1940, 
                                               
23 Jacob Golomb, In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus (New York: Routledge, 
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24 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 69. 
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26 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
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also published posthumously in 1983, and Anti-Semite and Jew (1944), they contain 
almost all of Sartre’s discussion of the concept of authenticity.27 In the War Diaries 
Sartre stresses the importance of the situation in being authentic, since “to be 
authentic is to realize fully one’s being-in-situation, whatever this situation may happen 
to be.” He reiterates and expands on this later in the diaries, stating that “the 
authenticity of your previous momentum doesn’t protect you in any way against falling 
next instant into the inauthentic,” and that “the situation is novel: a new authenticity 
has to be invented…the memory of the authentic, in inauthenticity, is itself 
inauthentic.”28 Again, in Anti-Semite and Jew Sartre stresses the importance of “having 
a true and lucid consciousness of the situation, “and “having freedom within the limits 
of a situation,” but it is only later in the Notebooks that he clearly relates authenticity 
to the ontological system developed in Being and Nothingness - and specifically to the 
notion of the for-itself, consciousness, as predisposed to the ontological disavowal that 
is bad faith, but also as capable of achieving authenticity.29 Here he writes that 
“authenticity bears on what I will…pure and authentic reflection is a will for that which 
I will.”30 What is willed is ontological freedom, so that, as Thomas C. Anderson 
observes, “I accept my diasporic mode of being,” accept “that I am not a substantial, 
necessary thing, which has a right to be, but a contingent, gratuitous freedom, which 
continually questions itself about the purpose of its existence.”31 Through pure 
reflection and the conversion it brings about I relinquish bad faith; I no longer pretend 
that I am a necessary, causal being, I do not attempt to unite my facticity and my 
transcendence, I recognise that I am both being-for-others and being-for-itself, and I 
no longer strive futilely for a synthesis of in-itself with for-itself, for the state of ‘being-
in-itself-for-itself.’32 As Santoni points out, “although the awareness of bad faith implies 
a kind of ontological pre-comprehension of good faith, it is the post-conversion 
authentic life that marks for Sartre the mode of being that is opposite (or antithetical) 
to living in bad faith.”33 However, since the anguish caused by this post-conversion 
                                               
27 One could speculate that he was not entirely convinced that a coherent system of ethics was feasible 
within his ontology developed in Being and Nothingness. 
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(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), p. 124. 
 152 
 
state predisposes consciousness to bad faith to assuage it, and because every 
situation requires a new choice, authenticity has to be regained in each new situation. 
While the Notebooks could not be charged with the ‘ontological pessimism’ sometimes 
attributed to Being and Nothingness, any optimism they suggest concerning freedom 
and authenticity is tempered by Sartre’s assertion that the “authentic individual cannot 
through conversion suppress his pursuit of being,” and so conversion is never 
absolute.34 
 
    Since Notebooks for an Ethics was never completed and was published 
posthumously, it is perhaps doubtful whether Sartre believed his conceptions of 
authenticity and freedom could provide a viable foundation for an ethical system. It 
seems likely though that if, as Sartre claims in Being and Nothingness, solipsism can 
be avoided by “recognising a primary relation between my consciousness and the 
Other’s”, since this provides an intimation of the Other’s transcendent subjectivity, the 
recognition of one’s ontological freedom should presumably also entail the recognition 
of others’ freedom through the same primary relation.35 The key question, though, as 
Sebastian Gardner suggests, is whether “commitment to the value of my freedom must 
be shown to lead to affirmation of the Other's freedom” for Sartre to reach what he 
calls “an ethical destination.” Gardner argues that this does not present “a logical gulf 
which needs to be bridged by argumentative means,” since in pure reflection each for-
itself “grasps its own freedom as indiscriminable from that of every other individual for-
itself,” so that “no affirmation of my freedom in opposition to that of other for-itselfs 
makes sense.”36 This grasping of freedom then is more a kind of ontological 
apprehending than a cognitive deduction, and in affirming my freedom I affirm that of 
others. In the Notebooks Sartre claims that we apprehend “the presence of the Other's 
freedom as a transcendence internalized into my own freedom. Its origin is the look. 
In the look, I am in communication (as looked at) with the Other's freedom. And I grasp 
myself as a transcended transcendence.”37 Consequently, as Linda A. Bell notes, 
since one’s freedom “is inextricably connected with the freedom of others, one cannot 
will one’s own freedom without willing the freedom of others.”38 Authenticity then, in its 
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recognition and valorising of freedom, does have ethical implications, and precludes 
the ‘ontological oppression’ of others that bad faith necessitates but refuses to 
acknowledge. 
 
    The novels to be discussed in this chapter were written at the height of American 
awareness (if not necessarily full understanding) of Sartrean existentialism and its 
concern with authenticity and freedom, and at a time when these, and the related 
notions of conformity and conformism, uniformity, individualism, and autonomy, 
informed much discussion of American culture, following the publication of David 
Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (1950), William H. Whyte’s The Organization Man 
(1956), and other similarly themed sociological texts. The prevailing conception of 
authenticity in the 1950s and early 1960s was then, essentially an existential one, and 
as Riesman’s acknowledgment of Sartre illustrates, it was influenced by his 
existentialism. However, despite the cultural concern with authenticity (and avoidance 
of individual inauthenticity), the protagonists of these novels are, just as much as those 
in previous chapters, inclined to bad faith in response to existential anguish (with two 
crucial exceptions). Indeed, bad faith is seemingly a ‘natural’ inclination, though the 
suburbanites in these texts are all living in a form, or aspect, of bad faith distinct from 
the two already discussed. The protagonists of Joseph Heller’s Something Happened 
(1974), John Updike’s Rabbit is Rich (1981), and Raymond Carver’s short stories, 
discussed in Chapter One, are all in denial of the unstable, constantly transitional 
nature of self, and seek ontological fixity, a kind of entropic selfhood, denying the 
disequilibrium that being both facticity and free transcendence renders them, and 
seeking the impossible state of ‘being-in-itself-for-itself’. In Chapter Three the 
suburbanites in Joyce Carol Oates’s Expensive People (1968), John Cheever’s Bullet 
Park (1969), and Anne Beattie’s Falling in Place (1980), are all shown to be seeking a 
similar fixity, though their anguish is heightened by existential contingency, by their 
random, unjustified and gratuitous existence, possibility but not causal ontological 
necessity, which they crave. In Updike’s Rabbit Redux (1971), however, Harry 
Angstrom denies his facticity, exemplifying what Jacob Golomb terms the individual 
who “regard[s] himself as pure transcendence, as forever beyond his ‘situation’.” Such 
an individual views himself as “neither part of nor responsible for choices he has 
made,” and “not as possessing a situated freedom, but as having a ghostly, dislocated 
freedom that glides through the world untouched and untouching.”39 The suburbanite 
                                               
39 Jacob Golomb, In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus (New York: Routledge, 
1995), p. 153. 
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narrators of Something Happened, Richard Ford’s Bascombe novels, and Chang-rae 
Lee’s A Gesture Life (1999) and Aloft (2004), all discussed in Chapter Two, 
meanwhile, exemplify bad faith in their denial of ‘the look’, of their ‘being-for-others’, 
deny not just their objectivity for others, but more significantly their intimation of others’ 
subjectivity (and freedom), as a means of maintaining a protective solipsism. The 
characters in John Updike’s Rabbit, Run (1960), Richard Yates’ Revolutionary Road 
(1961), and Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer (1961), however, are emblematic of a third 
type, or aspect, of bad faith. This, as Golomb notes, “consists in treating oneself as an 
other instead of treating oneself as one’s self” in order to “deny transcendence and 
turn one’s self…into pure facticity.” Golomb suggests that “this pattern occurs through 
being-with-others and is the most fundamental of the three [forms of bad faith].”40 This 
aspect of bad faith is comparable to David Riesman’s sociological notion of ‘other-
directedness’, the search for selfhood as constructed by others.41  
 
    In my analysis of these three novels I will argue that, in their ‘other-directedness’, 
the key characters welcome Sartre’s ‘the look’, their being-for-others, as providing a 
character, a sense of self, an ontological fixedness that assuages their existential 
anguish and maintains their bad faith. Sartre’s notion of bad faith and Riesman’s 
concept of other-directedness can also provide insights into the characters and 
suburban milieu of Mad Men, as will be seen, though Sartre’s “nostalgia of 
impermeability” (discussed in Chapter One) is also key in understanding the 
protagonists of the show.42 
 
Suburbia as inauthentic  
 
Rabbit, Run: “A pure open space in the middle of a dense net” 
 
    Updike’s Harry ‘Rabbit’ Angstrom exemplifies bad faith in its complex and various 
aspects and forms. In Rabbit Redux (1971) he cannot accept what Sartre calls the 
“nihilating ambiguity” of being both facticity and transcendence, and his denial of the 
former is “a refusal of being in the midst of the world…of being something other than 
pure transcendence.”43  In Rabbit is Rich (1981) he denies his subjectivity, his 
                                               
40 Ibid. p. 153.  
41 For Sartre though, of course, ‘being-for-others’, an objectified self-constructed by others, is an 
ontological inevitability, and it co-exists with the self as transcendent subjectivity, ‘being-for-itself’. 
42 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 58. 
43 Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, 1983 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
p. 176. 
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transcendence, and is obsessed with the past, with his former selves, his facticity, and 
the people he has known who are now dead (and so who are pure facticity, since 
“death is a contingent fact which belongs to facticity”): these people all become 
composite parts of his facticity, his past selves, for Harry.44 The frustrations and limits 
on selfhood that this obsession with facticity causes is precisely why he cannot 
relinquish it, because to do so would be to experience acutely the anguish that comes 
with the recognition of the self as “a being which is what it is not and which is not what 
it is,” one that is constantly surpassing, transcending itself and so is free subjectivity 
(in the ‘context’ of its facticity).45 This oscillation in relations with others (and so with 
oneself), between denial of subjectivity (being-for-itself) and denial of objectivity 
(being-for-others) is recognised by Sartre as typical of bad faith in the ‘pre-conversion’ 
state; as Linda A. Bell points out, “because, in an unconverted individual’s awareness 
of the Other, the latter moves between the two poles of subjectivity and objectivity, the 
former has no alternative in the face of defeat of one way of relating to the Other but 
to adopt the other way.”46 For the twenty-six-year-old Harry of Rabbit, Run (1960), 
whose facticity, in the form of his past and other people within that past, is necessarily 
limited, the Other’s subjectivity nullifies his own, through what Sartre calls ‘the look’. 
The Sartrean notion of ‘the look’ was discussed in Chapters One and Two, but here I 
intend to show how it may be understood as a kind of ‘self-alienation’, a self-
objectification, that is, a willing of the oppression that is ‘being-for-others’. Such self-
objectification, in its denial of subjectivity as transcendence, (partially and only 
temporarily) assuages existential anguish. It provides a chimeric selfhood, the self as 
fixity and objectivity for others, and so ontologically stable, and Rabbit, like the 
protagonists of Revolutionary Road (1961) and The Moviegoer (1961), having no 
sense of self, seeks such a stable, but chimerical, self. In this way all these characters 
are existentially inauthentic, both in Sartrean terms and in the cultural terms of the 
1950s. Suburbia, moreover, was an environment that engendered and embodied 
personal inauthenticity.  
 
    Early on in Rabbit, Run Harry Angstrom leaves his wife, driving aimlessly away from 
the Mt. Judge suburb of Brewer, Pennsylvania, where they live, in the direction of 
Philadelphia, with no destination in mind, and it is clear that his aimlessness is actually 
a form of searching for some kind of bearings, a means of locating himself, 
                                               
44 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 1943 (Bristol: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1984), p. 546. 
45 Ibid. p. 63. 
46 Linda A. Bell, Sartre’s Ethics of Authenticity (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 
1989), p. 85. 
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exemplifying what Gerry Brenner calls his “directed identity.” Brenner argues that “by 
accounting for the objects and places along a given route, Rabbit gains a false sense 
of identity by being able to place himself geographically,” and further suggests that “if 
he knows where he is in space he can attribute a special identity to himself,” one that 
will provide “a comforting sense of identifiable existence.” This shows that Rabbit’s 
identity “is not dependent upon himself, but upon the external objects he measures 
himself against.”47 There is clear textual evidence for Brenner’s argument; as Rabbit 
begins his journey “he feels he’s on a cliff, there is an abyss he will fall into,” and shortly 
after this “senseless fear cakes over Rabbit’s body.” Once he reaches Lancaster, 
however, and buys a map at a diner, he is able to identify and name all the towns he 
passes through (with no destination in mind), and has the sensation that “things are 
better already.”48 Driving further still, though, he “feels some great confused system, 
Baltimore now instead of Philadelphia, reaching for him,” so that “what he really wants 
is another map.” With a new map (but still no destination) Rabbit’s calm is restored, as 
he locates routes he can take and towns he passes through, but again his fear returns 
when he stops at a roadside café for coffee and senses that “he is unlike the other 
customers,” who “sense it too,” and the exaggerated politeness of the waitress 
“amplifies his strangeness.” There are no objects, places, markers of identity for Harry 
to locate himself, and he craves the familiarity of the suburban culture he has left, 
thinking “he had read, that from shore to shore all America was the same.” Seeking 
an illusory cultural uniformity, “he wonders, Is it just these people I’m outside, or is it 
all America?”49 Being a cultural outsider is a frightening experience for Harry, suffering 
from Whyte’s “soft-minded denial that there is a conflict between the individual and 
society,” robbed of his directed identity, and soon after leaving the café he decides to 
drive back to suburban Mt. Judge. 
 
    Rabbit’s directed identity can, I believe, be understood as an analogue of his other-
directedness (in Riesman’s terms), his need for a (suburban) self that is formed 
culturally from the societal expectations he perceives and which can provide a kind of 
reassurance or assuaging of the anguish he feels with so little sense of self. This 
interpretation is clearly at odds with readings of the novel which view Rabbit as a kind 
of (unsuccessful) rebel who repeatedly attempts to escape suburban conformity and 
uniformity – Sanford Pinsker, for example, interprets the novel as “the portrait of a 
                                               
47 Gerry Brenner, ‘Rabbit, Run: John Updike’s Criticism of the ‘Return to Nature’, Twentieth Century 
Literature, Vol. 12, No. 1 (April 1966) p. 6. 
48 John Updike, A Rabbit Omnibus: Rabbit, Run; Rabbit Redux; Rabbit is Rich, 1990 (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1991) p. 15, p. 16, p. 18. 
49 Ibid. p. 19, p. 20.  
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would-be rebel’s rise and fall, the story of an ordinary man’s extraordinary effort to 
break out of the domestic trap as the 1950s defined it”; and Stanley Trachtenberg sees 
Rabbit’s ongoing struggle as typifying the “unending and joyful American 
determination to leave the settled arrangements of society for the imagined if 
desperate release of personal freedom.”50 I would argue, however, that such personal 
freedom is precisely what Harry does not want and his repeated running away – from 
people and situations – is not a quest for autonomy, a rejection of suburban conformist 
culture, but a reflection and manifestation of his need for a stronger external source of 
identity and selfhood than those people and situations can provide. His pregnant wife 
Janice is an alcoholic who spends much of the day watching television, numbing 
herself to the oppressive suburban domesticity and isolation she feels trapped in, and 
who has even less sense of self than Harry – so being with her can only undermine 
his own other-directed identity; Janice does not provide the necessary expectations, 
the familial and patriarchal role for Harry to play, since such a role, like her own 
maternal and familial role (they have a two-year-old son, Nelson) has an unreality for 
her. Rabbit knows this, knows she has “a brittleness, an unconnectedness,” and in a 
dream sees Janice crying uncontrollably, but then “to his horror her face begins to 
slide, the skin to slip slowly from the bone, but there is no bone, just more melting stuff 
underneath; he cups his hands with the idea of catching it and patting it back; as it 
drips in loops into his palms the air turns white with what is his own scream.”51 Janice, 
then, can only increase Rabbit’s existential anguish, as he can only intensify hers. In 
a scene of ironic pathos Updike has them watch the children’s TV programme ‘The 
Mouseketeers’, in which the adult Mouseketeer sings, “Proverbs, proverbs, they’re so 
true…proverbs tell us what to do; proverbs help us all to bee – better Mouse-ke-teers.” 
He then looks “straight out through the glass,” and says “Know Thyself, a wise old 
Greek once said. Know Thyself…Don’t try to be Sally or Johnny or Fred next door; be 
yourself.”52 Neither Harry nor Janice has a self to know or be, and clichéd proverbs on 
a banal television programme can only underscore this.  
 
    After Rabbit returns from his aimless and abortive journey he visits his former high 
school basketball coach, Marty Tothero, a source formerly of both special and ‘normal’ 
                                               
50 Sanford Pinsker, ‘Restlessness in the 1950s: What Made Rabbit Run?’ in Stanley Trachtenberg, ed. 
New Essays on ‘Rabbit, Run’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 54; Stanley 
Trachtenberg, ‘Introduction’ in Stanley Trachtenberg, ed. New Essays on ‘Rabbit, Run’ (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 22. 
51 John Updike, A Rabbit Omnibus: Rabbit, Run; Rabbit Redux; Rabbit is Rich, 1990 (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1991), pp.7-8, p. 52, p. 6. 
52 Ibid. p. 6. 
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identity; as a basketball player Harry had set records for points scored in state 
tournaments and beaten his own record, exceptional in his skills and ability, but 
unexceptional in his high school persona of “a big clean-living kid.” Now, however, 
Tothero is a diminished, frail but hubristic, garrulous old man, “a clown and windbag,” 
and far from bolstering Harry’s sense of self, he undermines it further. Harry, though, 
unable to face returning to Janice and two-year-old Nelson, accepts the married 
Tothero’s invitation to go to dinner with his girlfriend and a ‘friend’ of hers, Ruth, who 
Harry soon realises is an ex-prostitute in search of emotional and financial stability. It 
is Ruth who, temporarily, provides the sense of self Harry needs from others, used as 
she is to validating others; he welcomes, in Sartrean terms, ‘the look’, objectified and 
therefore rendered fixed in his identity for Ruth. Harry’s sense of dread is thus allayed 
by his self-objectification, his identity through ‘being-for-others’. When they first meet 
in a restaurant he experiences this being-for-others as he imagines that “a stranger 
passing outside the restaurant window, like himself outside that West Virginia diner, 
would see him with a woman. He seems to be that stranger, staring in, envying himself 
his body and his woman’s body.”53 Significantly, it is the remembered sensation of 
lacking ‘locatedness’ at the diner that prompts this experience, as he now feels his 
anguish assuaged through his ostensible normalcy and ‘other-founded’ identity. 
Paradoxically, though, he knows that he is still self-alienated, since in his imagination 
he is both the one objectified by the look of the Other, but also the one looking; so as 
the looked at he is rendered an object, but as the one looking his subjectivity is nullified 
through his consciousness of being looked at.  Updike also illustrates Harry’s other-
directed identity through the use of imagery that is, as Philip Stevick notes, “literally 
eye-centred,” as Ruth’s gaze (and that of others) fixes, locates Harry’s identity in place 
and time.54 When Harry and Ruth leave the restaurant and go to Ruth’s apartment he 
is aware that “Ruth’s eyes watch him out of shadows that also seem gaps in a surface,” 
these gaps being facets of his own emptiness, as he tacitly recognises the nullity of 
his identity derived from “Ruth’s blue-eyed nothing,” but later thinks, and wants to 
believe, that “the blue of her eyes is no longer blank.” When she asks Harry what he 
thinks makes him “so special,” questioning his apparently unthinking (but actually 
panicked) behaviour, Harry feels incipient dread; as “she looks at him, squarely,” he 
realises that “these aren’t the eyes he met that night by the parking meters [outside 
the restaurant], flat pale discs like a doll might have. The blue of her irises has 
deepened inward and darkened with a richness that, singing the truth to his instincts, 
                                               
53 Ibid. p. 38, p. 122, p. 33. 
54 Philip Stevick, ‘The Full Range of Updike’s Prose’ in Stanley Trachtenberg, ed.  New Essays on 
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disturbs him.”55 The truth he apprehends is that his sense of specialness (sense of any 
kind of self, special or otherwise) is founded on others, and Ruth, key now in sustaining 
it, threatens to undermine it by her questioning of it. While she initially provides the 
self-validation Harry expected to obtain from a dutiful, and self-abnegating wife, a role 
Janice could not perform, Ruth is finally even less able to sustain such a performance 
than Janice. Her societal status of ‘mistress’ is demeaning, but, as Tonya Krouse 
observes, a woman with this status “possesses sexual autonomy” and “challenges the 
patriarchal privilege to which her lovers feel entitled,” refusing “her status as the 
‘property’ of one man.”56 
 
    Harry is always conscious of the gaze of others then, and seeks approval, self-
validation, through this. When the ineffectual Episcopal priest, Jack Eccles, tries to 
reunite him with Janice, Rabbit senses the minister’s own need to be validated by 
others, by their perception of the worthwhile role he plays as cleric, and his 
insubstantiality (Updike tells us “he seems unreal to Rabbit”) causes Harry to seek the 
gaze of the minister’s wife, Lucy, who is a strong component in Eccles’ other-directed 
identity, and knows it as she makes clear when she tells him (in Harry’s presence), 
“you’re just afraid of being snubbed and don’t quote scripture to justify yourself.”57 The 
eye-centred imagery is even more striking here; Rabbit watches her eyes and “as she 
adjusts her face to his height her eyes enlarge, displaying more of the vividly clear 
whites to which her moss-coloured irises are buttoned.” When “recognition frosts her 
eyes,” he is reassured and lets “his gaze go limp on the top of her head.” Seeking 
approval from Lucy too, Rabbit is later “conscious of nothing but the little speckled 
section of her green irises like torn tissue paper around her black pupil-dots,” her 
constricted pupils threatening his equilibrium, as he senses possible dislike or 
opprobrium in light of his behaviour, making him fearful since “he dreads being 
hated.”58 
 
    When Janice gives birth to a daughter (Rebecca), however, Harry does return, but 
leaves again almost immediately, having tried to have sex with Janice on her return 
from hospital, his need to be absorbed, physically, emotionally, as he has been with 
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and by Ruth, almost pathological – but Janice tells him “I’m not your whore.”59 Left 
alone with the baby Janice struggles to manage practically and emotionally, drinking 
even more than before, and in a drunken stupor while attempting to bathe Rebecca, 
befuddled and uncoordinated, she accidentally drowns her, only realising she has 
done so when she sees the baby’s lifeless features. On hearing of the baby’s death 
Harry returns to Janice, now staying with her parents, and asks Eccles, who is visiting 
the family, “What shall I do?” The irony of Rabbit asking the minister, as insubstantial 
and other-directed as he is, for guidance, is clear, and Eccles’ reply that he should “do 
what you are doing” is even more so, given that what Rabbit is doing, what he has 
done throughout the novel, is make panicked decisions, act on fear and seek any 
stability of selfhood through others. The minister also tells him to “be a good husband” 
and “be a good father,” roles that Harry is hardly equipped for, and, fearfully 
contemplating his future in suburban Mt. Judge – as husband and father, good or 
otherwise – he feels the randomness, contingency, and anonymity of the suburb that 
is itself without cultural specificity, indistinguishable from so many other suburbs, 
without identity. Harry reflects that “the houses, many of them no longer lived in by the 
people whose faces he all knew, are like the houses in a town you see from the train, 
their brick faces blank in posing the riddle, Why does anyone live here?” The faces of 
the people he knew (who knew him) are replaced with the featureless ‘faces’ of the 
anonymous houses, unseeing, unable to see, to look at, Harry, presaging the feeling 
of being without a self, identityless, and “coldness spreads through his body and he 
feels detached, as if at last he is, what he dreaded, walking on air.” No longer 
anchored, given weight and substance by others, “he is no one” and has “stepped into 
nothingness.”60  
 
    At the funeral Rabbit experiences the gaze of others, but now it is universally 
condemnatory, inevitably belittling to one so other-directed, who “dreads being hated,” 
his being-for-others now objectifying him in a contemptuous diminishing. Again, Rabbit 
runs, predictably to Ruth, who, he finds out, is pregnant. Ruth, however, only 
compounds Harry’s sense of insubstantiality, asking him to leave and telling him 
“you’re not just nothing, you’re worse than nothing.” In his final anguished fleeing Harry 
has, if not an epiphany, an intimation of the self-alienation caused by being-for-others, 
his other-directedness, and “feels his inside as very real suddenly, a pure open space 
in the middle of a blank net…a kind of sweet panic.” Harry oscillates in his bad faith, 
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and we can see the nascent selfhood of the Harry of Rabbit Redux emerge, one whose 
relations with others are characterised by denial of their subjectivity, a denial of his 
being-for-others, the very source of his identity in Rabbit, Run,  and a recognition solely 
of his own subjectivity, the transcendent being-for-itself.  Already, Janice and Ruth are 
nullified, as with “thought he dissolves both of them,” and he feels that “there is nothing 
outside, those things he was trying to balance have no weight,” as “his smallness fills 
him like a vastness.”61 Harry has chosen bad faith over the possibility of existential 
authenticity, and in his other-denying subjectivity (and hence negation of others’ 
freedom), will become an even more destructive force in Rabbit Redux. 
 
Revolutionary Road: “An enormous, obscene delusion” 
 
    If Harry Angstrom in Rabbit, Run has only nascent self-awareness, or ‘lack-of-self’ 
awareness, Frank and April Wheeler in Richard Yates’ Revolutionary Road (1961), set 
in 1955, are hyper-aware of their existential insubstantiality. Each one, though, strives 
desperately in their denial of this to maintain an entirely ‘other-directed’ selfhood, one 
in which ‘being-for-others’, the self-objectification inherent in the Sartrean look, is 
essential, and which the other-directed normative culture of the suburbs of the 1950s 
seemed to provide. Critics, however, have tended to see the Wheelers as, if not victims 
of the oppressive culture of conformity of 1950s suburbia, then compromised by it, 
rather than as manifestations of it. David Castronovo and Steven Goldleaf, for 
example, view the couple’s “deep yearning for personal authenticity” as thwarted by 
their inimical cultural environment, the “vacuous and chilling suburban landscape” of 
which they become a composite part.62 Frank, who commutes from their Connecticut 
suburb to New York for his job writing copy at Knox Business Machines, wants to be 
“an authentic self and a memorable character,” but in his quest has “turned to vague 
bits of existentialism – notably ideas about the nauseating quality of life, the liberation 
to be found in risk, and the essential absurdity of living.” In the other-directed culture 
of the 1950s, Castronovo and Goldleaf suggest, Frank, but also April, are inevitably 
“caught up in managing impressions of themselves,” and as a consequence “these 
characters lose their identities.”63 A similar view is expressed by Brian Rajski, who 
describes the Wheelers as “resigned to producing and maintaining a fragile distinction 
between their selves and their mainstream American environment.” Rajski also 
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suggests that “in the terms David Riesman laid out in The Lonely Crowd, the tedium 
of Frank’s job makes it easy for him to picture himself as inner-directed, able to stand 
upright in any context due to his inner ‘gyroscope’ and a strong boundary surrounding 
his self.”64 For Jerome Klinkowitz, Frank’s and April’s ostensible belief in individualism 
and defiance of suburban conformity “places an impossible burden upon the self,” and 
eventually “the compelling weight of reality…frustrates their hopes.”65 
 
    These views, however, assume that the protagonists of Revolutionary Road are 
culturally, societally, besieged and coerced, that each has an identity, a self, that can 
be burdened, become fragile, or even lost. Yates, though, seems to suggest that they 
have no such identity, that their selfhood is only mirrored identity, as he illustrates by 
having them both ‘perform’ actions and parts self-consciously (but without self-
awareness), and by the use of pervasive imagery of reflection, which undercuts their 
delusional sense of self. Near the beginning of the novel he describes Frank as having 
a face which “for all its lack of structural distinction…did have an unusual mobility: it 
was able to suggest wholly different personalities with each flickering change of 
expression.” In adolescence Frank had believed that “all he would ever need…was 
the time and the freedom to find himself” and in his twenties “loose strands of his 
character…seemed suddenly to have coalesced into a substantial and attractive 
whole.”66 Yates, though, has by this point already shown any such character to be 
illusory, with an image suggesting both vacuous performance and mocking, nullifying 
reflection; after April, a member of the local amateur dramatics group, has performed 
risibly in the part of Gabrielle in Robert E. Sherwood’s The Petrified Forest, alternating 
between “false theatrical gestures and a white-knuckled immobility,” Frank 
embarrassedly commiserates, but is himself limited to such theatrical gestures, as 
Yates makes clear when afterwards in April’s dressing room  
 
He looked at himself in the mirror, tightening his jaw and turning his head a little 
to one side to give it a leaner, more commanding look, the face he had given 
himself in mirrors since boyhood and which no photograph had ever quite 
achieved, until with a start he found that she was watching him. Her own eyes 
                                               
64 Brian Rajski, ‘Writing Systems: Richard Yates, Remington Rand, and the Univac’, Contemporary 
Literature, Volume 54, Number 3, Fall 2013, p. 550, p. 558. 
65 Jerome Klinkowitz, The New American Novel of Manners: The Fiction of Richard Yates, Dan 
Wakefield and Thomas McGuane (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1986), p. 18. 
66 Richard Yates, Revolutionary Road, 1961 (London: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 12, p. 21. 
 163 
 
were there in the mirror, trained on his for an uncomfortable moment before she 
lowered them to stare at the middle button of his coat.67  
 
This is the first textual hint of April’s unwanted intimations of her and Frank’s reflected 
identities, their insubstantiality, with her disavowal of such knowledge signalled by her 
averted gaze. Frank, however, considers himself “an intense, nicotine-stained Jean-
Paul-Sartre sort of man,” which ironically he is, but only insofar as he exemplifies bad 
faith through his adoption of an other-directed self, a self based solely on his being-
for-others. Accepting the “simple logic…that he’d be limited to intense, nicotine-
stained, Jean-Paul Sartre sorts of women,” Frank finds such a woman in April 
Johnson, and in describing their meeting Yates uses eye-centred reflective imagery 
that is reminiscent of Rabbit, Run, as Frank discovers “that he could not only hold the 
steady attention of her wide gray eyes but could make their pupils dart up and down 
and around in little arcs while he talked to her, as if the very shape and texture of his 
face were matters of absorbing interest.”68 Initially living in Frank’s Greenwich Village 
apartment, the couple decide to move to a more spacious one after April tells Frank 
she’s pregnant, and he tries to deny feeling “chagrin instead of joy” at what he thinks 
is the “first authentic involvement” of his life. After having a second child the Wheelers 
move to the suburbs, with Frank jokingly telling April, “I don’t suppose one picture 
window is necessarily going to destroy our personalities.”69 The joke though is of 
course on them, as neither has a personality other than their reflected identities and, 
far from destroying their personalities, the picture window symbolically creates them, 
or rather allows them to maintain the illusion of having personalities. Yates highlights 
this irony, after Frank has disingenuously lambasted suburban conformity and 
reassured himself and April of their own authenticity and superiority, commenting that 
“if he’d looked at the window at that moment he would have seen the picture of a 
frightened liar.”70  
 
    The Wheelers then, view themselves as living in a suburb without being suburban, 
a term that represents for Frank the worst kind of “optimistic, smiling-through, easy-
way-out sentimentality.” April, though, becomes increasingly dissatisfied, and then 
despondent, as a housewife and mother, with no means of self-validation other than 
through Frank, whose own other-directed identity requires constant validation from 
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her, and, though he cannot admit it, from his colleagues and superiors at Knox 
Business Machines. Unaware of the extent of April’s distress and necessarily 
incapable of empathy, Frank feels undermined by what he perceives as the withdrawal 
of her affirmation, a key part of his identity without which he feels destabilised. Seeking 
an alternative source of validation he embarks on an affair with a secretary at Knox, 
since through her he can bolster his idea of himself as, ironically, a “decent but 
disillusioned young family man, sadly and bravely at war with his environment,” unable 
to recognise that he is entirely reliant on that environment for his sense of self. April, 
meanwhile, unaware of her husband’s affair, is also unable to accept her lack of self, 
and seeks respite from her anguished state, her existential emptiness; in an attempt 
to strengthen her bad faith, she resolves to change their environment and so provide 
an alternative source of other-directed identity. In doing so, however, she abrogates 
her freedom, her subjectivity, convincing herself that Frank’s talents, his artistic 
abilities, are stifled in the banality of American suburban culture, and that Europe, and 
specifically Paris, would be the appropriate environment to cultivate and nurture those 
talents while she works to support him financially (thus mirroring the wistful yearnings 
of the character she played in The Petrified Forest, who dreams of going to France). 
April, then, in terms of the oscillation in relations with others identified by Sartre, has 
chosen denial of subjectivity (being-for-itself) and in recognising Frank’s subjectivity 
she experiences self-objectification, with the temporary assuaging of anguish that this 
brings.71 
 
    When Frank returns from work (and his affair) he is taken aback by April’s 
unexpectedly buoyant and forgiving mood. She tells him, with post-epiphanic zeal, that 
without quite realising it 
 
We both got committed to this enormous delusion – because that’s what it is, an 
enormous, obscene delusion – this idea that people have to resign from real life 
and ‘settle down’ when they have families. It’s the great sentimental lie of the 
suburbs, and I’ve been making you subscribe to it all this time. I’ve been making 
you live by it!72 
 
April reminds Frank of what he had said recently about “the whole idea of suburbia 
being to keep reality at bay,” and, expanding eulogistically on the idea that moving to 
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Europe will afford an intellectual and spiritual freedom, she tells him that “it’s your very 
essence that’s being stifled here. It’s what you are that’s being denied and denied and 
denied in this kind of life.” Although he is “instantly frightened” by April’s proposal, 
Frank is of course soon convinced by this version of himself since it is what he tries to 
project, the young man “bravely at war with his environment,” that he presented to the 
secretary with whom his is having an affair.73 While formerly, “catching sight of his 
walking reflection in the black picture window, he had to admit that his appearance 
was not yet as accomplished as hers” with only “the brave beginnings of a personage,” 
he now notices that “his face in the mirror looked ruddier and better than he’d seen it 
look in months,” with “a new maturity and manliness in the kindly, resolute face that 
nodded back at him in the mirror.” Believing that “the past could dissolve at his will and 
so could the future” he announces the plan to emigrate to their neighbours and his 
pompous and vituperative tirades against the suburbs continue with a renewed 
intensity.74 In their evangelical euphoria the couple also tell their two children about 
the proposed move, and, expecting them to be as enraptured as the couple 
themselves, are confounded by the children’s anxiety and confusion.  
 
    As I have argued in previous chapters, suburbia engenders and embodies bad faith, 
and so existential inauthenticity, which Frank and April Wheeler typify, yet in their 
delusional and absurdly overweening hubris they decry such inauthenticity, in an irony 
that Yates underscores here and throughout the novel. The couple’s euphoria over 
their plan inevitably does not last, with each separately and secretly increasingly 
plagued by anxieties. For Frank such anxieties arise from his intimations of the 
existential threat posed by the move to Paris, since he will no longer be able to 
maintain the illusion of being “painfully alive in a drugged and dying culture,” and it will 
be clear to both him and April that, as she told him, “it’s what you are that’s being 
denied” – a denial that Frank is at least complicit in, suburbia ensuring that he doesn’t 
feel “painfully alive,” doesn’t have to recognise that he lacks the “very essence” April 
believes is being stifled by suburban culture.75 April’s unease, meanwhile, slowly 
mounts as the unreality of the intended move to Paris becomes clear, not for her (she 
has applied for passports, and bought travel brochures and French language guides) 
but for Frank, so that her belief, her bad faith falters, reliant as it is on the plan and 
Frank’s gaining (wanting to gain) his freedom (at the expense of hers). Frank has been 
offered promotion at Knox, and is drawn to the security of the other-directed identity 
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the company can provide, its all-pervasive influence and affirmation of his character 
embodying “a completely new kind of talent,” one that will allow his full incorporation 
within the company, a corporate identity. He is consequently relieved when April tells 
him she is pregnant, the birth of a third child ensuring the abandonment of the planned 
move to Europe. April, however, has decided to have an abortion, and there follows a 
protracted campaign by Frank to dissuade her (despite his not actually wanting 
another child), in which he acts the reasonable, attentive, and supportive husband, 
successfully he believes, when she agrees to see a psychiatrist about her conflicted 
maternal feelings and a childhood characterised by absent parents. Their children, 
Jennifer and Michael, are once again confused when April tells them, with no 
explanation, that the family will not be moving to France after all, and Frank mistakenly 
and complacently - and with fatal results – interprets her impassivity as relenting 
passivity. Having resumed his affair with the secretary Frank experiences “a renewal 
of self-esteem, so that the face he saw in passing mirrors these days gave him back 
a level, unembarrassed glance,” and imagines that he has restored existential 
equilibrium, that his identity is no longer in jeopardy.76  
 
    April’s increasingly detached complaisance is ominous, suggesting a dissociative 
state, to which Frank is oblivious. After a drunken night out, April has sex with a 
besotted neighbour, who declares his love for her, to which she reacts by telling him 
inexpressively, “I really don’t know who you are…And even if I did…I’m afraid it 
wouldn’t help, because you see I don’t know who I am, either.” Recognising the inner 
emptiness she has tried so hard to forestall, she also recognises the emptiness of her 
relationship with Frank, and tells him she doesn’t love him, which he simply refuses to 
believe and flatly contradicts (“Wrong…you do love me”) unable to acknowledge the 
implications for his dependent identity. A final argument is followed the next morning 
by what will be a final breakfast together, which Yates makes clear through April’s 
exaggerated, near-robotic attentiveness and submissiveness. It is also apparent from 
the final reflective, but now nullifying, imagery as April watches Frank drive away from 
their house on Revolutionary Road and sees “the crumpled shape of the old Ford get 
smaller and smaller,” until “at the end of the driveway…a gleam of sun on the 
windshield eclipsed his face.”77 Frank has ceased to exist for April in her resolved 
dissociative state, but this image also portentously prefigures the eclipsing of Frank’s 
own identity. Moving around the house with a calculated deliberation April makes final 
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preparations, including writing a note to Frank telling him “Whatever happens don’t 
blame yourself” and then performs an abortion on herself. In the penultimate chapter 
Yates describes the reaction of the Wheelers’ suburban neighbours to seeing an 
ambulance pull up outside their house and April’s being taken to hospital, and Frank’s 
reaction to the news (his voice “insubstantial”), his bewilderment at discovering at the 
hospital that she has haemorrhaged severely and is now unconscious. A neighbour 
describes “the awful blankness of his eyes” when Frank is told that April has died, and 
later in his benumbed state he sits in the house on Revolutionary Road “in the 
darkness by the picture window,” his reflected identity extinguished.78 
 
    In the final chapter of the novel neighbour Milly Campbell recounts the aftermath of 
April’s death to the new residents of the Wheelers’ house, a dull young couple who 
listen attentively, while her husband Shep tries to contain his anger at her asinine 
description of Frank several months after April’s death as “courageous.” He 
remembers “a walking, talking, lifeless man,” and reflects that after he “felt the light, 
dry press of his handshake,” he “began to see how the life had gone out of him.” Frank, 
though, had talked expansively about his full commitment to his job with a new 
company specialising in “industrial relations in the electronics field,” one of the newly 
emergent corporate businesses William Whyte wrote about in The Organization Man, 
and Frank is now such a man, compliant and complaisant, “so damned mild!” Shep 
thinks contemptuously, someone “you could walk up to and take a swing at and knock 
down, and all he’d do would be to lie there and apologise for getting in your way.”79 
Frank then, has acquired a new other-directed identity, a corporatized self. As Brian 
Rajski argues, with such an ending “Yates bleakly lays out two possible dead ends for 
the ‘revolutionary road’ of individualism: the conformist hypocrisies of the suburb…or 
an identification with corporate modernity (for which Frank is now professionally the 
voice).”80 In the post-war theorising of sociologists such as Riesman and Whyte, both 
alternatives denote existential inauthenticity in their other-directedness, while in 
Sartrean existentialism they are also both inauthentic ontological states in their 
recognition solely of being-for-others, and their disavowal of the co-existing and 
transcendent being-for-itself.  
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The Moviegoer: “The worst kind of self-deception” 
 
    Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer (1961) is very different from both Rabbit, Run and 
Revolutionary Road: it is set in the south, in a suburb of New Orleans, rather than in 
the northeast, its protagonist, John Bickerson ‘Binx’ Bolling, is single and singularly 
well-off, and the narration is in the effusively analytical first person voice of Bolling. 
Like Updike’s and Yates’ novels, though, its key thematic concern is existential 
authenticity and it shares their historical and cultural context, the (perceived) 
conformity and consumerism of the 1950s. Binx Bolling, like Harry Angstrom and 
Frank and April Wheeler, exemplifies bad faith, and while he is perhaps more similar 
to Frank Wheeler than Harry Angstrom in his highly self-conscious (but not self-aware) 
expostulatory tirades and existential musings, he is markedly different from both in his 
use of an all-pervasive irony to reinforce, but simultaneously disavow, his bad faith. As 
Mary Thale noted in 1968, just seven years after the publication of The Moviegoer, the 
1950s were “the decade when most people thought of themselves as ‘inner-directed’ 
‘non-conformists’ in a society of ‘conformists’ who had suppressed their ‘spontaneity’,” 
and Percy “created a world where everyone sees himself as a unique person but acts 
just like everyone else,” but more significantly “it is a world where most people are 
types, easily identified by the narrator, Binx.”81 From his dismissive classifications of 
the people he sees (but rarely meets) it is clear that Binx thinks he is an inner-directed 
individualist, and his tone is highly ironic, as it is when describing himself, as if to 
undercut the truthfulness of his self-descriptions, through a disingenuous and deceitful 
narrative strategy. The greatest irony of the book, however, is that it is Binx’s cousin 
and eventual fiancé Kate Cutrer who exemplifies authenticity, or, in Sartrean terms, 
the good faith that is the precursor to authenticity, since she does not deny her 
intimations of ontological freedom and recognises the oppressiveness of her being-
for-others and the unviability of an identity based on other-directedness. 
 
    At the beginning of the novel Binx, citing, as the attraction of the suburb, its 
‘placelessness’, or environmental indeterminacy, explains that “for the past four years 
now I have been living uneventfully in Gentilly, a middle-class suburb of New Orleans. 
Except for the banana plants in the patios and the curlicues of iron on the Walgreen 
drugstore one would never guess it was part of New Orleans…But this is what I like 
about it.” He also likes the apparent anonymity, and the tranquillity, the peacefulness 
of the suburb, particularly at dawn, and thinks “it is good to walk in the suburbs at this 
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hour. No one ever uses the sidewalks anyhow,” so he can “muse along as quietly as 
a ghost.”82 Binx’s ghostly uneventful life seems insubstantial, and it is, though not, as 
he seems to think, in an existentially detached, insightfully observant way, but in a 
passively other-directed way. Binx derives his sense of identity from the films he sees 
regularly and obsessively, the protagonists having (unlike Binx) a “peculiar reality 
which astounds me.” The importance of an adoptive identity for Binx, one that can be 
acquired circumstantially, its source external and other-determined, is signalled 
through his very first description of a movie, one in which a man suffers amnesia in an 
accident and as a consequence loses “everything: his family, his friends, his money.” 
Binx goes on to explain that the man was now “a stranger in a strange city” and “had 
to make a fresh start,” which was “supposed to be a tragedy, his losing all this, and he 
seemed to suffer a great deal.” In Binx’s view though, “things were not so bad after all. 
In no time he found a very picturesque place to live, a houseboat on the river, and a 
very handsome girl.”83 The acquisition of one externally constructed identity can 
almost seamlessly replace another that has been lost, since what is essential is the 
validation of self from others, a self-constructed through external societal markers of 
identity. Bolling describes himself in such terms, albeit ironically (and seemingly in self-
mockery), claiming that “I am a model tenant and a model citizen and take pleasure in 
doing all that is expected of me. My wallet is full of identity cards, library cards, credit 
cards,” all sources of external validation of course, as he points out, stating that “it is 
a pleasure to carry out the duties of a citizen and to receive in return a receipt or a 
neat styrene card with one’s name on it certifying, so to speak, one’s right to exist.”84  
 
    For all his arch ironizing of (inauthentic) conformism, such a certifying is exactly 
what Binx seeks, though through the movies rather than the objectifying paraphernalia 
of consumerism. He goes to see Elia Kazan’s Panic in the Streets (1950), filmed in 
New Orleans, with his cousin Kate, to whom he has explained that the movies provide 
what he calls “certification” and after seeing the film Kate understands this 
phenomenon, which she indicates by looking around the neighbourhood and telling 
him, “Yes, it is certified now.” Binx then explains the need for such certification since   
 
Nowadays when a person lives somewhere, in a neighborhood, the place is not 
certified for him. More than likely he will live there sadly and the emptiness which 
is inside him will expand until it evacuates the entire neighborhood. But if he 
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sees a movie which shows his very neighborhood, it becomes possible for him 
to live, for a time at least, as a person who is Somewhere and not Anywhere.85  
 
This highlights an apparent contradiction in Binx’s thinking about a sense of place, of 
‘locatedness’, as a source of identity. If certification provides a kind of validation of 
place, and indirectly of self, so that it is possible to live as “a person who is Somewhere 
and not Anywhere,” his choosing to live in the geographical indeterminacy of a suburb, 
anywhere rather than somewhere, would suggest a need to be ‘uncertified’, to avoid 
the conferring of an identity. Binx does indeed feel the need both for an other-directed, 
externally ‘certified’ identity and, paradoxically, for its nullification, but it is the source 
of such an identity that is crucial to understanding this conflict, and his abrogation of 
freedom in seeking ‘certification’ from the unreality of the movies. The Bollings are a 
traditional southern aristocratic family dominated by noblewoman and matriarch, Aunt 
Emily. She is a powerful and oppressive force in Binx’s life and constantly reminds him 
of his failure to meet his familial obligations, to uphold the family traditions, most 
notably by resisting his calling, as she believes, to become a doctor, which would 
represent the fulfilment of his talents, something his job as a stockbroker manifestly 
does not do, and which in addition discredits the Bolling family name. Aunt Emily’s 
objectification of others is absolute and Binx’s move to the suburb, placing himself 
outside her geographical and cultural orbit of influence, New Orleans, is one means of 
resisting this nullification of selfhood, through which  
 
All the stray bits and pieces of the past, all that is feckless and gray about people, 
she pulls together into an unmistakable visage of the heroic or the craven, the 
noble or the ignoble. So strong is she that sometimes the person and the past 
are in fact transfigured by her. They become what she sees them to be.86 
 
Binx resists Aunt Emily’s transfiguring of him into craven and ignoble nephew, resists 
her implicit injunction to be what David Riesman calls the ‘tradition-directed’ type of 
individual, who “learns to understand and appreciate patterns which have endured for 
centuries,” and for whom “important relationships of life may be controlled by careful 
and rigid etiquette.”87 Far from being inner-directed however, he corresponds to 
Riesman’s other-directed type who is “at home everywhere and nowhere, capable of 
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a rapid if sometimes superficial intimacy with, and response to, everyone.”88 This is 
apparent in his abortive and emotionally disengaged affairs with his secretaries, Linda, 
Marcia and now prospectively Sharon, and from his matter-of-fact admission that “for 
years now I have had no friends. I spend my entire time working, making money, going 
to movies and seeking the company of women.”89 
 
    Binx’s rejection of his being-for-others for Aunt Emily, of her tyrannical objectifying 
look, entails the nullifying of his familial culture and history through his anonymising of 
place and self. This he does by living in Gentilly, anywhere not somewhere, as an 
anyone not a someone, but this represents a perilous existential threat (the risk he has 
already recognised that “the emptiness which is inside him will expand until it 
evacuates the entire neighborhood”). He therefore needs a means of locating himself, 
and his self, the certification he describes, which the movies provide, and which 
extends to movie theatres themselves, the need for a geographical specificity attached 
to the films he sees. The extent of his existential precariousness becomes clear when 
he explains that  
 
If I did not talk to the theater owner or the ticket seller, I should be lost, cut loose 
metaphysically speaking. I should be seeing one copy of a film which might be 
shown anywhere and at any time. There is a danger of slipping clean out of 
space and time. It is possible to become a ghost and not know whether one is in 
downtown Loews in Denver or suburban Bijou in Jacksonville.90 
 
In Binx’s musings, however, there seems to be self-conscious posturing as much as 
self-awareness, as if his recognition of his ghostly anonymity was the very existential 
insight that gave substance to his otherwise blankly anonymous self, and this is where 
his bad faith becomes clearest. It is manifest in two ways, firstly in his failure to 
recognise his dependence on the movie actors and stars he constantly refers to (and 
later addresses his narrative to) as sources of his other-directed identity, and secondly 
in his disingenuous claim to have discovered “the possibility of a search,” a heightened 
existential awareness, which is “what anyone would undertake if he were not sunk in 
the everydayness of his own life.” The search seems to be a way of lessening what he 
calls “the malaise,” which is “the pain of loss,” since “the world is lost to you, the world 
and the people in it, and there remains only you and the world.” The search is 
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supposedly ontological, his previous searching for a scientific understanding of the 
world already achieved, the “only difficulty” with such a search having been he says 
“that though the universe had been disposed of, I myself was left over.”91 This 
possibility of a search though remains just that, a possibility, and it seems to function 
as a means of bolstering his bad faith, believing he is somehow inner-directed, 
distinguished from the hordes of other-directed types in his perspicacity. The search, 
then, seems to be a disavowal, a reimagining of his need for externally validated 
identity, as a need for an internally generated and autonomous one.  
 
    The need for the former type of identity is apparent in his numerous references to 
actors and his addressing them personally in the latter part of his narration. The 
significance of actors for his sense of self is crucial, and, as Virginia Nickles Osborne 
notes, “Binx not only perceives the world on film as somehow more authentic and 
memorable than his own, but also adapts his behavior to imitate certain actors.”92 
Those actors are numerous and include John Wayne, Orson Welles, Richard 
Widmark, William Holden, Paul Newman, Tony Curtis, Akim Tamiroff, Gregory Peck, 
and, most importantly, Rory Calhoun, to whom he addresses most of the final part of 
his narrative. Binx’s imitative self is entrenched and integral, indissociable from any 
other aspect of his selfhood, and is valued by him as crucially formative to that 
selfhood, as is clear from his (disingenuously) ironic observation that “during my last 
year in college I discovered that I was picking up the mannerisms of Akim Tamiroff, 
the only useful thing, in fact, that I learned in the entire four years.”  Intending to make 
himself attractive to his new secretary, and assuming they will have an affair, he keeps 
“a Gregory Peckish sort of distance. I am a tall black-headed fellow and I know as well 
as he how to keep to myself.”93 On receiving a phone call and, knowing that Sharon is 
watching him, he is careful to “think it over Gregory-Peckishly,” and on discovering that 
she is dating someone else he becomes “Gregory-grim.” Later, on an excursion he is 
able to impress Sharon with a bullet wound in his shoulder from the Korean War, “a 
decent wound, as decent as any ever inflicted on Rory Calhoun or Tony Curtis.”94 In 
constructing his identity in this way Binx, as Richard Pindell suggests, “pretends, with 
much of the actor's perfection of gesture, to be a somebody somewhere.”95 This 
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underscores the irony in Binx’s conflating the identity of the actors he emulates with 
the identity of the characters they play, the actors having supplanted any inner identity 
with an externally constructed one, just as Binx himself does, but while their identity is 
of course only a celluloid one, his constitutes the very (lack of) substance of his self. 
This irony is particularly disturbing (and near-pathological), when he recounts an initial 
abortive sexual encounter with his cousin Kate to Rory Calhoun, addressing him 
directly (“I’ll have to tell you the truth, Rory, painful though it is.”) and continues to 
address Calhoun for the remainder of his narrative.96 
 
    It is Kate’s own existential anguish and failure to assuage it through bad faith, 
however, that highlights most clearly Binx’s bad faith in assuming an other-directed 
identity based solely on being-for-others. Kate is considered by her step mother, Aunt 
Emily (and seemingly by Binx too) to be mentally and emotionally unbalanced as a 
result of her fiancé’s death in a car accident several years previously, and she is 
unbalanced insofar as she recognises her (and everyone else’s) ontological 
disequilibrium, the inherent instability of being and impossibility of balance. It was 
through the crash itself that this recognition occurred, in a kind of epiphany. Kate tells 
Binx, that “at the time of the wreck people were so kind and helpful and solid.” No-one 
could acknowledge “the truth… that our reality had been purchased only by Lyell’s 
death,” or the broader truth that it is “only in times of illness or disaster or death,” that 
such solidity of presence, such reality, is possible  – or rather the semblance of it.97 
Extreme events and occurrences provide a heightened sense of reality and a 
concomitant diminishing of existential anguish as they are distractions from the 
constancy of our existential flux, our inevitably inchoate and free ontological state. The 
consequence of this realisation for Kate is an inability to form, or assume, an identity 
that she knows to be her being-for-others, an objectified self that nullifies her 
transcendent subjectivity. Binx fails to understand this, and when she breaks off her 
engagement with her current fiancé he interprets this as indicative of Kate’s “trapping 
herself too often: hitting upon a way out, then slamming the door upon herself.” She 
tries to explain to him that the relationship was untenable because she was often “as 
nervous as an actress,” and although “there were moments when I succeeded in being 
myself…so brilliantly that I think he loved me,” these were just that, momentary, and 
impossible to sustain.98 Binx’s failure to understand this, part of the denial implicit in 
his bad faith, is signalled by the opacity of Kate’s gaze, the traumatised blankness he 
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believes he sees in her eyes. He describes them as “pools of darkness” and repeatedly 
comments that frequently “her irises turn to discs.” Binx is “wary of Kate’s revelations,” 
what he calls her “exalted moments,” though what he takes to be exaltation seems 
more anguished fearfulness and panicked frustration at his incomprehension that she 
had lived “twenty-five years…through a misunderstanding,” and then “had discovered 
that a person does not have to be this or be that or be anything, not even oneself. One 
is free.”99 
 
    The anguish this causes is finally unbearable for Kate, and, renouncing her 
freedom, she asks Binx to be with her, even though she is “frightened…[and] not 
merely of marriage,” accepting her being-for-others identity, an identity that casts her 
as emotionally unstable and needing psychotherapeutic help to ‘cure’ her. Kate 
therefore renounces her good faith, succumbs to bad faith, and Binx is complicit in her 
capitulation, which bolsters his own bad faith. He in turn capitulates to his Aunt’s view 
of him, her objectification of his identity, deciding to train to be a doctor and to marry 
Kate, and so is now another one of the people who “become what she sees them to 
be.”100 He has exchanged one other-directed identity for another, and there are no 
more references to movies in the novel. The final irony however, is that Kate’s future 
is likely to be what she had earlier described as “monstrous,” envisioning (and 
refusing) an oppressive suburban domestic life with Binx, one in which, she tells him 
 
You would be hubby, dearest Binx…Seeing hubby off in the morning, having 
lunch with the girls, getting tight at Eddie’s and Nell’s house and having a little 
humbug with somebody else’s hubby, wearing my little diaphragm and raising 
my two lovely boys and worrying for the next twenty years about whether they 
will make Princeton.101 
 
Binx had himself at the beginning of his narrative remarked sardonically, on meeting 
a friend living just such a suburban life, “This is how one lives! My exile in Gentilly has 
been the worst kind of self-deception,” in his irony unwittingly revealing an unpalatable 
truth.102 Despite, though, the likelihood of Kate Cutrer acquiescing to an other-directed 
identity, she is the only protagonist of all the novels discussed in this thesis who 
evinces good faith, if not, finally, authenticity, and this is perhaps all the more 
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remarkable given the “monstrous” oppression of women in the 1950s, the difficulty of 
escaping the domestic drudgery of their societally sanctioned being-for-others 
identity.103 Binx Bolling, far from helping her resist such an inauthentic identity, 
compounds her (and his own) oppression, allowing her bad faith to subsume the 
possibility of good faith, and thus in his denial also chooses an inauthentic self. This is 
particularly egregious in view of Bolling’s disingenuous claim throughout his narration 
to have intimations of “the possibility of a search,” to have avoided being “sunk in the 
everydayness” of life, and therefore to have achieved a kind of existential authenticity. 
Believing himself to be distinguished from those around him by his insight and 
awareness, he fails to see that Kate’s ‘illness’ is actually existential anguish caused 
precisely by the awareness he lacks, the recognition of the existential freedom he 
disavows. At the end of the novel Kate, boarding a streetcar, tells Binx where she will 
be sitting and exactly how she will position herself, needing him to “be thinking of me 
just that way.” Binx, complicit in Kate’s self-objectification, reassures her, grants her a 
fixity of self she knows to be chimeric, but which he, ironically, does not.104 
 
Mad Men, suburbia and (in)authentic identity: “And who are you supposed to 
be?” 
 
    Mad Men is generally considered to be a revisionist depiction of the epochal societal 
changes of the 1960s, and the relation between these changes, in a newly burgeoning 
consumerist culture saturated with advertising, and the evolving identities of the 
characters who were both influential in creating, and influenced by, that culture. This 
is not entirely accurate however, for two reasons. The first is that the series (at least 
for the first three seasons, and arguably up until the fifth season) is far more concerned 
with the 1950s than the 1960s. Commenting on the genesis of Mad Men at the Austin 
Film Festival in October 2009, executive producer, occasional director and writer 
Mathew Weiner explained, “I was not interested in the Sixties.  I was interested in the 
Fifties.  It’s an important distinction.”105 It clearly is a significant distinction, and if, as 
Philip Jenkins argues, the 1960s as a distinct cultural and political period, began with 
the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963 and ended with the resignation of 
Richard Nixon in 1974, then the first three seasons focus solely on the 1950s.106 The 
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fourth and fifth seasons depict the emergence of early 1960s culture within a resistant 
and consternated oppressive post-war culture of conformism, not just conformity, and 
seemingly unassailable white patriarchal hegemony. It is only the sixth and seventh 
seasons then that are fully focused on the 1960s, and, even though the last episode 
ends in 1970 (projecting forward to the famous McCann Erickson 1971 Coke 
advertisement in the final scene), this is still very much the 1960s, if Jenkins’ decadal 
delineation is accepted. Secondly, the consumerist culture of the 1960s, based on the 
notion of an identifiable mass public with measurable indicators of conformity, was an 
evolution rather than a revolution, a cultural continuity from the 1920s rather than a 
discontinuity. In The Averaged American (2007) Sarah E. Igo traces the development 
of the concept of American averageness, and so normalcy and uniformity, within which 
Robert S. Lynd’s and Helen Merrell Lynd’s sociological (or ‘anthropological’) 
Middletown (1929) survey was of seminal importance. The Lynd’s study of Muncie in 
Indiana identified “the triumph of an artificial consumer society…a worrisome 
standardization of work and family life…[and] the demise of an earlier, seemingly more 
authentic, American community.” The Lynds viewed the town as “a distorted but 
resonant icon of American modernity,” one that in its ‘distortion’ was becoming the 
norm.107 If this survey provided a kind of benchmark for Americans to assess how far 
they, or their towns, conformed to typical or average characteristics, the rise of market 
research and the use of opinion polls (perhaps most notably by George Gallup and 
Elmo Roper), encouraged them to self-assess extensively on various aspects of their 
lives publicly. Such polls devised by Gallup and Roper had the express intention of 
identifying the ‘average’ American, and, as Igo notes, “pollsters were convinced that 
only by silencing some voices could they reach the most representative ones.” The 
increasing ubiquity of polls and fledgling market research in the 1930s and 1940s then, 
created rather than reflected a conception of averageness, normalcy, and having 
created a demand for knowledge about majority views and characteristics, were 
themselves the only way to satisfy that demand. The clear implication of this, as Igo 
suggests, was that “in a society constantly seeking information about itself…statistical 
means could themselves become normative.”108 
 
    The culture of Mad Men is that critically depicted in Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd 
(1950) and Whyte’s The Organization Man (1956), and although the Lynds’ description 
of Middletown may sound remarkably similar to those studies’ portrayal of an 
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inauthentic cultural conformity, or even uniformity, the difference, as discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, was the rapid development of mass suburbia in the post-war 
years, as well as more generally the increasing bureaucratisation, corporatisation and 
commodification of culture of which it was a part. By the 1950s, as Igo observes, the 
survey saturated American public’s “knowledge about itself was at once highly 
intrusive and completely anonymous, self-scrutinizing and other-directed, familiar and 
impersonal.” This ‘knowledge’ engendered “peculiar tensions of life in a ‘mass’ society: 
between being ‘oneself’ and being known as a member of a group, between being an 
individual and being a statistic.”109 These characteristics distinguish 1950s 
suburbanites from the inhabitants of the Middletown of 1929 (and their portrayal in 
fictional satires of 1920s suburbia, most notably Sinclair Lewis’ Babbitt, published in 
1922). The knowledge and tensions identified by Igo are central to the depictions of 
character in Weiner’s Mad Men, and they underlie the conflicted dynamics of the 
series, the personal and interpersonal crises and changes the characters undergo. 
Some critics have interpreted these changes and crises through direct 
acknowledgement of the corporate culture identified by Riesman and Whyte; Gary R. 
Edgerton, for example, classifies the key characters according to Riesman’s typology 
in a (perhaps slightly overly schematic) way, suggesting that  
 
The traditionalists (Bertram Cooper, Roger Sterling) resist change and rigorously 
follow time-honoured beliefs and practices; the inner-directeds (Don Draper, 
Peggy Olson) are far more self-made, stubbornly self-reliant, and goal-oriented, 
while the other-directeds (Betty Draper, Pete Campbell) tend to obsessively seek 
approval, prefer group over individual action, and freely sublimate their own 
needs and desires to the will of the crowd.110  
 
The characters in Mad Men, however, do not always fit quite so neatly into these 
categories – especially Don Draper and Peggy Olson – and there is a risk in such 
classification of eliding some of the complexities and conflicts that characterise the 
show. The organisational culture depicted in the show is though, as Maura Grady 
contends, within “Whyte’s parameters,” since the men who work for Sterling Cooper 
(in its various incarnations) “are invested in identifying as ad men and operate strictly 
within the terms of Sterling Cooper’s existing hierarchy,” all, that is, except for Don 
Draper (and Peggy Olson, who refuses to become an honorary ‘mad man’) whose 
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interest as a character lies precisely in his apparent adherence to those hierarchical 
norms and yet also his transgression and subversion of them. Crucially however, as 
Grady observes, “a kind of nervous energy pervades the office and its workers, 
suggesting they are far from the sense of security Whyte’s study suggested the 
organization man felt he was receiving in exchange for his loyalty,” though Whyte 
seems to suggest that allegiance to the organisation is in part a response to insecurity 
rather than an indication of a sense of security.111 Any such sense of security would 
necessarily be oppressive in Sterling Cooper, a company which is, as David P. Pierson 
notes, “rigidly hierarchical, numbingly conformist, and generally resistant to 
change.”112 Working for such an organisation, and commuting to and from the suburbs, 
would inevitably exacerbate the tensions and anxieties identified by Igo concerning 
personal authenticity, the sense of being “completely anonymous, self-scrutinizing and 
other-directed,” and the conflict “between being ‘oneself’ and being known as a 
member of a group.”    
 
    Mad Men’s concern with authentic selfhood and the suburban culture of the 1950s 
(and earlier) is also apparent from the influence of John Cheever’s stories, cited by 
Weiner as pivotal in the show’s creation.113 This influence can be seen in the key 
characters, some of whom seem based on Cheever’s protagonists. Blake, in ‘The 
Five-Forty-Eight’ (1954) is strikingly similar to Pete Campbell in his insecure bullying 
of a secretary and exploitation of her, believing she is powerless and is therefore ideal 
for an affair, since “her diffidence, the feeling of deprivation in her point of view, 
promised to protect him from any consequences,” much like other women he had 
“picked for their lack of self-esteem.”114 Following his discarding of the secretary, 
whose name he can’t remember, he is humiliated by her at gun point on his commute 
to the suburbs (fittingly) and made to grovel on the ground, just as Pete Campbell is 
humiliated (rather differently) in his misjudgement of Peggy, his admonishing by the 
employer of the au pair Gudrun, who he manipulates into sleeping with him out of 
gratitude, and by the woman beaten up by her husband after he sleeps with her at his 
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New York apartment, who arrives bruised and bloody at his suburban home. Similarly, 
Jack Lorey in ‘Torch Song’ (1947) who has a lifelong infatuation with the “serene…big, 
splendid” Joan Harris, resembles Roger Sterling in his relationship with the (almost) 
identically named Joan (Holloway) Harris, as does the ill-disciplined, chain-smoking 
Mr Bradish in ‘Metamorphoses’ (1963), who “had never had any occasion to 
experience self-righteousness other than the self-righteousness of the sinner,” and 
whose disdain had generally been for people “who drank clam juice and cultivated 
restrained tastes,” until he decided to give up smoking and, in his obsessional craving 
attacked a young woman he “mistook for a Lucky Strike,” which was “his undoing.”115 
Marcie in ‘The Trouble of Marcie Flint’ (1957), seems much like Betty Draper, in her 
Junior League of Tarrytown civic-mindedness, as she seeks to keep herself occupied 
during her husband’s extended absence on an unexplained business trip, joining a 
madrigal group, becoming a committeewoman, and accepting a position on the village 
council, so that “virtuousness, reason, civic zeal, and loneliness all contributed to poor 
Marcie’s trouble.”116  
 
    ‘The Swimmer’ (1964), however, is probably the most important of all the Cheever 
stories for Mad Men, in its charting of a wealthy and successful suburban man’s 
psychological breakdown and the resultant dissolution of his identity. While in Mad 
Men the various scenes of Don Draper swimming are associated with crisis and 
attempted resolution and renewal, in Cheever’s story Neddy Merill’s mental 
disintegration becomes apparent as he swims across one suburban swimming pool 
after another, ostensibly on his way home from a party. Early on in his journey he is 
dismayed to discover the inexplicably drained pool of a couple he knows, subsequently 
realising that the couple had moved long ago, yet he was oddly unaware of this. 
Doubting his own senses and judgement he asks himself whether he has become “so 
disciplined in the repression of unpleasant facts that he had damaged his sense of the 
truth.” Soon after this episode we learn that “he had covered a distance that made his 
return impossible” and he feels an increasing sense of foreboding when a couple 
commiserate with him over his misfortunes, mentioning the loss of his house and his 
“poor children,” and a bemused Merrill succumbs to fatigue, stopping to rest at a 
neighbourhood party, only to be physically ejected as a gate crasher who has 
committed some unmentionable former transgression against the hosts.117 On finally 
arriving at his house he finds it is locked, dark and deserted, and when he looks 
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through the windows its forlorn emptiness reflects his own emotional dissolution and 
desolation. Neddy Merill’s journey from successful suburban businessman to 
ostracised social pariah, his identity unravelling, is clearly comparable to Don Draper’s 
odyssey over seven seasons of Mad Men and his eventual disintegrative drifting, 
breaking down in a countercultural retreat. As with Cheever’s story, and the other 
stories mentioned above, the suburbs are the locus of existential unease about 
identity, a cultural environment characterised by self-deception and personal 
inauthenticity. This post-war 1950s notion of suburban inauthenticity is central to Mad 
Men, most clearly evident in the first three seasons, but present throughout the series, 
and is exemplified most fully by Don Draper, but also indirectly and contrastingly by 
Peggy Olson, the two characters I will discuss in illustrating the development of this 
theme through the series.  
 
    The suburbs are the ideal environment for Don in their indeterminate identity, and 
as Maura Grady suggests, “Draper is himself analogous to the ‘great package suburbs’ 
[as William H. Whyte termed them]; he is beautiful to look at but his identity is entirely 
constructed.”118 Although both the suburbs and Draper have a fabricated identity it is 
its indeterminacy that is of crucial importance in each case, since the former is neither 
the city nor the country but rather geographically and culturally ‘placeless’, and the 
latter is neither Don Draper nor Dick Whitman, but rather ‘identityless’ in his conflicted 
state. While critics have generally viewed this conflict as pivoting around his 
constructed identity as Draper and his actual or ‘real’ identity as Whitman, I would 
argue that Mad Men’s key protagonist has three identities that are unreconciled – Dick 
Whitman up until the Korean War (and his CO’s death), Don Draper, (who loves and 
is loved by Betty Draper in the New York suburb of Ossining, Westchester), and Dick 
Whitman since the Korean War (who loves and is loved by Anna Draper in the suburb 
of San Pedro, California) - and consideration of each of these and how they interrelate 
may provide a more nuanced  understanding of the character(s).  
 
    Before discussing these identities though, it is important to consider the significance 
of Mad Men as a ‘revisionist’ depiction of the 1950s and 1960s, since it inevitably 
influences the portrayal of those identities. Many critics have analysed the nostalgia 
inherent in the series, or the nostalgia it (ironically or otherwise) seeks to evoke in 
viewers, implicitly establishing comparisons and parallels with the equally epochal 
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early twenty-first century present.119 Clearly the interplay of the past and present 
occurs on multiple levels in Mad Men – the tensions and conflicts between Don 
Draper’s/Dick Whitman’s past and present are played out against the backdrop of the 
past and present within the series, and against the past and present of individual 
viewers, watching from the contemporary present as it relates to the past of the period 
depicted in the series. There is perhaps inevitably a form of nostalgia within such multi-
layered relations between past and present, but these relations can be understood 
more specifically with reference to what Sartre calls the “nostalgia of impermeability.” 
Sartre uses this term in discussing the person whose response to “being-in-the-world,” 
and so his being-for-others, and ‘the look’, is to reject its “nihilating ambiguity.” This 
rejection, a manifestation of bad faith, will, as noted in previous chapters, lead such a 
person to avow either that “I am what I have been (the man who deliberately arrests 
himself at one period in his life and refuses to take into consideration the later 
changes),” or that “I am not what I have been (the man who in the face of reproaches 
or rancour dissociates himself from his past by insisting on his freedom and on his 
perpetual recreation).”120 These forms of bad faith are for Sartre equivalences, or 
reformulations of, in the first instance, entrenchment solely in one’s facticity, and in the 
second, belief only in one’s unfettered transcendence, unimpeded by that facticity.  
 
    Clearly Don Draper exemplifies the latter form of bad faith, though very falteringly, 
and this, I believe, can be seen in his failure to reconcile his identity as Dick Whitman 
as a child and young man, with his identity as Dick Whitman in the present. The series 
appears to posit an ‘authentic’ Dick Whitman in California, with Anna Draper, and a 
conflicted ‘inauthentic’ Don Draper in New York, though in Sartrean terms these two 
selves are both inauthentic, since both seek to renounce a past self (the young Dick 
Whitman), but are unable to do so. When in the first season Don tells Midge, his lover, 
that he can’t decide whether she has everything or nothing, she tells him “I live in the 
moment. Nothing is everything,” a poignantly ironic remark since this is precisely what 
Don cannot do.121 This is apparent when his half-brother Adam visits him at Sterling 
Cooper, having seen his photograph in a newspaper and recognised him as Dick. 
Throughout Mad Men Don has anguished flashbacks to his childhood in a brothel, his 
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mother having been a prostitute who died in childbirth, so that he was brought up 
harshly by his father (one of her clients) and later following his father’s death, by his 
step-mother and her second husband. In his attempt to jettison this past he behaves 
with nullifying cruelty towards Adam (who later commits suicide), telling him “I have a 
life and it only goes in one direction – forward,” a statement which, given his repeated 
flashbacks, is obviously delusional.122 This is a compounding of the initial betrayal of 
Adam by post-Korean War Dick, and the significance of the suburbs in Dick’s/Don’s 
subterfuge is clear from a flashback scene in a later episode. Following a scene in 
Korea in which Dick Whitman’s CO, Donald Draper, is killed in an explosion, and Dick 
switches name tags with the dead man, we see a coffin with, supposedly, Dick’s body 
inside, taken off a train at a station. Adam sees Dick on the train and tells his father, 
who tells him Dick is in the coffin. The scene on the train transforms into a scene on a 
suburban commuter train, Don alighting with all the other commuters, his past elided 
in the anonymised mass of suburban normalcy, the commute rendered transformative 
(though he is later recognised as Dick on his commute to New York).123  
 
    If suburbia’s ‘placelessness’ is a protective environment for Don, it more typically 
symbolises domestic contentment, if not bliss, and an existential stability and comfort, 
and he exploits this through his job as creative director at the advertising company 
Sterling Cooper, most notably in an advertisement for Kodak, renaming a slide 
projector originally called ‘The Wheel’ as ‘The Carousel’. Showing slides from his own 
(Draper) family as he makes a pitch to Kodak, he explains that “nostalgia literally 
means the pain from an old wound. It's a twinge in your heart far more powerful than 
memory alone,” and the Carousel “takes us to a place where we ache to go again.”124 
In this way he uses advertising to ‘sell’ the “nostalgia of impermeability,” though in this 
case this is a desire for each of us to be able to believe “I am what I have been” and 
to renounce the “nihilating ambiguity” that arises from acknowledging also that “I am 
not what I have been.” Don’s advertisements may seek to assuage consumers’ 
anguish about the present and the future, nullifying the socio-cultural anxieties of the 
1950s and early 1960s, and offering suburbanites a sentimentalised vision of 
themselves, but the series clearly does not offer viewers such tranquilising nostalgia. 
As Rebecca Colton Josephson observes, “though Mad Men masks itself as a show 
about memory and nostalgia, it actually addresses the fundamental issue that a freely 
constructed identity is always realised in the context of memory and society,” though 
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this issue is one that Don Draper and post-Korea Dick Whitman consistently refuse to 
acknowledge.125 For Don, moreover, the “context of memory” is inadmissible because, 
as Melanie Hernandez and David Thomas Holmberg point out, “his metaphorical 
‘killing’ of his past is not a simple ‘self-forgetting’ but an active erasure of his history, 
an attempted regeneration of self.”126 The fact that Don tells Rachel Menken about his 
early life (though not his name change and its circumstances) near the end of the first 
season, should not then be seen as a fraught attempt at reconciling his past with his 
present since his affair with Rachel, like most of his affairs, is compartmentalised as a 
kind of adjunctive fantasy, fleetingly parallel to his self-created life as Don Draper 
happily married to Betty Draper.  
 
    In subsequent seasons the dynamics of Don Draper’s (and we find out near the end 
of the second season, post-Korea Dick Whitman’s) conflicted identity are developed 
and become more complex, though they do not fundamentally change. Most 
illuminative in the second season is the revelation of the relationship post-Korea Dick 
has with Anna Draper, the widow of Dick’s former CO, who he eventually ‘divorces’ to 
marry Betty Hofstadt. Anna lives in the Californian suburb of San Pedro, and the 
relationship she has is with Dick Whitman, who is a calmer, warmer, more relaxed and 
open character than Don Draper, in a West Coast suburban environment that appears 
to nebulously mirror those traits. He is no more ‘authentic’ however, since he disavows 
the pre-Korean War Dick, who, significantly, they never talk about (nor about exactly 
what Dick did to become Don). Dick tells Anna, “I have been watching my life. It’s right 
there. And I keep…scratching at it, trying to get into it. I can’t.”127 As Maura Grady 
suggests, Don’s “present existence exists precisely because his past does not,” 
though it might be more accurate to say his present existences, or selves (since it is 
Dick telling Anna about Don’s life) neither of which can be authentically and fully 
‘inhabited’ because they embody a denial of the “nihilating ambiguity” that “I am what 
I have been,” and are predicated solely on the notion that “I am not what I have been”, 
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so Dick and Don can only partially inhabit themselves and must observe those 
selves.128 
 
    There does, though, seem to be a possibility of Dick’s/Don’s past being recognised 
and reconciled in the third season, when, at their suburban home in Ossining, Betty 
finds Don’s key to a drawer with a box of photos and other mementoes from the young 
Dick’s life, saved by Adam and sent to Don before his suicide.  In the confrontation 
that ensues Don claims that after his CO died in Korea “they made a mistake” which 
resulted in his being given Draper’s identity, disavowing his own action and choice to 
adopt that identity, suggesting rather that he passively accepted it because “it was 
easier to be him.” Don tells Betty about his childhood and the familial figures in the 
photographs, breaking down when he tells her of Adam’s suicide, and at this point he 
seems transformed into post-Korea Dick grieving not just for Adam but for his entire 
childhood. Such a nascent reconciliation would potentially undermine his seemingly 
autonomous identity as Don Draper however, and the next day both his normative 
suburban family image and briskly competent organisational demeanour at Sterling 
Copper seem restored. Whilst the defining moment of the third season is the 
assassination of John F. Kennedy, it is prefigured by this momentous scene and by 
an incident which both addresses the recurring question of Don’s and Dick’s identities, 
and underscores the seismic cultural loss of identity that is imminent. On Halloween 
Don’s daughter Sally dresses as a gypsy and his elder son Bobby as a hobo to go trick 
or treating with their parents (a shared familial ritual that already seems antiquated in 
1963). After they knock at the door of a house, a man answers, and, looking down at 
the children, says “We’ve got a gypsy… and a hobo,” and, ignoring Betty and their 
baby but looking up at Don measuredly, asks “And who are you supposed to be?”129 
In the final episode Don tries to persuade Peggy to join him in setting up a new 
advertising company, as Sterling Cooper faces an imminent takeover by McCann 
Erickson, and he tells her “there are people out there who buy things, people like you 
and me, and something happened. Something terrible. And the way that they saw 
themselves…is gone. And nobody understands that. But you do. And that’s very 
valuable.”130 The way people saw themselves was of course influenced by Don and 
advertising companies such as Sterling Cooper, but Don/Dick is obviously able to 
understand the experience of identity loss (as, perhaps to an even greater extent, is 
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Peggy), and the need to acquire a new creditable identity in post-Kennedy America, 
in what is now unquestionably the 1960s.  
 
    With Don Draper’s separation from Betty and Anna Draper’s death from cancer in 
the fourth season, Don’s/Dick’s identities begin to go into disintegrative freefall, and 
are less clearly distinct from each other. Don, attempting to restore both his identity 
and physical health, cuts down on his drinking and starts a journal to regain control 
over his own narrative. When he writes, “we’re flawed because we want so much more. 
We’re ruined because we get these things and wish for what we had,” his nostalgia is, 
ironically, for the false stability and externally validated identity of the suburban self 
that he fabricated, and the image of which he sells in his job as creative director at 
Sterling Cooper.131 The irreversible demise of the myth of 1950s suburbia, ostensibly 
tranquil, idyllic, restorative, and near-hermetically protective, is signalled by the 
penultimate scene in the final episode in which Don and Betty are standing in the 
empty kitchen of their house in Ossining, which is soon to be sold; they leave from 
opposite doors and we see the starkly tired looking furnishings, 1950s décor, in the 
dim overhead lights, a bottle of whisky standing solitarily on the kitchen table. When 
Don breaks off his relationship with Faye Miller (a strategist for a consumer-research 
company) and tells her he is marrying (his secretary) Megan Calvert, she says, 
displaying her insight as a strategist, “I hope she knows you only like the beginnings 
of things.” Beginnings of relationships do not threaten to expose the conflicted and 
unreconciled identities of Dick and Don, allow for the projection of an unsustainable 
image of integrated solidity of self. The seeds of their marital dissolution are already 
apparent, then, when Megan, lacking Faye’s insight, tells Don “I know who you are 
now.”132 Don has intimations of the unsustainability of his marriage throughout the fifth 
season, most starkly in a scene in which he calls the elevator at Sterling Cooper, and 
as he is about to step in, looks down and sees the exposed elevator shaft, a reflection 
of the chasmic breach in his identities, underscored by his subsequently seeing Adam 
entering an elevator and, on a visit to the dentist, seeing Adam as the dentist while 
under anaesthetic, who tells him, “You're in bad shape, Dick…I'm gonna do you a 
favor and take it out. But it's not your tooth that's rotten.”133 
 
    It is not until the end of the sixth season, however, that Dick’s/Don’s identity 
unravels, his two selves no longer distinct and carefully compartmentalised, the need 
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to reconcile them with the earlier self of the young Dick Whitman destabilising both. In 
a meeting with Hershey’s the conflict between the nostalgic lies Don tells the company 
representatives about his own childhood association with Hershey’s for the ad 
campaign, and the reality of Dick’s actual childhood memories of Hershey’s is 
exposed, because Dick deliberately exposes them, in a matter-of-fact confession. 
Pitching the ad, Don tells them that Hershey’s “relationship with America is so 
overwhelmingly positive that everyone in this room has their own story to tell” from 
their childhood, his being the chocolate bar’s symbolic value as evidence of his father’s 
love, so that “forever his love and the chocolate were tied together,” Hershey's being 
for him like everyone else “the currency of affection.” Affection and fatherly love were 
of course singularly absent from Dick’s childhood and the mordant irony of the tale 
Don has just told prompts Dick moments later to tell the representatives the real 
significance of Hershey’s for his younger self. Dick recounts that “I was an orphan. I 
grew up in Pennsylvania in a whorehouse…Closest I got to feeling wanted was from 
a girl who made me go through her John's pockets while they screwed. If I collected 
more than a dollar, she'd buy me a Hershey bar. And I would eat it alone in my room 
with great ceremony feeling like a normal kid.” Now the power of the chocolate bar is 
its association with normalcy, precisely, ironically, the association that sells so many 
of the products he and the company advertise – and one that explains Don’s motivation 
to assume a normative suburban identity in Ossining. Following the meeting Don is 
called to a meeting of the company partners and told by Roger Sterling that they all 
think he needs to “take some time off and regroup,” refusing to give him a return date, 
suggesting he is effectively being fired by deferral. In the very last scene of the season 
it seems there is for the first time a very real possibility that Dick will reconcile his past 
as the young Dick Whitman with his current self and achieve a form of personal 
authenticity; Don takes all three of his children to the dilapidated remains of his 
whorehouse home (the cultural antithesis of cloistered and normative suburbia) and 
tells them “This is where I grew up.” Nothing further is said, but Don and Sally 
exchange looks, and both look back at the house, Sally’s understanding of her father 
definitively and irreparably altered, Dick’s reconciliation of selves now seemingly 
realisable.134  
 
    From the beginning of the final season though it is clear that no such reconciliation 
has occurred, with Don eventually being reemployed at Sterling Cooper and Partners 
in a severely circumscribed role. Separated from Megan who now lives in California, 
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Don sells their Manhattan apartment, and, when Sterling Cooper and Partners is finally 
“absorbed” by McCann Erikson, goes on a road trip, ostensibly in search of a woman 
with whom he had a brief affair. The trip eventually takes him to California and to the 
home of Anna Draper, where Stephanie, her niece, is now staying. It is clear to 
Stephanie that Dick (as she knows him) is in crisis, and she insists that he goes with 
her to a countercultural retreat. Here, the identities of post-Korea Dick and Don 
become confused, as an increasingly disorientated and distraught Dick speaks to 
Stephanie as Don, confounding and upsetting her. After she leaves a session crying, 
feeling judged for having given up her baby, Dick follows her, but it is Don who talks 
to her, re-enacting an episode in the past with Peggy. She tells him “You're not my 
family. What's the matter with you?” but Don insists, “I just know how people work. 
You can put this behind you. It'll get easier as you move forward,” to which Stephanie 
replies, “Oh, Dick, I don't think you're right about that.” Dick/Don looks utterly lost and 
bereft at this point and, when he phones Peggy and tells her “I'm not the man you think 
I am,” it is clear that he is speaking as Dick, as he oscillates between identities in a 
state of near psychic meltdown, finally entering a semi-catatonic state after Stephanie 
leaves the retreat without him.135 He only overcomes this through the help of a woman 
who takes him to another session at the retreat where he is jolted out of his benumbed 
state by a stranger’s confession that “It's like no one cares that I'm gone.” Intensely 
moved by the weeping stranger’s feeling of abandonment and neglect, Dick hugs him 
and breaks down himself, grieving for his own diminished identities and for the 
abandonment of the young (self) ostracised Dick. Perhaps the final irony though is that 
in the last scene of the final episode we see an apparently reconciled Dick/Don at a 
yoga session, sitting cross-legged in the lotus position, as the yoga leader intones, 
“The new day brings new hope. The lives we've led, the lives we've yet to lead. New 
day, new ideas, a new you.”136 As the group chant “Om” repeatedly a beatific smile (or 
smirk) crosses Don’s/Dick’s face, and the scene cuts to the ‘I’d like to buy the world a 
Coke’ McCann Erickson 1971 Coke advertisement. The implication is clearly that Don 
will return to McCann Erikson and create the advertisement from his experience of the 
counterculture that, as shown by the yoga leader’s vacuous intoning of “a new day, 
new ideas, new you,” functions exactly as advertising does, to mollify people’s sense 
of personal inadequacy and to assuage their existential anguish. Any hope of post-
Korea Dick’s reconciliation with, and integration of, the young Dick Whitman, and so 
of authentic selfhood, is therefore irrevocably lost. As Don gains ascendancy, Dick 
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(both the post-Korea and childhood self) is repressed, sublimated, so that the “new 
ideas, new you” Don Draper can succeed in his self-mythologising and the 
mythologising of the advertising industry.  
 
    Although Don Draper/Dick Whitman is the central character in Mad Men, Peggy 
Olson is also of crucial importance in the series, and the dynamic of their evolving (and 
often combative) relationship is pivotal in its development. Peggy’s changing, self-
generated identity, created within an oppressive and belittling organisational culture of 
male entitlement, highlights the fear, complacency and hierarchical rigidity of that 
culture as it resists the societal changes of the early 1960s. As Lilly J. Goren suggests, 
“Don may be the tragic figure at the center of Mad Men, but Peggy is the character 
who engages with and, in many ways, adapts to the shifting cultural environments that 
surround her.”137 Peggy’s successful strivings for power and autonomy, for 
transcendent subjectivity and authentic selfhood, are remarkable, since all the cultural 
odds are stacked against her, and, as Kim Akass and Janet McCabe argue, “the ‘Mad 
Men’ may busy themselves constructing identities and telling women what they want, 
but it is how women like Peggy struggle for identity in and through those 
representations that is at stake here.”138 Expected to acquiesce passively in and to an 
other-directed identity based solely on her being-for-others, Peggy refuses to accept 
such an imposition and, over the course of the series, transforms herself, despite such 
oppression. As Fiona E. Cox notes, “the women of Mad Men are repeatedly shown to 
suffer because of their position within a gendered hierarchy that positions females 
primarily as the tantalizing focus of a desiring male gaze.” Peggy, however, refuses 
her designated position within that hierarchy, and subverts the gender stereotyping 
that causes such suffering. Rather than rely “on femininity to gain power… Peggy 
transgresses gender,” succeeding because of intellectual and creative merit, refusing 
to behave either like her female or her male colleagues.139 She is one of Lorraine Delia 
Kenny’s “insider-Others,” who “can appear fully ensconced on the inside, though “upon 
closer examination” it becomes apparent that “there is something not quite normative 
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enough about their identity or how they carry themselves in a normative world.”140 In 
rejecting her prescribed normative gender identity, Peggy necessarily accepts her 
insider-outsider status, neither part of the objectifying patriarchal culture of her male 
colleagues (and, initially, superiors), or accepted fully by her female colleagues, 
objectified and disempowered in the tyranny of the typing pool. It may seem, as Natalie 
Fuehrer Taylor suggests, that while Betty Draper, like many other women in Mad Men, 
“cannot – or does not want to – become Don, Peggy can and does,” but this notion is 
problematic for two reasons; firstly, she succeeds in her self-creation in a way that Don 
does not and cannot, and secondly, Peggy does not, as I have suggested, “behave 
like a man” as Taylor claims, but rather (within the societal constraints of the period) 
avoids adopting either a narrowly prescriptive female code of behaviour or a self-
alienating male behavioural code, both of which would result in further belittlement by 
the men with whom she works.141 Also, significantly, while those men retreat to the 
false idyll of suburbia, she moves independently away from (semi)suburban Bay Ridge 
in Brooklyn, and into the city, eventually buying an apartment in New York’s Upper 
West Side, antithetical to the idyllic, tranquil, suburban ideal cultivated by her 
colleagues. 
 
    Initially the innocent and ingenuous Peggy is employed as Don Draper’s secretary 
at Sterling Cooper, but her creativity – and refusal to accept a patriarchal other-
directed identity – soon becomes apparent. In a focus group for ‘Belle Jolie’ lipstick in 
which secretaries are asked to choose their favourite shade of colour, Peggy refrains 
from doing so, telling one of the executives, “I don't think anyone wants to be one of a 
hundred colors in a box,” and suggesting an inventive caption for the Belle Jolie ad, 
resulting in her being given copywriting work for the campaign, and subsequently 
being promoted (by Don) to junior copywriter.142 In this period she gains considerable 
weight, only realising she is pregnant when she is admitted to hospital with severe 
abdominal pains caused by her going into labour. That Peggy was in denial for the 
entire length of her pregnancy suggests a determination to create an identity as a 
successful copywriter unencumbered by oppressive gender restrictions, and shows, 
as Natalie Fuehrer Taylor argues, that “she was able to free herself, not only from 
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tradition and authority, but also from biology, in order to create a self.”143 It also 
highlights the oppressiveness of the identity and lifestyle she rejects; Peggy was 
pregnant by account executive Pete Campbell, whose suburban dream, far from being 
fulfilling, is rendered vacuous and purposeless for his wife Trudy when she discovers 
she is seemingly infertile. She asks Pete “What is all this for?” to which he replies 
lamely, “I don’t know.”144 The only person apart from her mother and sister who visits 
Peggy in hospital after she gives birth to a baby boy (she has been put in a psychiatric 
ward, her sister caring for the baby, her denial of maternity deemed pathological) is 
Don, who tells her, “Get out of here and move forward. This never happened. It will 
shock you how much it never happened.”145 This is of course ironic, given Dick’s 
inability to reconcile his young self with his post-Korean War self, his conflicted 
insistence that his childhood “never happened,” which repeatedly stops him (and so 
Don) moving forward. Peggy, however, is able to do precisely that, because she does 
not deny that she has given birth (even though she was in denial during her 
pregnancy), and does not deny her past, but accepts it in order to release herself from 
its determinative power. At the end of the second season, by which time Peggy has 
consolidated her position as copywriter and left the Catholic Church, freeing herself 
from the most oppressive force of her childhood and early adulthood, she tells Pete 
Campbell that she had his baby and gave the child up for adoption. Following his 
panicked protestations of love for her and crassly clichéd claim that his wife Trudy 
doesn’t know him, she tells him “I could have had you in my life forever if I wanted 
to…I could have shamed you into being with me. But I didn't want to…You got me 
pregnant. I had a baby, and I gave it away…I wanted other things.” Pete is 
uncomprehending and she tells him “Well…one day you’re there and then all of a 
sudden, there’s less of you. And you wonder where that part went, if it’s living 
somewhere outside of you. And you keep thinking maybe you’ll get it back. And then 
you realise it’s just gone.”146 It is easy to imagine Don Draper saying this, but from him 
such a statement would be disingenuous and mendacious, a forlorn desire for release 
from his childhood self as Dick Whitman. Peggy, however, experiences fully the pain 
of her choice, does not try to flee her anguish, and so can relinquish a painful past, as 
is apparent when in a later season she tells her colleague (and eventual lover and 
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partner) Stan Rizzo, “I’ve had loss in my life. You have to let yourself feel it. You can't 
dampen it with drugs and sex. It won't get you through.”147 
 
    It is ironic then that while Don acts, initially at least, as a kind of mentor for Peggy, 
both existentially and in her advertising career, he cannot achieve a chosen authentic 
selfhood in his false (and failing) suburban idyll, in the ways she does, in a process 
that, she knows, is continual, and unending. While it is true, as Sara Rogers argues, 
that “Peggy becomes a symbol of autonomy as she struggles to maintain belief in 
herself and to enact her own choices despite contrary pressure from her peers and 
her male superiors,” her relationship with Don is far more complex than with any of her 
other peers, and he is only nominally her superior, understanding as he does from his 
own experience her sense of being dispossessed and disenfranchised.148 As Mary 
Beth Haralovich notes, Don “tends to treat her as a genderless individual,” partially ‘re-
enfranchising’ her, though there are also “moments that reveal his awareness that she 
is a female in male world,” some of this momentary awareness evident from gender-
based abuse of Peggy by Don himself.149 However, he more often treats her as an 
equal, to a greater extent than the men she has relationships with, both at work and in 
her private life (which she endeavours to keep private) and recognises the strength 
and determination in her self-creation. Trying to persuade Peggy to join him in 
establishing a break-away company after Sterling Cooper has been bought by a British 
advertising company, which is itself being bought by McCann Erickson, he tells her 
“I've taken you for granted and I've been hard on you, but only because I think I see 
you as an extension of myself. And you’re not.” It is difficult to imagine a woman (then 
or now) seeing a man as an extension of herself, in view of gender inequalities, and 
Don’s comment would seem to be an admission of instrumentalism towards women. 
He may be suggesting, however, that he does not think of her as different from him 
because she’s a woman, and (seemingly paradoxically) that he recognises her 
sovereign selfhood and identity. The problem though, is that Don seems to think at 
times that he is responsible for bestowing that sovereignty, and also for her career, 
resulting in an arrogance that can only alienate Peggy, and when he shouts at her, 
“You should be thanking me every morning when you wake up, along with Jesus, for 
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giving you another day!” it seems inevitable that she will seek to build her career, and 
identity, elsewhere.150 
 
    Even when Peggy tells Don she is leaving to take up a position with a higher salary 
and more autonomy at another company, Don’s arrogance is unabated, as he blusters, 
“Let’s pretend I’m not responsible for every single good thing that’s ever happened to 
you,” and offers to beat the competitor’s salary. As Don really knows, however, and as 
Peggy tells him, “there is no number,” since her freedom to choose herself, her identity 
is at stake.151 In starting a sexual relationship with her new boss though, Peggy 
compromises that identity, and, when he promises to leave his wife to set up a home 
with her she is forced once again to disavow suburban domesticity as a meaningful 
life goal, telling him “I'm not that girl.” On hearing that he is relocating to California to 
save the (façade of) his happy suburban home life she says caustically, “Well, aren't 
you lucky to have decisions?” knowing his to be a retreat into a form of domestic 
sanctuary she would never choose precisely because it would deny her choice, her 
autonomy.152 The harmonious and happy suburban nuclear family (with a successful 
commuting husband and father and a dutiful housewife and mother) is in any case 
more a cultural fiction (one perpetrated by the advertising industry) than a reality, and 
American family structure and norms are already changing, as Peggy knows. She is 
able to use this knowledge when she wins a Burger Chef account for Sterling, Cooper 
and Partners. Peggy, now Don’s boss at SC&P, in an inversion that is also reflected 
in their personal relationship, tells him to work on ideas for a strategy. Their working 
and reworking of an idea featuring a nuclear family (mom, dad and two kids) stopping 
off for burgers and fries and eating together at home fails to convince them, and it is 
Peggy who finally understands why during a brainstorming session, asking Don, “Does 
this family exist anymore? Are there people who eat dinner and smile at each other 
instead of watching TV? Did you ever do that with your family?” Don replies that he 
doesn’t remember, and Peggy realises that the traditional suburban family, chimeric 
or real, is not who their ad should address, but rather the people (like her and, now, 
Don) who don’t have such a family and who see the societal and familial fragmentation 
that is occurring, for whom the tired nostalgia of advertising no longer resonates. Now 
it is her rather than Don who has the inspiration to break the creative impasse, asking 
“What if there was a place where you could go where there was no TV and you could 
break bread and whoever you were sitting with was family?” Suggesting they should 
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film the ad at a Burger Chef restaurant, she replies to Pete Campbell’s protestation 
that “it's not a home,” by telling him, “it's better. It's a clean, well-lighted place.”153 
 
    Such a familial and cultural environment is less inimical to Peggy’s inner-directed 
and self-created identity and when Sterling, Cooper and Partners are ‘absorbed’ by 
McCann Erickson and lose their status as an independent subsidiary, she takes up 
her new position with a transformative confidence and authority. When Dick/Don 
phones her from California, after a self-nullifying month-long road trip, he tells her he 
“messed everything up,” and that he “took another man's name and made nothing of 
it,” but she replies, “That's not true,” acknowledging his constant struggle to establish 
a credible and creditable identity.154 Where his struggle, though, leads to a 
disintegrative crisis, in the attempt to maintain a conflicted identity that cannot finally 
be sustained, her own self-creation (in what is also, of course, a fraught struggle) is 
successful and ongoing, adaptive and dynamic. It is Peggy who holds out the 
possibility of a kind of redemption for Dick/Don, mentee become (existential) mentor, 
even if, finally, such a redemption seems unlikely. She acts ethically, in Sartrean terms, 
willing Dick’s/Don’s freedom as she wills her own. As Aviva Dove-Viebahn suggests, 
“through Peggy, Don may see a possibility for looking forward and not back, but it is 
one he is not able to fully adopt for himself. Peggy’s refusal to follow traditional 
feminine inclinations – motherhood, marriage, domesticity – predicates her willingness 
to sidestep the status quo and make her own future in spite of her past.”155 In doing so 
Peggy chooses not just independence, but existential authenticity, and the challenge 
of self-creation, recognising her being-for-others, her facticity, an injurious but not 
determinative past, but also her transcendent subjectivity and freedom.  
 
    The theme of existential authenticity, and the related concerns with conformity, 
uniformity, and personal autonomy, is paramount in the three novels discussed in this 
chapter, and in Matthew Weiner’s Mad Men, and it is inextricably linked to 1950s (and 
early 1960s) suburbia. Emblematic of a spurious normalcy, yet inchoate in its liminality, 
in its geographical indeterminacy and amorphous identity, suburbia both offers an 
other-directed and apparently secure, stable identity, yet problematizes that identity 
through its liminal nature, causing unease and anxiety in its inhabitants. Harry ‘Rabbit’ 
Angstrom in Rabbit, Run needs the external validation of suburban Mt. Judge for a 
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sense of ‘locatedness’, seeks the self-objectification and oppression of Sartre’s ‘the 
look’ from others in order to feel any sense of self, and, until the end of the novel, finds 
comfort in an illusory cultural uniformity. Frank and April Wheeler in Revolutionary 
Road seem initially to be more self-aware than Harry Angstrom, but their self-
deception is soon apparent in their disavowal of the suburban conformity and 
uniformity they need for their other-directed, reflected identities, these identities 
symbolically bestowed, not diminished, as they believe, by the picture window in their 
suburban house. Binx Bolling, in The Moviegoer, however, anonymised in the New 
Orleans suburb of Gentilly, is the most disingenuous of all the protagonists in these 
novels, his ironic dissembling concealing an anguished desire for an externally 
validated identity, and a consequent negation of his freedom, a selfhood founded on 
his being-for-others.  
 
    While the ‘inner-directed’ Don Draper/Dick Whitman is perhaps the only one of the 
male protagonists in these literary texts (if Mad Men can be considered a literary as 
well as a filmic text) who actively struggles with and for existential authenticity, in his 
conflicted and irreconcilable identities, it is Peggy Olson in Matthew Weiner’s series, 
and Kate Cutrer in The Moviegoer, who recognise most fully their existential freedom 
and who strive for personal authenticity and autonomy. Kate, in her extreme anguish, 
cannot accept her being-for-others as an inevitable facet of her identity, coexisting with 
her being-for-itself, her transcendent subjectivity, but finally, in order to assuage that 
anguish, capitulates to an oppressive identity based only on her being-for-others, her 
good faith subsumed by bad faith. Peggy, however, is able to acknowledge both her 
self-objectification through her being-for-others, and her past as facticity, but also her 
freedom and transcendence. In a culture based on a rigid and conformist patriarchal 
hierarchy, with a seeming uniformity of aspiration, this recognition, and the resultant 
determination to forge a self-created and processive identity, sets Peggy apart from 
her male counterparts, who, in bad faith, acquiesce in their other-directedness, 
bolstering their bad faith in normative suburbia. For women, of course, an imposed 
other-directed identity would be especially oppressive and restrictive, with none of the 
(sexual or financial) licence that a societally sanctioned identity might grant men, and 
suburbia could only heighten that oppressiveness.  
 
    In such a culture, it may seem remarkable that it is only women who evince good 
faith and achieve a form of existential authenticity. However, it is precisely its 
oppressiveness that necessarily heightens Kate Cutrer’s and Peggy Olson’s 
awareness of bad faith, which does not provide the same assuaging of anguish for 
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them that it does for men; objectification of women is fundamental to men’s bad faith, 
a negation of the potential threat they pose to male hegemony, one that is neutralised 
through women’s acceptance of a gendered being-for-others identity. Although Sartre 
does not directly address this in any of his writing, Simone de Beauvoir’s analysis of 
women’s societal position in The Second Sex (1949) is in part an application of Sartre’s 
philosophy in Being and Nothingness to gender relations.156 The ideas and arguments 
presented in this seminal text are clearly Beauvoir’s rather than Sartre’s, but his 
ontological system informs them, and the concepts of being-in-itself, being-for-itself, 
being-for-others, and bad faith in relation to oneself and others, are key in her analysis. 
Beauvoir’s claim that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” encapsulates 
the complex arguments she makes at length, identifying gender as constructed, and 
women as aware of, if not complicit in, their objectification. “Man,” she suggests, 
“wants woman to be object: she makes herself object; at the very moment when she 
does that, she is exercising a free activity.”157 Clearly, when the men in the texts 
discussed here accept an other-directed identity, their being-for-others, this can 
provide a false refuge in bad faith from the anguish caused by existential 
indeterminacy and freedom; however, this does not deprive them entirely of agency, 
whereas for Kate and Peggy (and of course for other women in the 1950s) such an 
acceptance entails a forfeiture of any semblance of autonomy or self-determination.  
 
    Beauvoir’s analysis has a particular relevance and resonance with respect to 
gender relations in 1950s American corporate culture, and the significance of suburbia 
for each gender within that culture. Betty Friedan acknowledged this in The Feminine 
Mystique (1962), a study of American women’s political and social-economic position 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, one very much concerned with the plight of 
suburban housewives in particular. Friedan cites Beauvoir’s influence on her study 
and her thought, but the analysis in The Feminine Mystique is certainly not informed 
by Beauvoir’s existentialism, and in places seems to be a repudiation of it. George 
Cotkin notes that although both writers “approach women’s questions largely through 
an existential perspective…there is no indication” that Friedan “gained any theoretical 
structure or essential interpretive thrust from her reading of The Second Sex.”158 
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germane to the discussion here, and because I think the wording in places detracts from, rather than 
enhancing, the clarity of Beauvoir’s exposition as translated by Parshley. 
157 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1949 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 295, p. 626. 
158 George Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 253. 
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Indeed, Friedan “consigned Beauvoir to the briefest, inessential reference,” refusing 
“to see herself as either an acolyte of Beauvoir or a footnote to The Second Sex.” 
Because she considered Beauvoir’s thinking “abstract and theoretical, in contrast to 
her own brand of pragmatic existentialism, fully in the American grain,” she necessarily 
discounted the essential philosophical foundations of that thinking, and their 
implications for women’s societal position and for gender relations.159 “It is my thesis,” 
she claims in The Feminine Mystique, “that the core of the problem for women today 
is not sexual but a problem of identity – a stunting or evasion of growth that is 
perpetuated by the feminine mystique.”160 Friedan goes on to argue that many women, 
and suburban housewives especially, “have become dependent, passive, childlike; 
they have given up their adult frame of reference to live at the lower human level of 
food and things. The work they do does not require adult capabilities; it is endless, 
monotonous, unrewarding.”161 Women’s liberation from such demeaning work and 
from the “stunting or evasion of growth” of the feminine mystique, would require “men 
as well as women, scared liberals, disillusioned radicals, conservatives bewildered 
and frustrated by change – the whole nation” to reject “this mystique of feminine 
fulfilment…the cherished and self-perpetuating core of contemporary American 
culture.”162 For this change to occur and for sexual equality to be possible, 
relationships would need to be built on “the love of self-actualizing people” which is 
“not motivated by need, to make up a deficiency in the self.” Such relationships would 
require “the transcendence of self,” which “can only be attained by one who is himself, 
or herself, complete, by one who has realized his or her own identity.”163 Such 
completeness would, however, be an impossible fusing of transcendence and facticity 
in Beauvoir’s terms. Moreover, the desire to realise one’s identity as something 
complete, the desire to be complete, unchanging, is an impulse towards inauthenticity. 
Such an impulse, Beauvoir claims, is futile, and “want of authenticity does not pay: 
each blames the other for the unhappiness he or she has incurred in yielding to the 
temptations of the easy way; what man and woman loathe in each other is the 
shattering frustration of each one’s own bad faith.”164 The want of authenticity also 
denies the inevitability of ‘the look’, objectification by others, and one’s objectification 
of others, and so does not recognise the (for Beauvoir) inevitability of conflict in all 
human relationships, not just those between men and women. “Mutually recognizing 
                                               
159 Ibid. p. 254, p. 255. 
160 Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 1963 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 68. 
161 Ibid. p. 266. 
162 Ibid. p. 164, p. 16. 
163 Ibid. p.280, pp. 281-282, p. 282. 
164 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1949 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 728. 
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each other as subject,” Beauvoir writes, “each will yet remain for the other an other.”165 
Even if two people recognise each other’s subjectivity, if “two human beings [are] 
associated in their transcendence,” this would not mean that each has a complete and 
fully realised identity, independent of each other. This is an essential tenet of 
Beauvoir’s philosophy, one Friedan either tacitly rejects or fails to acknowledge. It is 
perhaps not surprising then, as Cotkin suggests, that a meeting between the two 
women in Paris in 1975, “proved to be chilly.” Friedan found Beauvoir to be “curt, 
distracted, and abstract in her thinking,” whilst Beauvoir would have considered 
Friedan’s “pragmatic existentialism,” so clearly “in the American grain,” to be 
“hopelessly bourgeois.”166 
 
    In The Second Sex, then, Beauvoir’s feminist philosophical analysis is 
unequivocally founded on the existentialism Friedan failed to engage with, and, 
crucially, the notions of authenticity and freedom. With other men, she contends, man 
is “a free agent confronting other free agents under laws fully recognised by all; but 
with woman – she was invented for this purpose – he casts off the responsibility of 
existence, he abandons himself to the mirage of his en-soi [being-in-itself], he puts 
himself on the plane of inauthenticity.”167 If the environment in which this occurs is 
normative suburbia, man’s retreat from the corporate world is dependent on a dutiful, 
self-abnegating wife. Such a retreat into a kind of feigned existential stasis, into a 
denial of transcendence and entrenchment in the ‘security’ of facticity, depends on the 
suburban wife being deprived even of such facticity. This would indicate a past and a 
form of selfhood, which she must relinquish in order to accept her being-for-others, a 
self-negation, obviating for man the potential existential threat posed by the Other. 
Consequently, as Beauvoir argues, “her whole existence is waiting, since she is 
confined in the limbo of immanence and contingence, and since her justification is 
always in the hands of others.”168 In this way, suburban woman in particular can only 
exist in a present, unable to transcend her immediate experience, the significance of 
which is determined by man. Conformity, acceptance of an other-directed identity and 
being-for-others, does not actually negate that identity, or self, for men; for women, 
however, it is obliterative of selfhood. For a woman to be independent in the 1950s, 
then, as Kate Cutrer attempts to be, and Peggy Olson succeeds in being, conformity 
to the suburban ideal for women can only be disempowering; as Beauvoir suggests, 
                                               
165 Ibid. p. 740. 
166 George Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), p.252, 
p. 255. 
167  Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1949 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 624.  
168 Ibid. pp. 621-622. 
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“whereas conformity is quite natural for a man – custom being based on his needs as 
an independent and active individual – it will be necessary for the woman who also is 
subject, activity, to insinuate herself into a world that has doomed her to passivity.”169 
In doing so, such a woman can hardly be unaware of men’s bad faith, and, by 
extension, her own, since she is complicit in the construction of the being-for-others 
identity she strives to transcend, and this implies awareness of all identity as a 
construct, as mutable and contingent. With this recognition comes the possibility of 
good faith, and of existential authenticity, so it is perhaps not surprising that women 
may be able to achieve these in a way that men cannot (or believe they cannot).  
 
    Beauvoir argues that woman is “suspicious of the principle of constant identity,” 
senses that fixity of self is chimeric, and so “does not entertain the positive belief that 
the truth is something other than men claim; she recognises, rather, that there is not 
any fixed truth.”170 She can consequently see “the contingent, absurd, unnecessary 
inverse of the imposing structure built by the males” and in regard to that structure 
“has a sense of misgiving…which is nearer to authenticity than is the self-important 
assurance of her husband.”171 This is not, of course, to suggest that achieving good 
faith or authenticity would be any less daunting for Kate, Peggy or other women in the 
1950s than for men; such an attainment would be far more difficult in many ways 
because of the rigidity of women’s being-for-others identity and the negation of both 
their facticity and transcendence. Consciousness of bad faith would, however, be 
harder for them to constantly and consistently disavow. That Kate, already cloistered, 
almost completely isolated, does finally founder, acquiesce in bad faith to (as seems 
inevitable) suburban oppression and nullification, while Peggy steadfastly refuses 
such self-abnegation, may perhaps be attributed to Peggy’s incremental self-
empowerment, and hence self-determination, in corporate culture, rendering an 
identity based solely on being-for-others untenable, and, possibly, unimaginable. 
 
    This is clearly not true, however, of the male protagonists of the three novels 
discussed in this chapter; their failure to allow good faith to supplant bad faith, and so 
to allow the possibility of acceptance of ontological freedom and the anguish that it 
causes, leading to existential authenticity, has dire implications for the fictional 
suburbanites of later decades. If suburbia is already associated with bad faith in these 
novels set in the mid-to-late 1950s, in the 1960s and throughout the following decades, 
                                               
169 Ibid. p. 692. 
170 Ibid. p. 624. 
171 Ibid. p. 637, p. 638. 
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bad faith becomes pathological in an increasingly suburbanised culture. It is manifest, 
as seen in the previous three chapters, through the desire for a kind of entropic state 
of being, a retreat into Other-denying solipsism in what Christopher Lasch calls the 
“culture of narcissism” (prefigured in the last scene of Mad Men) and through extreme 
violence in response to existential contingency.172 Fictive suburbia is now emblematic 
of, and even analogous to, bad faith, a cultural landscape that is inimical to the 
recognition or realisation of existential authenticity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
172 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in An Age of Diminishing 
Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Ltd, 1979). 
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 Conclusion: America’s influence on Sartre and the Americanisation 
             of existentialism 
 
    The preceding chapters have discussed the literary impact and influence of Sartre’s 
philosophy on US fiction of the suburbs in the second half of the twentieth century, the 
Americanisation and suburbanisation of existentialism. His influence on US culture 
and thought more broadly has been documented in Ann Fulton’s Apostles of Sartre: 
Existentialism in America, 1945 – 1963 (1999), and George Cotkin’s Existential 
America (2003), discussed in the introduction. Yet the influence of American culture 
on Sartre has received little attention, which seems curious given his visits to America 
in the 1940s and his commentaries on various aspects of the country in the 1940s and 
1950s – its architecture, education, media, music, literature, and its ostensibly 
conformist culture. The influence here was clearly not unidirectional; indeed, American 
culture had a profound effect on Sartre and, to some extent, on the evolution of his 
ideas in the 1950s and 1960s. It is important, then, to consider the interplay of 
influence when assessing this period in US literary culture, one in which Sartre’s 
influence on suburban literature grew, and was concomitant, perhaps ironically, with 
the rise of his increasingly entrenched anti-Americanism. My aim here is to address, 
firstly, how Sartre’s thinking was influenced by US society and culture, and then to 
consider what Americanisation and suburbanisation did to Sartre’s philosophy, 
expounded in Being and Nothingness (1943) and developed in later works. In 
particular I will focus on the significance of recurrent existential themes and their 
reworking in the American context. In doing so I will suggest that a reading of the 
preceding chapters in reverse order – from the preoccupation with authenticity in the 
1950s and 1960s discussed in Chapter Four, to the concern with contingency in the 
late 1960s, analysed in Chapter Three, and the prevalence of solipsism and an 
obsession with entropy in the 1970s and 1980s, identified in the first two chapters – 
provides an insight into a society in (deepening) cultural and existential crisis. I will 
also consider the legacy of the existentialist suburban fiction of the late twentieth 
century, one that has largely been renounced, or at least ignored, in favour of social 
satire and societal critique in early twenty-first-century fiction of the suburbs.  
 
    Sartre’s attitude to US culture in the 1940s and 1950s was, to say the least, 
ambivalent. As Marie-Christine Granjon observes, he, like Simone de Beauvoir, 
“combined a love for jazz and Hollywood films…with a burning enthusiasm for the 
American novel – Dos Passos, Faulkner, Hemingway, Steinbeck, Caldwell – which 
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they saw as revolutionising narrative techniques.”1 Even when Sartre became highly 
critical of the US he continued to praise such writers, refusing, as Richard Pells notes, 
to “repudiate his earlier infatuation with American culture and, above all, with American 
literature,” describing in 1946 “how exciting it had been a decade before to encounter 
the work of a new generation of American writers.”2 What is particularly striking though 
about Sartre’s early writing on America is his preoccupation with physical space, and 
the cultural and psychological significance he attributes to the openness and 
homogeneity of public spaces, lacking clear boundaries and borders. Sartre wrote 
about cities, but the features he identified were more characteristic of the newly 
burgeoning suburbs.  In an article for Le Figaro (‘American Cities’) in 1945 he 
describes American city streets as “frail and temporary, formless and 
unfinished…haunted by the presence of the immense geographical space surrounding 
them…nothing in them is definitive.” Emblematic of a cultural sense of optimistic 
expectancy, the city is, for Americans, “mainly a future; what they like in the city is 
everything it has not yet become and everything it can be.” American houses were 
notable precisely for “the uniformity of their patterns,” which “give one the feeling, when 
in the middle of the city, of walking through the suburbs of a watering town, like 
Trouville or Cabourg or La Baule.”3 In ‘New York, the Colonial City’, published in Town 
and Country in 1946, Sartre’s unease and sense of disorientation in such open and ill-
defined spaces is clear. In New York his “gaze met nothing but space. It slid over 
blocks of identical houses, with nothing to arrest it; it was about to lose itself in empty 
space, at the horizon.” He “could only find filmy atmospheres, longitudinally stretched 
masses with nothing to mark a beginning or an end.” Although Sartre’s “position is 
marked out in longitude and latitude,” there is “no valid reason” justifying his “presence 
in this place rather than in any other, since this one is so like another.” In such spaces 
“you never lose your way, and you are always lost,” so that, Sartre suggests, “you can 
experience the anguish of solitude here, but never that of oppression.”4 
 
    Sartre considered homogenous (and homogenising) American architecture to be 
illustrative of a kind, and degree, of conformity peculiar to the US. In ‘Individualism and 
                                               
1 Marie-Christine Granjon, ‘Sartre, Beauvoir, Aron: An Ambiguous Affair’ in Denis Lacorne, Jacques 
Rupnik and Marie-France Toinet, eds. The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French 
Perception (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 117. 
2 Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture 
Since World War II (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 248. 
3 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘American Cities’ in Literary and Philosophical Essays (London: Rider and 
Company, 1955), p. 117, p. 112, pp. 112-113. 
4 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘New York, the Colonial City’ in Literary and Philosophical Essays (London: Rider 
and Company, 1955), p. 119, p. 121, p. 123. 
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Conformism in the United States’, originally published in Le Figaro in February 1945, 
he suggests that “the American…makes it a point of honour to do as he is asked. It is 
when he is acting like everyone else that he feels most reasonable and most American; 
it is in displaying his conformism that he feels freest.” It is this apparent cultural 
valorisation of conformity, the ideological commitment to it as conformism – and the 
paradoxical sense of freedom that seemingly accompanies it – which interests Sartre. 
By performing the same actions as everyone else, such as buying a ticket for the 
subway every day, the American supposedly feels “just like everyone else. Not like an 
anonymous unit, but like a man who has divested himself of his individuality and raised 
himself to the impersonality of the Universal.”5 Sartre’s understanding of this seems to 
be that selfhood and individualism are (if they are not to become burdensome 
afflictions) manifestations of that conformism, since belief in individualism is a 
collective creed, and being – or at least feeling – like everyone else is both a token of 
cultural allegiance and belonging, and an indicator of one’s individual, separate 
identity, one the individual is free to create precisely through the same validation from 
others, who also feel like everyone else. “American individualism,” Sartre argues, “is 
not incompatible with conformism, but, on the contrary, implies it.” This, he suggests, 
is entirely alien to French culture (and history), since for the French (and presumably 
other Europeans) “individualism has retained the old, classical form of ‘the individual’s 
struggle against society, and more particularly against the state’. There is no question 
of this in America.”6 The suggestion here seems to be that while individualism, the 
ideological privileging of the individual over the group (or society), may be a 
fundamental tenet of US culture, individuality, the actual solitary experience and 
recognition of difference from others as constitutive of selfhood, ironically, is not.  As 
a consequence, the American “feels lulled by an immense solicitude that never leaves 
him helpless or abandoned.” While “the solitary person arouses suspicion,” a “hedged-
in individualism is encouraged,” one that is not antagonistic or antisocial, since 
“personality must be won,” and is “a social function or the affirmation of society.”7  
 
    What is interesting about this in the context of this study, is that Americans, or 
American socio-political commentators at least, were (contrary to Sartre’s inference) 
well aware by the mid to late 1940s of the societal tendency towards conformism, and 
by the 1950s it was precisely oppositional individualism – the putative absence of 
                                               
5 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Individualism and Conformism in the United States’ in Literary and Philosophical 
Essays (London: Rider and Company, 1955), p. 101, p. 102. 
6 Ibid. p. 103, p. 102. 
7 Ibid. p. 100, p. 105, p. 106. 
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which struck Sartre – that was increasingly valorised as a marker of integrity and 
personal authenticity, as discussed in Chapter Four. If Sartre’s antipathy to America 
was not yet entrenched by the mid-1940s, when the articles for Le Figaro and Town 
and Country were published, he was nonetheless predisposed, as discussed in the 
introduction, to view Americans as lacking reflective depth and as unsusceptible to 
existential anguish, encouraged by a superficial US culture to pursue “a life of rosy 
ease” and to be “conventionally happy.”8 In adopting this perspective Sartre was, 
Philippe Roger argues, attempting to “translate ‘Americanism’ culturally… by analysing 
it as the psychological key to the way Americans are socialized,” though he also 
suggests that in doing so Sartre was (perhaps unintentionally) reinvigorating an 
historical (European, and specifically French) prejudice, “continuing the anti-American 
discourse…by conferring on old phobias the prestige of original nauseas.” 
Americanism, Roger claims, was an empty, or at best nebulous, concept, a “false 
antonym” to anti-Americanism that “has nothing to do with it, either historically or 
logically”; rather, he suggests, with a wry allusion to, and extrapolation from, Sartre’s 
maxim, “anti-Americanism’s existence always preceded any essence of America.”9 
While it seems unlikely that Sartre would have knowingly reinforced “old phobias” it 
does seem that, despite his wish to “translate ‘Americanism’ culturally,” something was 
not so much lost in that translation as superimposed. The imposition, or assumption, 
of determinative cultural traits may have disinclined Sartre to concede, or even 
consider, the receptiveness of Americans to existentialism, and it seems doubtful that 
he would have been aware of the continued influence of his ideas on literature of the 
1960s and later decades of the twentieth century. Yet in his early writing in the 1940s 
he identifies features of American society that are likely to engender the anguish that 
is so central to an understanding of his ontological system: the sense of spatial and 
conceptual indeterminacy and liminality, the precariousness and ephemeralness of 
constructs, architectural and cultural, the enculturation through comprehensive 
organizational membership and ostensible belonging, underscoring a potential loss of 
personal autonomy – an autonomy that, if strived for and attained, might render an 
individual “free to escape into an almost Nietzschean individualism, the kind 
symbolized by the skyscrapers in the bright sky of New York”; and the geographical 
                                               
8 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Americans and Their Myths’, The Nation, October 18, 1947, accessed 08/01/15 
from: http://www.thenation.com/article/americans-and-their-myths. 
9 Philippe Roger, The American Enemy: The History of French Anti-Americanism (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. xiii, pp. 361-362, p. xiv. 
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openness that can alienate, diminish, through its sheer expansiveness, so that the 
individual may “experience the anguish of solitude.”10  
 
    By reading the chapters in this study in reverse order, however, it is possible to chart 
an historical failure in US culture to address the existential challenges that successive 
decades posed – challenges that were both personal, concerning the anguish of 
individual existence and identity, identified by Sartre, and national, as that anguish 
was mirrored in a collective societal loss of assumptive identity, one that was 
repeatedly and profoundly challenged. Morris Dickstein argues that “if social suffering, 
poverty, and exploitation topped the agenda of the arts in the 1930s, neurosis, anxiety, 
and alienation played the same role in the forties and fifties when economic fears were 
largely put to rest.”11 Though this is perhaps an overstatement of artistic trends (and 
societal ones, since anxieties concerning economics – and suffering, poverty and 
exploitation themselves – were hardly absent in the 1940s and 50s), it does identify 
the beginnings of a shift in the arts (and certainly in literature) towards existential 
themes and concerns. Dickstein goes on to discuss American literature specifically in 
the post-war years and subsequent decades of the twentieth century, noting that the 
world of writers who began publishing after the war was one of “material comfort and 
its dissatisfactions, including anomie, alienation, and a nagging sense of 
weightlessness; of a turn inward towards the self and its problems of identity; a world 
dominated by the utopian ease and abundance made possible by technology.” More 
importantly though, “by cultivating the self, not entirely without a certain narcissism, 
these writers found new ways of writing the history of their times, an age of prosperity 
and therapy when the exigent, imperial self became the obsessive concern of many 
Americans.”12 
 
    This obsession, or overriding preoccupation, is apparent in all of the novels 
discussed in this study, and suburbia was, of course, the key symbol of prosperity at 
this time, of “material comfort and its dissatisfactions.” The first of these 
dissatisfactions to emerge was with the very circumstances and environment that 
made such material comfort possible, was actually with the form it took, its 
manifestation; that is, suburbia. The self-conscious awareness of, and discourse 
                                               
10 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Individualism and Conformism in the United States’, p.106; Jean-Paul Sartre, 
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12 Ibid. p. 17, p.18. 
 205 
 
about, the newly burgeoning suburbs of the 1950s as an environment that was 
existentially threatening, as one that was inimical to its inhabitants’ individuality and 
personal authenticity, is largely limited to this period.13 Its social commentaries present 
alarmist critiques of the encroaching, and numbing, cultural and existential 
homogenization the suburbs foster; suburbia also provides the substance, not just the 
setting, of many of its novels (and, in part, of the first three seasons of the revisionist 
TV series Mad Men). Such novels are more explicitly about the suburbs than in later 
decades, when their ubiquity was established and the debilitating effects they had on 
suburbanite protagonists were less clearly definable, when the sense of malaise and 
ill-defined dread was all-pervasive but nebulously enervating, as illustrated by 
suburbanites’ retreat into solipsism and their obsession with entropy. In the 1950s, by 
contrast, suburbanite protagonists had a (self-consciously) oppositional relation to 
their environment, which (ironically) was definitional for them, vital to their sense of 
self, though as discussed in Chapter Four, Harry Angstrom in Rabbit Run (1960), 
Frank and April Wheeler in Revolutionary Road (1961), and Binx Bolling in The 
Moviegoer (1962), all believe that their identities are internally generated, indicative of 
their individuality; all deny that those identities are actually other-directed, founded on 
their being-for-others, and that rather than undermining their sense of self, suburbia is 
constitutive of it. In this way they exemplify Sartrean bad faith and inauthenticity, but 
such faith seems faltering, less entrenched than that of the suburban protagonists of 
novels of the late 1960s and subsequent decades.  
 
    By 1969, when Cheever’s Bullet Park was published (and a year after the 
publication of Oates’ Expensive People), the American suburbs already seemed to be 
besieged, no longer a safe and comfortable refuge from the tumultuous societal 
upheaval of the period. Rather than bemoaning the dulling, numbing effects of 
suburbia, Cheever’s Eliot Nailles resents the encroachment of urban life on Bullet 
Park, and, in his fearful, anguished state, desperately craves a tranquility the suburbs 
cannot now provide, wants to feel more numbed, not less, which the murderous, but 
equally anguished, Paul Hammer is determined to prevent. While Richard Everett in 
Oates’ novel sneeringly and disingenuously disparages the tranquilizing calm both 
Hammer and Nailles seek, he is no less desperate for such a state, his self-defeating 
violence failing to becalm him more than momentarily. These characters’ bad faith is 
                                               
13 Although suburbia is presented as an environment that encourages conformism and lack of 
individuality in some late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century suburban fiction (discussed 
in the final part of this chapter), it is not depicted as an existential threat to its inhabitants, but rather as 
an environment that encourages a concern with social status, consumerist aspiration, and that affords 
an ultimately unfulfilling materialistic lifestyle. 
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all pervasive, central to who they are, or can allow themselves to be, and a concern 
with personal authenticity is now inadmissible, since this would only heighten their 
existential dread, as they seek to deny contingency, to believe in a reassuring, but 
bogus, causality to explain their identity and selfhood, randomness and chance events 
undermining that bad faith. Both novels reflect the anxiety caused by the events of the 
mid-to-late 1960s, and the changes occurring throughout US society – including an 
increase in violent crime, the assassinations of Kennedy and King, the burgeoning civil 
rights movement, the continuing war in Vietnam and the (sometimes violent) anti-war 
movement – but they register them obliquely, through heightened existential anguish 
and an extremity of violence in response to intimations of contingency, intimations (and 
violence) that are seemingly incongruous in such an environment, an affront to the 
very notion of ordered, purposeful and placid suburbia. While this incongruity is 
repeatedly highlighted in Bullet Park, Cheever also seems to suggest that urban 
disorder is impinging on suburban culture, though there was at this time a form of 
urban displacement rather than an intrusion; as Philip Jenkins notes, since the 1940s 
increasing numbers of city residents had been moving to suburbs, a demographic 
change hastened by fears of rising crime and urban violence.14 Suburban, rather than 
urban, crime and violence are central to Updike’s Rabbit Redux (1971), which, unlike 
Oates’ and Cheever’s novels, does explicitly address societal changes, yet again the 
vision is of existential crisis and denial, as Harry Angstrom’s bad faith, tenuously 
maintained in Rabbit, Run, is transformed into an almost pathological nullification of 
others and his own past. Harry, more than any other character discussed in this study, 
exemplifies the oscillation in Sartrean bad faith between self-objectification (being-for-
others), central to Rabbit, Run, and, in Rabbit Redux, objectification of others through 
‘the look’, so that the young runaway hippie girl and the black militant Vietnam veteran 
in the novel are denied full subjectivity, enabling Harry to maintain a cold detachment 
from them, and to commit impassive acts of violence against them, almost indifferent 
to the societal change of which they are emblematic. Like Eliot Nailles and Richard 
Everett, Harry Angstrom responds to his existential anguish, heightened by the social 
tumult of the 1960s, by attempting to deny both; since bad faith is an attempt to 
assuage, to nullify, anguish, it also necessitates the nullification, through denial, of the 
societal changes that impinge on suburban life and intensify that anguish. Such denial 
is also apparent in Ann Beattie’s later Falling in Place (1980) though the principal 
characters in the novel are less able to insulate (and isolate) themselves against (and 
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from) the national sense of an ever-present existential threat, in the wake of crises that 
contributed to the sense of besiegement in the US, including the taking hostage of 
fifty-two Americans in the November 1979 occupation of the US embassy in Tehran, 
the Soviet Union’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, potentially catalyzing a 
military confrontation that always seemed imminent, the mass suicide in November of 
the previous year of over 900 people in Californian James Jones’ religious cult in 
Guyana, and the general perception of increasing, and increasingly random, violence 
throughout society. As NASA’s disintegrated space station, Skylab, falls to Earth, its 
atomized debris scattered, Beattie’s suburbanites nonetheless manage to exist, if only 
temporarily, in a state of somnambulant impassivity – except, that is, for a child of 
eleven, whose anguished violence against his sister (like Richard Everett’s violence in 
Expensive People) can only provoke a momentary, muted recognition of suburban bad 
faith, its denial in existential inauthenticity of contingency. 
 
    Such recognition, if fully acknowledged, would undermine the (self-defeating) 
project of bad faith and heighten the anguish it seeks to forestall. It is unsurprising 
then, that in Beattie’s novel and in other late twentieth-century suburban fiction, bad 
faith is entrenched, strengthened rather than diminished, as suburbia becomes an 
increasingly insular environment. This insularity is reflected in suburbanite 
protagonists’ near-hermetic withdrawal into an alienated and isolated solipsism, the 
attempted nullification of all external sources of existential disquiet, but also, in some 
of the fiction of this period, in a preoccupation with entropy, as the suburb becomes a 
‘closed system’. This can be seen in Updike’s suburbia, as Tony Tanner suggests, and 
especially in Rabbit is Rich (1981) a novel in which “death and decay are subtly 
pervasive.”15 Joseph Heller’s Something Happened (1974), however, exemplifies, 
more than any other novel, this thematic concern with entropy, but also with the retreat 
into Other-denying solipsism, depicted through the relentless monologue of its 
protagonist, Bob Slocum, who, as John W. Aldridge observes, “lives a life deodorized 
of want and contingency,” yet is “entombed in isolation,” existing only as “a mind 
encapsulated in a bubble of self-awareness afloat in a void.”16 These concerns are, of 
course, interrelated (and each seems to bolster the other in Heller’s novel), so that, as 
Tanner notes, in reference to Thomas Pynchon’s V (1963), with “the acceleration of 
entropy” there is a concomitant “avoidance of human relationships based on reciprocal 
                                               
15 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950 – 1970, 1971 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976), 
pp. 288-289. 
16 John W. Aldridge, The American Novel and the Way We Live Now (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983), p. 38, p. 35. 
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recognition of the reality of the partner.” Tanner suggests that “entropy and the dread 
of love may well be linked in some way, for they show a parallel movement towards 
the state of lasting inanimateness, and share an aspiration to eradicate consciousness 
and revert to thing-status.”17 The desire of a consciousness for “thing-status”, for the 
unrealizable state of being-in-itself-for-itself, is bad faith, and the confluence of the 
themes of entropy (the entropic drive of consciousness) and solipsism is the defining 
feature of American existentialist fiction, indicative of a profound cultural and 
psychological sense of indeterminacy, of a lack of fixity, stability, or permanence. 
Sartre commented on these fundamental aspects of US culture in his writing on 
America in the 1940s, yet he did not acknowledge the receptiveness they engendered 
to existentialism, perhaps as a result of his own European enculturation and his 
nascent anti-Americanism. Tanner, however, identifies insubstantiality of identity, at 
both personal and institutional level, as a defining feature of American, rather than 
European, culture and literature, since  
 
The American writer has much less sense of a stable society which his hero 
encounters and enters – the process by which the European hero usually gains 
an identity. The institutions, even the buildings, of American society have never 
had this stability, and the American writer is more likely to express through his 
hero his own sense of their bewildering fluidity…and the sense of moving among 
insubstantial ephemera.18 
 
    In their indeterminacy and liminality, isolated and isolating, the suburbs are an 
illuminating environment in which to explore this sense of bewilderment, which, in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, became more a sense of beleaguered exhaustion, with a 
process of seemingly irreversible entropic national decline and decay well underway. 
Phillip Jenkins notes that “the condition of American cities promoted a sense of 
economic decay…In just eight years in the 1970s, New York City lost half a million 
private sector jobs. As downtowns deteriorated, new malls and suburban shopping 
centers flourished, revolutionising concepts of social space.” Such lower middle-class 
suburban spaces are often the location of Raymond Carver’s stories, which frequently 
depict entropic dissolution, though Carver’s stories generally take place in suburban 
interiors, reflecting a diminishment rather than a revolutionising of the concept of social 
space. Jenkins further suggests that “in the summer of 1977, it did not seem far-
                                               
17 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950 – 1970, 1971 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976), 
p. 159. 
18 Ibid. p. 151. 
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fetched to imagine a systematic collapse of US influence much along the lines of what 
befell the Soviet bloc in 1989,” since “with Communist parties seeking inclusion in 
several European governments,” amongst other political developments, “the future of 
NATO and the Western Alliance seemed shaky,” provoking fears that “the West would 
be politically and militarily castrated.”19 Rather less dramatically, Edward D. Berkowitz 
characterizes the 1970s as “a painful decade of transition,” one in which  
 
The previously accepted dogma of urban renewal no longer enjoyed universal 
acceptance and would undergo a major change in the eighties. In general, the 
nation no longer possessed the postwar sense of confidence that economic 
growth and a steady national purpose would set things right in the cities, the 
suburbs or elsewhere.20 
 
This uncertainty, and the resultant individual and collective retrenchment, is apparent 
in Richard Ford’s The Sportswriter (1986) and in the subsequent Frank Bascombe 
novels, and also in Chang-rae Lee’s A Gesture Life (1999) and Aloft (2004), whose 
narrator protagonists are detached and distant from others, yet present their 
disengaged alienation as a form of sovereign individualism, as a privileging of selfhood 
over interpersonal relations. Christopher Lasch sees such solipsistic withdrawal as an 
ongoing reaction to “the turmoil of the sixties,” following which Americans “retreated to 
purely personal preoccupations, and “having no hope of improving their lives 
…convinced themselves that what matters is psychic self-improvement.” Lasch argues 
that the “consciousness movement…arising out of a pervasive dissatisfaction with the 
quality of personal relations,” provided “self-defeating solutions” since it advised 
people “not to make too large an investment in love and friendship, to avoid excessive 
dependence on others.”21 The narrators of Ford’s and Lee’s novels are illustrative of 
the consequences of adopting such advice, in an environment that countenances an 
isolated, affectless disconnectedness.  
 
    Whilst in the 1990s and early twenty-first century Richard Ford and Chang-rae Lee 
continued to develop the existential novel of suburbia, this period also saw the re-
emergence, and dominance, of social critiques and satires of the suburbs, novels that 
                                               
19 Philip Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 65-66, p. 62. 
20 E.D. Berkowitz, Something Happened: A Political and Cultural Overview of the Seventies (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 226-227. 
21 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in An Age of Diminishing 
Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Ltd, 1979), p. 4, p. 27. 
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could be seen, in part at least, as updates of Sloan Wilson’s The Man in the Gray 
Flannel Suit.22 T.C. Boyle’s The Tortilla Curtain (1995), James Kaplan’s Two Guys 
From Verona: a novel of suburbia (1998), A.M. Homes’ Music for Torching (1999), 
Jonathan Franzen’s The Corrections (2001) and Freedom (2010), and Tom Perrotta’s 
Little Children (2004) and The Leftovers (2011), all offer social and political analyses 
of the state of the American Dream in late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-
century suburbia. Heather J. Hicks describes The Tortilla Curtain as “Boyles’s attempt 
to map the social dynamics between upper-middle-class Southern Californians and 
the illegal Mexican immigrants flooding into the Los Angeles area,” a novel “which 
satirically suffuses the Southern Californian landscape with whiteness,” Boyle’s aim 
being the “satirizing [of] white fears about being overtaken by nonwhite populations.”23 
In the novel Delaney Mossbacher reflects on his material comfort and security in a Los 
Angeles suburb, commenting that in “his exclusive private community in the hills, 
composed entirely of Spanish Mission-style homes with orange tile roofs…the children 
grew into bigots, the incomes swelled and the property values rose disproportionately,” 
while his wife Kyra observes that “everything [is] new out here, a burgeoning, bustling, 
mini-mall-building testimonial to white flight, the megalopolis encroaching on the 
countryside.”24 The couple want to believe they are different from their neighbours, 
and Delaney believes 
 
He…[isn’t] materialistic, not really, and he never bought anything on impulse, but 
when he did make a major purchase he felt good about it, good about himself, 
the future of the country and the state of the world. That was the American way. 
Buy something. Feel good. But he didn’t feel good, not at all. He felt like a 
victim.25  
 
    Kaplan’s modern morality tale sees a kind of reversal of fortune in which the far 
wealthier, highly materialistic and ostensibly better adjusted of the eponymous two 
guys, Will, inevitably loses everything, while the emotionally damaged, anti-
materialistic Joel, who works in a sandwich shop, ends up buying out the owner and 
                                               
22 Clearly, there are not two mutually exclusive sub-genres, the ‘existential suburban novel’ and the 
‘satirical suburban novel’, but the difference between the novels discussed in this study and the 
suburban social critiques of the 1990s and after (and their predecessors in the 1950s), is more than one 
of thematic emphasis; their understanding of the very meaning and significance of the suburbs is 
different, and their concerns are primarily existential, not sociological. 
23 Heather J. Hicks, ‘On Whiteness in T. Coraghessan Boyle’s The Tortilla Curtain’, Critique: Studies 
in Contemporary Fiction, 45:1, 43-64, 2003, p. 46, p. 60. 
24 T.C. Boyle, The Tortilla Curtain, 1995 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1997), p. 225, p. 336. 
25 Ibid. p. 149. 
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becoming a small businessman. Joel’s integrity ensures his eventual success; it is he 
and not Will who sees the insular uniformity of the suburbs, the “houses each with a 
world inside…subtle variations of the same world, a world built, essentially, around 
going out and coming back and watching TV.” Each “nothing little suburban side 
street,” he reflects, is “lined with postwar ticky-tack boxes, albeit boxes enjoying a 
certain amount of separation from each other.”26 In some ways less dramatic than the 
corrective in Boyle’s novel (which finishes with a landslide), the ending of Two Guys 
From Verona, like that of The Tortilla Curtain, provides a kind of moral resolution. 
Reviewing Kaplan’s novel for The Booklist in 1997, Donna Seaman suggests that 
although it “appears to be yet another dissection of suburban life and white male 
midlife crises…a closer reading reveals its depth and complexity”; its tone and intent 
is nonetheless primarily satirical, social commentary in the form of a “witty, sexy, and 
wise comedy of errors and corrections.”27 Tom Perrotta acknowledges this in his 
review for The New York Times, commenting that “as in any self-respecting suburban 
novel, the plot revolves around parties and adultery,” a description that could, 
ironically, also be applied to his own 2004 novel, Little Children, set in a Boston suburb, 
in which adulterous and deluded mother Sarah views herself as “a researcher studying 
the behavior of boring suburban women,” telling herself, “I am not a boring suburban 
woman myself.”28 Critical of the suburban conformism she has embraced, she 
distances herself from all the other people who “just fell in line like obedient little 
children, doing exactly what society expected of them at any given moment, all the 
while pretending that they’d actually made some kind of choice.”29 All of the other main 
characters are shown to be equally deluded “obedient little children” in one way or 
another, and each eventually faces some kind of crisis of self-belief as a result. Charles 
Taylor’s review of Perrotta’s novel for Salon magazine places it firmly in the category 
of satire, albeit “compassionate satire,” the novelist’s “take on the gnawing 
dissatisfactions of family life, the tyrannical control small kids exert over their 
parents.”30 It has also, though, been viewed as a revealing cultural critique; Charles 
Hatton considers it indicative of “cultural anxiety about the nature of masculine 
                                               
26 James Kaplan, Two Guys from Verona: A novel of suburbia (New York: Grove Press, 1998), p. 262, 
p. 5. 
27 Donna Seaman, ‘Review of Two Guys from Verona’, The Booklist, November 15, 1997; 94, 6; 
ProQuest, p. 541. 
28 Tom Perrotta, ‘The Boys in the Burbs’, The New York Times, February 22, 1998, accessed 27/03/16 
from: https://www.nytimes.com/books/98/02/22/reviews/980222.22perrott.html; Tom Perrotta, Little 
Children, 2004 (London: Allison and Busby Limited, 2006), p. 3. 
29 Tom Perrotta, Little Children, 2004 (London: Allison and Busby Limited, 2006), p. 9. 
30 Charles Taylor, ‘Review of Little Children’, April 15, 2004, Salon, accessed 27/03/16 from: 
http://www.salon.com/2004/04/15/perrotta_3/. 
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identity,” a narrative in which “contemporary gender redefinition and moral laxity are 
symbolically resolved through the ambivalent endorsement of an image of reactionary 
masculinity,” the novel’s “satiric distance” only serving to underscore its “moral 
didacticism.”31 Perrotta’s The Leftovers (2011), is also set in an affluent suburb (of 
New York not Boston), but it initially seems to be a departure from the themes and 
tone of Little Children, since it focuses on the aftermath of a seemingly random and 
inexplicable event (similar to the biblical ‘Rapture’ of Christian belief) in which millions 
of people worldwide simultaneously seem to ‘evaporate’, disappear into thin air, 
leaving no trace. The existential ramifications of this, however, are not Perrotta’s main 
concern; rather, as David L. Ulin observes in his review for the Los Angeles Times, he 
chooses to focus “more on the human story than the metaphysical, which is essentially 
beside the point.”32 Perrotta has protagonist Kevin Garvey reflect that, despite the 
enormity of the loss, “eventually people got tired of brooding about it. Time moved on, 
seasons changed, individuals withdrew into their private lives,” lives typically 
circumscribed by dull conformity, by “a shabby little place, a generic suburban box with 
a concrete stoop and a picture window to the left of the front door.”33 Ulin describes 
the novel as “vintage Perrotta” as it shows that “he's a satirist who likes to poke fun at 
the vagaries of contemporary life,” in this case, individual and collective cultural 
responses to “the idea of a Rapture that may not be the Rapture,” responses that 
include the adoption of new alliances and conformist group identities.34 More 
specifically, Stephen King views the depiction of “the slow, sad drift of this suburban 
world into various forms of cultic extremism as a response to upheaval” as “a metaphor 
for the social and political splintering of American society after 9/11,” again 
underscoring the social critique central to Perrotta’s novel.  
 
    Whilst A.M. Homes’ Music for Torching is dissimilar in its (near) grotesquery to 
Boyle’s, Kaplan’s and Perrotta’s novels, its critique of suburban conformity is similar, 
and familiar from the novels of the 1950s. Paul and Elaine Weiss are a disaffected 
couple living in a Westchester suburb; Paul inevitably commutes to New York and 
“every day he rides back and forth with the same people. He knows what towns they 
live in, what kinds of coats they wear, what they eat for breakfast, but he has no idea 
                                               
31 Charles Hatton, ‘Bad Mommies and Boy-Men: Postfeminism and Reactionary Masculinity in Tom 
Perrotta's Little Children’, Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, August 2010, 48:3, 230-249, p. 
236, p. 232. 
32 David L. Ulin, ‘Book review: The Leftovers by Tom Perrotta’, Los Angeles Times, September 11, 
2011. 
33 Tom Perrotta, The Leftovers, 2011 (London: Fourth Estate, 2012), p. 297, p. 284. 
34 David L. Ulin, ‘Book review: The Leftovers by Tom Perrotta’, Los Angeles Times, September 11, 
2011. 
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who they are.”35  In case we fail to see the intended satirical edge, Homes explains 
that  
 
Every morning the streets are filled with Pauls – scrubbed and polished men in 
thousand-dollar suits thinking they are something. One hundred thousand 
offices, a million window-less cubicles, creativity and commerce. The metropolis 
hums – sings of the spirit, of the romance of trade, of the glory of the great game 
– things bought and sold.36  
 
Despite the novel’s dramatic and violent ending (a siege at a school in which one of 
the couple’s sons is taken hostage and shot), it doesn’t depart significantly from the 
suburban novel as social commentary and satire. Mary Holland describes it as 
“postmodern realism”, in that “postmodern problems” of “an estranging culture” result 
in “narcissism, consumerism and media images” replacing “socially directed 
behaviours and qualities like responsibility and belief”; but Homes’ novel could equally 
be considered another morality tale, one in which, as Holland points out, “adults pay” 
for a fleetingly brief “transgressive freedom from the strictures of suburban life,” from 
its “numbing predictability and safety,” indicating the author’s “sentimental attachment 
to moral meaningfulness.”37 
 
    The title of Jonathan Franzen’s The Corrections makes clear its thematic 
preoccupations, and the correctives that occur in the novel are on a number of levels; 
economic, social, familial and personal, as it charts the impact of the ‘market 
corrective’ in the US at the end of the twentieth century, and its wider societal impact, 
exploring, as James Annesley notes, “the inter-relationships between private life and 
wider social and economic forces”, in a rather laboured and perhaps reductive critique 
that highlights, Annesley argues, “the hollow circularity of Franzen’s sociology.”38 More 
generous in her assessment of the novel, but discussing it in similarly sociological 
terms, Catherine Toal suggests that in The Corrections Franzen “explicitly theorizes 
the problem of critique and judgement in the relationship between individual 
                                               
35 A.M. Homes, Music for Torching, 1999 (London: Granta Books, 2006), p. 88. 
36 Ibid. p. 325. 
37 Mary Holland, ‘A Lamb in Wolf's Clothing: Postmodern Realism in A. M. Homes's Music for 
Torching and This Book Will Save Your Life’, Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 53:3, 214-
237, May 2012, p. 216, p. 217, p. 231. 
38 James Annesley, ‘Market Corrections: Jonathan Franzen and the “Novel of Globalization”’, Journal 
of Modern Literature, Vol. 29, No.2, ‘Making Corrections’ (Winter, 2006), pp. 111-128, p. 116, p. 
123. 
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(psychological) and cultural dysfunction.”39 It is not quite clear, however, what theory 
Franzen is propounding (unless positing the interconnectedness of individual and 
cultural neurosis and pathologies is a theory). What is clear is the satirical intent, 
though, as Andrew O’ Hehir notes in his review for Salon magazine, “Franzen’s 
handling of the book’s difficult narrative balance between satire and realism is not 
always graceful.”40 Franzen contrasts the older generation of Lamberts living in the 
fictional Midwestern suburb of St. Jude, with their adult children, all of whom live on 
the East Coast, and the oldest of whom, despite wanting, like both his siblings, to be 
a corrective to the Midwestern suburban culture of his parents, has established himself 
as an ostentatiously wealthy banker in the Philadelphia suburb of Chestnut Hill. Gary 
Lambert reassures himself that he has “a spring in his step”, has “an agreeable 
awareness of his above-average height” and “late-summer suntan,” whilst “his 
resentment of his wife” is “moderate and well contained.” He is chagrined, however, 
to see that “shoppers at the mall near his parents’ house had an air of entitlement 
offputtingly similar to his own, and the electronic consumer goods for sale in St. Jude 
were every bit as cool and powerful as those in Chestnut Hill.”41 Lambert’s attempt at 
a corrective, like those of other characters in the novel, is shown to be dubious and 
highly questionable.  
 
    If The Corrections is an overambitious attempt at a suburban state-of-the-nation 
novel, Franzen’s novelistic canvas is broader still in Freedom, which again focuses 
principally on a family from the Midwest, and, in charting the lives of two generations, 
as James Phelan comments, “connects their travails to the larger contemporary socio-
political history of the country.”42 As in The Corrections, Franzen draws parallels 
between socio-economic, familial and personal upheaval and turmoil, and so the novel 
is, as Sam Anderson suggests in his review for The New York Times Magazine, “a 
close cousin to The Corrections: a social-realist epic about a depressive, entropic 
Midwestern family being swallowed and digested by the insatiable anaconda of 
modernity,” one that is “heavy on psychology and extramarital affairs and earnest 
speechifying.”43 At the beginning of Freedom, we learn that Walter and Patty Berglund, 
living in Ramsey Hill, a formerly rundown urban part of the Minnesotan city of St. Paul, 
                                               
39 Catherine Toal, ‘Corrections: Contemporary American melancholy’, Journal of European Studies, 
33(3/4); 305-322, 2003, p. 311. 
40 Andrew O’ Hehir, ‘The Corrections by Jonathan Franzen’, Salon, September 7, 2001, accessed 
12/04/16 from: http://www.salon.com/2001/09/07/franzen_2/. 
41 Jonathan Franzen, The Corrections, 2001 (London: Fourth Estate, 2002), p. 160, p. 226. 
42 James Phelan, Reading the American Novel 1920-2010 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 238. 
43 Sam Anderson, ‘The Precisionist’, The New York Times Magazine, August 12, 2010, accessed 
09/04/16 from: http://nymag.com/arts/books/reviews/67497/index1.html. 
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and now a gentrified suburb, had bought their Victorian house before gentrification 
occurred, intending to “relearn certain life skills” that Patty’s parents had “fled to the 
suburbs specifically to unlearn.” The life skills to be relearned include “how to protect 
a bike from a motivated thief, and when to bother rousting a drunk from your lawn 
furniture, and how to encourage feral cats to shit in somebody else’s children’s 
sandbox.” Now though, such skills are hardly necessary in affluent, suburbanised 
Ramsey Hill, and Patty Berglund’s lifestyle is not so different from that of her parents. 
On seeing the impoverished conditions in which Walter grew up in Hibbing, Minnesota, 
however, Patty acknowledges that they are “indeed a long way from Westchester,” 
from her “previously invisible world of…suburban privilege,” causing her to have “an 
unexpected pang of homesickness.”44 Patty’s guilt about her suburban privileges is 
equalled only by Walter’s anger about “how crowded the exurbs are already,” and 
about “the traffic and sprawl, and the environmental degradation, and the dependence 
on foreign oil,” despite which he decides to live in an exclusive suburban housing 
development named Canterbridge Estates when separated from her, and, following 
their reconciliation, the Berglunds become an exemplary suburban couple. They 
“hosted several barbeques and were much sought after socially in return” but Patty 
finally decides to return to her prestigious job, and the novel ends with the couple’s 
imminent move to New York, and, presumably, yet another suburb.45 
 
    All of these novels share a thematic concern with social critique, with the specific 
cultural, political and socio-economic circumstances in which they were written, and 
which form their subject matter. What distinguishes the novels discussed in this study 
from such fiction is their preoccupation with much broader, if not universal, 
philosophical questions about the nature of human existence – with what constitutes 
being, selfhood and identity, with the mutability of character, and if such a concept is 
really chimeric, with teleology, and the possibility that there is no directional purpose 
or inherent meaning in human societal development. To be sure, these novels were 
no less products of their time and culture, but it was, after the end of World War Two 
and the entrenchment of the Cold War, a time and (literary) culture that foregrounded 
such questions in its discourse, with the 1960s constituting what Mark Greif calls “a 
big bang for the intellectual and literary history of the twentieth century.” Sartrean 
philosophy was perhaps the most important of the “individual pieces rocketing apart” 
in the big bang, and afterglow, of what Greif calls “the discourse of the crisis of man,” 
                                               
44 Jonathan Franzen, Freedom (London: Fourth Estate, 2010), p. 4, p. 125. 
45 Ibid. p. 220, p. 561. 
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a discourse concerned with “totalitarianism, Enlightenment, universalism, 
existentialism, human rights, relativism, Cold War unity, technology, and critique.”46 
Indeed, Being and Nothingness and Sartre’s later works address all of these concerns 
and ideas, explicitly or implicitly. This may be why Sartre had, briefly, such a marked 
influence on US literature, at a time when seismic societal changes occurred, amongst 
them the demographic upheaval that the advent of mass suburbia caused, and the 
insular isolationism that suburbanisation came to represent. Greif suggests that in the 
US, between the early 1950s and 1970s there was a “phase of philosophical demand 
and rethinking, turning inward toward America,” a trend that is certainly apparent in 
existentialist suburban fiction, though, almost paradoxically, such fiction also 
addresses universal themes, an incongruity that seems to have heightened its literary 
impact.47 In November 2014, following the publication of Let Me Be Frank With You, 
John Banville, in an article for The Guardian on the four Frank Bascombe novels, 
described Richard Ford, seemingly oxymoronically, as “a relaxed existentialist,” one 
who “recognises the essentially contingent and slippery nature of our being here,” and 
whilst contingency is certainly central to the Bascombe novels, Ford’s authorial voice 
suggests calm forbearance more than relaxed acceptance, surely a necessity over the 
three decades in which he has presented his existentialist vision in and of suburbia.48 
It seems unlikely that any current or future novelists of the suburbs will have such a 
vision of this mutable, liminal environment, one in which existential anxieties and 
concerns, highlighted by Ford, Heller, Updike, and other late twentieth-century 
authors, have been elided in favour of those that are, perhaps, more easily explicated 
and understood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
46 Mark Greif, The Age of the Crisis of Man: Thought and Fiction in America, 1933-1973 (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015), p. xiii, p. xi. 
47 Ibid. p. 16. 
48 John Banville, ‘John Banville celebrates Richard Ford’s Bascombe books: the story of an American 
Everyman’, The Guardian, November 8th 2014, accessed 15/05/16 from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/nov/08/john-banville-richard-ford-bascombe-novels. 
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